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Summary
Labour relations in the West German and British chemical industries 
are investigated by means of a comparative em piricial research  design 
incorporating surveys of primary and secondary sou rces, unstructured 
focused interviews and a questionnaire survey. It was hypothesised that 
the technology, industrial organisation and economic development of the 
chemical industry significantly influence the practice of labour relations 
in the industry. However, other factors including political and legislative 
developments and management policies were also found to have a 
considerable influence on chemical industrial relations. Hence, no 
simple statement of the main factors which affect labour relations in 
chemicals is possible although the initial hypothesis was confirmed.
The study concentrates upon an investigation of labour relations in the 
West German chemical industry. Particular emphasis is given to 
analysis of collective bargaining and workplace industrial relation s, the 
latter based prim arily on case study information. In addition, the 
development and current role of management, trade unions and 
employers' associations active in chemicals is investigated. Furtherm ore, 
the structure of the chemical industry and the importance of 
co-determination in this industry is reviewed.
In Part Two, this analysis forms the basis for the comparison of labour 
relations in the West German and British chemical industries. The 
following conclusions emerge from this comparison:
Ill
1. Chemical labour relations are characterised in both countries by- 
effective joint regulatory disputes procedures which contribute 
to the low incidence of official and unofficial stoppages.
2. Union organisation is generally weak, particularly at the workplace, 
unless management policies and state intervention provide support 
for the unions.
3 . The state has played a crucial role in the development of chemical 
labour relations in both countries.
4 . Management policies have until recently displayed remarkable 
sim ilarities.
In conclusion, general hypotheses on chemical labour relations are
developed.
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Introduction *
The chemical industry i s  perhaps the most important industry in the
West German economy. Although such a claim cannot be made in
B rita in , the chemical industry is  nevertheless one of the fa s te s t  
(2)growing se c to rs . In 1977 i t  accounted for 5,6  per cent of to ta l 
manufacturing sa le s^ ^ w h ils t in 1978 11.2 per cent of to ta l  exports 
and 6 per cent of manufacturing employment were a ttrib u tab le  to the 
chemical i n d u s t r y . I n  the same year the 'West German chemical 
industry was responsible for 11.2 per cent of to ta l in d u stria l turn­
over, 15 *6  per cent of exports but only 7*5 Pe^ cent of manufacturing
(5)employment.
Why then, i f  the chemical industry is  so important to the economies 
of both countries, have the in d u stria l re la tio n s of th is  industry 
received rather l i t t l e  academic a tte n tio n ? ^ ^  The most obvious 
answer to th is  question may probably be found in the re la tiv e ly
Chapter I.
1. Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, Rahmenbedingungen der 
T a r ifp o lit ik , Band 2, Strukturdaten der M etallverarbeitenden. 
der Chemischen und der Druckindustrie, Frankfurt/IIew York.
1979, p .296.
2. C. G ill , R. Morris and J .  Eaton, In d u stria l Relations in the 
Chemical Industry♦ Farnborough, 1978, p.XV.
3. Personal communication from Mr. Egerton, Annual Census of 
Production, Newport, 7*9*1979, o®  ca lcu la tio n s.
4« Trade and Industry, V o l.36, No.3, 20*7*1979, p*148ff and CSO, 
Monthly Digest of S t a t i s t i c s . No.402, June 1979, p . l l8 ,  own 
ca lcu la tio n s•
5* A rbeitsring der Arbeitgeberverbande der Beutschen Chemischen 
Industrie e.V (A rb eitsrin g ), Zahlen zur S o z ia lp o litik  in der 
chemischen In d u strie , 10th Revised Edition, Wiesbaden, 1979,
• p .42. (cited  h ereafter as Zahlen zur S o z ia lp o lit ik , 1979)*
6. U ntil recen tly  the major exception to th is  was P.C. Verma, 
Labour Relations and In d u stria l Organisation in the B ritish
Chemical Industry, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Manchester, 
1966.
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dispute free nature of labour re la tio n s in the chemical in d u stry .w 
Academic atten tion  in B rita in  has more tra d itio n a lly  been focused on 
indu stries which have been more affected  by str ik e  action such as 
coal mining, ^^motor vehicle p ro d u c tio n a n d  engineering.^10  ^ In 
the Federal Republic in d u stria l re la tio n s does not e x is t as a subject 
in i t s  own r ig h t, although a v ariety  of so c io lo g ists  such as Bergmann, 
Hartmann and Jacobi work within th is  area.
These fa c to rs , together with the absence of an academic comparison^11  ^
of in d u stria l re la tio n s in the West German and B r itish  chemical in ­
d u stries , were the i n i t i a l  reasons for se lectin g  th is  topic of research . 
Another reason was a b e lie f  that crossnational comparisons of in d u stria l 
re la tio n s could lead to a b e tte r  understanding of the su b ject.
Furthermore, the author's background and experience in the chemical 
industry was p a rticu la rly  b e n e fic ia l w hilst carrying out the study.
7 . This topic is  discussed in d e ta il below, p a rticu la rly  in Chapter 7*
8. o f . W.H. S c o tt, E . Mumford, I .C . McGivering and J.M . Kirby, Coal 
and C o n flic t ; a Study of In d u stria l Relations at C o lle r ie s , 
Liverpool, 1963.
9« c f . H.A. Turner, G. Clack and G. Roberts, Labour Relations in the 
Motor Industry. London, 19&7 anc^  Beynon, Working for Ford, 
Harmondsworth, 197 3•
10. A .I .  Marsh, In d u stria l Relations in Engineering, Oxford and 
London, 1965*
11. A team of trade union o ff ic e rs  and managers did carry out a 
comparative study of in d u stria l re la tio n s and productivity in 
the chemicals in du stries in the UK, France, Germany and Holland 
during the early  1 9 7 0 ' s .  Whilst providing a useful factu al 
guide, the report did not do the subject matter ju s t ic e .
c f . Chemicals EEC, Chemicals Manpower in Europe, London, 1973.
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duction site of one of the three major West German chemical companies
(12 )as a part of his first degree which was primarily in chemistry. 1 
This experience provided a practical grasp of industrial relations 
in this type of environment and it has proved invaluable as an aid 
to understanding labour relations in the chemical industry in general.
A study of industrial relations in the chemical industry possesses 
certain advantages for the researcher because it has enjoyed a stable 
economic background and is a prime example of a high technology in­
dustry. Since these conditions are common to both Britain and West 
Germany, it should be possible to draw some conclusions about their 
influence on industrial relations within different national environ­
ments •
The lack of research into industrial relations within the chemical
industry was apparently'conspicuous to a number of other authors,
for during the course of the study, several publications have
appeared on the subject. The most noteworthy of these in English
is Gill and his colleagues * study of industrial relations in the
British chemical industry which demonstrates clearly the significance
(13)of government intervention«N Two other recent studies by
12. Combined Honours Studies in Chemistry (60+) and German 
language with Regional Studies (407’). Part of the regional 
studies programme was devoted to industrial relations. In
this way, the necessary linguistic skills were gained to 
carry out the research as was an ability to understand the
technical nature of the industry.
The author spent one year working in a laboratory on the main oro-
13. Gill e t a l ., 00.cit.
Theo Nichols in collaboration with Armstrong and Beynon are of particular 
relevance to this investigation since they were carried out in similar 
factories to those used here for the case study investigations. 1^4^
In West Germany, a number of recent publications have also been added
to Filrstenberg's classic study concerning the social conditions of
( 1 5 )the lives of chemical v^orkers.v These studies include Dzielak
et alfs analysis of the 1971 strike in the chemical industry^ 1^^ and
the work of the Pro.jektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung based at the
(17 )Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt• '
The study has a number of primary aims. It attempts to provide ex­
planations for the basic characteristics of industrial relations in 
the West German chemical industry and to compare these explanations 
with the situation in the British chemical industry. In this way an 
endeavour is made to provide a more general interpretation of in­
dustrial relations in the chemical industry.
(i) Definitions and Terminology.
It has so far been assumed that there is no difficulty in defining 
either the ohemical industry or indeed what is meant by industrial
14* T. Nichols and P. Armstrong, Workers Divided! a Study of Shop- 
floor Politics, London, 1976 and T. Nichols and H. Beynon,
Living with Capitalism: Glass relations in the Modern Factory. 
London, 1977*
15* F. Furstenberg, Die S'oziallage der Chemiearbeiter, Neuweid and 
Berlin, 1969.
16. W. Dzielak, W. Hindrichs, H. Martens, V. Stanislawski and W. 
Was-sermann, Belegschaften und Gewerkschaft in Streik, Frankfurt, 
197$.
17. Amongst others this research group includes Otto Jacobi and 
Walter Muller-Jentsch and has published regularly on the 
chemical industry since 19 7 7•
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terms•
In 1958 Reddaway noted some reasons for the difficulties which arise in
/ TO \
finding a generally acceptable definition for the chemical industry. '  
Amongst others he named the diversity of goods produced*'20^ and the fact 
that some of these products are really intermediatary materials for the 
production of others. If anything, these problems have increased in 
the twenty years which have passed since then. Furthermore, inter­
national concepts of the industry also vary and since this study is a 
comparison between the two countries additional difficulties arise.
It might seem logical to attempt to define the industry according to
( 2 1 )the scientific methods used.' ' However, all industries which employ
chemical reactions cannot be considered to be a part of the chemical
industry. An example may be provided by the production of iron from
iron ore, which, although a chemical processes very rarely considered
( 2 2 )a part of the chemical industry.
In general, two types of approach are taken to delimit the chemical 
industry in both Britain and Germany. The first relies on confining
1 8 . Although "industrial relations" is generally used here, "labour 
relations" is used occasionally for stylistic relief. No parti­
cular significance should be attributed to the particular term 
used in specific circumstances as it is assumed that they have 
equivalent meanings•
19. W.B. Reddaway, "The Chemical Industry" in D. Burns (ed.), The 
Structure of British Industry, A Symposium, Vol.l, 1958? p.2l8f.
20. On this subject cf. P.C. Verma, op.oit., p.l8ff.
21. cf. Ibid♦, p.l5f and A. Reichl, Chemische Industrie und Chemie-^  
auss en—.hande1, Doctoral Thesis, Ludwigshafen am Rhein, 1957?
p.Iff. This latter work provides a very complete discussion of 
the scope of the chemical industry from a German point of view.
22. Verma cites two incidences of this. P.C. Verma, op.oit., p.16.
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(18}relations. In fact, there are a variety of understandings of both
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the industry to a number of areas such as "heavy chemicals, industrial
( 2 3 )explosives, plastics and synthetic resins."' ' This is a very narrow
definition which has no equivalent in Germany, since pharmaceuticals,
paints, detergents, photographic chemicals and cosmetics, etc. have
been included in a narrow definition. The second approach is to
include a large number of associated industries within the scope of
the chemical industry. Examples of these industries are glass, cement,
( 2 5 )ceramics, fermentation and tanning.
The definitions which have been chosen hy relevant institutions such as 
the Chemical Industries Association, the German Chemical Employers' Fed­
eration and the statistical offices in both countries all vary. The CIA 
takes a very narrow definition since separate JIC's exist for paints,
soap, candle and edible fats. Taking this definition about 270 000
( 2 6 )employees are covered by the CIA. ' The German employers, on the other 
hand, take a very wide definition which corresponds to that for the
( 2 7 )chemical insurance society and which covers over 87O 000 employees.
23* Association of British Chemical Manufacturers, Report on the Chemical 
Industry, 1949> P»5« This seems to be the origin of the approach 
taken by the Chemical Industries Association (CIA). Interview MAN 9? 
Dec.*77• (The interview coding system is explained below).
11 ft
24* R. Fricke, Uber das Wesen der Chemie und ihre Bedeutung fur Volk und 
Vollcswirtschaft, Stuttgart, 1936, p.4f*
2 5. Ibid. and S. Miall, A History of the British Chemical Industry. 
London, 1931. This reflects approximately the organisa­
tional area of the Industrial Union of Chemical, Paper and 
Ceramics Workers.
26. Interview MAN 9? Dec.'77 • Separate negotiations still take place 
for general workers in the Chemical and Allied (Heavy Chemicals) 
and Drug and Fine Chemicals areas. Gill et al., ot> .cit., p. 9f •
27* Interview ER 8, Sep.'77 and Berufsgenossensohaft der chemischen
Industrie, Jahresbericht '771 no place (Heidelberg), no date (1978), 
p.lSf. A wide definition of the industry is also used for collective 
agreements covering the 'West German Chemical Industry, cf. IG 
Chemie-Papier-Keramik (IG Chemie), Manteltarifvertrag fur gewer- 
bliche Arbeitnehmer und Angestellte in der chemisohen Industrie vom 
22. Februar 1973 in der Fassung vom 1. Mai 1978? Para 1 (3),
Damnover 1978, p.6ff.
Official statistics offices in both Britain and West Germany have taken 
positions which fall between these two extremes. The Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) revised in 1968 and used by the Department of Trade 
and Industry for the annual Census of Production is perhaps the most 
useful definition for the U.K. since most statistics are hased on it. 
Order V in the SIC, Chemicals and Allied Industries as the group is 
called, covered 431 000 employees in 1978^ ®^ and the table below shows 
its breakdown into 18 industrial sectors.
Table 1.1.
( 2 9 )Chemicals and Allied Industries - Order V '
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Minimum
List Heading___________ Sector
271 General Chemicals
.1 Inorganic chemicals and gases
.2 Organic chemicals
.3 Other chemicals
272 Pharmaceutical Chemicals and Preparations
273 Toilet Preparations
274 Paint
275 Soap and Detergents
276.1 Synthetic resins and plastics materials
.2 Synthetic rubber
277 Dyestuffs and Pigments
278 Fertilizers
279 Other Chemical Industries
.1 Polishes
.2 Formulated adhesives, gelatine, etc.
.3 Explosives and fireworks
.4 Formulated pesticides, etc.
•5 Printing ink
.6 Surgical bandages, eto.
.7 Photographic chemical materials
In West Germany a similar definition is used but it includes synthetic
28. Trade and Industry, 00 .cit.
29. CSO, Standard Industrial Classification, 3rd Edition, London,
1968, pp.11-12.
( 3 1 JIn 1978 this definition covered 565 700 employees.
fibres, as indeed does the Standard International Classification.^0 ^
It can be concluded that official statistics on the chemical industry
are fairly comparable for West Germany and the United Kingdom and
for this reason these classifications will generally be used for the
( 3 2 )purpose of statistical comparison.N ' The diversity of industries 
with an enormous number of goods produced by many different processes 
presents problems, however, for the choice of an appropriate research 
design to study the industry. The solution used in this case is 
discussed below. The variations in the definitions of the chemical 
industry employed particularly by organisations involved in industrial 
relations should nevertheless be borne in mind.
Professor Hugh Clegg has recently discussed the meaning of the term 
"industrial relations" and the significance of ideological standpoints 
on it.^ ^  He comes to the conclusion that the selection of either 
Marxist or pluralist approaches does not necessarily mean that differen* 
answers are arrived at. This analysis seems to provide a working basis 
and Clegg’s definition of the study of industrial relations being con­
cerned with "the rules which government employment"or as Flanders
(35)put it, "the institutions of job regulation", 'might be accepted as
30. Reprinted in OECD, The Chemical Industry 1976, 1978, pp.51-55*
31. Zahlen zur S'ozialpolitik, 1979? op *cit», p.7*
32. However, in a recent German publication, a definition excluding 
synthetic fibres was chosen and data from this source will also 
be used for comparative purposes, of. Projektgruppe Gewerk- 
schaftsforschung, Band 2, 1979? op.cit., p.295*
33. H.A. Clegg, The Changing System of Industrial Relations in Great 
Britain, Oxford, 1979? P P *446-456.
34* Ibid., The System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain, 3rd 
Edition, Oxford, 1976, p.l.
35* A. Flanders, Industrial Relations: What is wrong with the System?, 
London, 1965? p«10.
useful in the context of this research project.
Any comparative study of aspects of countries in which different languages 
are spoken is hound to be fraught with terminological difficulties. In 
order to make this study as accessible as possible to readers who are 
not totally familiar with West German or British industrial relations 
a glossary of standard translations' yhas been included to aid com­
prehension. In addition, quotations from German publications have been 
translated and the original text has been included in a footnote.
It should perhaps be added that a considerable amount was learnt in the
field of terminology by the author during-the course of his investigations.
As a result of some initial misconceptions, respondents occasionally
( 3 7 )understood questions in ways which were not intended, 1'but this did 
not pose a serious problem since it was obvious from their answers• In 
such cases, more precise questions could then be put in order to gain the 
information required. A consideration of this type of problem leads on 
naturally to the next section, in which the research methods chosen are 
discussed.
(ii) Research methods.
Some indication of the difficulties involved in selecting an appropriate
36. These translations are mostly those in general use although some
revisions of common translations have been made by the author in
the light of his experience and to suit their applicability to 
the chemical industry.
37* Some examples of those terms which created "problems" (a word which
incidentally was unacceptable to a large number of respondents)
are discussed in a variety of places below. Also translation of 
the term "industrial relations" created particular difficulties. 
Eventually "Arbeitgeber- und Arbeitnehmerverhffltnisse" was decided 
upon but it was clumsy and not understood by all respondents. No 
German term is in common usage but with hindsight "Arbeitsbezie- 
hungen" would be chosen, cf. K. von Beyme, Gewerkschaften und 
Arbeitsbeaiehungen in kapitalitisohen Landern, Munchen, 19771
p.l2ff.
/ tO\
research designv 'has been given above. To recapitulate, a research 
design was required which would enable a single investigator with 
limited resources in terms of finance and time to study industrial 
relations in the chemical industries of both West Germany and the 
United Kingdom. These industries are extremely diverse, they produce 
enormous numbers of very different goods using a large variety of 
production processes and which employ together approximately one million 
people•
It was decided to limit the areas of industrial relations covered to 
the most important. Particular emphasis was given in the empirical 
investigations to collective bargaining at its various levels, to 
the trade unions and employers ’ associations active in the chemical 
industry, and to a study of workplace industrial relations. Con­
sideration was also given to the influence of legislation on industrial 
relations, particularly within those areas listed above.
The approach chosen concentrated on two main empirical methods. On
the one hand, in order to investigate the roles of trade unions,
employers’ associations, their relations and the practice of collective
bargaining a series of experts were selected and interviewed by use
(39 )of an informal focused interview technique, whilst workplace
38. A useful review of this subject may be foimd in J.A. Black and 
D.J. Champion, Methods and Issues in Social Research. New York, 
1976, pp.75-121.
39* C.A. Mo.ser and G. Kalton, Survey Methods in Social Investigation. 
2nd Edition, London, 1971? p.296ff and E.K. Scheuch, MDas 
Interview in der Sozialforschung", in R. Ivonig (ed.), Handbuch 
der enroirischen Sozialforschung, Band 2, Grundlegende Methoden 
und Techniken der empirischen Sozialforsohung, Erster Teil,
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3rd Revised and Extended Edition, Stuttgart, 1973, p.l21ff.
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relations were investigated primarily by the use of case studies 
supported by visits to a number of major companies. These investi­
gations are discussed below.
Informal focused interviews allow the respondents a good deal of freedom, 
are ideal for gaining detailed information and are much more likely to 
lead to unknown facts than highly structured interviews. 4^0^ At the 
same time, use of an interview schedule ensures that all the topics 
are covered and this should provide reasonably comparable data of 
known validity and acceptable reliability.^41^
These interviews were normally conducted with only one respondent 
present although occasionally this was not possible since senior 
officials insisted on a protege” being present. It was considered 
impolitic for the interviewer to object greatly to this for fear of 
prejudicing the willingness of respondents to take part in the survey. 4^^  
The length of the interviews which were usually recorded on cassette
/  A 1 'I
tapes varied considerably according to the situation, the re­
sponsiveness of the respondent and the actual interview schedule being 
used.^ 44^  Nevertheless, it can be said that the interviews generally
40. The relative advantages of the two types of approach are discussed 
in more detail in J. Galtung, Theory and Methods of Social Research. 
London, 19^ 7? p.ll8ff.
41. Both these factors are discussed in detail by Black and Champion, 
op.cit., pp.222-261.
42. of. J. Galtung, op .cit., p.l62f.
43* On three occasions only was permission to record the interview 
refused, twio.e in Germany and once in the U.K. On two further 
occasions tape recorder failure necessitated a reversion to 
note-taking, as did technical conditions beyond the interviewer's 
control such as background noise on three oocasions.
44* A number of phases of interviews were used, see below. A
selection of interview schedules are reproduced in Appendix 2.2.
lasted between forty-five minutes and three hours, although on one 
notable occasion an interview lasted six hours excluding interruptions. 
Although there are certain dangers attendant upon lengthy interviews - 
increase in errors by respondents with time *^ -^ a great deal of 
valuable information was nevertheless gained by allowing the respondents 
to answer questions fully and to elaborate with examples if they so 
desired. Since interviewers are more prone to tiredness than re­
spondents,^ 4®^  ready check on this source of errors is provided by 
the interviewer himself.
All interviews were conducted by the author so the problems 
interviewer variability were eliminated. Although the author had
no formal training in interviewing, several standard w o rk s\-jere 
studied before the major rounds of interviews were attempted. In 
this way it was hoped to at least keep the errors as a result of 
interviewing to an acceptable minimum •
The empirical investigations in the United Kingdom were carried out 
over a period of two years as appointments could be gained with the 
desired respondents, whilst in Germany it was necessary to concentrate 
as many interviews as possible into a short period in order to justify 
the high costs of a visit. A series of visits to Germany were made
- 12 -
45. Moser and Kalton, on.oit., p.390 and Black and Champion, op.cit*, 
p.254f•
46.' E.K. Scheuch, o p  .cit., p.93*
47* cf.* Black and Champion, op .cit., p. 372.
48. Particularly E.K. Scheuch, op.cit., and Moser and Kalton, 
op .cit., pp.270-301.
4 9* Further discussion of the limitations of the research design 
and possible sources of error may be found below.
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during the course of the study. Although the research was carried out 
to a certain extent concurrently in both countries, for simplicity's 
sake, a detailed breakdown of the interviews will be given separately, 
commencing with the United Kingdom.
It was decided early in the study to concentrate investigations on West 
Germany since much less had been published on industrial relations in 
the chemical industry or generally than in the United Kingdom. The 
interviews carried out in this country were designed to provide fiirther
insights to the published material and to clarify certain specific
• + (50)points.
A total of ten respondents were interviewed in this way, covering the
( 5 1 )
six largest trade unions in the chemical industry 'and the Chemical 
Industries Association. The respondents were mainly the national trade 
union officers or their assistants and on the employers’ side, a senior 
executive was interviewed.
Due to the relatively small number of interviews carried out in the
( 5 2 )U.K.  ^ 'the interviews are coded simply into two groups, with no 
differentiation between the respondents questioned on workplace or more 
general industrial relations issues. Trade union respondents are coded 
TU followed by a number (l to 15) and the approximate date. Management 
and employers’ respondents are coded similarly with the prefix MAN and
50. The high percentage of interviews dealing with workplace industrial 
relations (64/0 also reflects the greater importance of this area 
of industrial relations in the United Kingdom.
51. TGWU, GMWU, USDAW, A (JEW, EETPU, ASTMS.
52. See the discussion of the case studies below.
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numbers ranging from 1 to 13.
A total of four research trips were made to West Germany. The primary
(53)aim of the initial visit' 'was to establish contacts with a number of 
relevant organisations such as trade unions, employers' organisations 
and statistical offices. A collection of primary source material was 
also made to aid preparation for the second visit which was the first 
phase of a survey of trade unions and employers' associations as well 
as to establish contacts with a number of chemical companies to explore 
the possibility of case study investigations and to gain background 
information on workplace industrial relations. This is discussed in 
more detail below. A short third visit was carried out to pre-test 
questionnaires for a survey of conciliation and arbitration^4  ^in the 
chemical industry. Finally, during the last visit the conciliation and 
arbitration survey was completed and the case study investigations were 
carried out.
( 5 5 )
In all, twenty eight trade union representatives and fourteen officials 
from the chemical employers' were interviewed. The German trade union 
respondents are coded with the letters FTO, a number (l to 28) and the
53* Dates of the visits xvere :
(a) March 1977 (bir weeks)
(b) August-September 1977 (2 months)
(c) February 1978 (l week)
(d) October-November 1978 (2 months)
54* These investigations were carried out as part of a comparative in­
vestigation of conciliation and arbitration in the U.K. and West 
Germany which was financed by the Federal Trust for Education and 
Research. The author was requested to carry out a survey of the 
situation in the West German chemical industry. This opportunity 
to study in more detail these two features which are central issues 
both in collective bargaining and workplace industrial relations 
was greatly appreciated. (Report forthcoming).
55* Thirteen full-time officers and the chairman of a variety of
collective bargaining committees who might be classified a lay 
official•
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approximate date, whilst the employers’ respondents have ER, a number 
(l to 1 4 ) and the date.
No attempt at random selection of these respondents was made. They 
were chosen as a result of their function so that as much of their 
respective organisations could be covered as possible (purposive 
sampling). The table below shows the percentages of the various types 
of officials covered on the trade union side.
Table 1.2.
Percentages of Trade Union Officials Interviewed.^ "^ ^
Total Interviewed
Official__________________ Number______Number____ Percentage
Chemical Workers’ Union:
National Executive Officers 8 2 25*0
Regional Secretaries 8 5(57 ) 62.5
Regional Officials 37 5 13*5
District Secretaries and 
Officials 152 7 4.6
Head Office Officials 69 4 5.8
Officials of other Trade 5
Unions
Total CWU 274 23 8.4
A small number of officials were interviewed on several occasions
social contacts also provided the opportunity for a large number of 
informal discussions which greatly increased the author’s insight
5 6. The percentages are calculated according to the number of 
officials on 31.12.1975* OS 72-75? op .oit., p«343.
57* One Regional Secretary interviewed has subsequently been 
elected onto the National Executive.
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into the workings of the Chemical Workers' Union. A good coverage of 
the trade union regions was achieved, for interviews were held with 
officials from 87.5 per cent of the regions covering 90.2 per cent of
/ r Q \
members in employment. Due to the much larger number of districts
the same sort of coverage could not be achieved, although officials
were interviewed, in 10.4 per cent of districts covering 24.5 per cent
( 5 9 )of members in employment. J J
As far as the Chemical Employers' Associations were concerned, inter­
views were held with representatives of the national organisation (3 ) 
and with officials from six out of twelve regional employers' assoc­
iations which nevertheless covered 84*5 Pe^  cent of employees working 
for chemical companies organised in employers' associations.^ *®0^
In this way it was hoped to cover as much of the chemical industry as 
possible. However, since the larger and more important regions, 
districts and associations were selected it is possible that industrial 
relations in the smaller, less important regions, often containing much 
smaller companies are under-represented, Some balance has perhaps been 
achieved, however, by carrying out the case study investigations on 
smaller sites. It is to a discussion of the case studies that we now 
turn.
It was decided that a case study approach^ ®1 w^ould be the most appropriate
58. Ibid., pp. 29 2-4 ? own calculations.-
59• Ibid. Six large districts and one very small one were visited.
60. Zahlen zur Sozialoolitik, 1979? on .cit., p. 6 , own calculations.
61. cjf. Black and Champion, op .cit., p.89ff.
Some major advantages of this method are flexibility in data collection
/ go ^
methods, 'the ability to study a su.bject in depth and the suitability 
of case studies for the generation and testing of hypotheses on the 
operation of workplace industrial relations in the chemical industry 
which were some of the major aims of the study. The major dis­
advantage is, of course, the lack of generalisability of the data, 
and this, given the disparate nature of the chemical industry, does 
limit the applicability of the findings considerably. It had initially 
been hoped to carry out a series of case studies to reduce this problem, 
but as will be explained, circumstances made this impossible.
In order to compare workplace industrial relations in the West German 
and British chemical industries, similar plants^4\<rere required in both 
countries. By searching the production statistics of individual chemicals 
in various production locations in both countries it was possible to
draw up fourteen pairs of plants where similar processes were used to 
produce similar tonnages per annum of particular chemicals.
The size range of the companies producing these chemicals varied con­
-  17 -
in order to study workpls.ce industrial relations in both countries.
62. Some of the methods used included informal focused interviews, 
structured interviews, observation and documentary analysis.
These types of method have recently been recommended. G. Cole 
and R. Stuart-Kotze, "Employee attitude surveys - a neglected 
technique," Optimum, Vol.10, No.l, 1979? p.22.
63. On this type of study of. N. Lin, Foundations of Social Research, 
New York, 1976, p.l42f.
64. In the chemical industry a plant is generally a single production 
unit for the production of e.g. sulphuric acid. Plants are grouped 
together into works, factories, or sometimes on a site. On 
matching techniques of. Moser and Kalton, op .cit., p.220ff.
65. Chemical Bata Services, Chemical Plant Bata Book, London, 
no date (under constant revision)•
- 18 -
siderably in both countries from approximately 1000 up to the largest
companies in the industry. The chemicals covered a number of sectors,
but were classified primarily in the general chemicals (both inorganic
and organic) sector together with fertilizers and plastics materials.
It is recognised that these sectors form the heavy chemicals end of
the industry and that the fine chemicals sectors such as pharmaceuticals,
toiletries, etc., have been ignored generally as far as a direct study
of workplace industrial relations is concerned. Since these sectors
often use batch processes, and relations are commonly different under 
/ \
these conditions' 'this represents a -weakness of the study which was 
caused by chance and which due to limitations of resources and manpower 
could not be rectified later.
The list of plants and companies was used to explore the possibility 
of carrying out case study investigations and to gain understanding and 
background information on workplace industrial relations in the chemical 
industry by holding interviews with plant and personnel managers on the 
one hand and works councillors and shop steward convenors on the other-.
In general, the German companies were very helpful and forthcoming? 
several of them agreed in principle that it would be permissible to 
carry out a case study on their premises. However, the British com­
panies were far less co-operative. The refusal of one very major British 
chemical company to have anything to do with the study eliminated a high
66. Several respondents stressed the differences, e.g. Interviews 
TU 9, Feb.*78 and TU 14, June ’78.
( Sr,\
percentage of the possible pairs of plants. J Eventually provisional 
permission to carry out case studies was received from two British 
companies. The- corresponding German firms were approached and one case 
study was carried out at Agrochemie AG.^ ®8^
It proved impossible to carry out the second study to the scope which 
would have justified classification as a case study, since the climate 
of industrial relations in the company was marked by a feeling of in­
security on the part of the workforce as a result of the fact that the 
investigations were preceded by a considerable drop in the international 
value of the dollar and the company concerned is owned by an American 
Corporation. A limited number of personnel managers and works councillors 
were interviewed together with one production manager, but these inter­
views have subsequently been classified together with those providing 
background information on workplace industrial relations.
On the author's return to the United Kingdom, similar problems were 
experienced with Growmore Ltd. Industrial relations in the works 
intended for investigation had become very sensitive due to the intro­
duction of a productivity agreement. Senior company personnel manage­
ment considered that an investigation would have been rejected by both 
local management and the workforce. However, the company arranged for
6 7. Industrial relations in this company receive sufficient coverage 
in publications so that this should not be extremely detrimental 
to the study in general, cf. C. Gill et al., oo .cit., pp.77-122, 
and J. Roeber, Social Change at Work, London, 1975*
68. All companies taking part in the study requested anonymity.
Agrochemie AG is an invented name, as is Groitfmore Ltd. the 
British equivalent and any similarity with existing company 
names is purely accidental. The Agrochemie AG case study is 
discussed in more detail below.
-  19 -
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a limited investigation in their main production works. Nine shop 
steward convenors, personnel and production managers were interviewed 
in total on this site.^^
In Germany, 18 works councillors (interview coding BRV, number, date) 
and 18 members of management (interview coding CM, number, date) were 
interviewed as part of the background investigation of workplace in­
dustrial relations. These respondents covered all the major chemical 
companies as well as a range of smaller companies. In the U.K. six 
shop steward convenors and twelve members of management were interviewed 
from a variety of the middle-sized companies (including Growmore Ltd.) 
in the chemical industry. Considering the limitations of resources 
these interviews provided a reasonable amount of background information 
on workplace industrial relations in the chemical industry.
Extraneous circumstances greatly reduced the value of the case study 
method of comparison which had been chosen as most suitable for the 
investigation of workplace industrial relations. Nevertheless, the 
Agrochemie AG study described presently did fulfil the purpose as far 
as Germany was concerned, and a limited comparison with the situation 
in the U.K. should also be possible.
One of the advantages of case study methods is that a variety of means
69* These interviews, like those already described above, together
with the others designed to gain background information on the 
practice of workplace industrial relations were of the informal 
focused type.
70. In particular, reference to the two studies by Nichols et al.,
cited above, which were carried out in similar works to the
Agrochemie AG works studied should be helpful in this context.
were chosen, including various forms of interview and observation.
Those groups of the workforce likely to be important as far as work-
(72)place industrial relations are concerned' 'were supposed to be
interviewed by use of an informal focused technique similar to that
described above. However, it was discovered at a very early stage of
the investigation that a large number of supervisors, works councillors
and lay officers found difficulty in replying to questions with an open
format. It was decided, therefore, to include a range of the questions
from the structured questionnaire which is described below in interviews
(73)with these groups. The length of these informal interviews varied
from 40 minutes to two hours and they were recorded on cassette tapes.
In order to survey the attitudes of wage earners and non-managerial
staff on workplacee industrial relations a structured questionnaire
was devised which was put to the respondents orally. The author then
marked their answers onto the questionnaire sheet. The questionnaire
which is reproduced as Appendix 2.1 vjas written according to the guide-
( 7 4 )
lines in standard sociological reference works. In addition, a
number of questions were adapted from previous surveys in the chemical
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(71)of data collection can be used. At Agrochemie AG'1 'a range of these
71. The works investigated employs around 400 persons who are engaged 
on the production of fertilizers and inorganic acids. The works 
has been owned by a variety of firms since the Second World War 
and at the time of the investigation was a part of Agrochemie AG, 
the chemical subsiduary of a large German company. The works is 
located in a rural area and is the major industrial employer in 
the immediate vaoinity.
72. i.e. Management, works councillors and trade union lay officers.
73. cfN Appendix 2.1. Questions included as applicable.
74* Moser and Kalton, on .cit., po. 303-349 a^ d E.IC. Scheuch, op .cit., 
PP*77-95*
industry' "in order to provide some basis for comparison with the 
data collected here*
In general very few problems were experienced with this questionnaire, 
although there was a lack of understanding of one expression in parti­
cular, Sozialleistungen* This word which might be translated as 
welfare or fringe benefits is common in German industry but the majority 
of the respondents did not understand its meaning. This illustrates
the problem discussed by Scheuch in choosing words not likely to be
(76)understood by respondents. ' Responses covering this area must be 
treated with a certain amount of suspicion.
These structured interviews varied in length between 25 minutes and' 
one hour depending on the eloquence and loquacity of respondents. All 
interviews at Agrochemie AG were held in private in a room provided by 
the company which was centrally located in the works•
A fairly sophisticated sample of the Agrochemie AG workforce was
selected for the interviews. Two approaches were used. The "acid"
plant which had drawn initial attention to the works because of its
comparability with a similar plant in the U.IC. only employed 14 men.
It was hoped to interview all of this group. Disproportionate stratified 
(77)random samples "were taken of the remainder of the workforce as 
indicated in the following table•
75* F. Furstenberg, op .cit., and M. Schumann, F. Gerlach, A. Geschossl 
and P. Milhoffer, Am Beispiel der Septemberstreiks - Anfa,ng der 
Relconstruktionsphase der Arbeiterklasse?, IColn, 1971*
76. U.K. Scheuch, op .cit., p.78ff.
77* of. J. Galtung, op .cit., p. 56 and Moser and Kalton, op .cit., p.93ff»
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(75)
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Table 1.3.
Sample of the Agrochemie AG Workforce.
Size of Size of
Group Group Sample Sample Jo
Wage earners 274 37 13.5
Staff (non-managerial) 43 9 20.9
Staff (managerial) 35 6 17.1
Lay Officers 30(40)(7 8 ) 6 20.0 ( 1 5 . 0)
Works Councillors 10 6 60.0
Senior Managers 4 4 100.0
A disproportionate stratified random sample was chosen in order to 
ensure the selection of a high percentage of people heavily involved 
in workplace industrial relations. It also allows more account to be 
taken of minority groups such as non-managerial staff where a higher 
refusal rate was expected based on the author’s experience of employ­
ment within this group. As is seen beloxtf, these expectations were 
justified.
According to probability theory, at a 5 per cent standard error, 
estimating the proportion of the population exhibiting a given 
characteristic to befiO per cent (this gives the maximum sample size) 
and employing the finite population correction, a simple random sample
78. In fact the 10 works councillors are also lay officers but they 
were not selected under this group. This illustrates a general 
problem* It was almost impossible to make the groups muimally 
exclusive with the result that lay officers turned up within 
all the other groups except senior management and managerial 
staff appeared within both the lay officer and works councillor 
groups. This led to an even higher degree of selection of these 
groups than was intended. Selection of the lay officers was 
carried out by the works council chairman according to the 
random sampling method explained to him. The reason for this 
was his unwillingness to release a list of lay officers to me. 
The range in knowledge and experience of the lay officers inter­
viewed seems to indicate that they were indeed randomly chosen 
and not simply selected.
of 80 would be required. (79) r^ g f7nax number of persons interviewed 
was 63? subdivided into 52 in the random sample and 11 in the ’’acid” 
plant sample. While it is realised that errors might be introduced 
because the sample size was too small, this is not uncommon.The 
main limiting factors were time since the company had specified that 
the maximum permissible duration of the survey was two weeks, and 
technological difficulties which prevented respondents being released 
from their jobs at the time arranged for their interviews. This 
often happened towards the end of the survey when it was impossible 
to arrange an alternative interview time.
This last factor is also of significance in computing the response
/ Al \
rate' 'since it meant that the number of respondents questioned was 
lower than it would otherwise have been. Other reasons for the difference 
betv/een the absolute and the relative response rates were the un­
availability of respondents due to sickness, holidays, etc. The 
various response rates are shown in the table below.
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79* Moser and Kalton, op.cit., p.l46ff and Black and Champion, op .cit *, 
p.311ff. Corrections for the use of a disproportionate stratified 
random sample cannot be made, but it is assumed that the sample 
size would be of the same order.
80. Ibid.? p.311* For tabulation the two groups will be known as 
the acid plant and the works sample.
81. There is no agreement as to what actually constitutes a response 
rate. cf_. N. Lin, op .cit., p.241f« Two different ones will be 
used here:
Absolute Response = Humber interviewed -v- inn
Rate (ARR) Number in sample '
Relative Response = Number in sample - Number of Refusals .n- 
C m A  Number in sample X
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Table 1*4*
Response rates and percentages interviewed, by groups.
Group
ARR
m
-■  mB.
RRR
(*)
 ^**» “♦/ R
No. in 
Group
u. w  v. yj 0 *
Interviewed 
No.(82) #
1. Works Sample 
Wage earners 78 100 274 35(83) 12 .8
Staff (non-man.) 56 66 43 5 1 1 .6
Staff (man.) 84 100 35 7 20.0
Lay Officers 84 100 30(40) ll(84) 36.7
Works Councillors 84 100 10 6 60.0
Senior Managers 100 100 4 4 100.0
2. Acid Plant
Wage earners 75 92 12 9 75.0
Staff (man.) 100 100 2 2 100.0
Total 83 95 - 63 -
The relative response rates which are dependent on the number of
refusals are high so that there should be little bias as a result of
this. The percentage of the groups interviewed also shows that despite
the non-exclusivity of groups the stratified nature of the sample has
been preserved. In this way, the aim in selecting this form of sample
which was to interview hi,gher percentages of those groups 1more in-
volved in workplace industrial. relations was achieved*
Analysis of the questionnaire results was carried out by use of the
University of Manchester SPSS system• The main form of analysis used
82. These figures are taken from Appendix 3 Tables .59 a^ d 64' and 
knowledge of the breakdown of salaried staff interviewed into 
the various groups.
83. Including lay officers and works councillors who were also wage 
earners.
84. Including two who worked in the acid plant.
( Ss ^was frequency tabulation 'together with some tests for differences 
between groups. The frequency tables were also cross-tabulated^ 8^  
with one another if a possible association between the two variables 
had been hypothesised and the chi-squared test of significance was
/ Qrj \
used to test for association. 7 Where a more specific form of 
association could be expected, the more precise linear or non-linear
/ oo \
correlation tests were carried out.' ' The level of significance used 
throughout is 0.05 or less which means that there is less than a 5 per 
cent chance of randomness causing the relationships. 8^"^  The results 
of the tests are given in the body of the study where they are applicable.
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Data from the informal interviews was also analysed in this way where 
appropriate but the main form of analysis of these interviews, ®^^ as 
with all interviews of the informal focused type was content analysis 
and transcription of portions of the interviews from the cassette tapes.
In addition to the case study investigations and the other interviews,
85. See Appendix 3 for the results of this.
86. cf. N.H. Nie, G.H. Hill, J.G. Jenkins, K. Steinbrenner,
D.H. Bent, SPSS, 2nd Edition, 1975? p.230ff.
87- Ibid., p.223f.
88. Ibid., p.280ff.
89* Black and Chanvoion, on .oit., p.l60f and J. Galtung, on .cit.,
p.372ff.
90. These interviews are coded in the following way:
Management: M, number, date.
Works Councillors: BR, number, date.
Lay Officers: VL, number, date.
Other respondents: Number, date, (quotations from the
standardized questionnaire)
A summary of the different interview codes used may be 
found after the Glossary of Abbreviations.
documentary analysis was also carried out. A wide range of primary
sources produced by the parties involved in industrial relations were 
(91)studied.' These sources provided a wealth of detailed information
about industrial relations in the chemical industry. Furthermore, their 
function was also taken into account and this provides a number of in­
sights into the practice of industrial relations. Secondary data were
( 9 2 )also considered,' 'particularly that produced by the statistical
agencies in the two countries. In addition social research archives in
Germany were used in order to carry out a search for relevant literature
(93)on industrial relations in the chemical industry.' '
In summary, the research method can be said to consist of three parts. 
Informal focused interviews were used to study the role and structure of 
the trade unions and employers1 associations as well as the practice of 
collective bargaining at its various levels. Case study investigations 
and informal focused interviews were used in order to gain an under­
standing of workplace industrial relations and to generate and test 
hypotheses on this. The interviews were supported by an analysis of 
primary and secondary source material. In total 28 interviews were carried 
out in the U.K. and 141 in West Germany, 63 of which were part of the 
Agrochemie AG case study. During the course of this section some mention 
of the limitations of these methods and the possible sources of errors 
have been made. These subjects are now considered in greater detail.
91* In particular annual reports, press releases, union journals and 
publications by the employers 1 associations were considered.
92. On the analysis of secondary sources of. Black and Champion, 
op.cit., pp.403-425.
93. Thanks are due to the Zentralarchiv fur empirische Sozial- 
forschung at the University of Cologne.
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(iii) Limitations and Errors*
The primary limitations to the research method may he found within the 
investigation of workplace industrial relations in the U.K. and in West 
Germany. In order to assure a high degree of generalisability a large 
number of parallel studies should ideally have been carried out.
However, in the case of this study, limitations of time, manpower and 
financial resources necessitated the adoption of a less ambitious, yet 
comparable technique of investigation. This method did, however, result 
in the under-representation of certain sectors of the chemical industry 
particularly those using batch production processes. Furthermore, small 
companies and regions in which there was a low concentration of chemical 
industry were not considered to an ideal degree. To a certain extent 
these weaknesses in method can be negated through incorporation of 
secondary source material but the basic limitations a5 far as original 
empirical research are concerned still exist.
The research method leaned heavily on the use of interviews, whether of
the informal focused or highly structured type. This can lead both to
( q r )
bias and to errors. It is. important that data should be valid and
reliable. Checks of validity were made in a number of ways. Some factual 
questions were asked to which the answer was already known. Although 
inaccurate replies were occasionally received to such questions they 
were rare, particularly with increasing seniority of the respondents in
94* Given a reasonably large research team, about 10 studies in each
country covering a range of sectors and company sizes would produce 
highly comparable data of general applicability.
95. £f. Black and Champion, op .cit. ■> p. 37 Iff and Moser and Kalton,
op .cit., p.378ff.
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Other tests of validity were difficult to apply due to the nature of
the samples chosen since the tests apply to simple random samples.
Nevertheless, it is possible to compare the percentage turnout at the
works council elections (89 per cent) with the number that said they
voted in the disproportionate stratified random sample at Agrochemie
AG (97*7 per cent).^®^  This difference can probably be explained in
a number of ways. First, people more involved in industrial relations
are more likely to vote than those who are uninvolved. Second, office
staff and women, both of which groups are known to have less interest
( 97)and tendency to vote,w1"generally refused to be interviewed. Finally, 
it is possible that respondents who could not remember whether they 
voted responded positively since this is a more socially acceptable 
reply. All these factors would lead to an increased turnout in the 
sample. It would seem that had a rigorous simple random sample been 
used, the replies would have been more valid. A second test was applied 
by comparing membership in the Chemical Workers’ Union at Agrochemie AG 
in the sample with the actual membership. In this case 90*4 per cent 
membership in the sample compared well with the actual level of 90 per 
cent. The bias due to the type of sample probably cancelled out due to 
increased levels of sampling from both management and trade union officers
96. These are tests of concurrent validity. Black and Champion, 
op.cit., p.228ff.
97. cf. IG Chemie, Per Betriebsrat, Vol.28, 1979? No.3, p.57 and 
65ff.
their respective organisations.
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have been good. Thus general satisfaction with wage levels was very
similar.^ 8) Similarly knowledge of the roles of the works council
correlated highly with knowledge of the co-determination rights of the 
(99)works council.' ' As far as can be assessed the Agrochemie AG survey 
which was carried out according to the same principles as the other 
studies was both valid and reliable.
The internal reliability of the Agrochemie AG survey seems generally to
Although interviewer errors are reduced when only one interviewer is 
involved in a study, variability can still cause discrepancies as a 
result of inconstant techniques. As the vast majority of the inter­
views were recorded on cassette tapes this could be checked for subse­
quently. Some variations were detected particularly when respondents 
were aggressive towards the researcher. However, such cases were very 
rare. At Agro.chemie AG the median assessment of the interest of re­
spondents in the survey was I .78 on a scale of 1 (very interested) to 
5 (impatient, wanted to break off interview). 1^00^ This means the 
accuracy and willingness to response are likely to be of an acceptable 
level. (1G>1)
Bias can be introduced by an interviewer into the investigation in a 
number of ways.^ 10^  The author was careful to withhold his opinions
98. of. Appendix 3, Table 4-72$ and Table 46 - 75$*
99*  cT* Appendix 3? Tables 31 and 4 1 • Pearson's correlation test 
gave r = 0.62 which was significant (99*9$ level).
100. of. Appendix 3, Table 65.
101. Moser and Kalton, op.cit ♦, p.39if»
102. of. Ibid., p.379*
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lest bias be introduced in tliis way. This was generally possible even 
in the case of more extended contact such as at Agrochemie AG.
Errors can also be introduced when recording data, either through mis­
coding or inaccurate transcription. In a number of cases the tape re­
corder was run when filling in structured questionnaires and very few 
coding errors were subsequently detected. Those errors which were traced 
were unsystematic in nature. Furthermore, tapes provide a permanent 
record which can always be consulted again in case of doubt. In the 
case of computerised analysis, punching errors can occur. A variety of 
impossible codings did occur in the first run and these were traced.
Sinoe there is a far greater chance of a mis-punched code being in­
appropriate it can be assumed that the majority of stich mispunches were 
detected. Even so, only 0.1# of punches were inaccurate and thus errors 
from this source would seem to be negligible.
The influence of terminology and sample size on the accuracy of the survey 
have been discussed above. A number of difficulties were experienced here, 
and the replies on Sozialleistungen must be treated with care. A number 
of procedural errors on the part of the interviewer were detected. On 
two occasions the statistical questionnaire 1^0^ was omitted due to lack 
of concentration and disconcertion on the part of the interviewer. In 
addition it was necessary to omit questions occasionally due to their 
lack of applicability to the respondent or to a shortage of time. This 
was unfortunate but unavoidable.
103. cf. Appendix 2.1.2.
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In conclusion it can be said that the main limitations to the study 
are imposed by the lack of generalisability of the data on workplace 
industrial relations. Bata which was collected seems reasonably valid 
and reliable, although some errors were detected*
(iv) Conclusion.
The central working hypothsis is that the technical nature, the in­
dustrial organisation and the economic state of the chemical industry 
all have a significant influence on the practice of industrial re­
lations in the chemical industry both in the United Kingdom and West 
Germany.^°4) Since certain of these features, especially the tech­
nical nature of the chemical industry, are not limited to any one 
particular country, there are a large number of similarities between 
industrial relations in the British and German chemical industries.
The majority of differences which occur can be traced to the different 
traditions of industrial relations and the different political and 
| economic developments in the two countries.
The study falls logically into a number of parts:
After an introduction which presents the research methods used, Part I 
describes and analyses labour relations in the German chemical industry. 
This analysis commences with a consideration of the development of 
labour relations in chemicals. The relevance of economic and tech-
104* There is considerable similarity between this hypothesis and 
that expounded by Verma, oo.oit., p.7ff* However, it was 
developed independently as a result of this study. Only 
late in the investigation was Vermafs thesis discovered as 
a result of a recently published bibliography, of.
G.S1'. Bain and G.B. Woolven, A Bibliography of British 
Industrial Relations, Cambridge, 1979*
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nological factors as well as the organisational nature of the chemical 
industry emerge from this. The current economic state of the West 
German chemical industry, its organisational structure and the tech­
nological nature of the industry are then examined in greater detail. 
Collective bargaining and workplace industrial relations in the West 
German chemical industry are' subsequently analysed in the light of 
these characteristics. Finally a summary of industrial relations in 
the industry is given.
Part 11 is an examination of industrial relations in the British 
chemical industry and a comparison with the situation in West Germany. 
The study is concluded by a comparative review of the major conclusions 
about the nature of industrial relations in the chemical industry.
Part 111 consists of a number of appendices covering the statistical 
results of the study and the questionnaires used. A bibliography of 
sources cited and works consulted ends the thesis.
An understanding of the background to present industrial relations in 
the German chemical industry is a pre-requisite to a detailed con­
sideration of it and thus it is to this development that we now turn.
Part One - Industrial Relations in the West 
German Chemical Industry
- 35 -
The development of industrial relations in the German chemical 
industry.
(i) Introduction - Economic background and the development of the 
chemical industr?/".
It is the aim of this chapter to show the relevance of certain historic 
features of German society for current industrial relations in the 
chemical industry.
Chapter 2 .
According to Half Dahrendorf: "What did and did irot occur at the time
of industrialisation has determined above all else the evolution of
( l )German society since then".
Thus we should consider the main characteristics of the German industrial 
revolution, and look at the subsequent economic, technological and 
political developments in Germany, referring particularly to the 
chemical industry.
In the same work, a classic analysis of the development of German society,
Dahrendorf shows that the industrial revolution in Germany may be des-
( 2 )cribed as:"late, rapid and thorough".' It will be seen during the
1. Author’s translation of: "was also in der Zeit der Industrialisierung 
geschehen. und nicht geschehen ist, hat die Bildung der neueren 
deutschen Gesellsohaft vor allem gerragt," Gesellschaft und Demo- 
kratie in Deutschland, Munchen, 1965? P*45*
2. Author’s translation of: "scat, sohnell und grundlich", Ibid., p.47* 
Most economists now seem to agree that the take-off for the German 
industrial revolution was during the 1840’s, cf. W.G. Hoffmann,
"The Take-off in Germany", in Economics of Take-off and Sustained 
Growth, edited W.W. Rostow, New York and London, 1963? oited in 
Ibid., The World Economy, London and Basingstoke, 1978.
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course of this chapter that these characteristics are of great signi­
ficance to industrial relations from this time onwards and that the 
consequences are still apparent today. Dahrendorf also identifies 
certain other features of the German industrial revolution which are re­
flected in the modern chemical industry and its industrial relations.
One such feature is the size of economic unit, which was seen to be much
(3)greater than in Great Britain. " This has also been the case in the
German chemical industry since its rapid development^ f^rom about 1870
onwards. The result was that by 1895 37# of all workers were employed
( 5 )in plants with more than 200 people. ' Currently, of course, three out 
of five of the world's largest chemical companies are based in West 
Germany: Bayer AG, Badische Anilin- und Soda Fabrilc AG (BASF) and 
Hoechst AG.^ *®^
Another characteristic of the German industrial revolution was state 
( 7 )involvement*. Whilst there is little reference to direct state owner-
( 8 )ship within the German chemical industry, "it is likely that some of 
the state mines manufactured chemicals from the coal they produced. 
Certainly, the companies which prospered were privately owned and today
3 . R. Dahrendorf, 0*0 .cit., p.48f.
4 . cf. J.J. Beer, The Emergence of the German Dye Industry. Urbana,
1959; F. ter Meer, Die I.G. Farbenindustrie AG, Dusseldorf, 1953
and L.F. Haber, The Chemical Industry during the nineteenth Century, 
Oxford, 1958.
5* H. Schulte, Die: ESntwicklung der Chemischen Industrie Deutschlands, 
1908, p.18 cited in L.F. Haber, The Chemical Industry 1900-1930, 
Oxford, 1971? p.15*
6. A Chemical Age Survey, Chemical Age, 20.7*1979? P*4 and K. Done,
German Chemicals, Giant at bay, Financial Times, 6.6.1978.
7. R. Dahrendorf, 0 0  .cit., p.49f»
8. L.F. Haber, 1958, 0 0  .cit., p.49ff*
this is reflected in the paucity of state involvement in the chemical 
(9)industry.
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A further feature of the period of industrialisation was the state 
socialist policies introduced by Bismarck during the 1070's and *80's 
which included sickness and accident insurance schemes, old age pensions 
as well as statutory regulation of the length of the working day and 
protective legislation for women and children. In the chemical 
industry, this social legislation was the basis on which rested extra­
ordinarily wide welfare services. A striking feature of these services
( l l )was the provision of cheap company housing.' This paternalistic
style of management is still found today in the larger German chemical
companies and seems to have a significant influence on the attitudes
(l2)of employees in these companies.' Further mention will be made of 
this important feature of industrial relations in the German chemical 
industry elsewhere in the study.
9 . Yeba AG is 43*75 per cent owned by the state, and it has 
some subsiduary companies which operate within the chemical
and oil sectors, Yeba Geschaftsberichte 77 and of_, Manfred
Kruper, "Yeba Konzern .jetzt massg©schneidertGewerkschaft- 
liche Umsohau (Zeitschri t^ fur die Funktion^ re der IG Chemie- 
Papier-Keramik), Nr.4? 1978, pp.14-17•
10. R. Bahrendorf, op.oit.. p.51*
11. L.F. Haber, 1958, op .cit., p.249f» One reason not mentioned
by Haber was that this housing and the other services were 
often needed since several companies built their works on 
green-site locations with no facilities. Interview CM 12,
Nov.*78.
12. W. Dzielak et al., op .cit., p.268ff. A recent example of
this philosophy can be found in: Erhard Bouillon, Betriebliche 
Sozialpolitik in unserer Zeit, Grundsatzlich.es zur Sozial- 
politik bei Hoechst, special publication for Hoechst AG 
without date but 1978.
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to have had supplementary effects around the turn of the century.
Working conditions appear to have been far superior and thus more
( 1 3 )healthy in Germany than in Britain at this time. An interesting
contrast is provided by the vivid description in Gill et al. of the
appalling working conditions in the British chemical industry just a
few years earlier.Another consequence was that there were no trade
( 1 5 )unions in the large German dyestuff factories at this point of time. J
The reasons for this would seem to be management resistance together
( l 6  )with reasonable welfare services.
The rapid growth of the German economy and in particular of the chemical
industry at the end of the nineteenth century has been well summarised
by Haber:
"Germany’s economic development in the last thirty years of the nine­
teenth century was extraordinarily rapid and by the end of the period 
its industrial structure was far more powerful than that of France. 
Chemicals provide a striking illustration of this change. On the. eve 
of the Franco-Prussian war, German chemical manufacture in size as well 
as technical ability lagged behind French. Barely a generation later 
the roles were reversed. The production of heavy chemicals was the 
first to feel the effects of the striking transformation in the country's 
economy". (1 7 )
Not only did industrial growth stimulate the heavy chemical industry,'
Social legislation, paternalistic attitudes and welfare services seem
13, A.F. Anderson "Regulations of ... Occupations in Factories ... in 
European Countries", from Dangerous Trades, edited Sir Thomas 
Oliver, 1902 cited in L.F. Haber, 1958, op.cit., p.234*
14* C. Gill et al., 00 .cit., p.l38ff.
15. L.F. Haber, 1958, op.cit., p.247*
16. The development of the trade union movement in Germany is discussed 
in more detail later in this chapter.
17. L.F. Haber, 1958, on.cit., p.121.
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for acids and alkalis as well as other chemicals are important to in­
dustrial production. In addition, the chemical industry itself generated 
a requirement for a vast amount of chemicals used to synthetise dyestuffs
/ l g  \
and fertilizers. The rapid growth in population' °'with its requirements 
for clothing and food provided the stimulus for the production of these 
substances.
Such conditions were not unique to Germany, however, and the reasons for
(19 )the meteoric rise of the German dyestuffs industry, "should be con­
sidered, especially since synthetic dyes were a British invention.
The reason for the success of the German chemical industry at this time
was the fortunate co-existance of a number of factors. One such factor
was the extremely close relations between the universities and industry,
which resulted in the provision for industry of large numbers of highly 
( 2 l )trained chemists. ' This was necessary since even at this stage the
(22)importance of research had been recognised by the chemical industry. '
The numbers and quality of the chemists was not the sole reason for
success. Managerial and financial ability, aided by generous depreciation
(23)provisions were also important. Furthermore, the late development of
18. H. Bechtel, Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte Deutschlands, Munchen, 
1967, p.324ff.
19. In 1881 German dyestuffs production amounted for half of world 
production and by 1900 it represented 80-90 per cent. L.F. Haber, 
1958, op .cit., p.128.
20. B.G. Reuben and M.L. Burstall, The Chemical Economy, London, 1978
(1st Reprint), p. 16. Bob Edwards blames the lack of British iniative
in developing the chemical industry further in Britain on the profit 
orientation of the owners cf. B. Edwards, Chemicals: Servant or 
Master?, London, 1945? passim.
21. A. Reichl, op.cit., p.25ff*
22. Reuben and Burstall, o p  .cit., p.l6.
23. L.F. Haber, 1971? op .cit., p. 14*
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the German chemical industry meant that it was more able to make use of 
the newer technology which became available at this time. Instead, for 
example, of "being plagued by the use of the Leblanc process for the 
production of sodium carbonate it was able to use the Solvay ammonia- 
soda process which has been described as the first continuous process 
to be used in the chemical industry.
Finally, the geography and natural resources of Germany were also
important factors. Waterways and railways provided good communications,
fuel was cheap and coal was available in large amounts as an essential
raw material in the production of dyestuffs, and other chemicals.
There were also abundant salt deposits between the Elbe and Weser and
(25)in the Ne clear Valley.v
Much has been said then about the rapid expansion of the German chemical 
industry at the end of the nineteenth century. What did this expansion 
actually mean, though, in terms of the number of employees in the in­
dustry? Within twenty years of 1875 employment in the chemical industry
had increased by 120 per cent to 115,000 and by 1913 it had more than
( 2 6 )doubled again to 277,000.' ' BASF, to give another example, had in-
(27 )created in size from 520 employees in 1870 to 6 ,7 1 1  by 1900.'
24« Reuben and Burstall, op.cit., n*15*
25. L.F. Haber, 1971, on .cit., p.l4f.
26. Dzielak et al., on.cit., p.52. Whi1st Haber agrees with the first 
figure, he puts employment in 1913 at 180,000, or 210,000, de­
pending on the definition of the industry. L.F. Haber, 1971,
on.cit., p.108. Nevertheless, the increase remains impressive.
27* L.F. Haber, 1958, on .cit., p. 131.
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This means, of course, that throughout this period of time the chemical
industry had an enormous requirement for manpower. This is therefore
one reason for the relatively good wages and conditions prevalent in
the chemical industry at this time. They were simply necessary in order
to attract sufficient labours and since the chemical industry had good
( 2 0 )profit rates at this time it was able to afford these measures.'
Although conditions of labour shortage are traditionally favourable for
( oo ^trade unions, there is no evidence that the Factory Workers1 Union ' 
was able to take advantage of the situation.
The German chemical industry continued to expand up to and throughout
( 30  )the First World War. The superiority of the chemical expertise in
Germany at this time was reflected in the development of the Haber-Bosch
process for the synthesis of ammonia. This process was the first modern 
(31)chemical process and enabled Germany to continue fighting for much- 
longer than would have been possible without access to the nitrogen 
thus made available•  ^^ ^
During the war chemical production was, of course, subordinated to the
(33war effort. This occurred particularly swiftly and smoothly in Germany. " 
After the war the political situation was unstable for some t i meand
28. Dzielak et al., oo.cit., p.64*
29* Verband der Fabrikarbelter Deutschlands, this was the trade union 
which attempted to organise workers in the chemical industry.
30. For example, exports of chemical trebled between 1900 and 1913• 
L.F. Haber, 1971? on .cit., p.108,
31. Reuben and Burstall, on.cit., p.17•
32. L.F. Haber, 1971? on.cit., p.l99ff.
33* Ibid., pp.184-217 and 230.
34* cf. H. Bechtel, on.cit., p.429ff*
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as will be discussed below. This period of insecurity and intense
economic competition led finally in 1925 to the formation- of IG Farben--
Industrie AG (IG Farben). Tendencies to form cartels had, however,
been present in the German chemical industry since shortly after the
(35 )turn of the century. ' IG Farben was at this time the largest chemical
company in the world, being the amalgamation of eight major companies,
c \
having a starting capital of £22.7 million  ^ rend employing 88100 people
( 3 7 )on 1st January 1927*
Amongst the many other developments in the field of industrial relations
/ iQ \
during this period of time ' 'was the establishment of trade unionism 
and an increase in the importance of collective bargaining. Both these 
developments are discussed in detail later in this chapter.
Perhaps one of the best known features of the Weimar period of German
history is the raging inflation which had the result of devaluing money
( 3 9 )
to the extent that a loaf of bread cost millions of marks. ' A few 
years later Germany was smitten, along with many industrial nations,
the chemical industry was also affected by the turbulence of the times,
35* This whole process is discussed in great detail in L.F. Haber,
1971? on .cit.
36. Ibid., p.284.
37* Ibid., p.380.
38. Such as, for example, the introduction of works council legislation, 
government recognition of trade unions and the close association of 
trade unions with the whole Weimar state apparatus. There might, 
of course, be causal links between these occurrences and the 
acceptance of trade unionism in the chemical industry, cf.
R. Dahrendorf, op .cit., p.209ff«
39* of. Bechtel, op .cit., p.4l8ff.
-  43 -
by extremely high levels of unemployment.^ 40' Although one author has 
stated that the chemical industry was not affected to the same extent 
as the heavy industries, he also shows that IG Farben made 46OOO em­
ployees (more than 40 per cent) redundant between 1928 and 1931 and 
that in 1932, 95 per cent of the remaining employees were working short 
t i m e / 4 1 )
Whilst working in the West German chemical industry the author gained 
the impression that the experience of high inflation and severe unem­
ployment had left a permanent scar on the memories of fellow employees. 4^^  ^
They seemed to be reluctant to engage in any activity which might cause 
inflation or unemployment. This attitude seems also to have been mirrored 
in the moderation of German trade unions at the slightest indication of 
economic recession. These hypotheses were tested in a limited way in the 
course of the case study investigation at Agrochemie AG. When asked to 
select the four main priorities for trade union action 59 cent of 
respondents in the works sample included protection from unemployment and 
42 per cent included maintenance of price stability. These results, 
whilst limited in their applicability, might seem to suggest that ex­
periences gained during the Weimar Republic are still of significance 
today in the West German chemical industry.
40. In the winters of 1931 and 1932 unemployment was estimated as 
effectively 7 million. G. Stolper, X. Hauser, K. Borchardt, 
Deutsche Wirtsohaft seit 1870.. Tubingen, 1964, p. 139*
4 1 .  A. Leisewitz, "Die Auswirkungen der Verwissenschaftlichunff der 
Broduktion auf die Uono-oolbildunff; und auf das Verhaltnis von 
Okonomie und Politik dargestellt am Beis-piel der chemischen 
Industrie", Das Argument, Vol.14, Ho.5/6 , June 1972, p.488.
42. This idea is also to be found in F. Vogl, German Business after 
the Economic Miracle, London and Basingstoke, 1975, P*5^ »
43. From a possible 14* of. Appendix 2, Question 25, and Appendix 3, 
Table 29*
Hitler1 s rise to power has been studied, in detail^^and this is not 
the place for a discussion of it. However, the failure of the trade 
union movement and its resultant dissolution are of significance and 
are discussed below. The chemical industry did, nevertheless, have 
some part to play in the rise of Hitler, and since the present separation 
of Germany into two states might be seen as a direct consequence of 
Hitlers * "Third Reich" it is worth noting some of the main links between 
the ohemioal industry and the National Socialist movement.
IG Farben was one of the many large industrial companies to provide
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electoral funds for the National Socialists and after Hitler gained
ii
(46)
power, the connections remained close. (45) jG ;par-ben was heavily in­
volved in the development of synthetics to prepare Germany for war 
and this gave her a virtual monopoly of those areas later to become the 
major growth sectors of the chemical industry. The results of this can 
be seen in the present strength of those companies formed from the de- 
cart elised IG Farben.
Among the consequences of defeat for the Nest German chemical industry 
was the loss of a large number of production sites, including the 
enormous works at Leuna,)since they were in the Russian Zone. The
44* For example, of. R. Dahrendorf, op .cit., p.415ff.
45* R• Sasuly, IG Farben, Berlin, 1952, cited in J. Rauschel, Die 
BASF, Zur Anatomie eines multinationalen IConzems, IColn, 1975? 
p.l6ff.
4 6 .  A. Leisewitz, on .cit., p.487ff»
47* J* Rauschel, op .cit., p. 22.
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level of damage to the chemical industry as a result of the war remains
/ a Q \
uncertain. One report claims that it severely restricted production. 
Another states that 90# o f plant at Ludwigshafen lay in ruins.
However, the overall extent of damage to production capacity has not 
been established accurately and discussions have tended to suggest that 
it was- not as great as many authorities have stated, particularly on 
the large sites. Quite why Allied Bomber Command does not seem to have 
made these enormous production sites priority targets is not clear, but 
suggestions of international pressure by affiliated companies have been 
made •
Although the senior IG Farben management were arrested on charges of 
war crimes, °^^ many of these managers soon took their "rightful" places 
in the successor companies. In this instance, the war had little in­
fluence on the careers of men involved in National Socialist war crimes.
During the course of research a claim occasionally made by some re­
spondents was that the "Third Reich" and the experience of defeat had 
removed the class barriers in Germany and that this was the reason for 
the lack of industrial conflict since the war. However, as it has been
shown that the German trade union movement has adopted very similar
(5l)policies to those in Weimar, this seems unlikely. A more likely
48. Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Die Deutsche Industrie 
im Kriege 1939-1945? 1954? p.l06ff.
49* J* Rauschel, op.oit., p.20.
50. _cf. Ibid.*? p.23ff and Reuben and Burstall, on .cit., p.l32f.
51. R. Dahrendorf, op .cit., p.209ff*
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( 52 )oal situation in West Germany as opposed to the Weimar period.w
explanation can be found in the entirely different economic and politi-
One reason occasionally voiced in this country for the "Economic 
(53)Miracle"' 'experienced by West Germany after the Second World War
was the opportune necessity to build now production plants at a time
when technological developments, some the result of the war, had made
much existing plant obsolescent. As far as the chemical industry is
concerned, this argument seems to have some basis in fact. Although
the American chemical industry had moved towards the use of hydrocarbon-
based organic chemicals during the 1930's, Germany, bound by policies-
of national self-sufficiency did not follow suit until after the war.^4^
Therefore the reconstruction of the German chemical industry coincided
with the change in basic raw materials for organic chemicals from coal
to oil and natural gas. At the same time the latest developments in
process technology could be incorporated so that the plant was both
(55 )modern and more competitive. '
The advantages of oil and natural gas as raw materials for the organic 
chemical industry are considerable. Since they are fluids it is possible 
to use them in continuous process plants both as rax* materials and as a
52. For example, the proximity of a comnranist state, severe living
conditions and a rapid economic recovery thereafter could all 
have lowered the level of industrial action.
53* A review of the co-called "Economic Miracle" can be foimd in F.
Vogl, op.cit., p.4ff, and a more detailed analysis in G. Milton, 
Das wirtschaftliche Wachstum der Bundesrepublik Deutschland seit 
der W^hrungsreform 1948, unpublished B.Sc dissertation, University 
of Surrey, Guildford, (*1975) •
54* Reuben and Burstall, op.cit., p.33.
55. W. Munde, "Ohemisohe Industrie der Bundesrepublik Deutschland",
Ind. Chem. Belg., Vol.38, Mo.5, 1973, p.535*
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source of energy. In addition, many chemical compounds such as 
paraffins and defines, which may he regarded as the basic building 
blocks for a large number of organic substances and polymers, are far 
more accessible via cracking than they were from the liquification and 
gasification of coal.^^ Further advantages also exist since contin­
uous production systems generally use up less energy than batch pro-
( 5 8 )
( 5 7 )cesses. Continuous reactions also have lower labour costs, are
more easily automated, and indispensable for large scale reactions.
In fact, the economies of scale of some chemical processes are quite 
(59)staggering.
The consequences of these factors were that the West German ohemical 
industry which developed after the war was modern, tended to have large 
plants, especially as time passed, and to employ continuous production 
systems which were increasingly more automated. ^
Reference has already been made to the decartelisation of IG Farben by 
the Allied Powers after the defeat of National Socialist Germany. This 
action was by no means immediate, however. The Allies took control of
5 6 . Winnacker/Biener, Grmdzuge des Chemischen Technik, Munchen, 1974? 
P*7 •
5 7 * Dzielak et al., op .cit., p«5 7 «
58. Reuben and Burstall, op .oit., p.407f* Reuben and Burstall do
neglect to mention, however, that shift work is required, often at
a high social cost.
5 9* cf. Ibid., p.56f f ,
60. The intention is not, however, to imply that small scale batch
processes do not exist; indeed, they are eminently suits,ble for 
particular reactions, e.g. slow reactions. Ibid., p.407f.
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the company in 1945? "hut this did not prevent shares in IG Farben
(62)being traded on the open market after the war. } Originally it had
been planned to nationalise IG Farben and to dismantle a large number
of plants which produced chemicals necessary for war. As it transpired,
neither came about. Only a very small number of pieces of equipment
were removed from the Ludwigshafen works, for example. '  Not until
1953 did the Western Allies decide what to do with that portion of IG
Farben under their control.^ ®4'* IG Farben was split up into tx^ relve
(65 )autonomous companies, the most important of which are the three . 
mammoth concerns BASF, Bayer and Hoechst together with Chemische Werke 
Huls AG and Casella Farbwerke Mainkur AG. These companies had appromi- 
mately the structure of the firms which founded IG Farben. This action 
could in fact be conceived as a blessing for the German economy. ®^®^
Ever since the rapid growth of the dye manufacturing companies at the 
end of the nineteenth century tendencies tovrards centralisation within 
the German chemical industry have been apparent. It might be thought 
that the Allied Administration had wished to prevent such a concentration 
of power within the chemical industry from recxirring. However, the
61. E. Schmidt, Die Verhinderte Heuordnung 1945-1952, Frankfurt and 
Koln, 1970, p.54* Schmidt gives a very good account of the re­
establishment of the old order, with particular reference to the 
coal and steel industries. Many parallels between the develop­
ment in chemicals and these industries seem to exist.
62. R. Sasuly, op .cit., p.220ff cited in J. Rauschel, on .cit., p.22.
6 3. Nationalrat der Nationalen Front des demokratischen Deutschland
(Eds), Weissbuch uber die amerikanische-englische Interventions- 
nolitik und das Wiedererstehen des deutschen Imperial!smus, Berlin, 
1953> p .50, cited in J. Rauschel, op .cit., p.21.
64* G. Stolper et al., op .cit., p.226.
6 5. J. Rauschel, op .cit., p.24*
66. G. Stolper et al., op .cit., p.226f.
"big three" German chemical companies have gone from strength to strength 
Whilst it was estimated that XG Farben produced 57 per cent of chemicals 
in Germany in 1938,' 'in recent years about one third of chemical turn­
over has been directly attributable to Bayer, BASF and Hoechst• Lack 
of appropriate statistical data makes a more accurate estimation of the 
importance of these companies difficult, but if account is taken of 
internal transactions within the concerns, approximately 50 per cent of 
chemical turnover might be ascribed to these three companies. Once
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more the German chemical industry is amongst the most powerful in the
e to;
(70)
world., kith Hoechsi;, BS.S1? and Bayer having achieved th p three
places in the world league of chemical companies in 1978.
Charles Levinson, the General Secretary of the International Federation
( 7 1 )of Chemical and General Workers' Unions (ICF) has drawn a comparison
between the process of centralisation and concentration within the West
German chemical industry and the development of IG Farben:
"The movement towards concentration in the West German chemical industry
is perhaps most impressive. It almost feels as if one has been returned
to the time before the Second World War when the IG Farben concern dom­
inated the scene. The three successor companies of this mammoth organi­
sation ... have almost achieved integration to a degree which de facto, 
resembles an industrial empire of the type of IG Farben ..." (72)
6 7 . K. Hauenschild, article on West Germany, in C. Levinson (ed), 
Industry's Democratio Revolution, London, 1972, p.111.
68. WSY — Mitteilungen, Vol.24, Ho.6, 1973, p.225ff.
69* Reuben and Burstall, on .cit., p.l21ff.
70. "CA 200, Survey 1979”, on.cit., p.4ff.
71. of. Gill et al., on .cit., p.2l8ff.
72. "Vielleicht am eindrucksvollsten ist diese Konzontrationsbewegung 
in der chemischen Industrie der Bnndesrenublik. Man fuhlt sich 
fast in der Zeit vor dem 2. Weltkrieg zurxickversetzt, als der 
gigantische IG Far be n-K on z e rn die Szene beherrschte. Die drei■S—  —  ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- M,Nachfolgegesellschaften dieses Mammutgebildes ... nahern sich 
einer Integration, die de facto wieder auf ein Industrie - 
imperium nach dem IG Farben-Modell hinauslauft." C. Levinson, 
Inflation, das Weltweite Phanomen, Hamburg, 1972, p.224 cited 
Dzielak et al., on .cit., p. 5 5 1*
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The consequences of the high concentration of the chemical industry 
for its industrial relations will he discussed in more detail below.
The importance of Hoechst, Bayer and BASF for industrial relations, 
particularly at supra-plant levels can hardly be stressed suffioiently, 
however•
Post-war labour relations in the German chemical industry have occurred
against the backdrop of a remarkable economic development. Immediately
after the war living conditions were severe and much reconstruction was
( 7 3 )required before factories could be reopened and unemployment reduced. 1 
This resulted in co-operation between trade unionists, works councillors 
and the authorities.(74)
( 7 5  )
Nevertheless chemical production reached pre-war levels in 1949 and
it continued to exhibit meteoric growth rates with only minor recessions
/ ^ \
for the next twenty years. This development might best be described
( 7 7  )
as "growth with structural changes". The acttial extent of this
growth is demonstrated in Table 2.1 and its great magnitude is immed­
iately apparent.
73* The general situation is described in G. Stolper et al., on.oit., 
p.234Tf. Schmidt gives an account of the demonstrations and 
strikes which occurred in protest against the poor conditions, 
cf. E. Schmidt, op .oit., p.^hf'f*
74* Ibid., passim and J. Rauschel, op.cit., p.20.
75* D*R* Ebsworth, Die Deutsche Ohemiache Industrie, unpublished B.S'c 
dissertation, University of Surrey, Guildford, 1975? p»10.
7 6 . cf_. for further details USI-Mi tt ei lungen, Vol. 24, No. 6, 1973, 
p.220ff, "Chemical Age Survey - Nest Germany", Chemical Age, 
25.5*68 and Dsielak et al., p,53ff.
77 . "Wachstum mit Strukturanderungen", Vf. Kunde, op .cit., p. 535*
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TABLE 2.l(78^
The West German Chemical Industry 1950-1969t Basic Economic Bata
. . I95O _ 1961 1969
Turnover Mill DM 7150 24000 46692
Employees 1000 286 483 563
Investment Mill DM 410 2657 4900
Export Mill DM 1080 6490 17136
Export as Jo turnover 15.2 27*0 36.7
Export as fs total exoorts~ tj 12.9 12.7 15.1
Import Mill DM 420 2.690 885 6
Import as Jo total imports 3.7 6 .1
0•ON
Between 1950 and 1969 turnover increased by 650 per cent, an annual rate 
more than 10 per cent and as employment only doubled over this time, 
there was a correspondingly great increase in productivity. The 
chemical industry soon became an important exporter and has always had 
a positive balance of payments«
The increase in productivity is partly reflected in the high level of
investments in the chemical industry, since nextf and bigger plant was
constantly required. Investment was also required due to the structural
changes within the industry; between 1953 and 1967 the consumption of
plastics and chemical fibres which are based on organic intermediates
(79)increased by 1077 cent and 111 per cent respectively. '
78. Ibid., p.536 and VGI, Chemiewirtschaft in Zahlen, 18th Edition, 
Dusseldorf and IColn, 1976, passim. (cited hereafter as Chemie­
wirtschaft , followed by year of publication).
79* RKW, S'ieben Berielite, Frankfurt, 1970, p.70. The change of im­
portance between branches is difficult to show since most data is 
norma,lly published in terms of value, cf. W. I'lunde, on .cit., p.537 * 
This data does not reflect the remarkable drop in the cost of 
chemicals and plastics over this"period of time as a result of 
efficiences of scale, erf. Ibid., p.538; Chemiewirtschaft in Zahlen 
1976, p.78f; Reuben and Burstall, op.cit., p.56ff and Dzielak 
et al., p .54f•
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intensity of the industry, which means that labour costs have been less
( 8 0 )significant than in many other industries.' " In general, therefore, 
the economic climate led to a situation where wage claims could be met 
fairly easily by the chemicaJ. industry and this doubtless had a great 
influence on the climate of industrial relations.
The consequence of these developments has been to increase the canital
These factors, such as the need to increase scale in order to be able 
to produce economically and the cost of such investments have further- 
contributed to the growth in strength of the larger chemical companies.
The post-war development of the chemical industry until the end of the 
I960’s might be summarised as establishing a situation in which the 
major chemical producers dominated the industry with successful economic 
growth influencing the climate of industrial relations. I11 this way, 
the trend, which was begun with the German industrial revolution, for 
a highly centralised industry able to take advantage of recent techno­
logical advantages due to its late start has continued through to the 
present day.
This has had a significant influence on the economic development and the 
industrial relations of the German chemical industry which has experienced' 
a century of almost continuous rapid growth interrupted only briefly
80. cf. Ohemiewirtsohaft in Zahlen, 1976, p.26ff.
81. cf. Bzielak et a,!., p.93ff and 537* Furthermore, the general 
labour shortage through the later part of this period made it 
necessary for many companies to pay wages which were far in 
excess of the agreed rates.
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during the world economio crisis and for a short time after the Second 
World War. Such rapid growth has required high investment levels and 
much expenditure on research as well as an almost constant requirement 
for additional manpower. Given the technological developments in the 
chemical industry which have led to a capital intensive industry with 
many continuous production processes and a fairly high level of auto­
mation, wages and conditions in the industry have generally been above 
average.
State socialist legislation in the nineteenth century and management's 
progressive paternalistic attitudes have also influenced wage levels 
and resulted in a wide range of company welfare services, particularly 
in the larger chemical companies. One of the consequences of this has 
been a high level of identification of many employees with their com­
panies. This, together with initial resistance by management hindered 
the development of trade unionism within the chemical industry. The 
development of trade unionism to its present state will now be discussed*
(ii) Trade unionism.
It might seem paradoxical to claim, despite the fact that the Industrial 
Union of Chemical, Paper and Ceramics Workers^ i^s the third largest in
82. Industriegewerkschaft Chemie-Papier-Keramik, for simplicity's
sake this union will be known hereafter as the "Chemical Workers' 
Union". This trade union does represent members in a wide number 
of industries. However, throughout the course of this study 
generalisations will be made about the union based on data from 
within the chemical industry. This does not imply that the 
situation in all industries is the same as in the chemical 
industry.
the German Trade Union Confederation,^and although in 1975 this same 
trade union had an income of over DM,77 million, that in recent years 
it has been unable to meet the majority of challenges made by the chemical 
employers, particularly as far as collective bargaining is concerned,
How did this state of affairs arise? It is the aim of this section to 
show that the reasons for this may be traced partly to the development 
of the trade union movement in general and partly to the structure of 
the chemical industry.
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Trade union weakness is certainly not new to Germany. Indeed, it might 
be traced back to the very beginnings of trade unionism during the le/bter 
half of the nineteenth century although the origins of this weakness have 
not all survived through to the present day.
One of the initial causes of weakness in the German trade union movement 
was the formation of sectional unions which caused fragmentation into 
various ideological factions. It can be argued that the timing of the
83. Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, for a selection of accounts of this 
organisation from a variety of ideological standpoints, of.
E.C.M. Cullingford, Trade Unions in West Germany, London, 1976j 
J. Bergmann, 0. Jacobi and M. Muller-Jentsch, Gewerkschaften
in der BRP, Band 1, Gewerkschaftliche Lohnuolitik zwischen 
Mitgliederinteressen und okonomischen Systemzwangen, Frankfurt 
and Koln, 1975, p.222ff and the last two chapters in F. Deppe,
G. Fulberth, H.J. Harrer (eds), Geschichte der deutschen 
Gewerksohaftsbewegung, Koln, 1977- of. also Appendix 1 Table 1.
84. GB 72-75, P«332. For a further discussion of the financial position 
of trade unions in Germany of. K. Hirohe, Die Finanzen der 
Gewerkschaften, Dusseldorf and Wien, 1972 and H.-U. ITiedenhoff,
Die unbekannte Maoht, Koln, 1975*
85. Collective bargaining is analysed in great detail in Chapter 4«
86. This is by no means a deterministic statement and should not be 
taken to imply that this development was unavoidable »
this development. One of the characteristics of the German industrial
revolution was its late occurrence and this is significant because
political ideologies had developed further and so exerted a great in-
( 871fluence on the nascent trade unions.' ' The result of this influence
was fragmentation into sectional unions based on three main ideologies. 8^8^
The German General Workers' Association^ -^ founded in 1863 was primarily
influenced by the "social-democratic reformism" of Lassalle.  ^ The
Hirsoh-Buncker trade unions were formed along liberal lines with the
(9l)aim of correcting capitalism. In addition Christian trade unions
(go )were also formed based on Christian socialist teachings. '  This 
fragmention of trade unions led to a fundamental x^ eakness of the move­
ment in Germany for many years and was partly responsible for their
( 9 3 )
failure to resist national socialism. '
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industrial revolution in Germany was one of the factors which led to
Within the chemical industry management attitudes which were resistant 
to trade unions prevented successful organisation before Bismarck' 3  
anti-socialist legislation effectively disrupted the trade union move­
ment for twelve years from 1878.(^ 4 ) repeal of this legislation
'8 7. cf. B. Otto, Gewerkschaftsbex^ egung in Deutschland, Koln, 1975? 
pp.21-42 and 56-7 *
88. cjf. H. Dimmer, Die deutsche Gex+erkschaftsbewegung, Munchen and 
Wien, 6th Edition, 1973, p.l7ff and H. Grebing, The History of 
the German Labour Movement, London, 19^ 9? p.26ff.
89* Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein.
90. H. Grebing, op.cit., p.34ff and especially p.42. Marx and Engels 
were of less direct influence to the German labour movement,
Ibid., p.49*
91. B. Otto, op.cit., p.56f.
92. For a concise summary of this movement cf. H. Grebing, op .cit.,
pp.192-199 •
93* An interesting account of this struggle may be found in G. Beier, 
Das Lehrstuck vom 1. und 2. Mai 1933, Frankfurt and Koln, 1975*
9 4* H* Dimmer, op .cit♦, p.28.
led to the establishment of the Free Trade Unions amongst which was 
the Factory Workers’ Union^ ®^ which attempted to organise workers in 
the chemical industry.
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(95 )
From this time onwards, as far as the Continent was concerned "Germany
witnessed the most violent struggles ... The first objective of the
leaders (of the unions, author) was to obtain recognition, the second
to negotiate collective agreements. The obstacles were considerable:
the chemical companies were large, prosperous, concerted in their labour
policy, and, not least, supplemented social legislation by extensive
(97 )health and housing schemes. They also paid well". In general the
union was unsuccessful, at least as far as bargaining rights were con­
cerned, for by 1907 the Factory Workers’ Union only had agreements with 
18 chemical companies•(98)  ^ series of strikes at various Bayer works
were unsuccessful, Hoechst resisted unions entirely and BASF formed a
(99)company -union.
Before the First World War trade unionism had failed to establish itself 
to any degree in the chemical industry as a result mainly of co-ordinated
95* So called because of their freedom from Christian ideology, their 
full title was the General Commission of German Trade Unions 
(Generalkommission der Gewerkschaften Deutschlands). cf. H.Grebing, 
op .cit., p.68.
96. G.A. Ritter, Arbeiterbewegung, Parteien und Parlamentarismus, 
Gottingen, 1976, p.86.
97* L.F. Haber, 1971? oo .cit., p. 393* Haber also says that these 
amenities caused resentment since they were felt to be a 
substitute for wages.
98. Verband der Fabrikarbeiter Deutschlands, Festschrift zur Einneruyig 
ah die Grundung und der 40 jkhrgen Kamof, no place (Hannover),no 
date (1930), p. l’(f31
99* L.F. Haber, 1971? o p  .cit., p.393ff.
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management resistance and clever paternalistic policies.^ ^
The outbreak of the Great War saw an outbreak of nationalistic fervour 
in Germany- which also encompassed the labour movement.^ ^  Trade 
union leaders and social democrats agreed to support the war effort 
and they became increasingly involved in running the war economy.
One result of this policy was the first legal recognition of trade 
unions and the representatives of workers as part of the Auxiliary 
Service Act in 19l6.("*"®8^ At the end of the war defeat and other 
factors such as hunger and disillusionment'with their leaders caused 
the so-called November Revolution to break out.*'1®^)
The revolutionary situation and sudden influence of the Social Democrats 
in government forced the employers suddenly to make many concessions 
which they had long been resisting, such as the right to organise 
workers, the dissolution of company unions amongst many others.(~®^ )
100. Since no definative history of trade unionism in the German chemical 
industry has been written, it is not clear what the situation was as 
far as Christian or Hirsch-Duncker unions are concerned.
101. A nationalistic element had long existed in trade union ideology 
which can be traced back to Lassalle (cf. H. Grebing, op.cit., 
p.37) and remnants of this might today be found in the willing­
ness to moderate wage demands for the sake of the national economy.
102. A very interesting, if highly critical analysis of the German trade 
unions in the First World War may be found in K. Pohl and F. Nerther, 
"Die freien Gewerkschaften im ersten Weltkreig", in F. Deppe et al., 
op.cit., pp.94-145*
103* H. Dimmer, oo .cit., p.4 2. Carl Duisberg, the managing director of 
Bayer was heavily involved in the formulation of this act although 
he seems to have been against such extensive concessions to the 
•unions. Pohl and Werther, op .cit., p,123ff* For an analysis of 
the influence of this act in a large chemical works cf. Curt 
Duisberg, Die Arbeitersohaft der chemischen Grossindustrie,
Berlin, 1921, pp.74-79*
104* B, Otto, op .cit., p .65ff . cf. also H. Grebing, 00 .cit., p.97ff*
105. cf.. H. Limmer, op .cit., p.51 Tor a Tall list.
-  58 -
hut it robbed them of every chance in intervening in the structure of
> tl ( 1 0 6 )  the economy". '
This "gave the trade unions all that they had demanded for decades ...
The major consequence of the recognition of the trade unions by em­
ployers and state was a massive growth in membership, as demonstrated 
in the table below.
TABLE 2.2
/ S "NTrade Union Membership (1000 j during the early Weimar period.
ADGB Chr.Unions K.-D. Unions Total
1918 1665 405 113 2183
1919 5479 858 190 6527
1920 7890 1077 226 9193
The trade unions had suddenly gained the power which they had for so 
long lacked and as might be expected this led to a number of bitter 
conflicts. Strikes or lock-outs occurred at all the four major 
chemical sites in the early twenties and at Leuna a strike was only 
broken by calling in the troops. As a result large numbers of strikers 
were killed or wounded.
The climax of this wave of strikes took place in Lugwigshafen in 1924*
The major cause was defence of the eight hour day. Once again the troops 
were called in; however on this occasion in vain, despite the killing of
106. H. Grebing, op.cit., p.102.
107. H.-G. Schumann, ITationalsozialismus und Crewe rks chaftsbewegung,
Hannover and Frankfurt, 1958, p.l63ff.
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a number of strikers. The strike lasted for nine weeks but finally 
collapsed due to lack of funds and the principle of the eight hour day 
was lost. Despite the defeat of the union, IG Farben worked with it, 
accepting collective bargaining but the cost for the union had been 
high.(lo8)
Despite a rapid growth in trade union membership*" 10^ and an increase in 
militancy which perhaps reflected the political climate of the times, 
the unions in the chemical industry were unable to defend their rights. 
This reflected the strength of the chemical employers who displayed 
considerable resolution in the face of strike action as evidenced by a 
willingness to use lock-outs or force to win the disputes. It is likely 
that their policy was also highly centralized or even co-ordinated 
given the close associations which existed between the companies prior 
to the formation of IG Farben. Compared to the employers, the union was 
weak and ineffectual - a situation which seems remarkably similar to the 
present state of affairs. 1^10^
The trade unions were weakened considerably during the slump through loss 
of members and high unemployment.^ 111  ^ The trade union leadership totally
108. L.F. Haber, 1971? 00.cit., p«396 and J* Rauschel, op .cit., p.l3f.
After this dispute strikes in the chemical industry became very
rare. L.F. Haber, ibid.
109. In facfc , by 1924 membership had started to fall again partly as a
result of disillusionment amongst the rank and file due to the
inability of the unions to guarantee the wage levels of their 
members during a time of galloping inflation. _cf. Ii. Grebing,
op .cit., p.l28f.
110. See the discussion below and in the chapter on collective bargaining.
111. Additional fragmentation of the trade unions also occurred during 
this time xrfth the appearance of communist and National Socialist 
unions. C. Seifert "Die deutsche Gerwerkschaftsbewegung in der 
Weirmarer Republik", in F. Deppe et al., op .cit., p.!91ff and
H.-G. Schumann, op .cit., p.35ff«
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failed to appreciate the gravity of the rise of National Socialism; 
they were willing to sacrifice all their principles to try to salvage 
the organisation, but even this dubious aim eluded them. On the 2nd 
May 1933 Hitler dissolved the Free Trade unions, smashing the organi­
sation and arresting their leaders. As far as Germany was concerned 
open trade union work was finished for twelve years.
The reasons for the failure of the unions might be summarised as weak­
ness catised by a fragmented movement, poor leadership and severe economic 
conditions. During the long years of exile and imprisonment suffered by 
many trade union leaders much thought was given to the reasons for 
failure and it was resolved to try to eliminate the causes of this weak-
v
ness once the war was over. 1^11  ^ The success of these plans and the 
effect this had on trade unionism in the chemical industry is considered 
at this juncture.
The Allies decided initially to let the trade unions develop in the way 
that the workers wanted, but soon placed restrictions on the scope of 
organisation. To begin with unions were only permitted to organise 
within the locality and later this was extended to zonal level.^114^
112. of. Ibid., G. Beier, Das Lehrstuck vom 1. und 2. Mai 1933, Frank­
furt, 1975, H* Skrzypczak, "FuKrungsnr obi erne der sozialistischen
Arbeiterbewegung in der Sndphase der Weimarer Republik", in 
Herkunft und Mandat, Frankfurt and Koln, 1976, pp.128-147*
113. of. "Einheit und LTeubeginn. Die Planungen in der Emigration11, 
in U. Borsdorf, H.O. Hemmer and M. Martiny (eds), Grnndlagen- 
der Sinlieitsgewerkschaft, Frankfurt and Koln, 1977, pp.250-268.
Also interview FTO 6, Aug.'77*
114. of. E. Schmidt, 1970, op .cit., p.2pff; H. Limmer, op .cit., p.70f
and for a concise English account see D.VI.F. Bendix, Limits to
Co-determination?, Pretoria, 1973, pp.68-70.
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The early history of the Chemical Workers1 Union as described by 
respondents(“^^ s^eems to conform with the general pattern of develop­
ment. Immediate concerns were to overcome the severe living conditions 
and start production again. Only after the currency reform in 1948 was 
there any interest in collective bargaining.
Despite their original statements to the contrary the Allies soon began 
actively to influence the ftiture shape of the German trade union move­
ment. Pressure was exerted on leaders to adopt a centralised con­
federation of industrial unions as opposed to a single trade union 
covering all employees which it was feared might become too powerful. 
Eventually the trade unions bowed to this pressure.(
After the establishment of the Federal Republic in 1949 ihe German Trade(il)Union Confederation was formed. This required re-organisation and
rationalisation of a large number of local and zonal unions to conform 
with the principles of the new organisation. 8^ However, the section­
alism so long a feature of German trade unions could not be eliminated
115. Especially Interview FTO 6, Aug,'77 with a respondent who had 
become a union official in September 1945*
116. E. Schmidt, op.cit., p.36ff. British trade unionists actively 
supported the Allies in these plans and recommended that to 
Bockler and others to adopt the system of industrial unionism.
117* cf* Ibid., p.l68ff. For c\irrent membership figures see Appendix 1 
Table 1.
118. These principles are:
1. An industrial union should only represent the employees
in one particular branch of industry, such as the railways. 
(However, in practice several industries similar in nature 
are often covered.)
2. Unity, which means that each factory should only have one 
union representing its employees, whether wage earners, 
staff or civil servants.
3. The unions are independent of political parties or con­
fession .
4 . The unions are fully autonomous and control their own
finances.
cf. H. Limmer, op. cit., p.'72ff.
- 62 -
quite so easily. Immediately after the war a white-collar union was 
formed in Hamburg and in 1949 this became the German Salaried Staff 
Union. A Christian Trade Union Confederation was set up again in
1955^ 1 °^^ and a German Civil Servants* Association^^^also exists. In 
manufacturing industry none of these organisations has gained any parti­
cular significance, however. It would seem, apparently, that the German
( 1 2 2 )trade union movement has de .jure at last achieved unity' "and it might 
be assumed since one of the major causes of weakness of the trade unions 
before 1933 has been removed, that the present organisation would be 
particularly strong. Although it might be argued that this holds for 
the Metalworkers ’ Union*" ^ “^ it is certainly less true in the case of 
the Chemical Workers’ Union.
What organisational structure does the Chemical Workers* Union have and 
what relevance does this organisation have on the union’s policy and
119* Deutsche Angesteiltengewekschaft cf. 3. Otto, op.ci t ., p.98ff.
120. Christlicher Gewerkschaftsbund Deutschlands, Ibid., p.113, cf. 
also H. Grebing, op .cit., p.!96ff.
121. Deutsoher Beamtenbund, cf. K. von Beyme, Gewerkschaften und 
Arbeitsbeziehungen in kapitalistischen Landern, Munchen, 1977? 
p.46f. Membership figures for these three organisations can be 
found in Appendix 1 Table 1.
122. For a discussion of which form of trade union organisation is 
likely to develop under specific conditions cjf. Ibid., p.38ff 
and for West Germany especially, p.43*
123. Industriegewerkschaft Metall which is the largest trade union 
in a capitalist country. For a discussion of various aspects
of this union of. J. Bergmann et al., on.cit., p.l84ff; U. Millor, 
Trade Union Workplace Representation in the Federal Republic of 
Germany: An analysis of the Post-war Vertrauens1eute policy of
the German Metalworkers’ Union 1952-1977”? BJIR, Vol.XVI, No.3, 
1978, pp.335-355 an<I F. Opel, D. Schneider and 0. Brenner, 75 
Jahre Industriegewerkschaft 1891-1966. Vom Deutschen Metall- 
arbeiterverband zur Industriegewerkscliaft Uetall, Frankfurt,
i960.
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( ^
Figure 2.1
The Organisational Structure of the Chemical Workers' Union. '
A. Adapted from G3 72-75? 0 2^48. Key; ________  Elect
Delegate System 
-►Close co-operation 
“►-Appoint
Numbers in brackets indicate the number of offices. For a full 
range of statistics on the Chemical Workers' Union cf. Appendix 1 
Tables 2-9. Also, on the structure of the Chemical Workers' Union 
cf. Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforsohung, Rahmonbedingungen der 
Tarifnolitik, Band 1, Gosamtwirtschaftlic-he Ehtwicklung und 
Organisation der Tarifnarteien, Frankfurt /iTevj York, 1979? PP • 128-154 •
3. Beirat. This committee has the function of permanent body to stand 
in for the National Delegate Conference and take any decisions 
normally made at the conference but which require immediate action 
and so camrot wait for the next conference. Examples of such action 
are changes in the Rule Book or elections to e.g. the NEC (interview 
FTO 7 ? Aug.*77)? and cf. Satzung 77? Para. 48.
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effectiveness? A systematic representation of the Chemical Workers’ 
Union may he found in Figure 2.1. It can he seen that it conforms to 
the usual structure of West German unions, 1^24\;ith three main admini-
(l25) (126*) (l?7')strative levels: districts,' '^regions' 'and a head office' ‘ 'which
serves the full-time executive off icers ^ 2°^ of the National Executive 
Committee (NEC) .
The figure also illustrates the hierarchical system of delegatorial 
representation which exists in the union. It is apparent from this that 
the full-time officers of the NEC^ lj0 a^re quite remote from the member­
ship on the shop floor. The position of these officers deserves further 
consideration since an analysis of their position provides a key to 
understanding many features of the Chemical Workers1 Union and some of 
the reasons for its present weakness.
124« .of. H. Limmer, op .cit., p.77*
125. Verwaltungsstellen of. IG Chemie, Satzung 77? Paras 35-40 (cited 
hereafter as Satzung 77)•
126. Bezirke, of. Ibid., Paras 41-44*
127* Zentrale, based in Hannover.
128. Geschaftsfuhrender Hauptvorstand, consisting of 8 officers, each 
responsible for a division of the union such as finance and per­
sonnel; women members; salaried staff members and social policies 
etc. of. GB 72-75? P»7ff and- Satzung 77? Para 47*
129. (Gesamt-) Hauptvorstand., consisting of another 20 lay officers,
elected as are the full-time members of.the committee at the 
National Delegate Conference. (Gewerkschaftstag). The full 
committee meets on average four or five times per year. (inter­
view FTO 16, Feb.’78),' of. also GB 72-75, p.6f.
130. These officers will be known as 'National Executive Officers'
(NEO’s) from now on.
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O fficers might best be characterised as "centralised  power".
There are two main components on th is  power: the influence exerted by
the NEO’s on co lle c t iv e  bargaining and th e ir  control of the union
apparatus. I t  is  suggested here that there are two major reasons for
the NEO’s manoeuvring themselves into such a position . The f i r s t  i s
a desire to increase th e ir  own power; the second, an attempt to impose
a Unitarian course on a trade union which, although formally unified,
is  in fact sp l i t  along sectional and ideologica.1 l in e s .  - The idea of
(l32)opposition within trade unions is  not new' "but i t  is  contended that 
these schisms are merely the present day manifestation of the frag­
mentation which has so long been a feature of the trade union movement 
in Germany.
The p osition  of the NEC and in  p a r t ic u la r  of the National Executive
Although the co llec tiv e  bargaining system in the chemical industry is  
discussed in more d e ta il  elsewhere, the power of the NEO’s in th is  
system can be c learly  demonstrated. Even before the annual co llec tiv e  
bargaining round begins i t  i s  the practice for the NEO’s to recommend
131. This analysis i s  based primarily on interviews and informal d is­
cussions with trade union o ff ic e rs  but dravrs also on three works 
which deal with th is  particu lar question: Daielak et a l . ,  on . c i t . ,  
pp.1 1 1 - 1 3 3  which is  also based on a empirical investigation ; c f .  
also J .  Bergmann et a l . ,  op . c i t . p .270ff and H.D. Riesche, Zur 
Struktur und Funktion innergewerkschaftlicher Nillensbildung auf 
Gewerkschaftstagen der IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik 1948-1966, un­
published Diplomarbeit, Frankfurt, 19 6 8 .
132. c f . S.M. Lipset, M. Trow, J .  Coleman, Union Democracy, Glencoe,
111 .,  1956 and more recently for a B r it ish  Union: R. Undy,
"The e lecto ra l influence of the opposition party in the AUEW 
Engineering Section 1960-1975” ? BJIR, Vol.XVII, No.l, 1979? 
p . l 9 f f .
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a suitable level of demands for the lay o ff ice rs  to d e b a t e . i t  
i s  normal for the lay o f f ic e rs  to follow these recommendations f a i r ly  
c l os e l y. Unt i l  1978 wage negot ia tions were usually conducted at 
regional le v e l .  However, there was a close co-ordination of policy 
between the NBO’s and the various regional s e c r e ta r ie s . ) T?rom the
mid 1960's th is  co-ordination steadily  increased because the employers 
had begun to bargain in the various regions with wharf was e f fe c t iv e ly  a 
single committee.  ^ Furthermore, since co-ordination fa iled  badly on 
the union side in 1 9 7 1  th is  resulted in a change in policy as a resu lt  of 
a motion passed at the National Delegate Conference the following year^1^1  ^
However, although the NEC claimed in 1975 that i t  supported the principle
( -J 1 O \
of decentralised bargaining'-0 by 1978 they had been persuaded by the 
employers to bargain nationally. This had long been an aim of the
133. cf_. IG Chemie, "Chemische In d u str ie : IG Chemie-Kauptvorstand gibt 
Empfehlungen fur die Tarifrunde 1978" ,  p resse-d ienst, X iv / l ,  
Hannover, 16..1.197& -
134* Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, Tarifpolitik 1977,
Frankfurt/New York, 1978, p . l2 4 f f *
135* Bezirksleiter (interview FTO 6, Aug. ’77)*
3.36. o f.  GB 1966-68, p .257 and GB 1969-71, p*307f*
137* IG Chemie, Protokoll 9 * Qrdentlioher Gewerkschaftstag, Dortmund
17. bis 22. September 1972, Hannover, p.2p0f and Anliang p.l8f . 
(c ited  hereafter as Protokoll 1972).
138. GB 1972-75, p*349ff*
139• c f . IG Chemie, "Chemie-Runde *78 Spitzengesoroche" ,  Ge we rk s c haft s-  
p ost, (c ited  hereafter as Gp) 4178, p .2 and A rbeitsring, " Zentrale 
Tarifge spraohe" ,  Informationsbrief fur Fuhrungskrafte (cited  
heresrfter as In f o 'brief), 4/78, p .6fT In 1979 th is  practise  was 
again continued _cf. "Tarifgespraoh uber N anteltarif und Lohn- und 
Gehaltsrunde" , p resse-d ienst, X V /12, 26.2.1979* In f a c t ,  the 
f i r s t  instance of centralised  bargaining was 1975* o f » Dzielak 
e t a l . ,  op . c i t . ,  p .4 3 1 ff .
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Chemical Employers’ Associations since th is  su its  the highly cen­
tra l ise d  structure of the employers associations which are dominated 
"by the major chemical companies.
A second indication of the position of the NEO's in co lle c t iv e  bar­
gaining may be obtained by considering jo in t co n cilia tio n  procedure. (^41) 
In practice  the NEO’s always send a representative as part of the three 
man union team and i t  has been knox^ n for th is  representative to vote 
with the employers’ representatives and so bring about a binding agree- 
m e„t.( l 4 +
Should con cilia tio n  f a i l  then the NEC has s t i l l  further opportunity to 
influence the course of actio n . The NEC can decide whether to make 
s tr ik e  action dependent on a ballo t  in which case a 75 per cent vote 
in favour of action i s  required.(^43) ip^ Q c!hemi ca]. Workers' Union was 
the f i r s t  union in West Germany to c a l l  industria l action without f i r s t
140. Interviews ER 1, Aug.'77? UR 4? Sep '77? UR 7? Sen '77 and 
ER 8, Sep '77*
141* c f  * D.R. Ebsworth, "A rbitration in West Germany as i l lu s tra te d
by the Chemical Industry. Is  th is  a continuation of bargaining?" ,  
■unpublished paper given to the Federal Trust for Education and 
Research Seminar on "Conciliation and Arbitration in Brita in  and 
West Germany", held on 21.4*1978 at University of Surrey, Guildford, 
and an a r t i c le  which was mainly based on th is  paper: West Germany: 
The Importance of A rbitration", European Industria l Relations 
Review, (EIRR), No.55? August 1978, p .2 1 f .  See also the chapter 
on co lle c t iv e  bargaining below. (Since then i t  has "been decided 
that ' jo in t  c o n c il ia t io n ' is  a more appropriate term than arb i­
tra tio n )  .
142. Interview FTO 1 7 , Feb . '78  and Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, 
1978, op . c i t . ,  p .!39f«
143. Satzung 77? Para 15*
ballo ting  i t s  members. ^144  ^ i n theory, the use of fa st  industrial 
action without prior warning might be effectiv e  but i t  requires a high 
union consciousness on the part of the members, and unfortunately for 
the Chemical Workers’ Union th is  i s  lacking in the chemical industry. 
This was one of the contributory factors to the fa ilu re  of the s t r ik e .
Furthermore, the NEC may decide not to hold a b a llo t  even i f  a request 
i s  made by the co llec t iv e  bargaining committee, ^although to the 
author’s knowledge th is  has never happened. The NEC can decide to end 
a str ik e  at any time and no strike  may be held without the permission 
of the NECS 146^
This power of the NEO’s as the permanent representatives of the NEC 
has been seen to be considerable especially  since 1978 when i t  has 
been heavily involved in wage negotiations as w ell. This development 
i s  discussed in greater d e ta il  below but union o ff ic e rs  have expressed 
doubts in informal conversations whether there w ill  ever be a return to 
decentralised bargaining.
Not only do the NEO’s exert considerable influence on co llectiv e  bar­
gaining, they also e f fe c t iv e ly  control the trade union apparatus. This
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144* The employers claimed th is  s tr ik e  was i l l e g a l  and sued for
damages. However, the claim was re jected . For the basis of 
the decision c f . "Arbeitsgericht Dusseldorf, U rteil von 21.8.1972 
(7 Oa 19 9 5 / 7 lT” as published in K. Hernekamp, Arbeitskanrpf,
Aktue11e Dokumente, Berlin , 1975? 1974? p .6 7 f f .  For an analysis 
of the whole str ik e  c f . Bzielak et a l . ,  on . c i t .
145• Satzung 77? Para 16. 
1 4 6 . Ib id . ,  Paras 20-21.
includes the appointment de facto of a l l  fu ll-tim e o f f ic e r s ,  control 
of finance, having a large dependent s t a f f  to support them, the drafting 
of union guidelines and control of union publications.
Bergmann et a l . (^47)kave analysed the control of personnel appointments 
in four West German unions, one of which was the Chemical Workers' Union. 
They state  th a t :
"The NEC’s exert a considerable influence on the se lection  of personnel 
and on the appointment of fu ll-tim e o ff ice rs  at d i s t r i c t  and regional 
le v e l .  This provides the NEC's with important support for th e ir  p o l i t ic a l  
standpoints since the fu ll-tim e o ff ic e rs  determine the important everyday 
work of the organisation by putting the decisions of the National Dele­
gate Conference and the NEC's instructions into p ra c t ic e " .  ( 1 4 8 )
Although the Rule Book always gives these rights to the National Exe­
cutive Committee, the f u l l  committee meets too irregularly  ^  "49 ) .^0 eXert 
close contro l. The NSO's on the-other hand hold a meeting once a week.^ 1 ^0 
Therefore, although for accuracy the following argument w ill  deal with
I
the rights of the NEC, in practice much of th is  power is  in the hands of 
the NEO’s .
The influence of the NBC over the D is tr ic t  O ff ic ia ls  provides a good 
example. Should a fu ll-tim e o f f ic e r  be needed in a d i s t r i c t ,  then the
147* J  • Bergmann et a l . ,  00 . c i t . ,  p .2S2ff .
1 4 8 . Author's tran slation  o f ;
" . . .  verfugen die Hauptvorstande uber einen weitreichenden Binfluss 
auf die personelle Ausimhl und Besetzung der hauptamtlichen 
Funlctionarsstellen in den Verwaltungsstellen und Bezirksleitungen. 
Damit steht den Hauotvorstanden ein gewichtiges Instrument zur 1 1 "......  »■ 1 ■ ■ ' >"* I 1 1 i,m ■ . . . - lj.. . ., i i i H..I »■ '|'n<   '■ ■
Purchsetzung ihrer nolitischen Auffassungen zur Verfiigung, denn 
von den hauptamtlichen Funktionaren wird die entscheidende 
Verbandsarbeit der Alltagspraxis g e le is te t ;  s ie  setzen die 
Beschlusse der Gewerkschaft stage wie aixch die Anweisungen der111.1 .1- —I I ™ i... ■ IIMI — IIWI wil ■ I ■ — ■■■■ ■ . . I .IP.
Hauntvorstanden in die Organisationsnraxis um." Ib id . ,  p .282.
149* o f « Note 129 above.
150. Interview FTO 16, F e b . '7 8 .
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NEC suggests possible candidates in collaboration with the Regional 
Committee concerned. The o f f ic e r  i s  then elected by the D is tr ic t  
Committee and must be r a t i f ie d  by the next D is tr ic t  Conference. This 
o f f ic e r  must, however, also be r a t i f ie d  by the NEC. Not only, then, 
does the NEC have the right to suggest candidates, i t  also has to 
r a t i fy  those appointed and thus has considerable influence 011 who be­
comes a fu ll-tim e of f i oe r . ^ ^
Although the fu ll-tim e o f f ic e r  does not need to be re -e lected , ^ " ^ h i s  
contract of employment is  with NEC, and he may only be dismissed by the 
NEC, normally a f te r  discussion with the D is tr ic t  Committee, but i f  
required, such as in the case where instant dismissal becomes necessary, 
on the decision of the NEC a lo n e .^ 5 3 )
At regional level the influence of the NEC is  extremely s i mi l ar . ^ ^  
Nevertheless, as w ill  be seen below these powers of influence have not 
led to a monolithic body of o f f i c i a l s ,  nor for that matter i s  the NEC 
monolithic in structure. There i s ,  in fa c t ,  a considerable body of 
opposition to the policy of the NEC even amongst the fu ll-tim e o f f ic e r s .
The authority of the NEC in personnel matters is  not limited to the
151. Satzung 77? Para 36.
152. The reason for th is  was to strengthen the position of these 
o ff ic e rs  against loca l o f f i c ia l s  who might not want to follow 
the trade union p o lic ie s .  (interview FTO 16, F e b .’7 8 ) .  For
a history of the development of these powers c f .  Dzielak et a l . ,  
op . c i t . ,  p . l 25f .
153. Satzung 77? para 3 6 . 9 . The regulations for fighting dismissal 
or expulsion from the union can be found in Ib id . ,  Para 52. 
Informal discussions indicate that in 1979 even these regulations 
were tested by the NEC.
154. Ibid.., Para 42.
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fu ll-tim e o f f ic e r s .  Many lay posts, such as on d i s t r i c t  and regional
(1^5)committees, require the r a t i f ic a t io n  of the incumbants by the NEC.' 
Another example of the influence of the NEC may be found in i t s  de­
termination of trade union candidates for election  to the supervisory 
boards of companies in the organisational area of the union. ^
Although such rights seem p erfectly  reasonable as these representatives 
may provide the union with much important information, the regulations 
for th is  are not to be found in the Rule Book, but in .guidelines laid 
down'by the NEC.^1- '^
Such guidelines, a number of which ex ist covering various areas of
/ -j j— o N
work, ' -7  'are yet a further indication of the control of the organisation
exercised by the NEC. These guidelines seem to have the power of ru les ,
although they are passed by the NEC -  in th is  probably the f u l l  NEC -
(159)and not the National Delegate Conference. '
Undoubtedly much of the detailed preparation which goes into these 
guidelines is  carried out by the large s t a f f  based at head o f f ic e .  These 
o f f i c i a l s ,  several of whom have academic qu alif ica tion s are appointed by 
the NEC. This s t a f f  increased rapidly in size over the period 1971 to
155* For typical regulations c_f. Ib id . ,  Paras 36 .3 , 42.2 and 45*2.
1 5 6 . According to the Co-determination Act 1976. Further discussion
of th is  law may be found below. Also cf_. D.W.F. Bendix, on . c i t . ,  
p . 1 2 0 f f .
157* o f . IG Chemie, Rich tl in ie n  fur Aufsichtsratswahlen, 15.6.1976,
Section 1 .3  and I I I .  10.
I58* c f . Satzung 77, P *88 for a recent, i f  not fu lly  up-to-date l i s t .
This power i s  based on Ib id . ,  Para 47*8 (a ) .
159* o f .  Dzielak et a l . ,  on . o i t . ,  p.129.
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to 1 9 7 5 ? and although the ra t io  of head o ff ice  o f f i c ia l s  to regional 
o f f i c ia l s  was only 1.86 to l , ^ lo0^this change r e f le c ts  perhaps the 
increase in authority of the NEC over th is  period.
Another manifestation of the power of the NEC is  i t s  control of the 
finances of the union. Such control is  neither surprising not unusual; 
however, the amount which the NSC controls i s  considerable. I t  seems 
the NEC controls a l l  funds except the percentage of dues received by 
d is t r ic t s  which in the Chemical Workers1 Union varies from about 4 -  10# 
a f te r  a l l  personnel, administrative and material costs have been covered. 
The amount varies according to the needs of the d i s t r i c t ,  and lim its are 
imposed in guidelines. Spending i s  watched over by lay and full-tim e 
auditors. )
Part of the funds controlled by the NEC are spent on publications. The 
trade union paper, which appears monthly, Gewerkschaftspost (Gp), has 
an edition of h a lf  a m illion , ^® ^and i t  is  an instrument of the NEC.^1®"  ^
The cost of publications in general was DM 9*2 million for the period 
1972 to 1 9 7 5 , ^1®4 ^but several other publications are produced, including
160. GB 1972-75? p*343* Bergmann et a l . compared th is  ra t io  for four 
unions at the beginning of the 1970fs .  At th is  time the Chemical 
Workers’ Union ra t io  was 1.35 to 1, compared with the Metalworkers’ 
Union with a ra t io  of 3.6 to 1 and Building Workers’ Union with 
4*4 to 1. They explain th is  difference by the re la tiv e  strength
of the regional organisation in the Chemical Workers’ Union.
J .  Bergmann et a l . ,  op . c i t . ,  0 . 289 .
161. This information is  based mainly 011 Interview FTO 6, Aug.’77 *
Also c f .  J .  Bergmann et: a l . ,  op . c i t . ,  p .288.
162. R. Juhe, Gewerkschaftspresset Organisation, Kosten, Z ie le , Koln, 
1977? P* 1 5 . (This publication comes from the In s t i tu t  der 
deutschen W irtsohaft, an organisation run by the two main em­
ployers’ organisations. _cf. W. Simon, Maoht und Herrschaft der
Unternehmerverbande EDI, BDA und DIHT, IColn, I 976? P • 1391'£ • )
16 3 . R. Juhe, op.cit. ,  p .10. Also cf. Satzung 77? Para 59*
16 4 . GB 1972-75, p .331.
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one fo r o f f i c i a l s  and one fo r  works councillo rs  . )
I t  has been seen, then, that the influence of the 'TEC, and p articu larly  
of the NSO's extends through co llec tiv e  bargaining to control of the 
trade union organisation, which is  manifested by a great influence on 
the personnel p o lic ies  of the unions, the use of guidelines, support 
from head o ff ice  s t a f f ,  publications and control of finances.
However, i t  would be naive to claim that there are no lim its to the 
power of the NEC. The NSC i s ,  of course, bound to the rules in the 
Rule Book and to the decisions of the National Delegate Conference, as 
we 11 as the Union Standing Committee.  ^ In addition, the NEC's are
the only fu ll-tim e o ff ic e rs  in the union who are subject to periodical 
r e -e le c t io n . At present th is  occurs every four years at the
National Delegate Conference.
Despite th is ,  as far  as has been able to be established, no fu ll-tim e 
member of the NEC who has stood for re -e lection  has ever been re je c ted . 
In 1975, la s t  e lectio n , the percentage of voted oast for the eight 
candidates varied from 93 to 63 per cen t .^ 1^9  ^ I t  is  in terestin g  to 
note that the o f f ic e r  in charge of co llectiv e  bargaining received the
16 5 . Gewerkschaftliche Umschau (Bi-monthly).
166. Der Betriebsrat (monthly).
1 6 7 . Satzung 77, Para 47»8(a).
168. Interview FTC 16, F e b . '7 8 .
1 6 9 . Own calculations from IG Chemie, Protokoll 10. Qrdentlicher 
Gewerkschaftstag, Hamburg 19» bis 25. September 1976, Hannover, 
p .2 8 6 f f . (cited  further as Protokoll 1976T* Only one lay 
o f f i c i a l  put forward as a candidate for the NEC has been 
re jected  in the f i r s t  vote, and he was subsequently elected
in the second. Ib id . ,  p .305ff  and 314*
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lowest vote, i l lu s t r a t in g  how unpopular actions in th is  area can cost 
v o tes .
As the NEC is  well aware that i t  must face re -e lec t io n , a consideration
of the structure of delegates at National Conferences should provide
some explanation of the policy of the NEC, since i t  knows where i t s
support must come from. Approximately 25 per cent of delegates are
(170)full-tim e o f f i c e r s , '  'a  large number of these being D is tr ic t  Secre- 
(171)t a r ie s .  A further 63.1 per cent of delegates were works councillors
as against only 5*8 per cent who were simply lay o f f i c e r s . ( 172) The
occupational group "sa laried  s t a f f "  i s  also over-represented. In 1972, 
31.7 per cent of delegates came from th is group as compared with a 
membership in the union as a whole of 14*9 per c e n t .^ 178  ^ In 1975 the
respective figures were 3 6 . 1  per cent and 1 7 . 6  per cent.*'"*'7' )^
170. J .  Bergmann et a l . ,  op .o it  *, 0.296  and Protokoll 1976, p .224*
171. H.P. Riesche, 00 . c i t . ,  p .28.
172. This 63.1# may be subdivided as follows;
.31*0$ Full-time works council chairmen.
3.7^ Part-time works council chairmen 
2 2 .6$ Full-time works councillors*
5 . 8?' P art-t  ime works councillors.
Own calculations from Protokoll 1976, p .224*
1 7 3 . Protokoll 1972, p .202 and Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung,
Band 1, 1979? 00 . c i t . ,  p .147*
174* Own calcu lations, Protokoll 1976, p .224 and Projektgruppe
Gewerkschaftsforschung, Band 1, 1979? 00 . c i t . ,  p .147* Despite, 
or because of the large number of salaried s t a f f  (see Chapter 3
below) in the chemical industry, neither the Chemical Workers' 
Union, nor the German Salaried S ta f f  Union have been able to 
organise many w hite-collar workers. The number of members in 
th is  la t te r  organisation was evidently so low that a national 
exeoutive committee member was unwilling to sta te  the level of
membership in the chemical industry. (interview FTQ 13, Sep*T77)» 
This being so, the consequences of the lack of a separate white- 
c o lla r  union may perhaps be found in intra-organisational con­
f l i c t  within the Chemical Workers' Union.
-  75 -
I t  i s  most necessary, therefore for the NEC to keep the works councillors 
happy. Whilst th is  group is  also by no means monolithic in ideology, 
p articu larly  works council chairmen and works councillors from the 
larger chemical works have a reputation of accepting the ideology of 
so c ia l partnership. This is  also generally true of salaried s t a f f .
This naturally  has consequences for the unions1 p o lic ie s ,  and leads 
generally to moderation.
Although a detailed analysis of the role of the National Delegate Con-
/ *1 rj /? A
ference' "would be outside the scope of th is  study i t  might be 
summarised thus:
"A comparison of the position of the National Delegate Conference, the
highest le g is la t iv e  body with the highest executive body, the NEC, shows
the le g is la t iv e  to be in fe r io r " .  ( 1 7 7 )
I have argued that the position of the NEC and especia lly  of the NEO’s 
is  one of "centralised  power", receiving important support from members 
who are works councillors and salaried s t a f f .  This has consequences
for the strength of the union at local le v e l .
( 17 P )Since many works co u n cillo rs ' "in the chemical industry, and p a r t i ­
cularly in the larger companies are not renowned for th e ir  support of
Dzielak et a l . ,  passim.
176. _cf. H.D. Diesche, on . c i t . ,  and J .  Bergmann et a l . ,  op . c i t . ,  
p .292f f .
177* Authors’ translation  o f:
"Vergleiolit man die Stellung des hochsten Legislativorgans 
Gewerkschaftstag mit der des entsprechenden Exekutivorgans 
Hauptvorstand, so ergibt sich eine . . .  Unterlegenheit der 
Leg is la tiv e" . Dzielak et a l . ,  op . c i t  ♦, p .130.
1 7 8 . A more detailed analysis of the role of works councillors 
within the chemical industry can be found below, c f .
Chapter 5*
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(179)organisation in these works.
the union in t h e i r  works, t h i s  has contributed, to  a very low leve l of
The NEC is  aware of th is  weakness, and although i t  needs the support of
these groups attempts have been made to strengthen the position of the
union lo c a lly  against the works councillors; one such has already been
mentioned.: d i s t r i c t  se cre ta r ies  do not need to be re-e lected  once they
they hold the post* The rights of the lay o ff ic e rs  were also increased
at the beginning of the 1970 ?s ^ld0^but despite these changes the works
councillors s t i l l  have the dominating position in the works. ) As
a resu lt  of the developments described above an opposition group ex is ts
within the union consisting  of a large number of lay o f f ic e r s ,  some
progressive works councillors and a re la t iv e ly  small number of f u l l -
(182 )time o ff ic e rs  including a minority of the NEO’s .  'J
The consequences of a highly cen tra lised , yet divided, union apparatus 
and a weak union organisation at shop floor level can be c lea r ly  seen 
by considering co lle c t iv e  bargaining in recent years. Early in the 
1 9 7 0 ’s one reaction was to try  to introduce local bargaining in order 
to strengthen the loca l union organisation. “u This policy was
179* Except at BASF, Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, 1978, 
on . c i t . ,  p . 1 4 6 .
180. See Chapter 5 below and J .  Bergmann et a l . ,  op . c i t . ,  p .305f.
181. Dzielak et a l . ,  o p .c i t . ,  p .121. The empirical in vestig atio n s, 
a part of th is  study, confirmed these findings. (interviews 
V L 1, VL 3 and VL 5, a l l  O c t . ’7 8 ) .
182. Information from informal discussions, confirmed in Pro jekt­
gruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, 1978, op . c i t . ,  p . l2 2 f .
183. The Hessen region tr ied  to introduce i t  in vain in 1970. 
o f .  Ib id . ,  p ,8 5 f .
extremely controversial within the union and provoked a f a i r ly  violent 
argument for some years4(^84)
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In the end, however, th is  policy fa ile d  due to extreme resistance by 
f 1 PR 1
the employers "a n d  i t  has more or less  been abandoned, leaving a 
s itu ation  in the larger companies of a, considerable difference between 
the agreed basic rates and the basic level of earnings. ( 188^
Some regions then tr ie d  to gain agreements which included minimum wage 
increases as opposed to simple percentages in an attempt to decrease 
d i f f e r e n t ia ls .  By 1977? however, th is  policy met increased opposition, 
p articu larly  from the group of salaried  s t a f f  members, so that in th is  
year most d i s t r i c t s  demanded percentage in c r e a s e s .^ 87)
Since bargaining has been carried out at national lev e l ,  the agreements 
reached have only been of the percentage increase type.^188  ^ I t  seems, 
therefore , as far  as co lle c t iv e  bargaining is  concerned that centralised 
bargaining aiming to uphold d if fe r e n t ia ls  has gained ascendancy, despite 
the opposition of a faction  within the union.
1 8 4 . o f .  Protokoll 1972, p.470TB• Various points of view were put 
forward by respondents e .g . Interviews ETO 1, Aug.'77? ETO 6,
Aug.'77 and BRV 5? Sep.»77.
18 5 . This opinion was fo rce fu lly  put by most representatives of 
employers association s, e .g . Interviews ER 1, Aug.'775 UR 4?
Aug.'77 and ER 8, S e p . '77-
186. The la t t e r  i s  also hard to determine, and the gap varies from
company to company, e . g . Interviews CM 11, Sep. '77? 12-17$;
BRV* 5? S e p . '77? 50-60$; ETO 11, S e p . '77? 30-40$; Agrochemie AG 
case study works ca . 20$. There seems to be an association 
between the size of company and the level of plus payments.
187. cf. Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, 1978, op.cit., p.l22ff«
188. o f . "Mehr Urlaub -  Mehr Geld -  Chemie Tarifrunde 7 8 " Gp, 5/78,
p .3 and " 4»3 Prozent mehr Bohn und Gehalt Sechs. Nochen Urlaub
fur a l le  ab 1984* Mehr zusatzliches Urlaubsgeld." pressedienst,
XV/2 0 ," 2 6 . 3 . 1 9 7 9 . ■—
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Another long standing argument within the Chemical Workers* Union has 
centred around the question of plant representatives who ex is t  in a 
number of large chemical companies.^ ^ 9 )
The argument reached a head early in 1979 when an attempt was made to 
give a l l  plant representatives the status of lay o f f ic e r s .  Opposition 
within the union was disregarded to such an extent that a number of 
front page a r t ic le s  appeared in the "Frankfurter Rundschau" . Such 
p u blicity  was eventually given to the opposition campaign against the 
majority of the NEO’s, and such a wave of so lid arity  occurred amongst 
fu ll-tim e o ff ic e rs  against the over-reaction of the NEO’s that the 
proposals were eventually modified.
The Chemical Workers’ Union might be summarised, then, as a highly
centralised  union which gives considerable power to the NEC and'to i t s
permanent o f f i c i a l s ,  the NEO’s .  One consequence of th is  has been a
(191)weak shop f lo o r  organisation' and another has been opposition within 
the union, mainly based on ideological and sectional lines which r e f le c t  
perhaps tra d it io n a l s p l i t s  within the German trade \mions. Despite the 
power of the NEC, the opposition group has sometimes been able to modify
18 9 . Known generally in German as: betrieb liche Vertrauensleute" , they 
are elected hy a l l  employees, not just the union members. For 
example, o f . Hoechst AG, Betriebsvereinbarimg; uber betrieb liche 
Vertrauensmanner, Frankfurt(M)-  Hochst, 13.3.1967 * ~
190. This information comes primarily from informal discussions. The 
o f f i c i a l  trade union reaction may be found in "Vertrauenserklarung 
fur Karl Hauenschild. Verurteilung; tendenzioser Beriohterstattung; 
der ’Frankfurter Rundschau’" oressedienst, XV/2 5 , 5 *4*1979 ? 
"Berufung; b le ib t die Ausnahme" ,  Gu 3/79, P • 2 and "Anderung; der 
Satzung" , Go 4/79, p •2.
191. A more detailed analysis of the reasons for the weakness of the 
shop f loo r  organisation is  presented below. A sig n ifican t cause 
i s ,  however, the workforce structure of the chemical ind.ustry.
policy, although centralism seems to he gaining as far as co llec t iv e  
bargaining is  concerned,.^1" ^
As Klaus von Beyme has pointed out, ^ ^ c e n t r a l i s m  in trade unions i s  
not n ecessarily  bad, nor must decentralisation be good. However, i t  
i s  important that the trade union should be able to f u l f i l  i t s  ro le ,  
and not only in times of economic s t a b i l i t y .  I t  i s  contended that the 
cen tra lisa tio n  of the Chemical Workers’ Union has further increased 
i t s  weakness at shop f loo r  level which has consequences for the a b i l i ty  
of th is  union to str ik e  successfu lly  in the chemical industry.
( i i i )  Employers’ organisations and management.
German chemical companies have twice achieved a dominant position in 
the world chemical industry and management has made a s ig n if ica n t  con­
tribution  to th is  economio growth. Furthermore, rpanagement in the 
chemical industry has a long trad ition  of co-operation amongst i t s e l f ,  
not only in c a r te ls  but also through the formation of trade and employers ' 
association s. In th is  section the ro le  of employers’ organisations and 
management in the economic development and industria l re la tion s in the 
chemical industry are considered. I t  w ill  be shown that although owners 
and managers were partly  responsible for th is  economic growth, subse­
quently economic and p o l i t i c a l  developments together with the industria l 
organisation and the nature of the chemical industry exert considerable 
influence on the structure and function of both management and employers ’ 
organisations.
192. The e f fe c t  of employers’ policy on th is  tendency is  also d is­
cussed below.
1 9 3 . O o .c i t . ,  p .68.
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a. orSani sa‘fei°ns •
A consideration of the h is to r ic a l  development of chemical employers’ 
organisations w ill help to explain the current role and structure of 
employers’ organisations within the West German chemical industry.
Although, on- i t s  formation in 1 8 7 6 , the Central Association of German
Industria l i s t s  (CVDI/ 194\*as a confederation of associations from many
(195)branches of industry, " i t  did not include an organisation represent­
ing chemical manufacturers. Not u n til  one year la te r  was such an 
organisation formed. I t  seems highly l ik e ly  that th is  delay in
formation of an organisation to represent the chemical industry is  a 
re f le c t io n  of the rather belated developmert of th is  industry compared
with those industries such as coal, iron and t e x t i le s  which are the
(197 )c la s s ic  vehicles of the industria l revolution. "
/ n qO\
The power of the iron and s te e l  in d u str ies '"  "within the CVDI together 
with the divergence of in te re s ts  and p o lic ies  which existed between the 
owners of the heavy industries and the chemical industry caused the 
Chemie-Verein to leave the CVDI in l8 9 0 .^ 1^ ^  Not only did the
194* Gentralverband Deutsoher In d u s tr ie l le r . For an account of th is  
organisation o f.  H. Kaelbe, In d u strie lle  In teressenoolitik  in 
der Wilhelminischen G esellschaft, Berlin , 1967*
195* W. Simon, op . o i t . ,  p .19.
1 9 6 . This organisation was called Verein zur Hahrmg der In toressen 
der Chemischen Industrie Deutachlands, Chemie-Verein for short.
197* For example, in I 87O German a lk a li  production was only 34900 
tonnes compared with 1 . 4  million tons of pig-iron and 170000 
tons of s t e e l ,  L .F. Haber, 1958, o p  . c i t . ,  p .47 and W.O. 
Henderson, The Rise of German Industrial Power 1834-1914?
London, 1975? p»140 respectively .
1 9 8 . For the influence of these industries in the CVDI c f . H. Kaelbe,
o p .c i t . ,  p .39 •
1.99. I b i d .,  p . 175.
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chemical manufacturers and the owners of many of the newer manu­
facturing industries disagree with the p ro tection ist p o lic ies  supported
( 200 )by the heavy in d u str iesv as the newer industries were more export
intensive, there were also ideological differences between the two
groups of in d u str ies . (201  ^ Whereas the owners of the heavy indtistries
( 202)were protagonists of a form of a-uthoritarian paternalism, those in
the new industries such as chemicals employed a system of socia l 
paternalism. ( 2®8  ^ However, i t  seems that the reasons for th is ,  at 
lease as far  as the chemical industry was concerned, were more pragmatic 
than tru ly  ideological, since the chemical employers remained vehement 
in th e ir  opposition to trade unions and the c o lle c t iv isa t io n  of th e ir  
employees.
One reason for th is  so c ia l paternalism was the rapid growth of the 
chemical industry. As a resu lt  of th is  the industry had large labour 
requirements and in order to a t tra c t  th is  labour and reduce turnover i t  
introduced a wide range of welfare b e n e f i ts . (2°4) Another reason was the 
tendency to build chemical works on green f ie ld  locations and the re­
sultant lack of local f a c i l i t i e s  made the introduction of a large range 
of the benefits such as housing a n e ce ss ity . ( 20^) ICaelbe also considers
200. c_f. W.O. Henderson, op . c i t . ,  p .2 1 2 ff .
201. H.-P. Ullmann, Der Bund der In d u str ie llen , Gottingen, 1976, 
p. 3 6 f .
202. c f .  H. Kaelbe, o p  . c i t . ,  p«54Tf.
203* H.-P. Ullmann, o p .o i t . ,  p .3 7 f f .
204* c f .  L .F. Haber, 1958, op . c i t . ,  p.249T* These benefits were
made possible by the high p ro fit  rates of the industry.
Dzielalc et a l . ,  op . c i t . ,  p. 64*
205. The Bayer works in Leverkusen provides an excellent example of 
t h i s .  (interview OM 12, No.’78 ) .
that the size of fa c to r ies  was an important factor  here .^20°^ He 
argues that the formation of large fa c to r ie s  i s  not conducive to 
so c ia l paternalism, and although he presents figures to support th is  
argument the current s itu ation  in the German chemical industry, where 
the major companies s t i l l  display th is  sort of paternalism seems to 
invalidate h is argument.
This s p l i t  amongst the employers led in 1895 + o the formation of the
(207 )Federation of In d u s tr ia l is ts ,  'not least due to in i t ia t iv e s  by the
Ghemie-Verein{ 2°®^ I t  i s  in terest in g  to r e f le c t  that at a time when
the German trade union movement was divided along ideological l in e s ,
the employers’ organisations were also s p l i t .  This division does not
seem, however, to have hindered the industria l re la tion s p o lic ies  of
the chemical companies. Although many of the early associations had.
been formed with the express aims of re s is t in g  the new organisations of 
( 209 )labour, and despite the fact  that shortly a f te r  the turn of the
century both the CVBI and the BI founded employers’ asso c ia tio n s ,^ 210  ^
management policy which was often co-ordinated had been so successful
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206. Due to the la te  development of the chemical industry, there were 
few large chemical works at th is  time. For example, in 1895
13 per cent of emplojrees in the chemical industry worked in 
large works compared with 45 Per cent in the coal, iron and 
s te e l  in du stries . H. Kaelbe, on . c i t . ,  p .60.
207. Bund der Ind ustrie llen  (B l ) .  For an account of th is  organisation 
o f . H.-P. Ullmann, op . c i t .
208. Ib id . ,  p . 2 9 f•
209. H. Hartmann, Authority and Organisation in German Management, 
Westport, Connecticut, 1970, c.1959, p .209 and Interview
ER 3, Aug.‘77*
210. These associations were the Hauptstelle der Deutschen Arbeit 
geberverbande (CVDl) and the Verein der Beutschen Arbeit­
geberverbande ( B l ) .  W. Simon, op . c i t . ,  p .26. I t  i s  uncertain 
i f  the Chemie-Verein followed suit at the same time. Dzielak 
et a t . ,  (op. c i t . , p.~68) sta te  that they did whereas Ullmann 
(op . c i t . ,  p. 1 9 7 ) claims the opposite occurred.
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at re s is t in g  trade unionism in the chemical industry that few companies 
f e l t  i t  necessary to jo in .  Thus only 16 per cent of employees in the
chemical industry worked in companies which were members of the chemical
( 211)employers' associations around 19IO. 7
Despite the formal schism between these two employers' associations,
they shared sim ilar in te re s ts  and th is  led f i r s t l y  to close co-operation
(212)and f in a l ly  to amalgamation in 1913. German employers thus achieved
unity far  e a r l ie r  than the trade unions, in fact  before a central em­
ployers' association had even been formed in the chemical industry.
Since th is  time employers in Germany have displayed considerable 
so l id a r ity ,  a trad ition  which at the present time takes the form of 
sympathetic lock-outs and the maintenance of s t r i c t  d iscip line in the 
face of s tr ik es  such as re s is t in g  pressure to form company agreements. )
During the F ir s t  World War the CVDI s.nd BI were required to co-opera,te
closely  and employers' organisations gained in importance s ig n if ica n tly
under war condi t i ons. ip^ e ghemie-Verein, for example, took over
organisation and management of the export control system. a
resu lt  of th e ir  co-operation during the war and given the precarious
situation  of employers a f te r  Germany's defeat, the GVDI and BI decided
to amalgamate th e ir  organisations early in 1 9 1 9 * The resu lt of th is
(2 l6 )merger was the National Federation of German Industries. ' In
211. H. Kaelbe, on . c i t . ,  p .82.
212. This organisation was called the Vereiningung der deutschen
Arbeitgeberverbande, (VDA) .  H.-P. Ullmann, on . c i t . ,  p .199 ♦
213. For an example from the chemical industry in 1971 o f « Dzielak 
et a l . ,  o p .c i t . ,  p.394T«
214* W. Simon, o p .o i t . ,  p .27ff«
215. L.F. Haber, 1971, o n . c i t p. 2 5 9 .
216. Heichsverband der Deutschen Industrie (RDl), W. Simon, op.c i t . ,  
p .3 2 f f .
th is  way the h i-p a r t i te  system of employer representation in Germany^21^  
was created which may s t i l l  he found today. Trade associations and 
employers’ associations are organised at national level in two separate 
confederations, the VBA. and RBI of the Weimar Republic having been
( p i  p )
replaced by the BBA and EDI' 'a f t e r  the Second ’World War.
The aftermath of the F ir s t  World War also had d irect consequences for
employers’ organisations in the chemical industry. The f i r s t
centralised  chemical employers’ association  was founded on the express
request of the trade unions in 1 9 1 8 . This had immediate resu lts  for
the following year the f i r s t  national co llec t iv e  agreement for the
(219 )chemical industry was signed. Relations between trade unions and
employers continued to be reasonably good at national level for when
the General Federation of German Trade Unions (ADGB) withdrew from the
( 220)Zentralarbeitsgemeinschaft' in 1922, the indu stria l equivalent in
(221)the chemical industry remained in ex istence ' "although "resp o n sib ility
for  wages and conditions of work was transferred to a special negot-
(222)ia t in g  body, the Tarifgomeinschaft Chemie" .
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217. This ignores the Chambers of Industry and Commerce ( industrie- 
und Handelskammer) which organise a l l  the employers in given 
l o c a l i t i e s ,  c f . Ib id . ,  p . l2 2 f f .
2 1 8 . These organisations are called the Bundesvereinignng der 
Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbande or Confederation of German 
Employers* Associations and the Bundesverband der Deutschen 
Industrie or Federation of German Industries respectively .
219. Dzielak et a l . ,  op . c i t . ,  p .66f .  This agreement had three 
signatory parties on the trade union side, thb Factory Workers’ 
Union, together with Christian and H.-D. Factory Workers’ 
Associations. In Leverkusen 10 unions, many of which were 
oraft unions, were involved in looal agreements at th is  time. 
Curt Duisberg, op . c i t . ,  p .97f*
220. Formed in 1918 to co-ordinate employers’ and trade unions1 
actions during the immediate post-war period. c_f. H. Limmer, 
op . c i t . ,  p .50f f .
221. W. Greiling, 75 Jahre Chemieverband, Frankfurt, 1952, p .42.
222. L.F. Haber, 1971? op . c i t . , p. 259*
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At th is  point of time the tendencies towards c a r te l isa t io n  which had 
been apparent in the chemical industry f in a l ly  led to the formation of 
IG Farben. This enormous concern continued to pursue the so c ia l 
paternalism which had been a ch a ra c te r is t ic  of i t s  founder companies.
The level of plus rate  payments and welfare benefits  in the chemical 
industry was extremely high throughout th is  time, especially  in IG
Farben, and th is  aided the employers in containing the influence of
, . (223)the trade unions. ' '
In the immediate years a f te r  the Second World War the chemical
employers’ associations reformed f i r s t  loca lly  and by 1947 had achieved
a quasi-national organisation. Two years la te r  the Federation of
(224)German Chemical Employers’ Associations was founded. The Arbeits­
ring Chemie i s  an important member of the EDA^ 2 2 and sim ilarly  the
Association of the Chemical Industry (VCl), founded in 1951, i s  a
( 2?61member of the EDI. In th is  way the separation of in te re s ts  between
trade and employers’ associations which has tra d it io n a lly  existed in 
Germany was continued by the chemical industry in the Federal Republic. 
Nevertheless, co-operation between the two employers’ organisations in 
the chemical industry which had always been close grew more extensive
223. Dzielak et a l . ,  o p .o i t . ,  p .67f*
224« Arbeitsring der Arbeitgeberverbande der Deutschen Chemischen 
Ind u strie , or simply A rbeitsring (Chemie) .  o f .  L. Losacker, 
“P ortra it  eines Verbandes -  25 Jahre Arbeitsring der Arbeitgeber-...... ,|r„ .... — — —    —     —  - ...1^ . ...      ■ 1 1 W ... I .1 . 1. , .w. .. .
verbande der Deutschen Chemischen Industrie e .V . 1’ , in 25 Jahre 
Arbeitsring Chemie, Wiesbaden, 1974* Also o f .  Projektgruppe 
Gewerkschaftsforschung, V o l . l ,  1979, o p .c i t . ,  pp.117-127•
225* One re f le c t io n  of the importance of the A rbeitsring Chemie in 
the BEA was the succession of Ctto Ssser erstwhile President 
of the Arbeitsring to the post of President of the EDA on the 
death of Hanns-Hartin Bchleyer. c f . " Interview mit EDA -  
Prasident Otto B sse r , "  In fo b r ie f , 4/ 7 8 , n .3 f f  and Interview 
ER 8 ,  S e p .’77*
226. " 100 Jahre Verband der Chemischen Ind u strie , "  In fo b r ie f , 10/77,
P *3 f . For an analysis of the role of the BKfcjf. W. Simon, o p .c i t .
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with the passage of time p articu larly  on matters which concern both
(227 )organisations such as co-determination.
The Arbeitsring Chemie attempted to reaxreken the attitu des of so c ia l  
partnership which had existed in the chemical industry between em­
ployers and trade unions in the Weimar Republ i c. This policy was 
successful in the immediate post-war years with employers and unions 
working together to reconstruct the industry, and these attitudes 
apparently determined re la tio n s  between the Arbeitsring and the Chemical 
Workers’ Union through the 1950fs . )
What is  the structure of the Arbeitsring and how does th is  influence 
policy? Figure 2.2 shoxvs a schematic representation of the organi­
sation . Companies are organised into regional employers asso c ia tio n s ; ( ^ 0 )
these associations e lec t  representatives to a General Meeting^ 28^and
(232)they also appoint the standing Committee. ' The peak of the organisation
227. L. Losacker, 00 . c i t . ,  and Interview ER 8, S ep . '77 . Li several 
cases the Regional Directors of the Chemical Employers’ Assoc­
iations also run the Regional Trade Associations. Interviews 
ER 1, ER 3 and 3R 6, a l l  Aug.'77*
2 2 8 .  Dzielak et a l . ,  on . c i t . ,  p .6 8 .
229. Ib id . ,  p .69 and L. Losacker, op . c i t .
230. For example, in 1975, The Chemical Employers’ Association
in Baden-Wurttemberg had 307 member companies which employed 
77 695 persons. Arbeitsgeberverband Chemie Baden-Wurttemberg, 
Satzung, Hitgliedschaften . . . ,  Baden-Baden, 1.1.1975 a^d 
Arbeitsring, Zahlen zur S o z ia lo o li t ik ,  1979, o p .c i t . ,  p .6.
231* Mitgliederversammlung, c f . Satzung des Arbeitsring, 1976 ,
Paras 8 and 9•
232. M if'g liederra t , c f . I b id . ,  Paras 10 and 11.
(233) (?7Aconsists of the Executive Committee "which appoints the Directorate..
Figure 2.2
The Structure of the "Arbeitsring Chemie"
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1900 Chemical Works, Factories e tc .  671  000 Employees
A. Information from 25 Jahre Arbeitsring Chemie, 
pp . c i t . , ;  Sa.tzung des A rbeitsrings, op . c i t . ,  
and H. Maasen, Verfassungsbeschwerde der 
Arbeitgebervereinigungen gegen das KitbestG. ,
Bonn-Bad Godesberg,28.6.1977? p .33 (cited 
hereafter as Arbeitgeberbeschwerde ) . Numbers 
in brackets indicate number of persons on 
the particu lar body.
B. This association has no member companies but s ix  local 
employers’ association s. Ib id . ,  p.39I'f*
Esz
elect
appoint
close
4 r ~ ' *co-onera.ti.on
233. Vorstand, consisting of a President (Vorsitzender) and two
Vice Presidents and a further s ix  members in 1977 (excluding 
the Director General who also has a se a t) .  Interview ER 8, 
S e p .’77» However a to ta l  of eight additional members may be 
e lected . Satzung des A rbeitsrings, op . c i t . ,  Para 12.
234* Geschaftsfuhrung, consisting of a Director General (Haunt-  
ge s chaf t  s f  fthr er) and two Deputy D irectors. Ibid . ,  Para 14 
and 25 Jahre Arbeitsring Chemie, op . c i t .
According to Dzielak et al. the most important decision making body in 
the Arbeitsring is the Meeting of Representatives of Member Associations
(pic ]
(General Meeting). The voting system of this meeting reflects the
importance of collective bargaining, the major role of the employers ’ 
associations in the chemical industry, since wage costs are used to 
determine the number of votes which each member association has.^28^) 
However, this General Meeting only takes place once a year and is 
therefore not able to influence everyday activities.
The Standing Committee of Members has a far greater influence on the
policy of the chemical employers' associations. It has three major
tasks; it elects the Executive Committee (EC) every two years,^287^it
(? 10 )also appoints the Co-ordination Committee' 0/rrom amongst its members
and. the collective bargaining committees of the member associations,
and it elects the national collective bargaining committee. In this
way the Standing Committee directly appoints those bodies which carry
(239 )out both national and regional bargaining, 'as well as the most 
senior lay officers. The number of seats which each of the regional
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235* Dzielak et a l . ,  op . c i t . ,  p .7 0 f .  For an example of the kind of 
discussion which takes place at the General Meeting o f .  "Acht 
Thesen zur Rolle der Fuhrungskrafte in der In d u str ieg esellso h aft ,"  
Infobri'ef, 6/79, p .5 ff*
236. c f .  Satzung des A rbeitsrings, op . c i t . ,  Para 8.
237* The Standing Committee also e le c ts  the President of the Arbeits­
r in g . Until recently  the President was tra d it io n a lly  not a re­
presentative of one of the three largest companies. Dzielak 
et a l . ,  on . c i t . ,  p .71* However, the ciirrent President, Erhard 
Bouillon, i s  a member of the executive board of Hoechst AG. 
c f .  " Sachlichkeit in den Auseinandersotzungen,"  I nterview mit 
Erhard Bo\\i 11 on, In fo b r ie f , 6 '78, p .4 ff*  This appointment is  
more in line with the actual power situation  within the 
a sso c ia tio n .
238. Interviews ER 6, Aug.’77 and ER 8, S e p .?77« c f » Arbeitsring
Chemie, Grundsatze fur die t a r i fp o l i t ik  Koordinierung, 2 3 .7 «1976, 
(cited  hereafter as Koordinierungsgrundsatze) .
239• The Co-ordination Committee controls the regional bargaining of
the member asso cia tio n s, c f .  Arbei tgeberbeschwerde, op . c i t . ,  p. 35'
associations holds on the Standing Committee is  shown in the table below 
and i t  r e f le c t s  the importance of the various regions within the chemical 
employers’ associa tion s, and thus the structure of the chemical industry. 
Table 2.3
The Regional Structure of the "Arbeitsring Chemie" and the Importance 
of Companies with more than 2000 employees. (240)
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Employees 1978 Companies 2000+ 1977 Reps Stand.Comrni
Region No et... /O $  enroloyees c Reus .EC $ Rens .TIC No *
Baden-
Wurttbg. 77 215 1 1 . 6 47 78 78 3 1 1 . 1
Bayern 61 305 9*2 65 38 48 2 7*4
Berlin 13 585 2.0 71 20 33 1 3.7
Bremen 1 114 0.2 — — — 1 3.7
Hamburg 23 556 3*5 63 57 24 1 3*7
Hessen 113 461 17.1 66 75 63 4 14.8
Nieder-
sachsen 37 179 5.6 58 71 52 1 3.7
Nordrh.- 
W estfal• 186 446 28.0 77 83 71 8 29.7
Rheinld. -  
Pfalz 86 930 13.1 75 44 42 3 11.x
Saarland 6 694 1.0 — — ' — 1 3*7
Schleswig-
Holstein 10  417 1.6 38 88 •83 1 3.7
Westfalen 47 529 7*1 73 60 53 1 3.7
Total 665 430 100 68 63 54 27 100
240. Data, from Zahlen zur S oz ia lp o lit ik , 1 9 7 9 5 o p . c i t . , P .6 ;
Arbe:Ltgeberbeschwerde , 00 . c i t . ,  p . 36f f  and 25 Jahre Arbeit sring j
Chemie, o p .c i t . .  Own ca lcu la tion s . For the development of the 
numbers of employees in organised companies in the chemical 
industry cjf. Appendix 1 Table 11.
-  90 -
I t  i s  apparent, therefore, that three regions, Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
Rheinland-Pfalz and Hessen dominate the Arbeitsring Chemie from the 
point of view of the percentage of employees covered (5 8 . 2 ) and the 
percentage of seats on the Standing Committee (55*6). One reason for 
th is  i s  the location of the main production s ite s  of the three largest 
German chemical companies in these regions. For example approximately 
58 per cent of the employees in the Rheinland-Pfalz region work at the 
BASF s i te  in Ludxri.gshaf en. i t  i s  no coincidence th a t , in the .case
of regional wage negotiations taking place, these three regions are the 
f i r s t  to negotiate , or that the agreement reached in these regions is  
adopted almost without exception by the other regions.
The co-ordination of bargaining by the employers’ associations in the
chemical industry is  cru cia l for  the development of xmified policy within
(242)th is  area and for putting i t  into p ractice . " According to representa­
tiv es  of the employers’ associations the reasons for needing co-ordinated 
bargaining are f i r s t l y  a large number of th e ir  member companies having 
production s i te s  in a variety  of regions, and these companies would find
(2 4 3 )i t  d i f f ic u l t  to apply d ifferent wage increases. The second reason
given xtfas the fact  that the Chemical Workers1 Union is  cen tra lly  con- 
( 2 4 4 )t r o l le d .  Neither of these seems to be the rea l reason, hox>7ever,
241* Interviex-r FR 10, Sep. *77•
242. There are actually  tx^ o levels of co-ordination. The three 
biggest regions form a bargaining association , and do not 
bargain independently at a l l .  (interview ER 1, Aug.’77)« 
The second level i s  the Co-ordination Committee of a l l  the 
regional association s.
243. Ib id .
244* Interview ER. 8, S e p .’7 7 ‘
since there are large regional differences in wage l eve l s , ^ ^ a n d  
employers seem to manage to cope with th is  problem. Furthermore, much 
of the trend towa,rds cen tra lisa tio n  of bargaining within the Chemical 
Workers’ Union has been seen to be a reaction to increasing cen tra l­
isa tio n  on the employers’ side. Perhaps a more important motivation
for co-ordinated bargaining i s  to gain a ta c t ic a l  advantage over the 
( 2  A 6 1union and the hope that the influence of the leaders of the union
w ill  have a moderating e f fe c t  on the demands made by the union and the
(247)f in a l  level of the agreements.'
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The numerical influence of large companies in the various committees 
across the chemical employers’ associations does vary from one region to 
another but i t  always remains considerable, even in those regions where 
the percentage of employees in large companies is  f a i r ly  low, such as
in Schleswig-Holstein. There are various reasons for the high percentage
of large employers in the chemical employers’ associ at i ons . jtfot
( 249)only do la,rge companies predominate in the industry ,' ^ 'b u t  these
245* of_. Zahlen zur B o z ia lp o lit ik , 1979, op . c i t . ,  p . l S f f .
246. The employers associations have done th is  quite successfully  on
at least two occasions, 1 9 7 1  and 1 9 7 7 * uf. Dzielak et a l . ,  on . c i t  <■, 
p .394; Pro jektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, 1978, on . c i t . ,  p .154 
and Chapter 4 below.
247* National wage bargaining such as occurred in 1978 and 1979 can be 
taken as the ultimate in co-ordinated bargaining. In th is  case, 
a more moderate line can certa in ly  be expected from the union since 
a str ik e  or lock-out would have extreme f inan cia l conseqxiences for 
the union, besides being technically  d i f f ic u l t  to organise.
2 4 8 . Thus, a very large number of chemical companies are not organised 
by the employers’ associations e .g . in one region only 200 out of 
1500  companies were members, but despite th is  over 95/i-' o f  employees 
were covered by these 200 companies. Interview ER 6, Aug.’77«
This level of organisation of employers in terms of employees 
holds generally for the chemical industry. Interview ER 8,
Sep. ’77 *
249* See Chapter 3 below.
companies have more advantage from membership in an association . Since 
wage rates must be bearable to the smallest and least  profitable  com­
panies in the a s s o c ia t io n ,(2^®^this leaves the larger companies more 
room to manoeuvre in th e ir  re la tion s loca lly  with the works councils.
In th is  way they can appear to be generous employers paying high plus 
ra tes  and offering many welfare benefits and th is  often has a positive 
influence on the attitudes of employees towards the companies in which 
they work. Furthermore, since the works councils a,re dependent on 
success in negotiations with management for re -e le c t io n , they are less 
l ik e ly  to press for very high wage demands which might erode the level 
of plus rates and b en efits .  Due to the power of works councillors in 
the union, th is  also has a moderating e ffe c t  on wage demands.
Another reason for the high percentage of large employers is  that many
small companies which do not have works councils and whose employees
are generally not union members 6.0 not fe e l  the need for membership.
They fear tha/t they might be drawn into disputes which would not other-
( 21*) 1 )wise have affected them. In these cases the so lid arity  funds,
which many employers' associations including those in chemicals have
/pep)
established, do not a l te r  the companies' a lt i tu d e .
Nevertheless, i t  i s  often the a v a i la b i l i ty  of the other services pro­
vided by the employers ' associations within the chemical industry which
250. An argument often used by employers in bargaining. Interview 
FTO 7, Aug.'77 and ER 3, Aug.*77-
251. Interview ER 1, Aug.'77•
252. Interview ER 3, Aug.'77 and o f .  Dzielak et a l . ,  o p .o it . ,  0 . 69*
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provides motivation for the smaller and middle-sized companies to jo in , 
rather than the question of employers’ so lid arity  and co lle c t iv e  bar­
gaining. Perhaps the most important of these services is  legal advice 
and legal representation at Labour Courts.^2" ^  I t  is  a re f le c t io n  of 
the highly legalised system of industria l re la tion s in West Germany that 
by fa r  the vast majority of the o f f i c ia l s  of the chemical employers’ 
associations are lawyers. ^ ^ 4 )
Other tasks carried out by the chemical employers’ associations include
(255)running education courses at th e ir  sch o o l, '  ""providing th e ir  member 
companies with comparative information on the structure of the industry 
and images e t c . ,  and la s t  but by no means least  public re lation s a c t i -  
v i t i e s .  " " The aim i s  to present an "o b jectiv e” picture of chemical 
employers and to a ir  th e ir  point of view. This becomes especially  
cru cia l should a dispute s ituation  a r is e ,  as evidenced by the develop­
ments in 1 9 7 1  and 1977  • On both occasions the chemical employers were 
extremely successful in presenting th e ir  point of view to the media and
253. Interviews ER 3, Aug.’77 and ER 10, S e p .’77* This is  more 
important for  smaller companies because they often do not 
have employees with the same level of expertise as can be 
found in the larger ones.
254* "Not only does th is  background provide knowledge which is  
of great use, i t  also teaches the log ica l processing of 
information." Interview ER 1, Aug.’77*
255* Interview ER 3, Aug.*77• Amongst others, courses are run 
for supervisors, plant managers, senior managers, safety 
engineers, e to . c f .  Arbeitsring Chemie, Fortbildung 1977. 
Wiesbaden. Since 1972 some 4000 senior managers have taken 
part in seminars on society  and p o l i t i c s .  "Das Bildungswerk 
.des A rbeitsrings- Service fur Euhrun^skrafte, "  In fobrief 4/79> 
p .5 . Courses are also run for works coun cillo rs . Interview 
ER 7, S e p .’77.
256. Interviews ER 3 and ER 6, both Aug.’77 j ER 8 and ER 10, both 
S ep .’77.
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th is  contributed s ig n if ica n tly  to weakening the willingness of em­
ployees to s t r i k e . ( 2^7)
The Arbeitsring Chemie has a highly centralised structure dominated by 
the large chemical companies. This structure aids in the formulation 
and achievement of unified p o lic ies  and in co-ordinating bargaining 
t a c t i c s ,  with the resu lt that i t  has so far  been able to out-manoeuvre 
the Chemical Workers’ Union. Thus, the structure of the Arbeitsring 
i s  conducive to the achievement of i t s  •aims in the most important 
f ie ld  of i t s  a c t iv i t i e s ,  co llec t iv e  bargaining.
b . Management•
The contribution of management and senior s t a f f  in general to the 
success of the German chemical industry has been considerable.
According to Haber:
"Numbers and the quality  of the chemists were by no means the sole reason 
for success. Managerial and f inan cia l a b i l i ty  also counted and the 
f in an cia l basis of the larger companies was sound because of the gen-, 
erous depreciation provisions and the careful husbanding of resources. 
P ro f its  were ploughed back and the impression of f in an cia l strength 
was carefu lly  fostered; i t  was assisted by the practice  of the banks, 
which often held substantial stakes in the companies . . . "  ( 25 8 )
Although Haber was describing the German chemical industry at the turn
257* o f .  Dzielak et a l . ,  op . c i t . ,  passim and especia lly  393f. Also 
Arbeitsring Chemie, Pokumentation uber die Tarifrunde 1977 der 
chemischen Ind u strie , no place, 1977, especially  Part 3, pp. 
85-139• (cited  further as Tarifrunde 1977)• So successful 
were the employers in th is  la t te r  case, that a regional 
Director General sta ted : "There was not a single case o f  
unobjective reporting of th is  disuute." (interview ER 1 0 ,
S e p .’77) .
An example of th is  to ta l  o b jec tiv ity  i s :
"In reality the trade unions are dictating the conditions to 
the companies even against all economic rationality." Authors’ 
translation of: "In Wirklichkeit diktieren die Gewerkschaften 
den Unternehmen die Bedingungen, auch gegen jede wirtschaft- 
liohe V emunft," G. Spranger, Trierischer Volksfreund, 21.5*1977, 
reprinted in Tarifrunde 1977, op.cit., p.124*
2 5 8 . L.F. Haber, 1971, o p .c i t . ,  p .14.
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of the la s t  century, much of what he said i s  s t i l l  applicable at the 
present time.
The German ohemical industry was one of the f i r s t  to re a lise  the im­
portance of trained chemists and has always fostered close oo-operation
(259 )between industry and the u n iv e rs it ie s .  I t  was against th is  back­
ground that managers with a tra in ing  in chemistry became very important 
at a time when most industries were s t i l l  controlled by th e ir  oxmers.^2^®^  
The difference in ideology of owners and managers in Germany(28~^may well 
have contributed to the ascendency of socia l paternalism as opposed to 
the more authoritarian attitudes often apparent in the heavy industries . 
Nevertheless, Hartmann does sta te  that there i s  currently l i t t l e  d i f fe r ­
entiation between owner-entrepeneurs and the most senior members in 
management. ( 262^
The managerial structure of publio companies in the German chemical 
industry has the normal tw o-tier board system,(2^8^supported by a 
large s t a f f .  The shareholders representatives on the supervisory board 
are rarely  private persons. Normally they are elected to the board as
259. Ib id . ,  p .4 2 f f .
260. Heinrich von Erunok and Garl Duisberg were perhaps the best 
examples, c f .  Ib id . ,  1958, p . l8 6 f f .
261. A discussion of th is  question may be found in H. Hartmann,
o p .c i t . ,  p .2 2 f f .  For a recent investigation into the attitudes 
of Ph.D. chemists working in the chemical industry c f . J .  ICurucz 
(ed. ) ,  Das Selbstverstandnis Von Naturv/issenschaftier in der 
Ind u strie , Weinheim/Bergstr. ,  1912*
2 6 2 . Ib id . ,  p .4 1 •
263. c f .  Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy. 
Cmnd. 6706 , London, 1977, p»72ff and A. Maasen, Verfassunscs- 
beschwerde gegen das MitbestG. 1976 . . .  von den Aktiengesell- 
schaften . . .  und Gesellsohaften mit beschrankter Haftung . . . ,  
Bonn-Bad Godesberg, 28.6 .1976, p . 2 3 f f . ( c i t e d  h e r e a f te r a s  
Unternehmenbeschwerde) . Employee representation under the 
German system is  discussed' b e i0x7 .
(One reason for this is the absence of large private shareholders in the 
chemical industry. Bayer, for example, has approximately 520 000 share­
holders *" 2 ° and Eoechst has around 420 000. ^ 2®®^ As Rauschel has shown 
for BASF, the individual shareholders have very little direct power,
although much influence is exerted by the banks through the use of
» (267)proxy votes.
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tho rep resen ta tive  of some organisation  with in te r e s t s  in  the company. ‘
■The sane author has also traced the d irectoral posts held by both super­
visory board and executive committee members in BARF, Senior members of 
the EC hold many posts on the boards of daughter companies and the senior 
members of the supervisory board s i t  on the boards of a largo number of 
other companies -  the chairman and two deputy chairmen hold an average 
of ten such posts each*^2® ^ In th is  way the basis for co-operation 
between companies and for co-ordinated policy p articu larly  within the 
trade and employers’ associations i s  created.
Hartmann has discussed the question of the meaning of the term "manage-
(s>6<?)ment" in the German context. The resu lts  of research conducted as
2 64 . J .  Rauschel, 00 . c i t . ,  p . !3 1 f f .
2 6 5 . K. Hansen, Bayer -  B erichte , English Edition, Leverkusen,
31/1973, p .7 .
266. Hoechst, Gesohaftsbericht 1977? Frankfurt, 1978, p .? .
267» J*  Rauschel, op . c i t . ,  p .H 4 ff*
268. Ib id . ,  p . l 3 5 f f . The background of the directors of BASF orovides
an in terestin g  re f le c t io n  on the technical and. s c ie n t i f ic  nature 
of the chemical industry. For example only one executive board 
member since 1968 has not had a. doctorate. Ib id . ,  p. 131. Analysis 
of the q u a lif ica tion s of directors at BASF (as at 31 .12 .76) shows 
that 83 per cent are academically qu alified , 7 1  per cent hold
doctorates, whilst 49 per cent are qualified  in science and 14
per cent in engineering su b jects . BASF, Gesohaftsbericht 1976, 
Ludwigshafen, 1977? p .60. (own ca lcu la tio n s).
269 . H. Hartmann, o p .c i t . , p .3 3 f f .
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a part of th is  study agree in princip le , i f  not in d e ta i l ,  with his 
findings. Managers are only considered to he the senior executives of 
a company, e ither at hoard level or just below, and as such are f e l t  to 
be the representatives of the in terests  of cap ita l in the company. ^210  ^
Indeed, i t  i s  with th is  level of management that most matters are re -  
gulated between the works council and the company, especially  on the 
larger s i t e s .^ 211^
Nevertheless, a great deal of preparatory work is  done at lower levels
especially  within the personnel department and on jo in t  works council/
management committees which in certain  circumstances may also  make
(272)autonomous d e c is io n s . '  In spite of th is  i t  is  recognised that there
i s  a hierarchy of management which begins at the level of plant manage-
(274)ment and extends upwards. This lim itation to those categories
seems to be very sim ilar to those members of the workforce who are 
c la s s i f ie d  as senior managerial s t a f f .
270. 'This applies to the German term Manager which is  not very popular
in certain  c i r c le s .  Interviews FTO 10, FTO 13, BRV 5 and ER 8,
a l l  Sep . ’77 •
271. Interviews BRV 1, BRV 2, both Aug.’77 and BRV 4, BRV 5, both 
Sep. ’77*
272. Interviews CM 12, BRV 16, BRV 18, a l l  Nov.’78. Nevertheless, in­
vestigations indicated that informal re lation s between management 
and employee representatives were of considerable importance.
273. Such as in the case study works of Agrochemie AG. Interviews 
M 5, M 7, M 10, BR 2, a l l  O c t . ’7 8 .
274* Interviews BRV 4 and BRV 5* in fa c t ,  the Agrochemie AG oase
study showed quite c lea r ly  that the supervisors were c lea r ly
regarded as part of management too by the shop f lo o r .  This 
question is  discussed in more d eta il  below•
275* Thepe seems to be a divergence between the actual practice  of
o la ss if ic a t io n  of senior managerial s t a f f  in the chemical industry 
and the legal d e fin it io n . This has led recently to a number of' 
lav/ oases to determine who exactly is  a senior manager. The 
reason for the increase of cases has been the attempt of some 
works councillors to reduce the often excessive number of senior 
managerial s t a f f  given voting rights under the MitbestG. 1976. 
o f . ’’Leitende Angest e l i t e :  Abgrenzungsprozesse”, In f obrief ,7 /78 , 
p .6 f f  and G. W itt, Leitende Angestellte und Einheitsgewerkschaft, 
Frankfurt and Koln, 1975, P*9 ^ *
- 98 -
There are an extremely large number of senior managerial s t a f f  within 
the chemical industry. Around 4 per cent of a l l  emplojrees in the 
chemical industry f a l l  within th is  category as compared with 1 to 2 
per cent in most other in d u str ie s . (^7 6 ) in the larger chemical com­
panies, such as Hoeohst, the number of such s t a f f  i s  even greater.
At the end of 1977 5*1 per oent of employees were senior managerial 
s t a f f  and a further 6 .8  per oent were senior s t a f f . ( 277  ^ The reasons 
for such a high percentage of senior s t a f f  and p articu larly  for the 
considerable number of academically qualified  s t a f f  may be found in 
the nature of the chemical industry.
The chemical industry i s  the most research intensive industry in
3 to
(279)
( ^Germany' rend has long rea lised  the need for sk il led  s c ie n t is t s
ensure that i t  remains technologically  and economically competitive.
The Association of the Chemical Industry estimates that in 1977 54000
employees (9*4 per cent) were employed on research and development in
( 9 P 0  ^eluding about 8200 s c ie n t is t s .  The technological nature of the
chemical industry also requires that most managers have a s c ie n t i f i c
27 6. c f .  Appendix 1, Table 11 and G. W itt, on . c i t . ,  p. 22.
277• Hoechst AG, Berioht aus dem Personal-und Sozialbereich Hoechst-- 
Konzern 1977? no place (FrankfurtTV p .89 (c ited  hereafter as 
Personal-bericht Hoechst 1977) •
278. The industry planned to spend about 4900 M ill .  DM in 1979
research and development. VCI, Jahresbericht 1978/79, Frankfurt, 
1979, p .31* Also c f .  H. Grunewald, "Bayer's Formula for Product 
Innovation", International Management, Feb. 1978, p . lB f f ;  BASF
GB 1976, 00 . c i t . ,  p .7 and Hoeohst, GB 1977, 0 0 . o i t . ,  p . l 2 f f .
279* L.F. Haber, 1971, op . c i t . ,  p.354£*
280. VCI, Jahresbericht 1978/79, on . c i t . ,  p. 35* This would account
for about one th ird  of a l l  s c ie n t is ts  in the industry and since 
c a . 72 per cent of s c ie n t is t s  have the status of senior mana­
g eria l s t a f f  th is  amounts for quite a large number.
Appendix 1 Table 11, own ca lcu la tion s.
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or engineering q u a l i f ic a t io n . v  ^ J The more senior executives in the 
chemical industry tend to have a ‘background of chemistry or perhaps
( 2 82 )one of the other pure s c ie n c e s . '  ' On the maintenance side of the 
industry an engineering q u a lif ica tio n  is  an absolute necessity  due to 
the complexity of the equipment.^ u ' These various facets of the 
nature of the chemical industry have the resu lt  that there are a 
large number of senior managerial s t a f f  many of whom have academic 
q u a lif ic a t io n s .  This has a number of consequences for  indu stria l 
re la tion s in the German chemical industry.
The large number of senior managerial s t a f f  and disagreement with the 
p o lic ies  of the other s t a f f  unions led to the formation of a tre.de
( 284 )union for senior s t a f f  in the chemical industry as early as 1 9 1 9 .
One year la te r  th is  union succeeded in securing a co lle c t iv e  agreement 
for  academically qu alified  s t a f f ) and the chemical industry remains 
the only industry in Germany which has special agreements for th is
(201)
2 8 1 . Although tra d it io n a lly  chemists were employed in production, 
recently  chemical engineers have also begun to be employed 
there too. Interview7 CM 14? Nov.’78.
282. Interviews BRV 1, Aug.’77 and CM 12, Nov.’7 8 .
283* Interview M 11, O c t .*7 8 .
284« G. Witt, o p .c i t . ,  p .55* The present t i t l e  of th is  organisation 
is  the Association of Salaried Academics and Senior Managerial 
S ta f f  in the Chemical Industry, or VAA for short, o f . Glossary 
of terms and abbreviations. At the beginning of 1979 i i  had 
10000 members, o f . Appendix 1 ,  Table 1 0 .  For a number of 
tables containing s, s t a t i s t i c a l  description of th is  organi­
sation o f .  H. Bayer, W. Stroech, H.E. Treu, Die wostdeu.tsche 
Gewerkschaftsbewegung im Spiegel der Zahlen, ” Frankfurt,
19 8 0 , forthcoming.
2 8 5 . Interview ER 3, Aug.*77•
by several organisations with the A rbeitsring Chemie. Besides the VAA
( 287)and the academic group of the Chemical Workers 1 Union, "the German 
Salaried S ta f f  Union and a doctors* association a l l  negotiate to -
/ gOO "S
gather. ° Due to the number of members i t  has, the VAA has the
( 28q )most influence in these n eg otia tion s. " One reason for the a b i l i ty
of th is  group of s t a f f  to guarantee minimum conditions besides the 
trad ition  of bargaining is  a high level of organisation. The VAA a.lone 
claims to organise 80 per cent of s c ie n t is ts  and two thirds of senior
( 290)managerial s t a f f .  These claims seem rather excessive, but out of
(2Ql )around 30 000 possible members' " "they would have a membership density 
of 60 per oent. I f  the membership in the Chemical Workers1 Union is  
also taken into account, th is  gives a density of about 76 per cent which 
i s  higher than that of workers in the chemical industry! ( 2^2)
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( 286)group of s t a f f .  ° N egotiations fo r  these agreements are carried, out
286. Interviews ER 1, Aug.*77 and ER 10, FT0 13, both S e p .f77«
The two agreements concern general conditions of employment 
and minimum sa la r ie s  for  the f i r s t  five years of employment. 
c f . M anteltarifvert rag fur alcadenisch gebildote Angest e l i t e  
in der chemischen In d u str ie , Wiesbaden, 5•3•1976 and 16.5.1978 
together with G ehaltstarifvert rag uber die Hindest .jahre sbegllge 
fur akademisch ^ebildete Angestellte der chemischen Industrie 
in den ersten funf Berufs.jahren, 16.5 .1978.
287» c f . GB 72-75? oo . c i t . ,  p . l 8 9 f f .  This group had 5325 members 
in 1975.
288. Interviews ER 10 and FTO 13, Sep.'77«
289 . The Chemical Workers* Union onoe tr ied  to negotiate separately 
but th is  fa i le d .  Ib id .
290. F. Ische, "Wir sind nioht eine Gewerkschaft im Sinne einer 
Kampforganisation gegen den Kapitalismus" , In fo b r ie f , 9/77 ? 
p .6 . Dr. Ische was the President of the VAA but has subse­
quently been elected President of the UIA, the central 
organisation of trade unions for senior managerial s t a f f .
F. Ische, "Per DGB s o l l t e  seine diskriminierenden Angriffe 
go gen die UIA e in s te l le n , ” Inf obriefA 5 7^ 9?' P «7 f  f  • The 
amount of space given to th is  organisation by an employers* 
publication is  an in terest in g  comment in i t s e l f .  For more 
d e ta ils  on the ULA, c f .  G. W itt, o p .c i t . ,  p .5 3 ff*
291. F . Ische, In fo b rie f ,  9^77? op . o i t . ,  p .8 and ox-m calculations 
from Appendix 1 Table 11.
292.. GB 72-75? op . o i t . ,  p .295* The membership density of workers 
i s  65 per cent ( own ca lcu la tio n s).
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Another feature of the representative system for senior managerial s t a f f  
are councils which have been formed in the vast majority of chemical 
companies to make up for the absence of representation of th is  group 
of s t a f f  under the works council system. (293) councils which
attempt to deal with salary questions at company level and which are 
b a s ica lly  a vehicle for the VAA within the companies are s t i l l  f a i r ly  
in e ffe c tiv e  since thej7 lack the backing of le g is la t iv e  r ig h ts .
This had led to a certa in  alienation  of management towards the VAA and
( one: ^
the representative council in the Agrochemie AG case study works. 
.However, both the VAA and the representative councils have received 
considerable impetus as a resu lt  of the special r ights of senior mana­
g e r ia l  s t a f f  under the Co-determination Act 1976.
It was claimed by several respondents that the attitudes of academic 
managers in particular had an influence on industrial relations in the 
chemical industry. These attitudes led to a practical and rational 
style of management which facilitates the discussion of problems.
293. These representative councils are known in German as Sbrecher-
aussohusse. of. "Acht Thesen ..." Infobrief, 6/79? op »oit.
These councils have a h istory  which extends back to around 
1970* Interview CM 10, Nov.*78 and Hoechst, Berioht 1977? 
p .59*.
294* This remains one of the foremost aims of the VAA. F. Ische,
In fobrief, 9/77? op.cit. ,  p .7*
295* Interviews M 3? M 6 and M 7? a l l  0 c t . ’78.
296 . This is  discussed in more d e ta il  below. The strength of the
VAA over other organisations as a representative of th is  group 
is  shown in Table 2.4*
297* Interviews BRV 1, FTO 9, both Aug.f77 and ER 7? FTO 14? S e p . ’77* 
In addition a l l  employees have access to very senior manage­
ment should they want to discuss a -oroblem. Interview FTO 11,ItS‘ep.*77* Furstenberg does conclude? however? in his study o f  
the chemical industry, that there are a variety  of management 
sty les  and these influence employees a ttitu des to management•
F. Furstenberg, op.cit., p.131*
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Certainly, in the author’s experience, re lation s "between employees
(2Q8)and management are generally very good. '
Relations between the shopfloor and management are fostered in the
chemical industry as a resu lt  of the small primary work groups which
e x is t  p articu lar ly  within the production plants and by the f a i r ly
regular personal contacts between management and workers under these 
(299)conditions. " This close relationship between management and shop­
floo r  which is  promoted by the production system provides management 
with the chance to put a considera„ble a,mount of pressure on th e ir  
workers should the need a r is e .  An example of such a situation i s  the 
str ik e  in 1 9 7 1  when management ta c t ic s  of th is  type had s ig n ifican t 
influence in some a r e a s . (5®®) Generally, however, the economic strength 
of the chemical industry provides management with f l e x i b i l i t y  in th e ir  
re la tion s with the workforce and th e ir  representatives so that such 
measures are not necessary.
Sim ilar faretors such as small work groups and close contacts with the 
shopfloor also influence re la tion s between workers and the lower end 
of the management hiera-rchy, the supervisors and sp e c if ic a l ly  within
29 8 . o f .  Appendix 3, Tables 20 and 45* There was, however, l i t t l e  
agreement amongst the Agrochemie AG respondents as to what the 
q u a lit ie s  of good company management are. <cf. Ib id . ,  Table 52.
299* Interview FTO 11, S e p .’77 and personal observations. The
Agrochemie AG case study produced data which was very simila.r 
to that observed by Joan Woodward in her c la s s ic  study, and 
i t  seems to have had similan consequences. For example, the 
length of the chain of command in Woodward fs study for works 
of th is  type ws.s 6 as opposed to 5 at  Agrochemie AG and the 
number of hourly pa.id s t a f f  controlled by f i r s t  line super­
vision was sim ilar : Woodward 11: Agrochemie AG 1 5 .
J .  Woodward, 1965 j op . o i t . ,  p .5 0 f f .
300. Dzielak et a l . ,  passim and especia lly  p .3 8 7 .
the production plants, the sh if t  supervisors. ' The position of 
supervisors has received some considerable attention in Anglo-Saxon 
countries and various d efin itions have been proposed. " ' Practice
in the German chemical industry seems to conform best with the theory 
of the "man in the middle", ^although a hierarchy of supervision 
much lik e  that id en tif ied  by Thurley and Hamblin^8®4)seemed to ex is t  
in the Agrochemie AG cane study works. The most important of these 
levels  wan found to be the f i r s t - l i n e  supervisors, who in the pro­
duction area are called  Rchichtmeister and in the workshops simply 
M eister.
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(^01}
Senior management stre ss  that the f i r s t - l i n e  supervisors a-re cru cia l 
for  the climate in the plants and workshops, which wan observed and 
started to be very good. Credit for th is  was given by senior managers 
to the supervisors. (  ^ The shopfloor, on the other hand, generally
301. The German term is  Meister whioh has a long trad ition  p a r t i ­
cu larly  within c ra ft  areas and which can scarcely  be rendered
s a t is fa c to r i ly  in English. Terminology within the B r it ish  
chemical industry also varies considerably. Rome examples 
are foreman, superintendents, supervisors, e t c . On Meister
c f . P. Mathias and M.M. Postan (e d s .) ,  The Cambridge Economic 
History of Europe, V ol.V ll,  The Industrial Economies: C apital, 
Labour and Enterprise, Part I , Cambridge, 1978, Chapters IX 
and X, passim but esp ecia lly  p*457ff and 498ff'.
302. c f . J .  Child, The Industria l Supervisor, University of Aston
Management Centre, 1975* For a recent account of supervisors 
in Germany o f .  M. Fores, P. Lawrence and A. Sorge, "Germany’s 
Front-Line Force", Ma.na,gement Today, March 1978, p .8 7 f f .
303 * F . J .  Roethlisberger, Management and Morale, Cambridge, Mans.
1941, p .3 7 f f .  —  — .
304* K.R. Thurley and A.C. Hamblin (D3IR), The Runervisor and his Job ,
London, i 960 , p»5* They identified  three levels  of supervision, 
which in the cane study here can be c la s s i f ie d  as the senior fore-  
man -  Obermsister: the ( s h i f t )  supervisor -  (Rchicht) M eister, 
and the leading hand or senior process operartor -  Vorarbeiter 
or Erstmann.
305. Interviews M 3, M 7 and M 10, a l l  O c t . ’78. Also CM 1 4 , Nov.’7 8 .
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considered the f i r s t - l i n e  supervisors to he th e ir  immediate superior -  
the person to whom they turned with problems and who gave them in­
stru ction s. Both process and maintenance workers were happy with
the standard of th is  supervision fee lin g  the most important quality
„ . . . (306) of a supervisor is  understanding.' '
F i r s t - l in e  supervisors themselves c la ss i f ie d  the job as an intermediary 
one between management and the men. Their primary tasks are to keep 
the plant running to the required sp ecif ica tio n s, and to a llocate  work 
as required. Other tasks include drawing up holiday rosters ,  re­
cognising what repairs are required and dealing with a l l  the problems 
that o c c u r .^ ° 7 )  Two statements by sh if t  supervisors sum th is  situation 
up concisely:
" I t ’ s no good waiting for things to happen, you have to anticipate and 
make fa s t  decisions. There’s no time for consultation -  the plant 
could have exploded by then." (308)
"Especially  at weekends and at night there is  considerable responsi­
b i l i t y  on the sh if t  supervisor who has the whole plant under his con­
t r o l  and he has to deal with a l l  the problems that occur." (309)
In order to cope with th is  type of problem long-experience on the plant, 
often as a worker and as a senior operator i s  required, together with a
306. o f.  Appendix 3 Tables 12, 19 and 20. Cross tabulation of Table 
20 with Appendix 3 Table 1 was carried out and the chi squared 
te s t  of s t a t i s t i c a l  significance was applied, but there was no 
sig n ifican t association . Similar results  were found recently 
in another study of the chemical industry. o_f. F. Landwehrmann 
and R. Albring, Information und Mitwirkung, Heidelberg, no date,
( 1 9 7 7 ), p .9 8 .
307. Interviews E 1, VL 2, K 5 e.nd II 6, a l l  O c t . '78 .
308. Interview M 8, O c t .*7 8 .
309 . Interview M 1, O c t . ’78.
technological complexity i s  l ik e ly  to increase the need for formal
. . . (311)t r a in in g . '  '
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degrees of tech n ica l  knowledge.  ^ In fu ture  i t  i s  f e l t  in creas ing
Despite the fa c t  that the supervisor may be regarded a.s the bottom of 
the management chain he is  s t i l l  represented by the works council and 
as a resu lt of indu stria l unionism is  organised in the same union as 
the workers he supervises. The degree of trade union organisation 
amongst supervisors is  very high. ' These factors  led to an in te r ­
esting situation  at Agrochemie AG whereby several work groups on the 
production side elected th e ir  supervisors to be th e ir  union lay re ­
presentatives. This question is  discussed in more d e ta il  elsewhere
but i t  seems that the main factors which influenced th is  were the close
( 713 )relationships which grew up between men and supervisors and which
310. Practice  varied as fa r  as q u alif ica tion s were concerned. In 
Germany, the K eister i s  an established t i t l e  which is  normally 
gained by passing an examination. In c ra ft  areas, th is  quali­
f ica t io n  is  an absolute n ecessity . Although the eq.uiva.lent 
examination ex is ts  011 the process side, covering such subjects 
as chemistry, e lec tro n ics ,  mechanical engineering, man manage­
ment, i t  was not an absolute requirement. I11 some cases good 
men who were qu alified  chemical operators, (Chemiefacharbeiter) 
a q u a lif ica tio n  equivalent to a cra ft  tra.de, and who did not 
want to return to school were a.lso promoted. Interviews K 1,
M 3, II 9, K 10, M 11, a l l  O c t . ’78. “Also o f .  M. Fores et a l . ,  
op . c i t . ,  p .8 9 .
311. Interviews K 4? M 6, both 0 c t . ’78.
312. The estimates varied between 80 per cent and 98 per cent.
Interviews FTO 11 and BRV 5 both B e ? . ’77 and 3RV 17, Nov.*78.
At Agrochemie AG a l l  supervisors interviewed were union members. 
The Chemical Workers ’ Union had over 21000 supervisors amongst 
th e ir  membership in 1 9 7 5 * GB 72-75? o p .c i t . ,  p . 1 8 4 .
313. This is  re f lec ted  in the high degree of tru st planed in super­
visors to solve personnel and especially  work problems, c f . 
Appendix 3 Tables 23 and 24 together with Landwehrmann and 
Albring, op . c i t . ,  p .6 l f f  and P. Furstenberg, op . c i t . ,  p .130,
219  and 263 who a l l  report sinila.r re su lts .
/
(  ^T  ^*)
The place of the supervisor in Germany has been summarised as a 
" ’middle-man1 position . . . .  a place of power, with authority deriving 
from technical competence and from the fact  that he alone knows what 
i s  going on,” "and th is  seems to be in line with what was observed 
in the chemical industry.
By way of summary i t  can be said that the nature of the chemical in­
dustry has a s ig n if ican t influence on the management structure and 
therefore on indu stria l re la t io n s .  This influence on industria l re­
lations occurs primarily in two areas -  in re la tion s between senior 
and middle management with top executives and employers’ associations 
and in re la tion s between management and the workforce, p articu larly  
within the production sectors of the industry. The f i r s t  e f fe c t  has 
led to a more complete representation of the in te re s ts  of th is  group 
than ex is ts  in most industries and the second factor  has contributed 
towards peaceful re la tion s between management and the workforce.
( iv )  Co-determination and the chemical industry.
As Ralf Dahrendorf has pointed out^41®^state Involvement in industria l 
re la tion s has a long h istory  in Germany; i t  can be traced to state
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are fos te red  by the technolog ical na ture  of chemical production.
314* For example, small work groups, scattered work places and a 
supervisory role which requires touring the plants and d is­
cussing the progress of the process with the workers. Under 
these circumstances, together with a shopfloor background, 
close relationships develop.
315* Fores et al., on .cit., p.lpB. Also of. Landwehrmann end 
Albring, op .cit., p . 100.
316. On . o i t . .  p.1Q6.
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s o c ia l is t  leg is la t io n  at the time of Bismarck. Co-determination, which 
i s  one of the main in st i tu t io n s  of West German in d u stria l re la t io n s ,  
provides a prime example of the influence of le g is la t io n  at the present
tim e J 31+
The i n i t i a l  aim of th is  section is  to provide a b r ie f  resume of the 
development of co-determination to i t s  current form in the chemical in­
dustry. This is  followed by a consideration of the attitudes expressed 
by trade union o f f i c i a l s ,  managers and employers’ representatives as 
well as employees about co-determination. The section includes an 
analysis of the s ignificance of co-determination in the chemical industry 
and an evaluation of i t s  future p o ten tia l .
What i s  understood by the term "co-determination”? In general, co­
determination means a l l  forms of influence by employees or th e ir  re­
presentatives on tra d it io n a lly  autonomous decision making processes in
/ I I o \
industry. Although co-determination often aims at influencing a l l
levels  of economic decision making from the workplace up to involvement
(319)in economically relevant in s t i tu t io n s ,  ' i t  has only received
317« Lesislation  plays a fa r  more important part in West German in­
du stria l re la tion s than i t  does in B r ita in .  A highly readable 
but carefu lly  documented analysis of German labour law may be 
found in W. Daubler, Das A rbeitsrecht, Reinbelc bei Hamburg,
1976.
318. Due to the complexity of the law in West Germany i t  i s  often 
necessary to be more precise than th is .  The German term Mit- 
bestimmung is  generally accepted to mean co-determination where 
equal r ights of decision e x i s t . Where employees only have con­
su ltation  or information rights then the term used is  Mitwirkung.
319. c f . R. Schmiede, "Technical Change and Industria l Democracy", 
in SRRC, Industria.l Democracy: international views, Coventry, 
1978, p .6 3 . I t  w ill  be noted that the ’economic democracy’ 
conception of co-determination has been adopted. This can be 
traced to F. Naphtali's "Wirtschaftsdemokratie" , a work f i r s t  
published in 1928. For a recent republication cdT. ib id . ,  
Frankfurt, 1966 esp ecia lly  p . l8 2 f f .
significant legislative support at two levels.^20'* These levels are 
those of the works or factory and the enterprise. ^ ">21 ^ The discussion 
here will he concerned primarily with the latter since the former is 
closely connected with workplace industrial relations and is discussed
b e lo w + 2 2 )
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(32?)The origins of co-determination can he traced hack to the middle ages. 
However, the chemical industry f i r s t  experienced co-determination as a 
resu lt  of the so c ia l  reforms which were introduced in Germany with the 
establishment of the Weimar Republic. Along with a system of works
councils, one or two representatives of the ’workforce were given a place
on the supervisory board of public companies. ^°24  ^ These r ights were 
very limited in th e ir  e f fe c t  but are a re f le c t io n  of the tra d it io n a l 
desire of the Social Democratic Party and the trade unions in Germany
to reform capitalism through le g is la t iv e  procedures. ^12"^
320. For a consideration of some other levels of_. A.F. Napp-Zinn 
”W irtschaftsrate und uberbetriebliche Mithestimmung in 
Deutschland”, in W. Weddigen (e d .) ,  Zur Theorie und Praxis 
der Mitbestimmung, B erlin , I 964? pp.61-154? H. Hoohgreve, 
”Mogliohkeiten und Grenzen gesamtwirtschaftlicher Mithestimmung”, 
Die Neue G esellsohaft, Vol. 23? 1976, pp. 49 2-4 a*id F. Depps,
J .V . Freyberg, C. Kievenheim, R. Mayer, F . Werkmeister, K ritik  
der Mitbestimmung, Frankfurt, 1973, pp.235-242.
321. Betriebsebene and TJntemehmensebene respectively .
322. c f .  Chapter 5*
323. cf.* B. Muszynski, W irtschaftliche Mitbestimmung zwischen Konflikt 
und Harmoniekonzeptionen, Meisenheim am Gian, 1975? p .2 2 f f ,  and 
for the c la s s ic  analysis of the development of industria l democracy 
in Germany, c f .  H .J .  Teuteberg, Geschichte der Industrielien  Mit­
bestimmung in Deutschland, Tubingen, 1961.
324* Ib id . ,  p .7 0 f.
325* This can be traced to Lassalle *s picture of the role of the 
sta te  and through him to Hegel. c f . R. Dahrendorf, on . c i t . ,  
p .2 l6 f f  and 225 f f .
-  109 -
After the Second World War socia l reform was once again the resu lt  of 
defeat for Germany. S im ilarly , however, these reforms fa iled  to go as 
fa r  as much of the labour movement had h o p e d . O f  particu lar re­
levance to the chemical industry was the Works Constitution Act passed 
in 1952 against the votes of the Social Democrats and the Communists. )
This act provided limited rights for works councils and stipulates that 
one third of supervisory board, members of public companies should be 
representatives of employees. i n terms of the development of 
co-determination th is  act was not much of an improvement over the 
le g is la t io n  in the 1920  fs .
Although the Works Constitution Act was revised by the Social Demo­
c ra t ic  and Free Democratic coalition  government in 1972, the regulations 
for employee representation on supervisory boards remained unchanged 
from those of the BetrVG 5 2 .^ ^ ° ^  The German trade union movement had 
never re a lly  accepted the provisions of th is  act and had long desired
326. For an analysis of post World War One developments o f.  P .v. 
Oertzen, Die Probleme der w irtschaftlichen Neuor&nung und 
der Mitbestimmung in der Revolution von 1918, Frankfurt, no 
year ( 1962? ) .  An excellent account of the situation a f te r  the 
Second World War may be found in B. Schmidt, 1970? o u .c i t .
327 * B. Muszynski, o n .o i t . ,  p .H 9 f f .
328. Ib id . ,  p .123.
329. For an empirical analysis of th is  a c t ,  of.. 0 .  Blume, Normen 
und Wirklichkeit einer Betriebsverfassung, Tubingen, 1 9 6 4 *
330. o f .  K. F i t t in g ,  F . Auffarth, H. Kaiser, Betriebsverfassungs- 
gezetz, Bandkommontar, 10th Revised Edition, Munchen, 1972, 
p .8 7 9 f f . The main a ltera tion s were an extension of the co­
determination rights of the works council in personnel and 
socia l matters, o f . B. Muszynski, o p .c i t . ,  p . l2 5 ff*  English 
accounts of the BetrVG may be found in D.W.F. Bendix, o p .o i t . ,  
p.lOSff and M. F e ltz er ,  The German Labour-Managoment Re1ations 
Act, London, 1972.
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i t s  repeal. With the entrance of the Social Democrats into government, 
th e ir  hopes were revived. However, many years and much discussion were 
to pass before s ig n ifican t changes came abotit in co-determination at 
the level, of the enterprise * (^31)
F in a lly , a f te r  much wrangling between coalition  partners p articu larly  
about the representation of senior managerial s t a t f  'the Co-determ- 
ination Act 197 6 ^ 888\ras passed. An indication of the e f fe c t  of Free 
Democratic influence on the b i l l  can be found in the support that the 
f in a l  draft received from the Christian Democratic Party.
Since the new act only applies to public companies with more than 2000 
employees i t  is  of great relevance to the chemical industry'*''' 'with i t s  
predominance of large companies. For th is  reanon chemica,l companies and 
the chemical employers’ associations were p articu larly  active in trying 
to prevent i t  being passed by parliament and in challenging the con­
formity of the act with the West German co n stitu tion .
331. cf_. I ,  Ra.©hlmann, Dor In teressen stre it  zwischen DGE und PDA
um die Ausweitung der a u a lif iz ie r te n  Mitbestimmung, Koln,
1975-
332. c f . VAA, Mitbestimmung, Inform ationsblatt, Koln, 1974*
333. c f .  D.W.F. Bendix, oo . c i t . , p . l2 0 f f  and H. Schneider and D .J .  
Kingsmann, The German Co-determination Act 1976? Frankfurt,
1976, although th is  la te r  work should be used with some care, 
since i t  uses many non-standard tran sla tio n s.
334. c f . VCI, Jahresbericht 1975/76. Frankfurt, p .57 and for a review
of the parliamentary proceedings c f .  GB 72-75? p . l6 f f  and DGB,
Abt. G ese llsch aftsoo lit ik , Gewerkschaf ten und Mitbestimmung,, * — ■ ■ ■ 1 ■ ■      ^ ■ 1^- .I., . .-..--a'
Bonn, 1978? p .371ff (cited  further as Gewerksc-haften und 
M i t  b e s t  i  mmun g).
335* For public companies with less than 2000 emoloyses the regulations 
of the BctrVG 1952 s t i l l  apply.
336. c f . D.W.F. Bendix, or> . c i t . . p.l37*Y and the d iscussion below.
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Although the original trade union demands for a reform of the law
( ^on co-determination had by no means been f u l f i l l e d ,  'and although 
the unions were highly c r i t i c a l  of the new a ct ,  they decided to make 
the best of a bad situation  and to exhaust the p o s s ib i l i t ie s  which 
existed under the a c t . ^ 1^
P articu lar cr it ic ism  of the -act from o f f i c ia l  trade union c ir c le s  
centred on the system which allowed senior managerial s t a f f  to e lec t  
th e ir  own representatives; on the casting vote of the chairman of
the supervisory board in the case of a t i e ^ 140  ^ -  th is  chairman is  
always a representative of the shareholders,^141^and f in a l ly  on the 
e lec to ra l  system by which workers and salaried s t a f f  e lect th e ir  
representatives separately . ^442^
Although a decision to accept the act as i t  stands did provoke in­
tense discussions within the u n i o n s , t h e  vast majority of trade 
union o ff ic e rs  in the chemical industry who were questioned stated 
that they agreed with th is  decision .  ^844) j n mos-t; cases stre ss  was
337• For the original demands o f . BGB, Mitbestimmung je tz t  -  und 
keine lialben Pachen, Referentenmaterial zur Mitbestimmung,
Dusseldorf, p.74«
338. GB 72-75? p . l 8 f .
339* KitbestG, Para. 15(4) Mo.3.
340. MitbestG, Para. 29 (2 ) .
341* MitbestG, Para. 27*
342. MitbestG, Paras. 15-18. The o f f i c ia l  position i s  explained in
Gewerkschaften und Mitbestimmung, on . o i t . ,  p . 30Off.
343. Interview FTO 15, S e p .f79*
344* For example Interviews FTO 11, 3RV 4? BRV 5? al l  Pep.*77 
and FTO 4, FTO 6, Aug.’77.
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laid  that the position of the labour d irec to r ' 7 'would be crucial 
for the working of the a c t ,  and that the e lec to ra l procedure was far  
too complicated; th is  procedure might also lead to a sp l i t  of the em­
ployee representatives into faction al groups.
Despite the fa c t  that the employees have not achieved equal represent­
ation with the shareholders on the supervisory board, the Chemical 
Workers’ Union does hope that a number of labotir directors who have 
th e ir  support w ill  be e lected . In some companies agreements have 
apparently been made whereby the present personnel d irector would be 
rechristened labour d irector -  th is  i s  a common procedure in any case -  
and a f te r  his contract had expired, a union candidate would be supported 
by the shareholders in the next e le c t io n . ) l n addition some com­
panies had arranged for a new personnel ( i . e .  labour) d irector to be 
appointed for a period of about 5 years from just before the new act
came into force . In th is  way they can delay the chance for the union
to nominate candidates for the post of labour d i r e c t o r .^ 4| '
The reservations of the trade union o f f i c ia l s  about the complexity of 
the e lecto ra l system are fu lly  ju s t i f ie d .  Not only does the system vary
345* Although the labour d irector has the same t i t l e  as ex ists  in
the Goal, Iron and S tee l industries according to the MBG 1951? 
his rights and re s p e n s ib il i t ie s  are d if fe re n t .  The labour 
d irector i s ,  in f a c t ,  elected by the supervisory board in the
same way as the other members of the management board.
o f . H. Seidel, E. Kassler, W. Schotenrohr, "Mitbestimmungs- 
und gewerkschaftspolitisohe Schwernunkte des Mitbestimmungs- 
gesetzes 1976" , Das Mitbestimmungsgesurach, ITo .5./6, 1977 ? 
p .92, and for more d e ta ils  on the situation in Goal, Iron and 
S tee l o f .  S. V iesel, Der Arbeitsdirektor, Aufgaben und Pflich ten , 
IColn, 1973.
346. Interview BRV 14? Oct . ’ 78 and informal discussions.
347* Interviews FTO 7, Aug.’77 and BRV 5? S e p .’77*
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for concerns, m u lti-s ite  companies and s in g le -s ite  companies but 
some firms have th e ir  own procedure, although th is  i s  often against 
the w ill  of management, since some revisions of the procedure have 
been introduced by the union in th is  way. ( ®49) j n .^e  maj 0r i^y 0f  
companies i t  seems l ik e ly  that three elections w ill  be required:^ 
one to determine whether there w ill  be a d irect e lection  or whether 
the election  should be carried out by an e lecto ra l gremium; another 
to determine whether the blue co lla r  and white co lla r  representatives 
should be elected jo in t ly  or separately and f in a l ly  the e lection  of the 
representatives themselves. Qne Regional Secretary of the Chemical 
Workers1 Union summed up the problem concisely:
"There are fa r  too many e le c tio n s .  Democracy could be ruined by 
them." (352)
348. o f « 1. WO MitbestG vom 23*6.1977? Bundesgesetzblatt, (Bgb) 1977 
I S . 861; 2. WO MitbestG vom 23.6.1977? Bgb 3-977 I S . 893 and
3. WO MitbestG vom 23.6.1977? Bgb 1977 I S . 934-
349* For example o f .  Wahlordnung fur die Wahl der Arbeitnehmer- 
v ertre ter  in den Aufsichtsrat der Veba-Chemie AG, no place 
(Gelsenkirchen), no date (1977). Interviews BRV 14? Oct.*78 
and FTO 4 , Aug.'77*
350. On the e lec to ra l  system o f.  D.W.F. Bendix, or? . c i t . ,  p . !2 6 f f :
H. Unterhinninghofen, "Wahlen nach dem Mitbestimmungsgesetz" ,
Das Mitbestimmungsgesprach, No.5/6, 1977? p .9 3 ff  and A rbeits- 
ring, 'Wahl der Aufsichtsratsmitglieder der Arbeitnehmer -  Die 
Vorschriften der Wahlordnungen zum Mitbestimmungsgesetz" ,
B lo tter  fllr Vorgesetzte, ~8/l977 , p .6f f .
351. The guidelines are as follows; in companies with up to 8000 em­
ployees, direct e lec tio n , and in companies with over 8000, e lection  
by the e lecto ra l gremium -  unless the workforce decides in a b a llo t  
for the other form of election (MitbestG Para.9 ) j unless otherwise 
decided by b a llo t  the e lectors in the gremium are elected by the 
workers or s t a f f  separately (MitbestG P a ra .l0 (2 ) ;  whether the 
e lec to ra l gremium e lec ts  the representatives separately or jo in t ly  
may also be decided by b a llo t  in the gremium. (MitbestG P a r a .l5 (3 ) ) .  
The number of changes according to the f i r s t  cr ite r io n  has re­
mained small, although more companies changed from direct elections 
than turned to i t .  IC. Hauenschild, " Luclcenhaft und ungereimt",  
Wirtschaftswoche, No.3, 13.1.1978, p .23.
352 . Interview FTO 11, Sep. ’77*
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Employers arguments against co-determination in general can be groused
(3R3)into a number oi categories, " "and these arguments tend to play upon 
traditional fears ’which exist •within the German oorulaiion.
The first argument centres around the question of the threat of a 
society controlled by the trade unions, which they believe would mean 
an end to democracy and perhaps even socialism. For example:
"The trade unions would control over half the turnover of German industry 
and so change the form of the economy and society according to trade 
union ideals". (354)
The second argument concentrates on the question of whether co-determinaticr 
is constitutional or not. This is discussed in more detail below. The 
employers also argue that co-determination hinders the functional operation 
of companies especially if equal beard representation for shareholders 
and employees’ representatives were to be introduced. They contend that 
the decision making ability of the board would be greatly reduced. This 
argument was quite successful since it was for this reason that the chair­
man of the supervisory board was given a second vote to use in case of a 
( 3 5 5 )tie when voting.
353. This follows the argument presented in Gewerkschaften und 
Mitbestimmung, op . c i t  . ,  p .3 ?S ff .
354. Authors translation  of:"Die Gewerkschaften warden uber die Halfte■ ' - y p -  ■ - .... — ■ — ..in. h rrm — ........... —
der deutschen Industrieum.sa.tze kontrollieren und dam i t  Hirtschaft 
und Ges-ellschaft im gewerkschaft lichen ^inne, umfunktionieren, " 
from " 25X., Fein zur Mitbestimmung", Per Arbeitgeber, 2 / 19 6 9 , 
cited in Gewerkschaften und Mitbestimmung, on . c i  t . ,  p .392.
355* Experience within the Montan industries has shown that such close
voting is  rare, and the supervisory boards do not like taking im­
portant decisions under such conditions. Interview’s FTO 8, Aug. ’77 
and FTO 15, Dep.’77* For a review of the question of ’whether the 
operability  of companies suffer-' under oo-dctermination c f . K.0. 
rkndrioh, "Mitbestimmung und Fun.:tionsfahi e i t  von Uniornehmen", t 7    7Das Mitbestimmungsgesnrach, Uc.c '10 , 1G75, r . l q ^ f f .
Furthermore, the employers claim that co-determination would he harmful
for the economic development of industry, would hinder investment and
i ( 3 5 6 )  could enaanger .1 0 os.
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The employers in the chemical industry share these opinions with th.O'-e 
in many industries , hut due to the fact that the chemical industry is  
one of those industries most affected by the Cc-determination Act 19 "o, 
the employers have- been p articu larly  vehement in re jec t in g
i t .  For example, Professor Hansen, whilst chairman of the executive 
board of Bayer AG claimed publicly that he feared that co-determination 
might lead to the formation of a s o c ia l is t  worker*’ s ta te !  '
A large number of chemical companies are covered by the ne’-T regulations.
Out of about 600 companies which are affected in to t a l ,  approximately
( S ^60 are from the chemical industry. Due to the regional distribution
of the industry, some employers 1 associations are more affected than other:
Thus, the percentage of employees covered by the new act in the various
regional employers’ associations of the chemical industry varies from
38 per cent in ^chleswig-Kolstein to 86 per cent in the Cologne region.
On average some 68 p-r c^nt of employees covered by the Chemical Fm-
( IKO ’Iployors ’ Association f a l l  under the ju risd iction  of the new a c t . '
356. of. M25X Nein zur Hitbestimmung”, op .cit.
3 5 7 . Professor Dr. Hansen, Die Auswirkungen der Pegierungsbeschlusse 
in der Praxis eines Untemehmens, Vortrag vor dem IDA, Koln, 
2 6 . 3 . 7 4 ,  tranrcriot n*7f.
3 5 8 . VCI, Jahr0sberlcht  19 7 - <7 6 , on . c i t  . ,  p.  57-
359. Arbeitgeberbeschwerc 0 , on .cit., p.35ff, rr. calculations.
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The influence of companies with more than 2000 employees on the policy 
and co lle c t iv e  bargaining of the regional chemical employers’ assoc­
ia tion s is  also considerable. Some 63 per cent of the boards of d ir ­
ectors (860)and about 54 per cent of the members of the co llec t iv e  bar­
gaining committees come from these companies, althoiigh regional d is -
(361)p a r it ie s  are once more apparent.
I t  i s  s ig n if ica n t ,  therefore, that of the 30 employers’ associations 
which took part in the appeal to the Federal Constitutional Court, 16 
were from the chemical industry. ( 56^)
The appeals ( 888 "^against the Co-determination Act 1976 are the key to 
employers' a ttitudes within the chemical industry:
"Our opinion of the act can best be judged by the fa c t  that our organi­
sation was one of those which took part in the appeal about i t s  con­
s t i tu t io n a l i ty "  . ( 364 )
360. Vorstande.
361. c f . Table 2.3 above.
362. Arbeitgeberbesohwerde, op . c i t . ,  pp. 1-7* This appeal to a court 
for a decision on a b a s ica lly  p o l i t ic a l  issue indicative of the 
importance which courts play within industria l re lation s in West 
Germany. Also c f . D.W.F. Bendix, oo . c i t . ,  p . l3 7 f f ‘-
363. There were, in f a c t ,  two appeals: One by the employers' assoc­
ia tions which was concerned with A rt .9 P ara .3 of the Basic Law 
(The Principle of Autonomous Collective Bargaining -  T a r if-  
autonomie);  the second by nine companies, five of which come 
from the chemical industry and include Bayer and Hoechst. This 
appeal was primarily based on Art.14 P ara .l  Basic Law which 
concerns property r ig h ts ,  c f . Unternehmenbeschwerde, o p  . c i t .
3 6 4 . Interview ER 1, Aug.'77• Rimilar statements were made by 
almost a l l  the Directors of the regional chemical employers’ 
associations to whom the question was put.
According to respondents, the central issues, involved in the appeals 
concerned firstly the fact that labour directors who might well sit on 
collective bargaining committees of the employers’ associations could 
be strongly influenced by the trade unions. Secondly, trade union 
representatives^3^ ^ o n  the supervisory board would have access to in­
formation which would give them an advantage over the employers in 
negotiations and thus "the balance" of power would be destroyed. Third, 
should a shareholder representative not be able to attend a board meeting, 
then the employee representatives would have a majority and this would 
remove the shareholders rights to their own property. ^ 3<^  ^
However, a large number of the trade union off i c i a l s ^ q u e s t i o n e d  con­
sidered that the real aim of the appeals to the Federal Constitutional 
Court was not to change the act but to elicit a statement from the
judges that it lay just within the bounds of the constitution. In this
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way, the achievement of equal co-determination, which s t i l l  remains the
te d .
(369)
/ f \
aim of the trade unions, would be effectively preven . This aim
was confirmed by a number of employers’ representatives.
As a result of the appeals to the Federal Constitutional Court, and the
3 6 5 . A nximber of trade union representatives (2 or 3) depending on
the size of the company are elected onto the supervisory board.
Nomination occurs by the unions and election  by the workforce 
or the e lec to ra l  gremium. (KitbestG Para.7 (2) and 16).
366. Interviews ER 1, Aug. ’77 and ER 4, FR 8, both P'op. ’77*
367. Interviews FTO 4 , FTO 6, FTO 7, FTO 8, a l l  Aug.’77- e t c .
368. Protokoll 1976, on . c i t . ,  p .5 6 1 .
3 6 9 . Interviews ER 1, ER 3, both Aug.’77 and ER 7, Sep. ’77*
timing of the appeals, - the German Trade Union Confederation de-
( ^ 71 }cided to withdraw from the Konzertierte Aktion in protest. The
( ^7° )Chemical Workers’ Union were particularly incensed, 'fee ling that
the action of the employers’ associations and companies had done much 
to damage the climate of relations, which hart previously been marked 
by responsibility.(878  ^ Although it seemed art the time as if the 
actions and startements of the trade unions were designed to make an 
impression on the genera,! public, there has to-date been no return of 
the trade unions to the KA, although there have recently been reports 
of meetings between the employers’ associations and the trade unions 
at national level*(87^) jn general, no read differences in the re­
lations between the unions and the employers was observed as a result 
of the appeals.
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(370)
370. The appeals were timed so that to arrive at the Federal Con­
s t itu t io n a l  Court one day before the time in which i t  is  
possible to appeal about new acts ran out. In th is  way, i t
was f e l t  by many, that the employers had added insult to
in jury . Interview FTO 6, Aug.’77*
371* The usual translation  "concerted action" is  re jected  as
meaningless in English. I t  i s  a type of informal incomes 
policy introduced in 1967 • ££* Kirkwood and H. Howes,
The Role of Trarte Unions in the German Federal Republic :
Formula for successful Labour P o l i t ic s  in the Welfare S ta te ,
unpublished manuscrift, (1977) ? and J .  Clark, "Concerted 
Action in the Federal Republic of Germany", BJIR, Vol.XVII, 
No.2, 19 7 9 , pp.242-258.
372. The Konzertierte Aktion (KA) had long been a subject of'
considerable controversy within the Chemical Workers’ Union - 
c f . Protokoll 1972? op . o i t . ,  p.405f -  and some trade union 
o f f i c ia l s  expressed the opinion that they would not be sorry 
i f  the trade unions did not return to the ICA. Interviews 
FTO 1 and FTO 6, both Aug.’77-
373• "IG Chemie-Rauptvorstand warnt Arbeitgeber dor chemischen
Industrie" , o resse-d ien st, Xll'i/28Y 13.7 .1977* This opinion 
was also expressed on numerous occasions by both sides in 
interviews and discussions.
374* "West German unions and employers bury th e ir  d ifferen ces" , 
EIRE, ITo.63, Cep.1979? p.2~.
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IIuch to the surprise of both employers and trade unions, when the 
judges of the Federal Constitutional Court f in a l ly  made th e ir  decision, 
they did not make any statements about which p articu lar level of co­
determination would be in line with the Basic Lax-. Besides turning 
dovjn the a.ppeals of the employers’ associations and the companies, 
the judges also stated that the Basic Law did not specify any p a r t i­
cular form of economic ord er.^ ^ 5 )
As might be expected, the trade unions were happy with the decision 
and repeated th e ir  f in a l  aim of equal co-determination which the judges 
had agreed did not ex is t  under the current a c t .  The employers w il l ,
of course, respect the decision and might seek revision through a
t . .. , (376)change m  the law.
The Co-determination Act 1976 allowed two years, for the e lections to
( 3 7 7 )the supervisory board to take place. As a resu lt  the e lections
were complete, with a fex*r exceptions where the status of the company 
had been challenged in the courts, long before the decision on the 
co n stitu tio n a lity  of the act had been made.
The resu lts  of the elections in 57 out of 59 companies from the 
chemical industry are shox-m in the following ta b le .
1! ?
375* "Abfuhr fur die Arbeitgeber aus Karlsrxihe,"  Go, 3/79? P*5
and ’’ISntscheidung gegen I-Iitbestimmungsgeset zn, In fo b r ie f ,
3/79? p .6 f f .
376. Ib id .
377. MitbestG, Para .38.
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Table 2.4
Results of the F i r s t  E lec tions to the Supervisor:/ Boards of
Companies in the Chemical Industry under the Ki tb s s t G. (37 Q N •- J
Organisation
Worker 
Rees. 
No - $
S ta f f  
Hens. 
No ‘ *
0 .Manager 
S ta f f  Rep 
No $
xai Tracle Union 
s . Reps. Total 
No i  No $
IG Chemie 1 1 2  810.6 38 55.9 _ 79 0r- Oop • 0 229 59.6
Other 2GB 
Unions (375) 23 16 .5 5 i .4 - 16 12 -4 44 11.5
BAG - - 7 10.3 - 18 1 5 .O 25 6 .5
VAA - - 2 2.9 28 49.1 I rr O5 .0 37 9.6
Independents 4 2.9 16 23.5 2Q 5 0 .? - - 49 I q OL c . .  0
Total I C O 100 68 100 57 ICO 120 ICO 384 100
The 2GB trade unions were able to win 7 1 * 1  per cent of a l l the seats ,
and i f  the seats for the representatives of senior managerial s t a f f
are discounted, which might seem reasonable sinoe the DGB unions were
rare ly  able to even put up candidates for these sea ts ,  i t  can be said
that the ’7 received 8 3 .5  per cent of the sc a ts .  Although such resu lts
might be seen as a success, comparison with the overall position within
the organisation area of the Chemical Workers’ Union shows that i t  i s  
(^80)below average, “ re f le c t in g  perhaps the weakness of the Chemical 
Workers* Union in some of the larger chemical companies.
378* Bo.sed on data in " Bilans der Aufsiohtsratswr.klen, " Inf o o rio f , 
8/ 7 9 ? p-5f •, own ca lcu la tion s.
3 7 9 * Due to the fact  that some concerns may have works which belong 
to other industries , the corresponding 2GB trade unions which 
organise the employees in these works often had candidates 
standing on the same platform as the candidates of the 
Chemical Workers’ Union, o f . IG Chemie, Wnhlkurier der RGB -  
GcwGrksohafton IG Chemie -  IG Motall -  IG kruck und Papior 
zur Aufsichtsratswahl bei Gunther Wegnor Polik.an in Bannovor 
am 31.1* und 1 .2 .1 9 7 3 , Hannover, no date (1977).
380. o f . " Aufsichtsratawahlen -  ubcrsougenfier Brf olg der IG Ohonie- 
Pawier-Kerarnik " , pressedienst, XIV/20, 26 .6 .1973.
Has th is  recent wave of e lections to the Supervisory hoard had any 
influence on the understanding of the meaning of the word co-determin­
ation amongst employees in the chemical industry? Although no f in a l  
statement can he made on th is  question, some indication of where the ansuttc 
might he can he given. The survey of employees in Agrochemie AG late  
in 1978  included a question with sim ilar wording to that of a survey 
carried out by Furstenberg in seven chemical works in 19 6 6 . ^ ® ^  In 
the former survey there was no d ifferen tia tion  in the coding between 
works and company level co-determination, whereas here such a possi- 
b i l i t 3r was introduced. I t  must be assumed that Furstenberg coded a l l  
rep lies  ( i f  any) defining co-determination as an issue which occurred 
at company level with those at works lev e l .  Nevertheless only 30 per 
cent of his respondents were coded into th is  category, compared with 
30.2 per cent of the works sample of Agrochemie AG who stated that co­
determination occurred at works level and an additional 27.9  per cent 
who stated that i t  occurred at company l e v e l .^ 82 ) This large increase 
in respondents who understand co-determination as occurring eith er at 
works or company level might well be a resiilt of the wave of e lections 
to the supervisory board under the recent le g is la t io n .  The genera.1 
discussion of co-dotermimvbion at these levels in the media which occurred
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3 8 1 . c f . Aooendix 2 . 1 , Question 38, and F. Furstenberg, 00 , c i t . ,  
p.2 8 3 /
382. Ib id . and Appendix 3 Table 49* I t  is  in terestin g , however,
that the percentage of respondents who had l i t t l e  understanding
of co-determination had only decreased s l ig h tly  to just below
20 per ce n t .
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with the introduction of the Works Constitution Act 1972,^888^and the 
Co-determination Act 1976 might also have been partly  responsible for 
th is  in crease•
Another recent survey in the chemical i n d u s t r y ^ d e a l t  d ire c tly  with 
the question of e lections to the supervisory board, although under 
the regulations of the Works Constitution Act. They found that even 
under th is  system the turnout at elections was f a i r ly  low (66 per cent) 
and that 50 P©** cent of respondents did not know what the role of 
employee representatives on the supervisors7 hoard was.^88-7)
Equal oo-determination has been one of the main demands of the West 
German trade union movement throughout the th ir ty  yeans of i t s  e x is t ­
ence. ( 888) What do the unions hope to achieve with the fulfilm ent of 
th is  demand? The f i r s t  aim is  the rea lisa tio n  of democracy within 
industry and the second aim is  to secure and increase the freedom of 
action of the trade unions, ( 087^particularly through influence on 
investment.
383. There was l i t t l e  detailed knowledge of the co-determination 
rights of the works council. Although approximately 40 per cent 
respondents (Appendix 3, Ta/ble 30) named co-determination on 
personnel matters as one of the roles of the works oouncil, over 
50 per cent of respondents were unable to name anything which 
the works management could not carry out without the permission 
of the works council. (Appendix 3, Table 40)♦
38 4 . F .  Landwehrmann and R. Albring, 00 . o i t .
385* Ib id . ,  p .9 4 f f . As far  as is  known, no d e ta ils  of the turnout
at recent elections in the chemical industry have yet been
published. I t  w ill  be in terestin g  to see whether the hypothesis
of certain  trade union o f f i c ia l s  that the complicated electors,!
system w ill  lead to low turnouts is  v er ifie d .
386. c f .  H. Limmer, o p .c i t . ,  p .80 f.
3 8 7 . Gewerkschaften und Mitbestimmung, op . c i t . ,  p.304f«
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Since equal co-determination has yet to he established within the 
chemical industry i t  is  impossible to measure trade union advantages 
from co-determination against these aims. I t  i s  certain  that the flow 
of information from the supervisory boards to the trade union bodies 
such as the bargaining committees w ill  be improved, and i t  i s  to be 
hoped that there w ill  be an improved flow of information between the 
works councils and the employee representatives on the supervisory 
boards•
Certainly the VAA has consolidated i t s  position as a resu lt of the 
recent le g is la t io n .  Although the separate position of senior managerial 
s t a f f  in le g is la t io n  is  not n e w ^ ^ ^ i t  has been further strengthened by 
the Co-detrrmination Act 1976 and i t  seems l ik e ly  that the VAA w ill  con­
tinue to gain importance as the representative body for senior managerial 
s t a f f  within the chemical industry as a result of th is  le g is la t io n .
According to Bergmanns "co-determination . . .  became isolated in a 
prospering c a p ita l is t  economy and in turn became nothing more than an 
instrument of so c ia l policy . . .  with dangerous consequences for the 
unions This analysis seems co rrect :  indeed, i t  might even be
said that co-determination which is  based on co-operation as opposed to 
co n fl ic t  i s  a re f le c t io n  of the general d islike  of co n flic t  within the 
German trade union movement. ^
388. c f .  BetrVG 52 Para. 4 (2 c ) .
3 8 9 . J .  Bergmann in SS1C, Industrial Democracy: international views, 
on . c i t . ,  p . 5 8 .
390.* c f . P. Dahrendorf, op . c i t . ,  p . l 9 1 f f .
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The German trade unions including the Chemical Workers ’ Union should 
become more aware of the dangers involved in co-determination 
especially  for th e ir  a b i l i ty  to apply sanctions. In p articu lar i t  
should be made c lear to the membership that u n til  equal co-determination 
rights are gained there can be no equal resp on sib ility  of the employee 
and trade union representatives for the decisions made on the super­
visory board. Unless th is  occurs the membership is  l ik e ly  to blame 
th e ir  representatives as well as management for decisions with which 
they disagree. This could become particu larly  sig n ifican t in a stagnant 
or recessionary economy where redundancies become more l ik e ly .
(v) Summary.
The development of industria l relations in the German chemical industry 
has occurred against a backdrop of the evolution of German society  
characterised above a l l  by an industria l revolution which was " la t e ,  
rapid and thorough".
Amongst the consequences of th is  was sta te  involvement in industria l 
re la tion s in the form i n i t i a l l y  of socia l le g is la tio n  and la te r  through 
the introduction of the various forms of co-determination. These are 
some of the main features of the legalised system of industrial re la tion s
391* In the Chemical Workers’ Union e ffo r ts  have been made to learn 
from experience. The number of posts on a supervisory board 
which any o f f i c i a l  may hold is  limited to two, there are s t r i c t  
regulations regarding payment of fees received to trade union 
educational funds and e ffo r ts  are made to se le c t  suitable candi­
dates and to school them properly, cf). Protokoll 1976, Anhang, 
P . 199TT* For an analysis of some of the dangers to trade unions 
involved in co-determination c f .  T. Kirkwood and H. Mewes, "The 
Limits of Trade Union Power in the C apitalist Order: The Case
of West German Labour’s Quest for Co-determination," BJXP., 
Vol.XIV, No.3, 1976, pp 295-305.
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in Germany and both have had consequences for developments within the 
chemical industry.
Social legislation was the basis for the social paternalism, as it has 
been called, practised by the major chemical employers from the end of 
the last centiiry through to the present day. The motivation behind 
this form of paternalism seems manifold. Not only did the rapid ex­
pansion of the chemical industry create a vast demand for labour often 
on green-field sites so that many of the "benefits" were necessary to 
attract and retain employees. The technological nature of the industry 
also led to a predominance of academically qualified managers with a 
different ideology to the owners and this may also have been significant« 
Furthermore, the desire to create a. workforce loyal to the company was 
combined with the aim of preventing or at least hindering the develop­
ment of trade unionism within the chemical industry. The weak base of' 
the unions in the large chemical companies remains one of the major 
causes of the inability of the Chemical Workers’ Union to use sanctions 
successfully in this industry.
Trade union weakness has also been contributed to by the fragmentation 
which has existed for many years and which might be considered to exist 
even today within the system of industrial unionism. The present frag­
mentation takes the form, however, of a schism within the Chemical 
Workers’ Union basically along ideological lines but which reflects the 
traditional split between workers and staff magnified by the problem of 
a large number of works councillors interested in protecting their own
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position, often at the cost of the loca l trade union organisation. This 
often leads to c o n fl ic t  between the lay o ff ice rs  and the works coun cillors .
A reaction of trade union leadership within the chemical industry has 
been to try  to counter th is  fragmentation by increased cen tra lisa tio n  
within the union. This cen tra lisa tio n  which adds further to the weakness 
of the union lo c a lly  is  also a reaction to the policy of the chemical 
employers 1 association  which has become increasingly co-ordinated in 
recent years.
Co-ordination of policy on the employers’ side is  by no means new, 
however, to the chemical industry. Large companies have long been a 
feature of th is  industry, partly  as a resu lt of the la te  industria l 
revolution, and partly  due to the technology of the chemical industry 
whereby economies of scale and' research costs have only been viable for 
the larger companies. Close co-operation between the management of the 
more important firms was re f lec ted  in the trend towards c a r te l isa t io n  
which culminated in the formation of IQ Farben and which led to a co­
ordinated policy of resistance to trade unionism*
The importance of a small number of enormous companies and close co­
operation between th e ir  management was conducive to the re la t iv e ly  early 
formation of a unified employers’ association for the chemical industry, 
as compared with the establishment of a "unified” trade union movement. 
These factors have also aided the development of co-ordinated policy and 
t a c t i c s  on the employers’ side and th is  has contributed to the dominance
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of employers over the trade unions in collective "bargaining in the 
chemical industry.
The technology of the chemical industry has additional consequences for 
industrial relations. The capital intensive nature of the industry 
means that wage costs are fairly small with the result that companies 
can afford to pay* good wages and to provide good facilities. This has 
had a positive influence on the climate of industrial relations within 
the chemical industry as have the peaceful relations between the lower 
echelons of management and the workforce. Such relations have been 
fostered by the large number of managers and supervisors and by the 
degree of contact they have with the workforce which is generally employed 
in small groups. Both of these factors are a direct result of the tech­
nological nature of the chemical industry.
Future changes to industrial relations in the West German chemical 
industry may result out of the Co-determination Act 1976 which has in­
creased trade union information on the companies or as a result of the 
additional influence provided to senior managerial staff by this act.
However, a consideration of the development of industrial relations in 
the German chemical industry has shown that the technology, industrial 
organisation and the economic state of the industry have been of great 
relevance to industrial relations. Therefore, these three features and 
their influence on current industrial relations are examined in more detai 
in the next chapter.
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The West German chemical industry - Technological characteristios, 
industrial organisation, recent economio development and their 
relevance for industrial relations.
In the first chapter some indication of the diverse nature of the
chemical industry was given. The first aim of this chapter is to con­
sider in more detail the technological characteristics of the industry 
in terms of the range of production systems employed and to examine the 
effects of this on the type of work in the chemical industry. It is
clear that this influences workers’ attitudes
Chapter 3
An analysis of the organisation and structure of the industry in which 
such conditions- prevail follows on from this. The background to an 
understanding of labour relations in the West German chemical industry 
is completed by a review of its recent economic development.
(i) Technological characteristios.
The chemical industries in both West Germany and the United Kingdom 
manufacture many thousands of different products, even within the de­
finitions chosen for this study. These products have many different 
forms, such as- inorganic and organic gases, a wide range of liquid 
chemicals including acids, alkalis, alcohols, paints, medicines, inks,
1. 13. Wedderburn, and R. Crompton, Workers’ Attitudes and Technology,
Cambridge, 1972. Also H. Kern and M. Schumann, Industriearbeit
und Arbeiterbe-wusstsein, 2 vols., Third Edition, Frankfurt and"■ ■■ 1 1 11 1 11 1 1 ■ ■ * * J
Koln, 1974? although the work of these two authors seems to be 
rather deterministic, cf. J. Prott, Industriearbeit bei betrieb- 
liohen Umstrukturierungen, K8ln, 1975? p.253ff. Although tech­
nology, industrial organisation and economic development are 
considered separately it is not intended to imply that they are. 
independant of each other, since this is certainly not the case. 
However, this method has been selected in order to provide a more 
understandable approach, each section stressing particular features.
etc., as well as many different types of solid substances, fertilizers, 
synthetic rubbers and plastic materials, waxes, polishes, tablets, 
bandages, films and fireworks.
A vast number of different production systems are required to manu­
facture such a spread of products. One of the most useful categori­
sations of production systems was developed by Joan Woodward. She 
identified nine different types of production in her study of South 
Essex industry.
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I Production of units to customers’ requirements.
II Production of prototypes.
III Fabrication of large equipment in stages.
IV Production of small batches to customers* orders.
V Production of large batches.
VI Production of large batches on assembly lines.
VII Mass production.
VIII Intermittent production of chemicals in multi-purpose plant.
IX Continuous flow production of liquids, gases and crystalline 
substances."
Although chemicals would most usually be produced under categories VIII
(3)and IX, other production systems are found such as IV, V, VI' 'and even 
VII. As far as the chemical industry is concerned the types of process
2. J. Woodward, op.cit., p.39*
3. As in the Seagrass chemical works investigated by Wedderburn and 
Crompton. Since the main German chemical companies have production 
sites several times larger than this one, an even greater divers­
ification on one site might be expected. D. Wedderburn and R. 
Crompton, op .cit., p.30ff. For another example of a range of 
chemical production systems studied, c_f. F. Furstenberg, op .cit.,
p.l6f.
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used might he classified into three basio types: batch, semi-continuous
and continuous process production. It has been explained above that
this study concentrates on the continuous and to a certain extent semi-
continuous production systems that are commonly found in the manufacture
(5)of basio chemicals.
Subsequent studies by Woodward fs team found that batch production systems
were very varied and where chemicals are produced the system had much in
( 6 )common with continuous flow processes. J Nevertheless some differences 
in attitudes and behaviour have been found. Generally workers in batch 
processes, which were more labour intensive and where management act-
( l )ivities are apparently more complex than in continuous flow processes, '
showed a lesser degree of job satisfaction and this had a variety of
(8)consequences like high labour turnover and absenteeism.
This consideration of production systems in the chemical industry has been
(9)based on British studies due to a lack of similar studies in Germany. "
In particular, batch chemical production which has received some limited
4* This does not imply that all plants and works can be placed in one 
specific category as sometimes a range of different systems are 
used to make specific products and sometimes the bounds of the 
categories overlap, of. J.Woodward, op .cit., p.30 and D.Wedderburn 
and R. Crompton, op .oit., p.33.
5 . Several companies visited also produce pharmaceuticals, fine chemi­
cals and chemical fibres which are often made in batches and which 
include labour intensive spinning/twisting units and packaging units, 
cf. S. Cotgrove, J. Durham and C. Vamplew, The Nylon Spinners,
London, 1971? also Kern and Schumann, Vol.l, op .oit., p.l54ff*
6. J. Woodward (ed.), Industrial organisation: Behaviour and Control, 
Oxford, 1970,
7. J. Woodward, Management and Technology, London, 1958? p.30.
8. D. Wedderburn and R_. Crompton, op .cit«, p..34f*
9. Nevertheless, it is assumed that the technological nature of the 
industries are similar enough to permit this sinoe particular 
chemical processes are not limited to one country.
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Due to limitations of resources, this investigation does not solve 
this problem. It is suggested, that a comparative study of industrial 
relations in batch and continuous flow process chemical works would be 
fruitful, particularly if it was of a cross-national nature, since this 
would give some indication whether technological influences on industrial 
relations extend beyond national boundaries as might be expected.
a tte n tio n  in  the UK has been almost to ta l ly  ignored in  German s tu d ie s .
A number of studies have been carried out in Germany on continuous pro­
cess work in the chemical industryand the influence of this on in­
dustrial relations will now be discussed.
Continuous flow processes, which are often associated with a high degree
of automation are considered to represent an advanced and complex level
(ll)of technology.' Advanced technology is believed to have a variety
(12)of influences on industrial relations.' Some authors have stressed
(13 Jthe positive influences of advanced technology,' 'and Furstenberg claims
10. of. F. Furstenberg, op.oit. ;  J. Prott, op.cit.; Kern and 
Schumann, op .cit.; 0. Mickler, E. Dittrich und U. Nex^/mann,
Technik, Arbeitsorganisation und Arbeit, Frankfurt, 1976.
For the UK of. 2. Wedderburn and R. Crompton, op .cit.,
C. Vamplew, "Automated process operators: Work attitudes and 
behavioxir", BJIR, Vol. 11, 1973, pp.415-430 and S. Cot grove and 
C. Vamplew, "Technology, class and politics," Sociology, Vol.6, 
1972, pp.169-185.
11. of. J. Woodward, 1965, op .cit., p. 39* ancl Kern and Schumann, 
Vol.l, op .cit., p.144*
12. of. L. p'tettner, "The Impact of Advanced Technology on Industrial 
Relations", in B. Barrett, S. Rhodes and J. Beishon (eds.), 
Industrial Relations and the Wider Society, London, 1975? pp• 
163~170? also J. Stieber (ed.), Employment Problems of Auto­
mation and Advanced Technology, London, 1966, pp.371-447*
13* of. R. Blauner, Alienation and Freedom, Chicago and London, 1964? 
p.124ff•
to have demonstrated this for the West German chemical industry.*'1^
This topic is considered at various stages of the thesis based on the 
empirical findings of the study. It is discussed in depth in the 
chapter dealing with workplace industrial relations, particularly in 
terms of employees’ attitudes to working conditions in one sector of 
the chemical industry.
Mickler et al. have identified a number of typical types of job which
(15 )are carried out in automated chemical works.' These groups are 
basically control room operators, plant operators, laboratory tech­
nicians and maintenance workers. Less automated plants can also be 
expected to have unskilled labourers for loading and unloading operations. 
Other types of jobs within the chemical industry include dispatch as 
well as the normal range of management services. In particular there
(1 6 )
are a large number of employees working within research and development.
It is important, therefore, to avoid generalisations about the attitudes 
of employees in the chemical industry since there is such a variety of 
types of jobs as well as an enormous range of different types of pro­
duction systems• 1^7^
Continuous process production systems are unavoidably linked with shift 
work. The reasons for employing continuous process systems in the
14. F. Furstenberg, op .cit., p. 195* Another recent survey in the 
German chemical industry found that 68 per cent of respondents 
considered working conditions to be satisfactory or better. 
Landwehrmann and Albring, op .cit., p. 102.
15. 0. Mickler et al., op .oit., p.280ff.
16. cf. VCI, Jahresbericht 1978/79? op .cit«, p.35~*
17. In Chapter 5 The differences in attitudes between production 
and maintenance workers are considered, and the job breakdown 
of respondents in the Agroohemie AG study may be found in 
Appendix 3, Table 1.
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chemical industry are manifold. Besides technological necessities 
arising from the nature of certain chemical reactions, there are also 
economic ones. Continuous reactions use less energy than discontinuous 
ones which require cooling down and then reheating. Chemical plant is 
also very capital intensive and this is expensive so that management 
wish to achieve maximum utilisation of the plant.
The effects of shift work on the lifestyle of the shift worker and his
(19)family, as well as his health are well known* ' Shift work is ex­
tensive in the chemical industry, affecting approximately 33 per cent of 
all employees. 2^0^ However, Furstenberg found that 58 per cent of em­
ployees felt that there were no negative effects on their use of free-
(2l)time as a result of shift work. ' Such beneficient results were not
achieved in the survey at Agrochemie AG however. There only 31 per cent
(22)of shift workers in the works sample saw no disadvantages in shift work. '
The discrepancy between these twro results might be explained in a number 
of ways. Not only were different sampling techniques used, so was a
1 8 . J. Walker, The Human Aspects of Shiftwork, London, 1978, p.2Iff. 
Capital intensity is considered below.
1 9 . cf. Ibid.; 0. Neuloh, "Sozialisation und Schichtarbeit,M 
Soziale Welt, Vol.5? 1964? PP*35°-369 and P.E. Mott, P.O. Mann, 
0. MeLough1in and P.P. Warwick Shift work: the social psycho­
logical and physical consequences, Michigan, 1965*
20. Gp 10/80, forthcoming. In other words, this represents 58.4 
per cent of blue-collar workers, cf. Table 3*3 below, own 
calculations. This has caused the Chemical Workers’ Union to 
initiate a programme of action recently for shift workers. 
"Pro.jekt Schicharbeit: Erste Runde geschafft," Gp, 9/79? P*8 
This figure compares with 25 per cent of employees in German 
manufacturing industry. "Jeder Vierte geht auf Schioht,” Gp,
2 /79? p.lOf. Generally 8 hour shifts are worked but Hoechst 
uses 12 hour shifts £f. Personalberioht Hoechst 1977? op .cit., 
p «123ff•
21. P. Furstenberg, op.cit., p. 179*
22. of. Appendix 3, Table 8. (35 per cent of all shift workers 
questioned).
rather different phraseology. In this investigation disadvantages 
besides those to free-time activities would be, and frequently were, 
incorporated *
At Agrochemie AG most respondents stated categorically that the reason
(23 )for working shifts was purely financial.' '
"The only reason for working shifts is the money - i t ’s the only ad­
vantage". (interview VL 1, Oct.’78).
"I’m not a skilled man ... so I can’t complain about shift work. The 
pay is good ..." (interview M 8, Oct.’78).
The main disadvantages were stated to be, particularly when on night
shift, a disrupted rhythm of life, bad family life, stomach disorders,
lack of sleep during the day and the faot that public entertainment is
geared only to day work. In the words of one respondent:
"My whole life revolves around the shift plan ... but I accept it, 
otherwise I ’d have to change my job", (interview 003, Oct.’78).
Dzielak et al. have shown that differences in trade union consciousness
exist between production workers and craftsmen in particular. (24)
production workers in the chemical industry work shifts of one sort or
another. Some significant differences were also found at Agrochemie AG,
( 2 5 )between day and shift workers.' J The table below sets out some of 
the differences which were found.
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23* Other advantages cited included the chance to visit public
offices which are only open in the mornings, as well as 
looking after plots of.land they own. (Workforce of 
agricultural background).
24* Dzielak et al., on .cit., p.374Tf'»
25• Differences in attitudes between production and maintenance
workers are discussed in Chapter 5*
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Differences in actions, attitudes and knowledge between shift and 
day workers at Agrochemie AG.
Table 3*1.
Action/Attitude/Knowledge Day 
Workers ($)
Shift 
Workers (%)
Significance
«)
Knowledge Works Counoil 
roles:
Representative 77 50 5
Agreements 35 23 6
Safety 27 8 7
Codetermination on 
dismissal 23 4 5
Unfailing attendance at 
works meetings 58 9 1
Works council sufficient 
rights 73 90 3
Attitudes on technical 
progress
more
negative
less
negative 0.3
Skilled man 
(apprenticeship) 68 22 0.4
These findings seem to indicate that shift work hinders in the acquisi­
tion of knowledge, that shift workers are more complacent about the 
powers of the works council and that many shift workers are unskilled 
men seeking to improve their income by accepting the negative effects 
of shift work.
What are the reasons for these differences, and what consequences do 
they have for industrial relations? One primary reason is probably the 
influence of unsocial working hours which tire the shift v/orkers and 
disrupt their lives. It is difficult or even impossible for them to
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attend works meetings and trade union educational courses. Within the 
chemical industry, especially in the more automated plants, low manning 
levels and isolated workplaces add to the communication problems. ^
In this way, process workers on shift have little opportunity to dis­
cuss industrial relations matters and to increase their knowledge in 
these areas. This leads to a fragmentation of the production workers’ 
attitudes and action; a situation which is not likely to be conducive 
to co-ordinated industrial action. Shift bonuses and a 42 hour week 
instead of a 40 hour week also increase the average earnings of pro­
duction workers on shifts quite considerably. As a result of this the 
median monthly income of production workers was DM 222 more than that
of craftsmen at Agrochemie AG. This could conceivably be another reason
(27)for shift workers’ job satisfaction.' 1
Shift work is by no means the only factor which influences process
(28)workers’ attitudes. Technological conditions seem to be conducive,
at least in highly automated plants, to clean conditions, a lack of
(29)physical work and teamwork within the small work groups.' J Neverthe­
less, other factors influence industrial relations too, such as manage­
ment policies- particularly within the West German chemical industry -
th® effectiveness of works council and trade union representation, etc.
26. It has been argued that communication in automated chemical works 
is relatively easy. Kern and Schumann, op.cit., p.129* Perhaps 
this is true as far as central control rooms are concerned, how­
ever, these are not universal in the chemical industry.
27* The DM 222 means that process workers earned 13*7 per cent on
average more than craftsmen who possessed generally a greater 
level of qualifications. In Germany this reversal of differ­
entials does not seem to lead to friction as perhaps might be 
the case in the UK.
28. cf. S. Cotsgrove and G. Vamplew, op .cit.
29. R.Blauner, op .cit., p.l78ff. Working conditions and their 
influence on industrial relations in the ohemioal industry are 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5*
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It seems, then, that shift work is a contributory factor towards stable 
industrial relations in chemicals. Since the reasons for shift work 
are both technological and economic in the chemical industry, it is 
these basic characteristics which are responsible for the effects of 
shift work on industrial relations but also on the lives of shift 
workers•
The level of automation in the chemical industry has increased with 
developments in process technology. In particular the introduction of 
electronic instrumentation to measure the process conditions, the de­
velopment of computers and central control rooms have had a large 
influence. A major advance prior to this was the changeover from batch 
to continuous processes, and it was this change which prompted the intro­
duction of better control systems.However, it was not until after* 
the Second World War that electronics had developed to the level that 
such refinements as automatic registration of the whole reaction in a
centralised control room were possible^
In this context the attitudes of employees rn the chemical industry to­
wards technological change deserve consideration. The results of the
findings at the Agrochemie AG are presented here and compared with those 
which have been obtained in other studies carried out in the chemical 
industry in order to gain a wider view of opinions.
30. 0. Mickler, et al., op.cit., p.86f.
31. For an interesting discussion of these developments which go 
beyond the scope of this study cjf. Ibid., pp.50-61, 85-101 
and 114-139*
1Kern and. Schumann determined in their study of the influence of tech­
nical change on workers * ideology that workers were generally unable to
place their own experiences into an overall framework so that their
(32 ^attitudes were primarily formed by these limited experiences.' 1 In 
order to put the attitudes of respondents at Agrochemie AG into per­
spective the mechanism of technological change there is first re­
viewed. Although company managerial practices will have a significant 
influence on the mechanism of change, many methods used at Agrochemie
f 33 }
AG may be found generally within the West German chemical industry.' J
The major impression gained during the study was a lack of knowledge 
amongst all but relatively senior management on the mechanism of intro­
duction of new technology.However, at Agrochemie AG no large wave
(35 )of technological improvements had been carried out since 1968.' J A 
plant manager did summarise the methods used to introduce minor inno­
vations t
"Technological improvements are developed jointly by the engineers and 
the chemists. A cost/use analysis is carried out and permission to 
carry out the changes is obtained from senior management• It is best to 
talk to the men at this stage. If they react in a negative way I re­
think the plans but do not necessarily abandon them, since simplification 
is required in? the explanations and they can’t be expected to have a 
valid opinion on everything. When the new piece of equipment has been 
fitted the men are then taught how to use it. We tried handing out 
written instructions but this was unsuccessful, so I now explain it 
verbally to the four senior operators(36)and they pass on the inform­
ation to the others." (interview M 10, Oct. *7 8).
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32. Kern and Schumann, Vol.l, op .cit., p.273ff.
33. This statement is based on the background studies on workplace 
industrial relations and the author’s own experience working in. 
the industry.
34. A question on this subject was asked (of. Appendix 2.1.1, question 
10) in order to gain this information.
3.5.• Interview M 3, Oct.’7 8 .
36. This plant was relatively small and did not have shift supervisors.
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Some respondents did say that this system did not function fully since
they occasionally turned up on a job, for example on night shift, to
discover something had been changed which they knew nothing about.
Others agreed that there was room for improvements in the system of 
introducing new technology.
Prott reviewed the variety of effects which the introduction of new
(39)technology might have. '  These ranged from increases and decreases 
in the qualifications necessary for the job; a polarisation of working 
conditions; a decreased feeling of job security; increases in mental 
but decreases in physical stress, whilst in other cases more physical 
stress and an increase in shift work.
At the Agrochemie works manning levels were strictly controlled. Per­
mission had to be obtained from the company executive board to take on 
extra labour. The board had also imposed the last wave of rational­
isation on the works and this had resulted in a reduction in manning of
around 10 per cent despite the resistance of local management. 4^0^ Indeed 
over the period of a decade manning on some plants had been reduced by
/ a -  \
around 50 per cent' and the impression was gained that over this time 
around 100 jobs (ca. 20 per cent) had been lost although no exact figures 
were available.
37• Interviews 004 and 005, both Oct. *78. General satisfaction was 
expressed, however, in the workings of the employees' suggestion 
scheme whereby employees 1 recommendations which lead to improve­
ments in the process are rewarded by the company.
38. e .g. Interview M 9? Oct.*78.
39. J. Prott, op .cit., p.21ff. Also cf. L. Stettner, op.cit.
40. Interview M 2, Oct.'78.
41. Interview M 8, Oct.'78.
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These experiences are clearly reflected, in opinions expressed at the 
works on the effects of technological change. Of the types of changes 
to work loads mentioned by respondents in the works sample, 46 per oent 
covered increases in work load as a result of decreased manning, a 
figure which represents 58 per cent of those respondents stating there 
had been changes.^2) in addition 74 per cent of the works sample be­
lieved that one of the results of technological progress would be 
unemployment. (43 )
These results contrast considerably with Furstenberg’s findings. None
of his respondents mentioned an increase in work load as a direct result
of a reduction in manning, and only 24 per cent said there had been an 
( 44 ) TTincrease.' He also reports that 59 per oent of respondents viewed 
technological progress as leading to positive effects.(45) Results of 
this order were found in several studies carried out in the late 1960fs, 
not only within the chemical industry but more generally too.(46)
What are the reasons for such a marked change in the assessment of 
technological progress within just over a decade? One answer must 
certainly be sought in the different economic climate present in West 
Germany since 1975* Unemployment for so long eradicated in Germany 
returned with a vengence during the slump brought about by the oil 
crisis.(4?) with it returned the fears of redundancy and anything which
42. Or 36 per cent of all respondents, cf. Appendix 3, Table 3*
43. of. Appendix 3, Table 10.
44* F. Purstenberg, op .cit., p.261.
45* Ibid., p.272.
4 6. cf. M. Schumann et al., op.cit., p. 199 and Kern and Schumann,
Vol.2, op .cit., p.180.
4 7 * See discussion below.
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might bring it about. Another answer might be found, in an increased 
awareness of some of the potential dangers of technological change 
which could conceivably have resulted from the major disputes in the 
German printing industry in 1977 and 1978 which vie re concerned primarily 
with the introduction of new technology.
Such a range of technological changes could never have been introduced 
without a commitment to research and development within the chemical 
industry. Such investment in research and development r^equires high 
gross profit margins. As Rauschel has shown for BASF it is very diffi­
cult to determine exactly what profit rates are earned in the chemical 
industry.(^ O) ginoe qis analysis was carried out additional methods of
disguising profits have been introduced in the form of social balance- 
(5l)sheets.' ' Research and development costs are high as evidenced by
(52 )expenditure at BASF of DM 682 millions in 1976 'and also by a survey
of companies employing 80 per cent of employees in the chemical industry
(53)determined that these companies spent DM 3900 million in 1977* ' These
costs are covered by increasing the prices of chemicals to ensure that 
the gross profit margins are high enough to finance the research and 
development•
4 8. of. Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, 1978, op .cit., pp.l86- 
215 and "IG Chemie - Hauptvorstand und Beirat zum Arbeitskampf in 
der Bruck-und Metallindustrie," pressedienst, XIV/5,15.3*78.
49• See below, and VCI, Jahresberioht 1978/79? op .cit., p.31.
50. J. Rauschel, op.cit., p.l58ff.
5 1 . of. "West=Germany - compiling a social balance-sheet, "EIRR
No.66, p.7f and W. Mehte and M. Reimann, BASF Aktiegesellsohaft - 
Sozialbilanz - Analyse, Kritik, Ludwigshafen (IG Chemie- 
Verwaltungsstelle), no date (1977?)♦
52. BASF, Geschaftsbericht 1976, op .cit., p.7»
53. VCI, Jahresberioht 1978/79? op.cit., p.35*
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Another characteristic of the chemical industry which uses continuous 
process and to a lesser extent hatch process technology is a high degree 
of capital intensity. Capital intensity can he measured by the amount 
of capital employed per employee, and it has been shown that the chemical 
industry in Germany has employed around double the capital compared with 
all industries on average throughout the period 1970 to 19 7 5*
This has a number of consequences for industrial relations. There is
a direct relationship between capital intensity and the importance of
labour costs within an industry. In the chemical industry wage and
salary costs have generally been several per cent of turnover lower than
(55)the average for all industries. " Total labour costs have been higher- 
due to a range of additional costs, some as a result of collective agree­
ments and others paid by the employers as part of their system of wel- 
(56)fare benefits. J ; In this way, in 1975 total labour costs were 24.3
per cent of turnover in the chemical industry, whilst wages and salaries
were only 21.6 per cent. Total labour costs for industry on average were
(57 )27*2 per cent in 19 7 5* The consequence of these relatively low
labour costs is that management is more able to pay wage increases than 
industries where labour costs are more significant. This provides the 
employers with more flexibility in their negotiations with the trade 
unions than in many industries*
54• Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, Vol.2, 1979? op .oit., 
p.371* For example in 1976, 140 000 DM per employee in the 
ohemical industry and 76 000 DM per employee in all industries.
55. of. Ghemiewirtschaft in Zahlen, 1976, op.oit., p.26 and Arbeitsring, 
Paten zur Sozialpolitik, Folge 30, March 1978 and Folge 34?
September 1979* A revision of official statistics in 1976 makes 
comparison of figures before and after this date almost impossible*
5 6 . For a breakdown of labour costs see Zahlen zur Sozialpolitik,
1979? op.cit., p.54*
57• Ghemiewirtschaft in Zahlen, 1976, op .cit., p.26 and Statistisches 
Jahrbuoh 1978, op.cit., p.l64«
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Another probable effect of high capital costs, especially where de­
preciation of the plant is rapid, as is often the case in the chemical 
industry, would be a desire to ensure maximum usage of the plant.^8) 
This involves keeping down-time to a minimum, whether it be caused by 
cleaning, maintenance or industrial action. The need to keep plant on 
stream should therefore be conducive to concessions from management in 
their dealings with trade unions. However, on two occasions in Germany
employers have accepted the union challenge and have been prepared to
( 5Q )risk the consequences of a strike, despite the possible high costs. " '  
In such cases it is likely that hopes of keeping plant running despite
the strike, a possibility which is discussed at a later stage of the
thesis, together with other possible gains such as the value of defeat­
ing the union on such a major issue outweighed the consequences which, 
might•have resulted•
In summary it might be stated that despite a wide range of products and 
processes in the chemical industry, generally continuous process pro­
duction systems are used, particularly in the heavy chemical sectors of 
the industry. This has a number of direct consequences for industrial 
relations. High technology influences the type of jobs and continuous 
process systems lead specifically to a high degree of shift work. In 
particular shift workers show a lesser awareness of industrial relations 
matters, such as details of oo-determination and works counoil matters. 
Due apparently to a high income despite low educational qualifications 
they are also fairly satisfied with their jobs.
58. Interview MAN 3, June f79»
59. 1971 and 1977* of. Dzielak et al., or .cit., and Projektgruppe
Gewerkschaftsforschung, 1978, op .cit«
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Working conditions can sometimes be improved by technological advances 
and this seems especially the case in centralised control rooms on 
chemical plants. Despite this, respondents interviewed were sceptical 
of the long term advantages in technological progress. These con­
tradictory results probably arise from the limited experiences of the 
respondents•
Continuous process technology is also synonymous with capital intensity 
and this in turn seems to increase the room of management- to manoeuvre 
in industrial relations matters on the one hand whilst tieing their 
hands on the other. The type of industrial organisation found in 
this capital intensive industry and the effects it has on industrial 
relations- are discussed next.
(ii) Industrial organisation.
a. Concentration ancB. size of establishment.
One of the primary features of the industrial organisation of the West 
German chemical industry is the high degree of concentration. This 
topic has already been touched upon in the consideration of employers’ 
associations- above, (^ ®^and it is now analysed in greater detail.
According to the criteria of the West German monopolies commission, con' 
centration ratios are defined by the percentage of industrial turnover 
resulting from the three largest companies in the industry. There are
60. See Chapter 2, Section (iii)a.
three categories, very highly concentrated (50 per cent or more of
turnover), highly concentrated (25-50 per cent) and moderately con-
( 6l)centrated (less than 25 per cent). ' It follows from this that the 
West German chemical industry should he classified as highly concen­
trated since the three companies with the highest turnovers accounted 
for 27.5 per cent of turnover in 1973* Other industries in Germany
(62)varied from 3*3 per cent to 82.9 per cent.
It seems that the relative degree of concentration is rather low in
international comparison since the chemical industry in West Germany
takes up eleventh place as against fifth plaoe on average inter- 
(63)nationally.' This might he the result of higher than average con­
centration ratios in West German industry in general and a relatively 
broad base to the industry in terms of the numerous large companies in 
West German chemical industry.
Although it is not simple to state to which industry a mammoth:company
belongs, and it is difficult to know whether to count daughter companies
too, about 25 companies in the FAZ list of 100 largest companies have
substantial interests in the chemical and allied industries. This
seems comparable with the figures of 23 chemical companies out of 95
obtained in another study; these same companies accounted for 38 per cent
(6S )of total capital of the companies in the survey.
61. Monopolkommission, Mehr Wettbewerb 1 st moglich, Hauptgutachten 
1973/75? Baden-Baden, 1976, p.75*
62. The Woodworking and Aircraft Manufacturing industries respectively. 
Ibid., pp.603-5*
63. F.L. Pryor, "An international comparison of concentration ratios, 
"Review of Economics and Statistics. May 1972, pp.130-140.
6 4. of. M. Kruk,- "Die hundert grossten Untemehmen, l8'th Edition,
FAZ, 4*9*1976, N r .197, p . 15*
6 5. M. Panic, The UK and West German Manufacturing Industry 1954-72. 
NEDO Monograph 5? London, 1976, p.98f.
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The importance of large chemical companies from West Germany is also 
indicated by 17 out of the 200 largest in the world originating there*^ ®®^  
Furthermore the 50 largest German chemical companies cover 68.4 per cent
/ giy \
of the industry in terms of turnover, "although there were around 2700
public companies active in the chemical industry in 19 7 7>^ ®^ and in 1975
around 50 per cent of companies employed less than 20 people.
The West German chemical industry is highly concentrated and a small 
number of companies dominate the industry as far as turnover is concerned. 
The influence of this domination of the industry by a relatively small 
number of companies on the distribution of employment in the industry is 
also of importance to industrial relations*
It was shown above that 68 per cent of employees in companies organised
by the ohemical employers' associations work in companies with more than
(70)2000 employees. There are around 60 such companies. This agrees
effectively with the monopoly commission report which shows that the
(71)
50 largest companies employ 64.5 P®r cent of the ohemical labour force.
A similar picture emerges when the size of chemical establishments is 
considered as in the table below.
66. Ca 200, 1979? op.cit., p.S4ff*
6 7 . Monopolkommission, opTcit., pp.603-605.
68. Btatistisches Jahrbuch, 1978, op.cit., pp.110-3, own calculations.
69. Ibid., pp.110-113, and p.l60, own calculations.
70. VOI, Jahresbericht 1975/76, op .cit., p.57*
71. Monopolkommission, op .cit., pp. 603-605•
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A Comparison of Establishment Size in the West German Ghemical Industry 
and Manufacturing Industry in 1976. (72)
Table 3 .2 .
Establishment
Size
Establishments 
Chemical Industry 
No. $
Man .Ind. 
*
Employees 
Chemical Ind. 
N o . $
Man.Ind.
1- 19 2608 62.6 57.9 14845 2.5 4*4o\rel0C\J 608 14 .6 17.9 19442 3.3 6.8
vj
ri 0 1 VO vo 331 7.9 10.0 23615 4.0 8.4
100-199 229 5.5 6.5 31590 5.4 10.9
200-499 207 5.0 4.8 63165 10.8 17 '. 8
500-999 88 2.1 1.6 6I899 10.6 13.1
1000 and more 95 2.3 1.1 369042 63.6 38.6
Total 4166 100 100 583598 100 100
The large establishments in the chemical industry, although relatively 
few in number (95) account for around 64 per cent of chemical employ­
ment, which is far greater than the percentage for manufacturing in­
dustry on average.
The reasons for the size of companies and establishments are manifold.
As far as the three major production sites are concerned, there were 
historical reasons for their selection and growth which have been dis-
(73)cussed above. Other reasons may be found in the rate of technological 
change; the economies which are introduced hy increasing the size of 
chemical plant; the interlinked nature of much chemical, manufacture 
which makes the location of a number of plants on the same site advan­
tageous; and the facilitation of managerial, administrative and research 
economies. Many of these arguments may he found in a consideration of
72. Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1978? op .cit., pp.168-9, own calculations« 
73* cf. Chapter 2, Section (i).
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Another common feature of large companies in highly concentrated in­
dustries is that their productivity should be considerably higher than 
that of smaller companies. In the case of the chemical industry there 
seems to be only a slight improvement in productivity as reflected by 
the fact the percentage of turnover of the large companies is only 
slightly greater than the percentage of the chemical workforce that 
they employ.
This can be explained in a number of ways. The rate of technological
advance in the chemical industry is particularly fast and this requires
a high degree of expenditure on research and development. Research and
development is concentrated therefore on the large companies which are
more able to afford it. Thus Hoeohst spent DM 1044 millions on research
and development in 19 7 7? around a quarter of which was on environmental
(75)research, and it employed 14000 people in these areas.' Such em­
ployees contribute little to the current productivity of the company but 
are crucial to its future survival. This introduces the concept of the 
importance of the workforce structure to a consideration of the product­
ivity and indeed the labour relations of an industry. Before returning 
to this subject it is necessary, however, to consider what immediate 
effects the concentration of the chemical industry and the size of com­
panies has on labour relations-.
74* Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, Vol.2, 1979? op.cit., 
p.299* Tor a further consideration of productivity in the
West German chemical industry see below.
75* Hoeohst AG, Geschaftsbericht 1977, op.cit., p.12.
of the developments which led  to  the form ation of IG Farben.
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The concentration of the chemioal industry is of particular significance 
to the employers' organisations since it facilitates co-operation be­
tween company managements on economic, trade, political and industrial 
relations matters. Major policy decisions are taken on the boards of 
a very few companies, often in consultation with one another through 
directors who sit on numerous executive or supervisory boards, and yet 
these decisions affect the great majority of employees in the ohemical 
industry•
In this way it is possible for management to decide collectively to
resist union or works council pressure on a whole range of issues such
as wages, forms of payment, work regulations, etc♦ The relatively low
(76 )degree of competition within the ohemical industry' 'which is due partly
to the concentration but also to the diversification of companies into
(77 )specific product areas has also meant that the economic pressure on 
management to cut costs has not been so great as in more competitive 
industries. This pressure is also reduced as far as labour costs are 
concerned by the capital intensive nature of the industry.
One immediate effect of the size of companies and establishments on their 
labour relations can be found in works council and co-determination legis­
lation. Provisions for works councils only exist on establishments with
/ O \
five permanent employees.' No figures exist for the number of such 
chemical establishments but in 1975 44 per cent of them had less than
7 6 . Interview FTO 13, Sept. ’77•
77. See the discussion of the diversification of companies below.
7 8 . BetrVG 1972 Para 1.
10 employees' 'so it can safely "be assumed at least 25 per cent of 
establishments have no works council. Discussions indicated further­
more, that few establishments with less than 50 employees actually used 
the legal provisions for a works council. This would mean that approx­
imately 75 per cent of chemical establishments are without a works 
council, although this affects only about 5 per oent of the chemical 
labour force. 8^®^
An economics committee to watch over the financial state of the company, 
production levels and plans, rationalisation plans, mass redundancies 
and many other matters, may only be formed in companies with more than
/oi)
100 employees. 7 In smaller companies the provisions for consultation 
and information of the works council lack teeth.
As far as provisions for co-determination at company level in its various 
manifestations are concerned, company size is again of paramount im­
portance. Limited liability companies must have 500 employees before
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(79)
the employees received one third representation on the supervisory
t 19'
(83)
/ Op ^
board.' ' In addition the Co-determination Ac 76 only applies to
public companies, with more than 2000 employees.
All these legal provisions are based on the size of the company or the
79* Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, Vol.2, 1979? op .cit., 
p *369.
80. Ree Table 3.2 above.
81. of. BetrVG 1972, Para 106.
82. BetrVG 1952 Para 77*
83. cf. Chapter 2, Section (iv).
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establishment and although the simple provision of statute does not 
solely determine the character of labour relations, such features are 
not without significance either in workplace relations or as far as 
the unions are oonoerned in collective bargaining since they partly 
determine the amount of information available.
In the United Kingdom respondents from the chemical industry often stated 
that the size of establishment was a significant factor in determining 
the nature of industrial relations on a site. It was generally believed 
that relations were less personal and consequently often more prone to 
instability on sites with more than 200 to 300 employees.
In the Federal Republic on the other hand, it was believed that other 
factors were at work which changed the character of labour relations in 
a different way. One major factor which respondents felt.was associated 
with company size was management style. Small companies, often still 
run by owner-managers, tend to use outdated management approaches which 
demand servility and obedience from theiir employees and which resist
/ O c  \
trade unions and works councils. However, large companies especially
Bayer, BASF and Hoeohst employ much subtler policies in their dealings 
with works councils and unions. They try to bind their employees to 
the company by increasing their dependance on the firm through such 
measures as company housing, financial loans, other welfare benefits 
and plus-rate payments. Such measures induce a high degree of
84. Interviews TU 2, MAM 4 ? both June ’79? MAN 7? April ’78;
TU 13, August ’78. One respondent did put the change-over 
point at around 500 employees, Interview MAN 5? June ’79*
85. Interviews FTO 13, Sept.’77j BRV 11, BRV 12, and FTO 1 5 , 
all Nov.’78.
86. These influences become particularly critical in a strike 
situation erf. Dzielak et al., op.cit., passim and especially 
p.383ff*
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satisfaction, particularly with the level of wages which is well above 
average. In 1978 average hourly gross earnings in the chemical industry 
were 8.2 per cent higher than for all industries on average. The
result of this is a general lack of militancy of employees in these 
companies and the trade union has had difficulty in mobilising their 
members for strike action.
This creates problems primarily for the union but also for the works 
councillors. The size of companies and establishments can further 
increase these difficulties which are created by management policies.
The size of the works council and the number of full-time councillors 
depends on the size of the establishment. Where there are over 10000 
or more employees there is only one full-time councillor f<?r each 
additional 2000 employees. The bureaucracy which seems to be in­
volved in the job seems to lead to an alienation of the full-time works 
councillors from the workforce primarily because of a lack of contact.
Even many works councillors who prior to election had been highly 
critical of such developments become caught in the same way.^0^
Communications for the unions and the works councillors are made difficult
8 7. of. Zahlen zur Bozialpolitik, 1979? op .oit., p.22f, own 
calculations•
88. Interviews BRV 1 and FTO 6 , Aug.'77? FTO 11, BRV 4 and BRV 5, 
all Sept.'77» For the total failure at Bayer and Hoechst in 
1971 of« Dzielak et al., op .cit. For the more successful 
development at BASF in 1977 cf • Projektgruppe Gewerkschafts- 
forschung, 1978, op .cit.
89. of. BetrVG 1972, Para 38.
90. Dzielak et al., op.cit., p«453ff. Indeed the workings of the 
whole works constitution act might be described as a bureau- 
cratisation of industrial conflict.
(gi)
by the physical size of the major sites,w 'and by the fragmented and 
scattered nature of the production plants. Shift work, necessary 
because of the form of chemical production and for economic reasons, 
adds further to these communication difficulties#
One solution introduced■to attempt to combat these communication diffi­
culties is the pqst of plant representative. This is a representative 
elected by all employees who is subordinate to the works council. The 
failure of many of these representatives to support union policies is 
considered to be one of the reasons for the poor degree of union
organisation in the large chemical works with the notable exception of 
(92)BARF.' Other reasons for a low union density might be found in the 
insufficient number of organisers in the many scattered plants and in 
works council resistance to a strong union organisation for fear of a 
weakening of their own position.
b. Workforce structure.
The degree of trade union organisation in the chemical industry does 
vary, of course, according to the various occupational groups. The 
workforce structure of the larger chemical companies includes large 
numbers of such groups who are traditionally difficult to organise into 
trade unions, in particular office and to a lesser extent technical
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91. The Bayer site which is not the largest in Germany covers 
18 km2. Interview BRV 1 , Aug.*77« A large number of re­
spondents mentioned these communication difficulties, e.g. 
Interviews FTO 7? Aug.'77? FTO 10 and BRV 5 , both Rept.,77*
92. For the controversy within the Chemical Workers* Union see 
Chapter 2, section (ii) above. Membership density in these 
works in 1977 was 34*4 per cent at Hoechst, 37*4 per oent 
at Bayer and 66 per oent at BARF. H.G. Lang, "Innergewerk- 
schaftliche Auseinandersetzungen bei Bayer, Hoechst und 
BARF", in 0. Jacobi, W. Muller-Jentsch, E. Schmidt (eds.) 
Arbeiterinteressen gegen Rozialpartnerschaft, Kritischesr 
TTewerkschaftsjahrbuch 1978/79? Berlin, 1979*
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s t a f f ♦(93)
As was indicated above the labour force structure is one of the features 
of the industrial organisation of the chemical industry which has a 
bearing on its labour relations. The actual workforce structure seems 
to vary according to the particular sectors of the chemical industry 
which individual companies operate in^4 a^nd between types of company. 
Some indication of the range of workforce structures in the chemical 
industry is given in the table below.
Table 3«3»
(95)A comparison of workforce structures in 1976.
Percentage
Workforce _Blue Collar
of groups 
White Collar(a) AT LA Academics
All Industries 71*4 28.1 - - -
Chemical Ind.(b) 56.5 43.3 8.9 4.0 3.8
Chemical Ind. 
Niedersachson (0) 65.O 32.5 4.4 2.9 -
Hoeohst (d) 54*0 42.7 6.6 5.0 -
Chemical Ind. 
Baden-Wurttemberg (e) 60.5 38.0 7*0 - -
93* Interviews BRV 4 and BRV 5? both Sept.*77• Also of. Appendix 1, 
Table 3 below*
94* Pharmaceuticals have a very high percentage of white collar
staff and synthetic fibres and rubber have very few. Interviews 
ER 3 and ER 6 both Aug.*77•
95* (a) Total percentage of white collar workers including the
groups senior salaried staff (AT), senior managerial 
staff (LA) and academics but excluding owners.
(b) Zahlen zur Sozialpolitik, 1979? op.oit., p.lOf.
(c) Survey carried out by Chemical Employers1 Association in 
Niedersachsen of around 150 establishments covering around 
85 per cent of employees in the association’s member 
companies. Average size of establishment ca-210.
(d) HoeohstBericht aus dem Personal-und Sozialbereich Hoeohst 
Konzern 1976, no place (Frankfurt), no date (19 7 7) > p*72. 
(cited hereafter as Personalbericht Hoeohst 1976).
(e) Figures for employees of companies which are members of the 
Chemical Employers* Association in Baden-Wurttemberg. 
Arbeitgeberverband Chemie Baden-Wurttemberg, op.cit.
The striking feature which emerges is that the chemical industry has 
such a high proportion of white-collar staff except in Niedersachsen 
where small establishments mainly engaged in the production side of 
the industry predominate. On such sites the percentage of white-collar 
staff may even drop as low as 25 per cent as at Agrochemie AG. This 
is only the case because there is no sales department and only a very 
small research establishment, for it is these two areas which parti­
cularly contribute to the large number of white-collar staff' within 
the West German chemical industry. This is illustrated by the
figures for Baden-Wurttemberg which are in the middle of the range.
There is an absence of particularly large companies in this region with 
only 49*4 per cent of employees working in establishments which employ 
more than 1000 people. This reduces the number of salaried staff but 
not as much as in Niedersachsen due to the large concentration of'
pharmaceutical companies in Baden-Wurttemberg which tends to act as a
(97 )counter-balance due to the high number of sales staff. "
The percentage of white-collar workers has been increasing fairly 
steadily for quite a number of years.^ 8)  ^ number of factors were
recently identified as the reasons for this as far as Hoechst was con­
cerned. Technological progress had reduced the number of manual jobs at 
the same time increasing the number of positions which require a high 
level of training. This is particularly true in the production areas
96. Interviews- ER 3 and ER 6, both Aug. *77 •
97* Arbeitgeberverband Chemie Baden-Wurttemberg, op.cit. This 
percentage is an overestimate of the actual importance of 
large establishments since many small firms are not members 
of employers* associations.
98. cf. Zahlen zur Sozialpolitik, op.cit., p.10 and Personalbericht 
Hoechst 1976, op.cit., p.7911•
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automatic data processing. In addition trends towards centralisation
of administration and expansion of overseas activities have increased
(99)the number of staff in these areas. ' The technological nature of 
chemical production generally results in there being a high proportion 
of supervisory staff involved in production, basically due to the small 
size of work groups and shift work.^ 100) In general terms one conse­
quence of these changes has been a slight increase in the percentage of 
technical as opposed to office staff.
What consequences does this high percentage of white-collar staff have 
for industrial relations in the West German chemical industry?
The influence of the large number of managerial staff in the chemical 
industry has already been discussed above. In particular it has in­
fluenced relations between senior/middle management and top company 
executives with employee associations, leading to collective bargaining 
and the formation of representative committees for senior managerial 
staff. Furthermore, relations between management and the workforce have 
been affected positively by the close contacts which often exist within 
the production areas.(102^
White-collar staff can be further sub-divided into two groups - technical
99. Ibid. and Personalbericht Hoechst 1977? op .cit., p.90f.
100. As. a result of this Bayer employs about 1500 supervisors.
Interview BRV 1, Aug.*77• At Hoeohst there-were 2900 leading 
hands in 1976. Personalbericht Hoechst 1976, op.cit., p»72.
101. From 42:58 in 1970 to 45255 in 1974* Projektgruppe Gewerk­
schaftsf orschung, Vol.2, 1979? op .oit., p.440.
102. cf. Chapter 2, Section (iii)b.
but a lso  more re c e n tly  w ith in  o ff ice s  given fu r th e r  extensions to
and office staff.^101  ^ The actual percentage of each group varies 
according to the structure of the section of the chemical industry- 
under consideration. About 50 per cent of staff at Hoeohst are office 
staff^104^ as opposed to 56 per cent in Niedersachsen^ 10^ a^nd 59 per cent 
in Baden-Wurttemberg.These differences can perhaps be explained 
by research intensity and the size of sales and advertising depart­
ments. The large number of white-collar staff has an immediate
consequence on industrial relations in the chemical industry since they 
have proved difficult for the trade unions to organise. This is parti­
cularly true for the sub-group of office staff.^10^
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Bain discusses the traditional aversion of white-collar workers to join 
trade unions in his analysis of the growth of white-collar unionism in 
the UK. He rejects the commonly stated idea of a particular ’mentality* 
of white-collar staff as the reason for the traditional lack of organ­
isation amongst these employees.  ^ However, in West Germany white-
103. For a discussion of the types of jobs and qualifications
carried out by these two groups of. U. Kadritzke, Angestellte- 
Die geduldigen Arbeiter, Frankfurt and Koln, 1975? p*95*f*
The group office staff includes salesmen and others who do
not necessarily work in an office.
104. Personalbericht Hoeohst 1976, op .cit., p.74*
105* Employers Association survey, Hannover, 1976.
106. Arbeitgeberverband Chemie Baden-Wurttemberg, op .oit.
107* For example 8.5 per cent of the workforce at Hoeohst is employed
directly on research, together with around 20 per cent more in 
technical operations. 13*0 per cent of the workforce is em­
ployed in the sales organisation. Personalbericht Hoeohst 1976, 
op .oit., p.75* The pharmaceutical companies in Germany (con- 
centrated in Baden-Wurttemberg) are renowned for having an 
enormous sales and advertising organisation.
108. Interviews BRV 1, ER 6 , both Aug.*77 and ER 4 , FTO 10, FTO 11, 
all Sept.’77? TTO 16, FTO 17 both Feb.’7 8 . This discussion 
deals with membership in the industrial -union since managerial 
(VAA) and staff unionism (BAG) have been discussed above.
109. G.J5. Bain, The Growth of White-Collar Unionism, Oxford, 1970, 
p.40ff. The main factors which this study identifies are the 
degree of employment concentration, the degree to which employers 
are willing to recognise white-collar unions and the extent of 
government action promoting union recognition. Ibid., p.l83ff.
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collar status has a traditional significance which still seems to have 
some hearing upon their willingness to join trade unions.Evidence 
that this lack of willingness to he organised on the part of white- 
collar staff still exists, although it is decreasing, may he found by 
comparing the membership densities of wage and salary earners in the 
organisational area of the Chemical Workers* Union. Less than 30 per 
cent of salaried staff are members of the Ohemical Workers* Union as 
opposed to around JO p e r  cent of wage earners. '111^
Furthermore women who generally prove more difficult to organise than
their male colleagues ^ ^^ make up a higher proportion of white-collar
staff than they do of wage earners. Thus, in 1975 20.6 per cent of
wage earners in the chemical industry were women compared with 31 per
(113)cent of white-collar staff. 7 At Hoechst, for example, the female 
staff employees are concentrated in the offices, and this might be one 
reason for the lower union membership density in this group.^ 114^
An additional explanation for the greater propensity of technical staff 
to join unions might be that they are more likely to come into contact 
with production workers, or may indeed be employed within this area it­
self. In this way they may be influenced by their work situation.
110. The author had evidence of this during his own period of employ­
ment within this group of work^ fs, These experiences were sub­
sequently confirmed by a large number of respondents, especially 
Interviews FTO 16 and FTO 17, Feb.'78.
111. cf. Appendix 1, Table 3*
112. cf. Ibid. For a historical view of women in German trade unions
cf. G. Lossef-Tillmanns, Frauenemanzipation und Gewerkschaften,
Wuppertal, 1978, and on the reasons for a low level of organ­
isation especially p.6lf.
113. GB 72-75? op .cit., p.295? own calculations.
1 1 4 . 45*2 per oent office staff were female compared with 12.2 per
oent of technical staff. Personalberioht Hoechst 1976, op.cit., 
p.7 8 .
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union organisation within the white-collar groups has been the trend
towards status harmonisation. Although the differences between wage
and salary earners are firmly fixed in German insurance law (119)the
chemical industry has perhaps gone further- than any other in West
Germany to reduce the differences which traditionally exist between
white-collar and blue-collar workers. As a British study team
discovered in a visit to the German chemical industry,
"there are very few distinctions in conditions of service in the tariff 
agreements and all employees are treated equally over holidays, pay­
ment for overtime and hours of work. The tariff provides different 
pay scales for both employee categories but in one company a unified 
pay scale had been agreed." (117)
Indeed, a joint union-employers committee is working nationally on the 
question of unified'pay agreements for white-oollar and blue-collar 
workers. This committee is due to present an interim report at the
/ *i n O \
end of 1979* Although this committee does not have a simple task
it is a necessary one for many paradoxes exist in this region in the 
chemical industry. For example, a very highly qualified control room 
operator who is responsible for watching over and steering a whole 
chemical plant is a wage earner whilst a junior secretary is a member 
of the staff/119)
Such trends are not without their opponents, however. Some officials
115. cf. D. Rchewe, K. Nordhorn, K. Schenke, A. Meurer, K.-W. Hermsen
libersicht uber die Soziale Richerung, 9Th Edition, Bonn, 1975?
p.56ff.
116. Interview FTO 16, Feb. *7 8 .
117. Chemicals manpower in Europe, op .cit., p.42.
118. "Entgelttarifvertrages Ansatze auf Bundesebene," Infobrief, 
11/77, P-4f.
119. Both employers* and union representatives cited this example. 
Interviews ER 3 and! FTO 6, both Aug. *77.
Another consequence fo r  in d u s t r ia l  re la tio n s  beyond the weakness of
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of employers' associations believed they would lose the positive in­
fluence of the lack of militancy of white-collar staff if they are 
treated in the same way as workers. 1^20) Officials of the German Salaried 
Staff Union also oppose it^121 s^ince it is likely to cut the ground from 
under the representation of staff as a separate group.
A further feature of the workforce structure of the ohemical industry
is the under-representation of' workers who have completed an apprentice- 
(122)ship.' These skilled workers have long trade union traditions in
Germany, and even in the chemical industry have formed the core of
( 1 2 3 )support for strike action.' " Nevertheless the smaller size of this 
group does contribute to trade union weakness within the chemical industry. 
As a result of a lack of skilled immigrant workers, immigrant labour" is 
not a particularly important feature of the ohemical industry since in 
1979 only employed 2.9 per oent of the foreign labour in the Federal 
Republic as compared with 7*5 per oent of people in employment. 1^24^
This reflects the relatively qualified nature of employment in many 
sectors of the chemical industry. One respondent stated that there were 
no difficulties in relations with foreign workers since the number em­
ployed was small and all had to speak fluent German because of safety 
problems. ^ 12^  However, others did admit that difficulties can occur
120. Interview ER 6, Aug.'77*
121. Interview FTO 13, Sep.'77»
122. 34 per oent in the chemical industry compared with 40 per cent
on average. Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, Vol.2, 1979?
op.oit., p.440.
123* Dzielak et al., op .oit., p.374*
124* Zahlen zur Sozialpolitik, 1979? op.cit., p.13 and 42, own
calculations.
125. Interview CM 1, Aug.’77•
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both at work, particularly in the safety area, and socially - housing 
presented a particular problem.
Despite this, figures from Hoeohst show that immigrant labour can serve
as a buffer in times of economic decline. Due to a. high fluctuation 
(127)
rate, ya decision not to replace those workers which leave is an 
effective way of reducing manning levels. In this way the percentage 
of workers from foreign countries at Hoeohst was reduced from 28.4 per 
cent at the end of 1974 to 20.5 Pe** cent in December 1977 . In
1977 alone some 1450 foreigners left Hoeohst*s employment. 1^29^
The position of the trade unions under such circumstances is difficult 
for although many foreign workers are members,^ 110^ their German members 
press for the foreigners to be made redundant first.^111  ^ Indeed, 
foreigners are very poorly represented amongst officials of the Chemical 
Workers* Union. Only 4-6 per cent of works councillors are foreign as- 
compared with 11.6 per cent of the membership. 1^12  ^ This can lead to 
misunderstandings between members and a failure. to..use the potential of 
the foreign members during conflict situations.^
126. Interviews CM 10 and CM 12 both Nov.*78.
127* Varying from over 30 per cent in 1970 +0 12.6 per cent in 1976. 
Personalbericht Hoeohst 1976, op.cit., p.6l.
128. Ibid ., p.84.
129* Ibid., 1977? p.92. Also _cf. J. Rauschel, op .cit ♦, p.52ff.
130. 56.6 per cent in 1975 for the organisational area of the 
Chemical Workers* Union. Dzielak et al., op .cit., p.540.
131. Interview FTO 12, Sept. *77 • Tor a more general account of foreign 
labour and trade unions erf. S'. Castles and K. Godula, "Immigrant 
Workers and Trade Unions in the German Federal Republic", Radical 
America, Vol.8, 1974? No.6, pp.55“77*
132. GB 72-75? op .oit., p.299** anti Appendix 1, Tables 2 anti 4 ? 
own calculations.
133. of. Dzielak et al., op .cit., p.254*f«
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Various features of the structure of the chemical labour force have 
been seen to have a significance for industrial relations. In parti­
cular, trade unionism is weakened by a failure to organise strongly 
the large group of white-collar staff, by the relatively small number 
of skilled workers in the chemical industry and by a failure to re­
present and understand the interests of foreign workers#
o. Majjor companies and Product diversification.
There are a number of ways of defining diversification*^18^ - t h e  one 
most useful for our purposes is the number of "basic rereas" of pro­
duction in which the company operates. The actual number of products 
manufactured by a chemical firm may be large, however, if they are all 
classifiable under one particular sector, then this would give a false 
picture of diversification.
In the table below, the range of "basic areas" of production of most 
lairge(189 Vest German chemical companies is given. It can be seen that 
with the exception of Bayer, BARF and Hoechst firms tend to be fairly 
limited in their range of production.
The range of product areas of specific companies is usually traceable 
to the historical development of the companies, and thus in the middle 
sized and smaller companies activities tend to be limited to specific 
areas. In this way Begussa is still strong within the area of precious 
metals but has expanded into such sectors as metallurgical products,
134* cf. P.C. Verma, op .cit., p.117.
135* All but one of these companies had a place on the Chemical 
Age 200 largest chemical companies in the world list, 
cf. CA 20'0, 1979? op .cit.
-  163 -
o  
prP 
3 
H*
0) 
o 
prp 
p
£rct>
O
W  P  32 cf* 
P
M
a'pHj
0
P
H*ct*01
4P
OP3cf*
3 
(D4 
Cq 
<0 
4
s:
H*cf*
pr
<;
S'p
a
prp3H*P
>Q
a
prp3H*O
P
03 P4 
<} H*0 P
01
a
prp
s
Hj
p0ct*
01
P
ap
P
H
w
*S
&  t—1 
H* 
O
OH,
QP43
1+
BPL
O
3
vO
-oOV
*&*
•P*
VMOV
03
|4 O P 
0)
«p
4
£M,01Cf*
H*p
aq
PLp
4
I
*1
s:H*4cf*
0i0 
3* 
PHjct*01 
s 
o 
o 
prp
a4
ru
Vri
im*VI
vn
-o
■Mp4
OP
3ct*
oqp
pp
oct*
O4
vn
o
oo-V]
vn
M
Vn
vn
O
4rVM
OO
ru
vn
ro
vn
ov
ro
vn
>
pVri 4 
• P
ovoq Vri P
s:W X X PPppf-3 a a o tdwp 3 3 4 t P P o p • & P • P >o cf- prP HJH p 3 p*3 m X 03IV Oq 4 3 3 H-H*o R*PPP pp p tx|P p O P P 1 prP • P > « 44 4 prP 4 3 a p H Q P a >
a P p P O 3 prcf* O M P w > Qs:3 oq IV 3 P Q O «■—*o Qtrp H* 3 > 3 (-•s p pprp 4 p > 03 H*Q crOlN /~N3 pr Q P p PP p P 4H*p > H s o cf* H*P Q N S'O 3> I—' 3 Hj oq> Q !> H*Hj
fe
pQ Q PLct* 4
P>
Q
Q
X  X  X  I I I I
IV)
IM I X  I I X  I
IM IM OO OV
X X X X X X X V n x X !  XXI own
t s i i t i i on « a i x i i vo
X I X I  | x  X  -P* I I I I I X  V H  O V
I I I i x i x - s l t  I I X I X - A I M
i i i t i i i v o i i x i i i v n - f c
I I i X  I ( I I I I | I | | I *n 3
IM -a
I X I  X I  I X ^ O X I  I X  X  X  O o  O o
VfJ Vri Vri VM IM IM -P--V3IMVM -fVH VM *\] OO
a
prp3p
a
pp
a01 
§
TJ
PH*3cf*P
*T3H
PPcf*H*OP
W3 cr o' p4 P
O4
oq
hcjH-3P
a  h  
pr 3
p oq
tJXppcf*3Hjh>P
>
Oq401
prI
i
•*1
H*
cr4pp
oW*H
5?°
Ocf-
prp4p
crp4
*TJ4O
3ocf*H*
B
OH*<p4P
H*Hj
H*O
Pcf*H*
3
s:H*cf*
prH*3
H*P
PaH*3
oq
o
o£
H*PP
H*3
ct*prp
pPct*
QP
3
a
prp3
H*OP
H3a3 p cf*4
f-3
PO'HP
MJ
Vri
ov
-  164 -
inorganic chemicals, etc/187) Wacker Chemie on the other hand, gained 
importance during the First World War because of a process to manu­
facture acetaldehyde, and it still has considerable interests within 
this area/188)
The main advantage of a highly diversified production palette is the 
degree of economic stability provided. Various sectors of the German 
chemical industry were affected to different extents by the economic 
recession in the mid 1970 *s/189 )and companies which lacked diversifi­
cation suffered badly. This is particularly true of the fibres sector 
where world-wide overcapacity caused considerable problems / 14°)
As might be expected such developments are not without consequences as 
far as industrial relations are concerned. The case is perhaps best 
illustrated by Enka Glanzstoff, which as can be seen from the table 
above, is limited in its activities to the fibres sector. The economic 
problems led to a number of plant closures, redundancies and even pro­
voked limited international union action/1*11) Furthermore, the import­
ance of Enka *s representation in the Arbeitsring Chemie exceeds that 
which the size of the company would warrant. One of Enka*s senior 
managers is chairman of the employers* collective bargaining committee/1*1^ ) 
illustrating how useful it can be for companies active in more profitable
137. Chemfacts Germany, op .oit., p.ll8. Also of. "Auf breiter Basis 
gut verdient - Be gassa", Wirtschaftswoohe, Nr.14, 25•3.77? P*54«
138. Ibid., p.!49f. The process was subsequently named after the com­
panies founder Br.A.Wacker, cf). Reubin and Burstall, 00.cit., p.203f.
139* e^e below*
140. cf). "Europe’s troubled fibre industry - a home for masochists", 
Chemistry and Industry, 5*2.77> P*95»
141. .cf* H.-R.Northrup and R.L. Warton, "Multinational.union activities 
and plant closings: the case of Akzo," Industrial Relations 
Journal, Vol.9 , No.l, 1978, pp.27-36*
142. "Organisationen der deutsohen Wirtsohaft - der Arbeitsring Chemie", 
Infobrief, 10/79? P * 8 .
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sectors to have their agreements linked to the less successful companies 
in the industry.
The large and more diverse companies, particularly Bayer, BASF and Hoeohst 
therefore have more room to manoeuvre in their local relations with the 
works council and are able to follow their social paternalistic policies 
which have been described above. This seems to greatly influence the 
climate of industrial relations in these companies, although to a lesser1 
extent at BASF than in the other companies as a result of more effective 
union activities.
The chemical industry is renowned as having a large number of multi­
national interests, and this also provides some protection against economic 
recessions. Analysis of data in a handbook on ohemical companies located 
in Germany produced the results given in the table below.
Table 3.5.
Ownership and multinational companies in the West German Chemical 
Industry. (143)
Type of oxmership - Company type - Scope Percentage
German - multinational companies 18.9
German - subsidiaries - multinational activities 4*4
German - subsidiaries - Germany 32.2
German - non-multinational companies 18.9
American - subsidiaries 10.6
British - subsidi aries 3.6
Belgian - subsidi aries 3.3
Dutch - subsidf aries 3.1
French - subsidi aries 2.8
Swiss - subsidiaries 1.1
LichtenshHn - subsidiaries 1.1
Total 100
143. A sample of 90 companies selected, presumably, according to their 
importance. Company size range from those employing less than
100 people to those which employ over 100,000. Chemfaots Germany, 
op .oit., pp.106-154*
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The data reveals that around 5° per cent of these companies are not 
multinational themselves although many of these are suhs id (.aries of 
multinationals. Approximately 25 per cent of companies are owned by 
foreign multinational companies.
Industrial relations in foreign-owned companies are often conducted 
rather differently to those in German owned companies, particularly 
in the case of American companies. American firms are more prone to 
anti-union feelings than German companies, 1^44^ and they also tend to 
be reluctant to joint employers* associations .^45) jn this later 
case, a company or works agreement is often made between management 
and the Chemical Workers* Union. ^46) According to works council re­
spondents in an American subsidiary visited,^141 t^he parent company 
kept a very close watch on the financial workings of the subsidiary so 
that the works councillors often had the feeling that their true neg­
otiating opponents were not sitting across the table from them.^ 14^
Diversification of production and multinatibnal activities can provide 
a buffer should economic recession occur and in their way the climate
144* Interview FTO 6, Aug.*77 and informal discussions. For
similar attitudes elsewhere in Europe from American chemical 
multinationals, of. E. Pheihl, Multinationals Konzerne und 
internationale Gewerkschaftsbewegung, Nordlingen, 1975?
C.1973, p.63f.
145* Interviews ER 1, Aug.*77? ER 4 and ER 8 both Fept.*77*
146. Interviews FTO 1, FTO 6 and ER 1, all Aug.’77*
147* This company is a member of the employers’ association, and 
did not show anti-union tendencies.
148. Interviews BRV 15 and BRV 14, both Nov.*78. On this see 
also G.B.J. Bomers and R.B. Peterson, "Multinational Cor­
porations and Industrial Relations: The oase of West 
Germany and the Netherlands", BJIR, Vol.XV, 1977? p*51*
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of industrial relations can benefit. Foreign ownership oan result in 
the importing of industrial relations traditions from the country of 
origin or in strict control of the subsiduary companyfs activities.
d. Location.
A discussion of the size of chemical establishments has revealed that 
the majority of employees work in establishments of some size, in 
addition each of the main three West German chemical companies has 
a main production site. It seems likely, then, that the chemical 
industry might he concentrated into specific areas. (li!l9) . i^s 
the oase, the regional concentration or location of the ohemical in­
dustry may have an influence on labour relations.
The table below considers the changes in the regional location and 
concentration of the West German chemical industry over the last twenty 
years.
14 9* A large number of factors can influence the choice of an in­
dustrial location such as raw materials, markets, transport, 
energy sources, manpower availability, government activity, 
etc. of. R.C, Estall and R.O, Buchanan, Industrial- Activity 
and Economic Geography, Revised Edition, London, 1966. As 
far as the West German ohemical industry is concerned, raw 
materials such as coal and potash, the availability of 
transport (in this case, navigable rivers), and energy 
sources seemed to have been most significant. B. Burtenshaw, 
Economic Geography of West Germany, London and Basingstoke, 
1974? p.ll4ff and R. Geipel, Industriegeographie als Ein- 
ffihrung in die Arbeitswelt, Braunschweig, 1969* p*82ff*
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Regional Location and Concentration of the Chemical Industry compared 
with Manufacturing Industry in West Germany. (150)
Table 3 .6 .
Region Man. 
Ind.
i
L977 { 
Chem: 
Ind.
<
} Conoa) 
Factor
Man.
Ind.
$
1966 /
Chem.'° 
Ind.
.....$
) 1957 (d) 'Cone. Cone.'
Factor Factor
Schleswig-
Holstein
2.85 1.86 0.70 2 .12 1.35 0.64 O.58
Hamburg 2.21 4 .2 1 1.90 2.59 2.99 1.15 1.28
Niedersachsen 9.43 5.87 0.62 9.01 5.74 O.64 O.65
Bremen 1 .1 3 0.21 0.19 1.18 0 .15 0.13 0.30
Nordrhein-
Westfalen
28.14 36.50 1.30 33.03 38.97 1.18 1.04
Hessen 8.96 15.93 1.78 8.48 14.73 1.74 1.85
Rheinland- 
Pf alz
5.19 11.67 2.25 4.58 13.16 2.87 2.96
Baden-
Wurttemberg
19.46 IO.48 0.54 17.94 10.31 0.57 0.57
Bayern 18.56 10.86 0.59 15.73 10.22 O.65 0.72
Saarland 1.74 0.39 0.22 2.00 0.29 0.15 —
Berlin (West) 2.61 2.02 0.77 3.34 2.10 0.63 O.65
Total 100 100 - 100 100 - -
It is apparent that chemical employment is centred around the regions
in which the main production works of thei big three companies are located
it
150. Source: Statistische Jahrbucher, various years. Own calculations.
(a) Including oil refining and coal products.
(b) Factor given by Regional chemical employment
National chemical employment 
Regional industrial employment 
National industrial employment
(c) Without oil refining or coal products.
(d) Excluding Saarland.
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However, the chemical industry only achieves concentrations notably 
above that for manufacturing industry in general in Hessen and Rheinland- 
Pfalz, although the largest number of chemical employees is to be found 
in Nordrhein-Westfalen, as might be expected due to the high concen­
tration of industry in general and the location of coal as- a raw material 
and energy source in this area.^^1  ^ The chemical industry does seem to 
be gaining in importance in this latter region, however, due probably to 
the decline of iron, steel and coal industries in recent times.(^2)
The only major growth in concentration in the chemical industry seems 
to have occurred in the Hamburg region. Reasons for this are the 
availability of cheap nuclear energy, coastal sites which have good 
supplies of water for cooling and for effluent discharge and are con­
venient from the point of view of water transport, a ready market for 
chemical products around Hamburg and available labour due to the general 
decline of the shipbuilding industries. (^3)
Does this regional location have consequences for industrial relations., 
as far as the chemical industry is concerned? This question seems 
difficult to solve due to an insufficient breakdown of the statistics 
covering such matters as industrial disputes,. Analysis of working days 
lost in different regions over the period 1962-1978 shows that around
151. For the locations of sources of energy of. D. Burtenshaw, 
op.cit., p,65ff.
152. of. Ibid.
153. This information was gained during the course of interviews 
and informal discussions with representatives of companies
who have recently sited works in this area.
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38 per oent of days were lost in Nordrhein-Westfalen, a figure which 
corresponds approximately to the percentage of manufacturing industry 
in the area, whilst a further 26 per cent of days were lost in Baden- 
Wiirttemherg, ^^4 a^ figure disproportionately high when compared with 
the amount of industry located in this region.
Although the concentration of the chemical industry in Baden-Wurttemberg
is quite low and whilst it is high in generally peaceful regions such as 
(155)Rheinland-Pfalz, """it would be rather bold to claim that more than a 
slight contribution to the low incidence of industrial action in the 
ohemioal industry^^results from the regional location. This does not 
mean, however, that the regional distribution and concentration are 
without significance to industrial relations both nationally and locally*
The concentration of the chemical industry in the regions Nordrhein- 
Westfalen, Hessen and Rheinland-Pfalz ensures that it is these regions 
that are crucial as far as a result in the annual wage negotiations are 
concerned. It cannot be mere ooinoidence that these same regions generally 
negotiate wage increases one or two months before the other regions. ^ 7^)
As has been demonstrated above, the regional strengths of the various 
employers' associations within the national employers* bodies are deter-
/ -j q o a
mined according to size' "and in this way regional location can be seen 
to exert additional indirect influences on industrial relations.
154* Btatistische Jahrbucher, various years, own calculations.
155* Approximately 1.6 per cent of working days lost were in Rhein­
land-Pfalz over the period 1962-1978 . Ibid.
15 6 . Bee Chapter 4? Section (iii)o, below.
157. The collective bargaining system is discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter 4 below.
15 8 . cf. Table 2.3 above.
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Locally such factors as unemployment, absorption of labour from de­
clining industries which have different industrial relations traditions, 
wage levels in other industries and the background of the workforce 
could all have an influence on labour relations. However, such factors 
seem very difficult to quantify, and the individual circumstances of" 
particular sites should be considered when a study is being carried out 
in a specific location.
At Agrochemie AG a number of respondents claimed that the background 
of the workforce which was believed to be mainly from farming contri­
buted to the quiet nature of industrial relations there. ^ 59) wag
demonstrable that over a third of respondents came from an agricultural 
background, but it was not possible to show that the profession of the 
respondents* fathers was a significant factor in the formation of 
opinions on industrial relations matters such as strikes, trades unions, 
management and the works council. S'ome differences in response did’ 
occur between those from industrial and agricultural background but no 
particular significance can be attached to them.^^ 0^
Although it is possible that the social background of chemical workers 
which can be influenced by the location of the works might have an 
effect on labour relations, this could not be demonstrated as far as 
Agrochemie AG is concerned and a larger survey covering a range of sites 
would probably be required to test this hypothesis in a more valid way.
159* Especially Interview M 3, Oct.*78.
160. For example only 14 per cent of respondents from an industrial 
background stated they would be willing to engage in political 
strike action compared with 36 per cent from an agricultural 
background. A result which is perhaps the reverse of that 
which might have been expected.
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In summary the industrial organisation of the German chemical industry 
can be described as having the following characteristics. The industry 
is highly concentrated, although there are numerous large companies 
and establishments. In this way co-operation between management on 
industrial relations matters is facilitated as in co-ordinated action. 
The type of co-determination rights available and used also depend on 
company or establishment size. Management techniques are generally more 
subtle in their approach towards the works council and unions in the 
larger companies where the employee representatives are often over­
burdened with bureaucratic functions.
The workforce structure which is characterised generally by a high per­
centage of white-collar and supervisory staff, consequently also has 
influences on industrial relations. Examples of such consequences are 
relatively low union densities, a lack of militancy and trends towards 
status harmonisation.
The three major chemical companies are far more diversified than the 
remainder of their competitors and this gives them additional economic 
strength in times of recession and thus creates more room to manoeuvre 
in their relations with the works council. In this way the climate of 
industrial relations can be positively affected.
The ohemical industry is located primarily in three regions and thus 
gives the employer and union regional organisations from these areas- 
particular importance. There is scant evidence, however, of further 
regional effect on labour relations in the chemical industry.
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The West German economy suffered its first minor recession since the 
post-war recovery in the middle of the 1960Ts. 1^ 1^  ^ However, this re­
cession left the chemical industry relatively unaffected and the first 
economic reverses were not felt in this industry until 1970 because 
it is highly export intensive whilst this recession was primarily a 
German experience • ^
This analysis commences, however, in 1969 since a number of significant 
developments occurred in West Germany in this year* Not only was there 
an almost unique outburst of unofficial strikes^^^but a Social Demo­
cratic government, was returned for the first time since the Weimar 
Republic, an occurrence whioh is likely to have influenced the relation­
ship between the trade unions and government.  ^
a. Chemical output.
The overcapacity in world chemical production particularly in such 
sectors as man-made fibres and plastics began to make itself felt in 
1970 and this resulted in price reductions and loss of profits. This 
economic situation, which with hindsight "cannot be seen as a normal­
isation of the high growth rates during the 1968/69 boom ... but to­
gether with the downturn of then unforeseen proportion in the national
economy must have appeared as a danger to the whole production and 
profit strategies practised by the West German chemical industries so
161. F.Vogl, op .cit., p.8. One consequence of this was the intro­
duction of incomes policy via the Konzertierte Alction. of. 
R.S3eitenzahl, Einkommenspolitik durch konzertierte Aktion,
Koln, 1974. ' " ' ~ ~
162. Dzielak et al., op .cit. ,  p.63 and erf. Footnote 176 below.
163. of. M. Schumann et al., op.cit.
164. A coaltion with the Free Bemoncrats. of. F. Vogl, op .cit., 
p .10ff.
( i i i )  Economic development 1969-1978.
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successfully throughout the Sixties"/1 9^) One of the consequences of 
this conception of the crisis "by the management of ohemical concerns 
was the strike in the chemical industry in 1971? since the union ex­
perienced unexpectedly hard resistance to their wage claims/1 8^)
The general trend of output over the last decade in the chemical in­
dustry is of interest since it might have had consequences for in­
dustrial relations. The table below shows chemical production as 
compared with total industrial production in index form. The same 
data is represented graphically in the figure which follows the table. 
Table 3.7.
Production and Turnover in the Chemical Industry as compared with 
Manufacturing Industry 1969-1978* (167)
Index of Production 1970=100 Turnover
Year Chem.Ind. Man.Ind. Chem.Ind. $ Man.Ind. (Mill.DM)
1969 94.7 94.4 47 369 10 .1
1970 100.0 100.0 50 527 9.6
1971 105.3 101.2 53 576 9.5
1972 112.5 104.8 56 740 9.5
1973 126.9 111.9 65 170 9.8
1974 130.5 110 .5 86 929 1 1 .6
1975 114*5 103.6 78 541 10.7
1976 131.3 110.7 91 219 1 1 . 1
1977 132.0 113-7 108 538(a) 1 1 .7
1978 138.9 116.7 111 574(a) 1 1 .2
16 5. Author*s translation of: "so erscheint es sehr problematisch 
die rucklaufigen Umsatzzahlen (1970/71) als *Normalisierung* 
gegen fiber den hohen Wachstumszahlen im Boom 1968/69 zu 
oharakterisieren .«. zusammen mit dem in seinem Ausmass noch 
nicht absehbaren Abschwung der nationalen Kon.junktur fur die 
chemische Industrie in der Bundesrepublik als eine aktuelle 
GefMhrdung ihrer in den sechziger Jahren so erfolgreich 
praktizierten Absatz- und Gewinnstrategien erscheinen."
Dzielak et al., op,oit., p.63f.
166. These connections are repeatedly made in Dzielak et al., op.cit.
16 7 . Sources; Chemiewirtschaft in Zahlen, 1976, op.cit. ,-p.40.
Wirtschaft und Statistik, No.8, 1979) p«526*
Zahlen zur Sozialpolitilc, 1979> op .cit., p.43.
(a) Limited comparability due to change in classification 
system.
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The table and figure reveal that except for the years 1970, 1975 and 
1977 ihe chemical industry production increased more rapidly than that 
of manufacturing industry in general. The effect of the recession in 
1974/75 which was a world-wide phenomenon is particularly striking, 
and it seems to have been caused at least in part by the oil-crisis 
of 1973/74168^
The economic recession hit the chemical industry in a number of xmys.
Oil is extremely important to the ohemical industry - before the oil
crisis 87 per oent of raw materials for the organic chemical industry
were oil-based^ 1®^ a^nd the recession in other sectors of the economy
which consumed large amounts of chemicals also greatly reduced the 
demand for chemicals. In particular difficulties in the textile, 
building, motor and furniture industries had a great effect upon the 
ohemical industry. 1^10^
Practically the only sectors of the chemical industry which remained 
almost unaffected by the crisis were those which produced goods directly 
for consumption such as pharmaceuticals, agrochemicals, etc. This can 
be illustrated by comparing the sectoral production indexes for 1974 
and 19 75s
168. H. Adam, Brauohen wir eine neue Wirtschaftspolitik?, Koln, 
1977? P*93f. For a criticism of this approach to the analysis 
of the eoonomio crisis, particularly in relation to the oil 
crisis cf_. J. Huffschmid and H. Schui (eds.) Gesellsohaft im 
Konkurs?, Koln, 1976, p.266ff.
16 9. E. Koch, "Chemie kann die Kohle besser nutzen," Die Welt, 
4.1.74.
170. D.R. Ebsworth, 1975? o p .c i t . ,  p . l8 .
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Table 3.8.
Sectoral production indexes 1974/75 1970=100. )
Year Chem.Ind. Inorg.Chems. Org.Chems.
Other
Inter­
mediates
Chemicals
Consumer
Products
1974 130.5 120.6 133.0 132.0 130.0
1975 114.5 110.4 103.2 107.9 130.7
This economic recession together with technological changes and over­
capacity in certain sectors of the industry has led to shifts in the
( 1 7 2 )importance of the various sectors.
Table 3.7 above also indicates that in 1976/77 there was stagnation as 
far as the ohemical industry as a whole was concerned.(- 3^) This lack 
of growth was not universal within the chemical industry, however, and 
BABF proved to be particularly healthy. This provoked the Chemical 
Workers' Union region of Rheinland-Pfalz to attempt, in vain, to gain 
a higher wage rise than the other regions. ^ ^4)
An economic recession naturally has an influence on industrial re­
lations since it must affect the climate in which collective bargaining
p i a . c e .
in particular takes^  This is even more likely to be the case when 
unemployment has risen.
171* Chemiewirtschaft in Zahlen, 1976, op .oit., p.43•
172. cf. Appendix 1, Table 13*
173. One reason for this was a drop in the value of chemical exports
from 1974 to 1975 around 22 per oent in current prices which 
had not been made up even by 1978. Chemiewirtschaft in Zahlen, 
1976, op .oit., p«85, own calculations and Paten zur Bozial- 
politik, op .cit., Folge 33? Marz 1979* Nevertheless, in 1978 
32.8 per oent of chemical turnover was as a result of exports 
leaving the chemical industry very sensitive to international 
changes in the value of the Deutschmark. Ibid., own calculations.
174* This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4* Also cf.
Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, 1978, op .cit., pp.ll8-l85.
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The conditions of the labour market may be considered by examining 
several features such as the numbers of employees, people without em­
ployment, short-time workers and positions vacant. These features of" 
the labour market in the West German chemical industry are presented 
below. (Table 3*9)•
The table reveals in that the importance of the chemical industry within
the economy is growing and this reflects its relatively stable economic
position compared with industry in general although it can be clearly
seen that the chemical industry was affected by the recession in 1974./
75 and by a slight decline in 1971/72. This slowing-down of the economic
development in the early seventies was one of the contributory factors
(17 51to the ohemioal industry dispute in 1971* Nevertheless it does
seem that in the chemical industry a recession does not immediately re­
sult in unemployment. This is illustrated by the higher rates of un­
employment in 1972 and again in 1976. However, short-time work seems 
generally to be introduced as an interim measure fairly soon after the 
start of a recession.
Due to the relatively steady economic growth experienced by the West 
German economy since the early 1950‘s unemployment had been low for 
many y e a r s . T h e  lack of fear of unemployment was illustrated in
175* Dzielak et al., op .cit., p.63f.
176. In 1967 national unemployment did reach almost half a million. 
However, the ohemioal industry was relatively unaffected since 
only 5415 chemical workers were unemployed and 1916 were on 
short-time work. Statistisch.es Jahrbuch, 1969? op .cit., p. 129°
The reason for this may well be the importance of exports in 
the chemical industry - in 1967 almost 29$ of- turnover was a 
result of exports as compared with 27$ in 1966. On average 
less than 19$ of turnover in German industry resulted from 
exports in 1967* Chemiewirtschaft in Zahlen, 1976, op.cit«, 
p.18, own calculations.
b . The labour market s i tu a t io n .
(d) 
Percentage 
of 
all 
short-tim
e 
w
orkers, 
(e) 
New 
industrial 
clarification 
introduced, 
(f) 
Including 
Craftsm
ens* 
Establishm
ents 
from 
1978, 
(g) 
Average 
Jan 
- 
March 
only.
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studies carried out at the end of the 1960*s, for example one survey 
showed around 25 per oent of respondents having particular fear of
/ 1 rt O V
unemployment. However, an identical question at Agrochemie AG
revealed almost 60 per cent of respondents who feared unemployment #(^9) 
Although a much wider study would he required to test the general 
validity of’ such a hypothesis it does seem that recent experience of 
a high level of unemployment both nationally and to a less extent 
within the ohemical industry itself has led to an increased fear of 
unemployment amongst chemical workers.
Buch a change in attitudes must influence the climate of industrial 
relations with workers being far less willing to risk their jobs for 
any reason. Under these circumstances union members are less willing 
to engage in strike action,sickness rates drop^ ^^ and so does 
labour turnover.
Another consequence for labour relations was a willingness amongst 
trade unions to accept much lower wage increases and this was- also the 
case in the ohemical industry
17 8 . M. S'chumann et al., op .cit., pp.191? 204? 208, 213 and 215.
In another study 37 per cent of respondents foresaw negative 
effects to the technological progress, one of which can be 
conceived of as unemployment. F. Furstenberg, op.cit., p.272.
179* of* Appendix 3, Table 29*
180. Interview BRV 5> Sep.*77*
181. In the chemical industry the sickness rate dropped by 16.4 per 
cent from 1973 to 1975? as compared with an average drop of’
12.6 per oent.on average over this period. Zahlen zur Bozial- 
politik, 1979? op.cit., p.63.
182. At Hoechst, for example, ca. 10 000 left the company in 1973 
compared with around 6 400 in 19 7 5* Personalbericht 1976, 
op.cit., p.58 . This report also contains an interesting 
account of management employment policies under recessionary 
conditions. Ibid., p.42ff.
183. cf. Dzielak et al., op .cit., p. 537*
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It was noted above that with the exception of the recession year 1975 
chemical production has been steadily increasing over the last decade. 
However, employment levels in the chemical industry are presently very 
similar to those of ten years agao. This increase in productivity is 
discussed in the next section*
c. Productivity.
According to the Pro.jektgruppe Geswerkschaftsforschungs
"It is interesting to note that the increase in the rate of labour pro­
ductivity from I960 to 1970 kept almost exact pace with the increase in 
production whilst over the period in 1970 to 1976 growth in productivity 
far exceeded growth in production." (l84)
The change in productivity over the period which is of particular in­
terest here is considered in the next table.
Table 3.10.
Productivity in.-the chemical industry compared to industry on average 
1969-1978. (18L5)
Year
Total
Index
(1970=100
Industry
\ ^) Change
Chemical
Index
(1970=100)
Industry
<?/i°
Change
1969 97*7 +7*1 99*4 +9.0
1970 100.0 +2 * 3 100.0 +1 .0
1971 102.0 +2.0 106.1 +6 • 1
1972 108.2 +6.0 115*1 +8.5
1973 115*0 +6 .3 128.1 +11.3
1974 116 .2 + 1.0 130.2 +1 * 6
1975 1 15 .8 -0.3 117 .0 - 1 0 .1
1976 127.6 +10.2 137*2 +17*3
1977 132.7 +4 * 0 138.7 +1 . 1
1978 136.1 +2.6 148.0 +6.7
Average Annual  ^ g 
Increase - 4*9 -
I84. Author*s translation ofs "Aufschlussreich ist aber, dass zwischen
185 *
i960 und 1970 der Anstieg der Arbeitsproduktivitat fast im 
Gleichschritt mit der Ausweitung der Produktion erfolgte, 
wahrend in dem Zeit raum von 1970 bis 1976 das Produktivitats- 
wachstum das Produktionswachstum deutlich ubertraf". Projekt­
gruppe Gewerkschaftsforschuhg, Vol.2, 1979? op .cit., p.314*
Zahlen zur Sozialpolitilc, 1979? op .oit., p. 49* The form of pro­
ductivity used here is one of several alternatives, since pro­
duction per employee hour or worker could equally be used.
For the period 1959-1968 the average annual increase in pro­
ductivity in the chemical industry was around 9 P®** cent.
M. Panic (ed.), op .cit., p.38, own calculations.
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The effect of the recession in 1974./75 on the chemical industry is
again visible. The reason for the chemical industry being influenced
to a greater extent than industry in general is an inability to lay
off labour at short notice as a means of decreasing the effects of 
(T 86 3
the recession. 7 Since greater use was made of short-time working 
than redundancy the decrease in productivity in terms of employee hours 
worked was only 5*0 cent. 1^^^
Such increases in productivity had been necessitated to a large extent
by the need to keep export prices constant, a factor which generally
ensured steady or decreasing prices for chemical products over a fairly
(1 88)long period of time. 7 However, the increase in prices for raw
materials and the decrease in productivity resulted in a very rapid 
increase in the prices for many chemicals.
Improved productivity increases management's room to manoeuvre in their" 
negotiations with the trade unions and works council. In this way the
wage differentials which have existed between the chemical industry and
have
(191)
industry in general for sometime ka  increased slightly from 7 per
cent to 8 per cent from 1970 to 1978.
186. Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, Vol.2, 1979? op.cit., 
p.314.
187. Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1978, op.cit., p.l8l, own calculations.
188. Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, Vol.2, 1979? op .cit., 
p. 315*
18 9* of. Appendix 1, Table 1 4 .
190* Wage levels are discussed in more detail below. Parallels
between productivity and earnings for the period 1959 to
1968 for the chemical industry have been clearly demonstrated. 
cf. M. Schumann, op .cit., p.l86.
191. Average hourly gross earnings for workers. Zahlen zur S'ozial—
politik, 1979? op .cit., p«22, own calculations.
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developments in the chemical industry which have enabled the construction
( 1 9 2 )of plants of greatly improved capacity with the resultant economies.' '
This has led to the German chemical industry building new plants and 
improving existing ones,,for as a British study team reported, "German 
companies appeared to seek improvements (in productivity) mainly by 
using opportunities presented by new investment". 9^3) jq. -therefore 
seems appropriate to consider investment policies in the German chemical 
industry next.
d. Investment.
During the Fifties and Sixties there had been a massive growth in the 
amount of investment in the chemical industry with the result that by 
1969 this industry accounted for 17 per cent of all industrial invest­
ment in Germany.However, since then, increasing economic diffi­
culties and an inability to pass the costs of investment on to the 
consumer in the form of price increases due to the intense international
competition has led to a reduction in investment in the chemical in- 
(195 )dustryx as is clearly illustrated by the table below.
In te rn a tio n a l com petition has "been co n stan tly  increased  by techno log ica l
192. Ethylene, a basic organic feedstock, provides a good example, 
of. Reuben and Burstall, op.cit., p.l71ff.
193* Chemicals Manpower in Europe, op .oit., p.15*
194* Dzielak et al., op «cit., p.53.
195* Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, Vol.2, 1979? op .cit., 
p.310f•
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Table 3.11.
Investment in industry and in the chemical industry 1969- 1978. ^
Total Industry Chemical ■ Industry
Year Mill .DM Quota^ a I^ntensity^  ^ Mill.DM $ Quota^ a I^ntensity^ ^
______________$______DM_________   Total $____ DM____
1969 28595 6.1 3442 4855 17*0 10.3 8567
1970 35820 6.8 4164 5510 15*4 10.9 9250
1971 37995 6.7 4495 5240 13*8 9*7 8835
1972 35400 5*9 4260 4400 12*4 7*7 7530
1973 35380 5*3 4230 4680 13*2 7.1 7920
1974 34865 4*6 4281 5500 15.8 6.3 9159
1975 34465 4*7 4525 5500 16.0 7*0 9440
1976 37135 4*5 4999 5500 1 4 *8. 6.0 9625
1977 38100 4*1 5246 5500 14 .4 5*1 9637
1978 41890 4.2 5513 5700 13.6 5*1 IOO67
The stagnation of investment in the chemical industry has resulted in 
a decrease in investment in real terms, which for the period 1970 to
(19 7)1976 was 27 per cent. Although the amount of investment per em­
ployee has increased in net terms over the last decade, in real terms
there has again been a decline as since 1970 there has been a 50 per
(198)cent increase in the cost of living in West Germany. '  The decrease 
in investment in the chemical industry is perhaps one reason for the 
slower rate of increase in productivity determined above.
196. Sources: Zahlen zur Sozialpolitik, 1975? op.cit., p.71* 
Zahlen zur Sozialpolitik, 1979? op .cit., p.53.
(a) Investments as a percentage of turnover.
(b) Investments per employee.
197* Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, Vol.2, 1979? 
op .cit., p.310.
198 . Zahlen zur S o z ia lp o l i t ik , 1979? op . c i t . ,  p .64*
investment in the chemical industry goes annually towards the con-
(199)struction or purchase of new plant and machinery. Since the
number of employees in the ohemical industry has remained relatively 
constant these investments constitute rationalisation which is likely 
to lead to an increase in the level of technology and automation. The 
influence of these factors on industrial relations has already been 
discussed above. Investment, although declining in recent years, is 
seen as contributory towards a trend of increasing technological 
sophistication in the German chemical industry.
The economic situation during the period 1969-1978? several features 
of which have been discussed from the point of view of the German 
chemical industry, may have had an influence on the level of wages and 
salaries paid in..this industry as compared with industry in general 
and the situation prior to 1969* In order to investigate this possi­
bility earnings in the chemical industry are considered next,
e. Earnings.
The earnings; of employees can be considered in a number of ways. 
Limitations in the statistical data available necessitate that wage 
and salary earners be treated separately, but gross earnings and agreed 
earning levels are both of significance.
Data fo r the period 1970 to  1975 revea ls  th a t around J6 per cent of
Btatistische Jahrbucher, 1979, op 1► cit., P-.165.
1976, op,.cit., P-.234*
Own calculations. 1974, op,.cit., P-.217.
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Wages in the ohemical industry compared with industry in general
1950- 1978. (200)
Total Industry Chemical Industry
Year Gross Earnings Tariff Gross Earnings Tariff
per hour / \ Index per hour Index # /, %
________DM Index _______ DM Index Diff.'0'
Table 3 .12 .
1950 1.26 21.2 26.9 1.32 20.0 22.5 4.8
1955 1 .7 8 30.1 35.2 I .84 28.1 28.8 3.4
i960 2.69 44*3 48.6 2.70 41.4 41.4 0.4
1965 4.26 69.6 7 1 .0 4.34 66.8 65.5 1.9
1967 4.69 74*2 79.6 4.90 75.1 74.0 4.5
1969 5.37 8 7 .I 88.4 5.61 85.2 83.2 4.5
1970 6.09 100 100 6 .5 1 100 100 6.9
1971 . .6.82 111.0 113.0 7.23 110.2 110.9 6.0
1972 7.42 120.9 122.8 7.83 119.5 120.6 5.5
1973 8.23 133.5 134.5 8.61 130.7 132.2 4.6
1974 9*13 147*1 150.4 9.77 147.7 148.8 7.0
1975 9.85 158.7 163.9 IO.51 159.3 161.8 6.7
1976 10.49 168.8 173.2 11.32 170.9 173.4 7.9
1977 11.27 180.8 185.6 12.21 183-9 186.1 8.3
1978 11.88 190.4 195.3 12.85 193.8 195.7 8.2
There has apparently been a trend of an increasing difference between
the wages paid in the chemical industry as compared with industry in
general. This has been particularly so since the onset of the economic
recession in 1974 and- seems to suggest that this recession has affected
(20l)
chemical workers* earnings less seriously than it has average earnings. 
Furthermore, chemical workers have always earned above average wages
200. Bources: Zahlen zur Bozialuolitilc, 1979? op .oit., pp. 22,26. 
Own calculations.
(a) All indexes 1970=100.
(b) Percentage difference between gross earnings per hour 
in the ohemical industry compared with total industry.
20'1. The recession did, however, lead to restraint in wage demands 
and agreements both generally and in the chemical industry, 
c f " Tarifkalender 1975". Kon.junturberiohte, Vol.27? No.l, 
1976, pp.22-23.
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since 1950* It also seems that agreed (tariff) wage rates have in­
creased slightly faster than gross earnings and this would contribute
( 202)to a decrease in wage drift. 7 The question can be posed as to 
whether it is possible to identify similar trends as far as salaries 
are concerned.
Table 3.13>
Salaries in the chemical industry compared with industry in general 
1957-1978. (203)
Year
Total Industry 
Gross Monthly Earnings 
DM Index(a)
Chemical Industry 
Gross Monthly Earnings 
DM Index Diff
1957 559 42.4 560 40.8 0.2
I960 663 49*8 680 48.3 2.6
1965 971 7 1 .0 1036 70.2 6.7
1967 1088 78.6 1171 78.2 7.6
1969 1260 89.2 1358 88.6 7.8
1970 1408 100 1523 100 8.2
1971 1577 110.4 1677 IO8.7 6.3
1972 1725 119 .8 1812 1 1 7 .2 5.0
1973 1965 131.9 2026 127.2 3.1
1974 2189 145-5 2272 142.1 3.8
1975 2378 157-4 2476 155-3 4.1
1976 2553 167-8 2649 I65.8 3.8
1977 2742 1 7 9 .6- 2844 177.7 3.7
1978 2904 189.7 3026 189.1 4.2
202. of. E.H. Phelps Brown, "Wage drift", Economica, Vol.XXIX, 1962, 
pp.339-356 and B. Robalc, Industriezweigstruktur und uber- 
tarifliche Entlohnung, Berlin, 1978, p.43ff. This question 
will be discussed in the light of additional data below.
20.3* For technical and office staff. Indexation of tariff salary
rates is impractical due to the vast range of different salary 
groups•
Sources: Zahlen zur Sozialpolitik, 1979? op .cit., p.40, own 
calculations•
(a) 1970=100.
(b) Percentage difference between gross monthly salaries 
in the chemical industry compared with total industry.
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Whilst salaries in the chemical industry have also remained higher than 
those in industry in general, different trends emerge. In recent years 
the gap has declined which might he a reflection of the increasing number 
of salaried staff in the chemical industry/20*1) In times of economic 
recession it is unlikely that fringe benefits and plus-rate payments 
would be increased so that the amount received by each member of staff" 
would be less. Certainly in recent years staff salary increases have 
been of similar size to workers wage increases whereas previously they 
were less. This change has conceivably been brought about by the
trend towards status harmonisation in the chemical industry, part of 
which was the introduction of joint wage and salary agreements in the 
chemical industry/ °^6^
Whether there is a "wage gap" between gross salaries and agreed salary 
rates is also of interest. Bue to the different salary rates for office, 
technical and supervisory staff it is necessary to calculate the wage 
drift for each group separately, although in the case of supervisory 
staff the calculation becomes impossible due to the lack of published 
data on the average earnings of this group.
Bata for June 1976 which was the most recent available indicated that 
the average monthly earnings of office staff were BM 2484 compared with 
a mean tariff rate of BM 2217* The difference, generally referred to 
as the wage gap, was 12 per cent. For technical staff at this time
204. In 1955 70 per cent of chemical employees were workers compared 
with 6l per cent in 1970 and 55 Pe^  cent in 1978. Ibid., p. 10.
20.5. cf. GB 72-75? op .cit., p.352.
206. Interview FTO 5) Feb.*78.
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average earnings were DM 2849 compared with a mean tariff rate of 
DM 2439? a wage gap of 16.8 per cent.^20^
Respondents had indicated that such differences probably existed^20^  
and they also suggested that for workers the wage gap was far greater. 
For various companies, the wage gap was stated to vary between 12 and
(209)60 per cent. Similar calculations to those carried out for
salaried staff indicated that in 1975 +be wage gap for chemical workers
(2 10)hourly earnings was 39.7 per cent' 'and that by mid 1979 it had in­
creased further to 44*4 per cent.^211^
Robak determined as part of her very thorough investigation of the 
causes of plus-rate payments that the wage gap in the chemical industry
(2 1 2)in 1962 was 24 per cent.v ' This resulted from a relatively low
tariff rate and a high gross rate and placed the chemical industry
(213)sixth in industrial comparison.' ' According to Robalc the reasons 
for wage gap in the chemical industry ares
207* Zahlen zur Sozialpolitik, 1977? op.cit., pp.32, 38 and Ibid., 
19 7 9? p.40, own calculations.
208. Interviews BRV 4 and FTO 11, S*ep. *77 •
209* Ibid., and also CM 11, S'ep.,77? BRV 5? S’ep.,77 and data
from Agrochemie AG - see below. One of the main factors
determining the size of the gap seems to be company size.
210. Zahlen zur Sozialpolitik, 1975, op.cit., p.25 and Ibid.,
3-979? P * 2 0 ,  own calculations.
211. Ibid., 1979? pp.1 8, 20 and Wirtschaft und Statistik, No.8, 
1979, p.559* — -
212. B. Robak, op .cit., p.lllff.
213* Ibid., p.204.
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"large labour requirements together with a low tariff wage rate ... 
the difference in productivity within the industry might also be a 
cause of the large gap, for although there is a high degree of con­
centration in the chemical industry there are ... numerous small and 
medium sized companies in certain sectors (of the industry)"* (2 1 4)
Suoh factors would have continued to have an effect throughout the last 
deoade and a half although labour requirements have reduced. ^
Economic recessions do not generally seem to have had all that great 
an effect on the wage gap in the ohemical industry^21®^although there 
is evidence that some employers did reduce their voluntary payments
and cancel a number of works agreements during the 1967 recession. ^21^
\
Nevertheless, one reason for an increase in wage gap for chemical 
workers from 1975 to 1979 might be that the former year was in the 
middle of the latest economic recession.
It is almost impossible to generalise when discussing the origins of 
the payments which cause a wage gap since it will vary from works to 
works, company to company, especially with company size^21^and from 
one group of employees to another. However, the structure of wage 
payments at Agrochemie AG is given here as an example:
214* Author*s translation of: "ist in erster Linie auf den starken 
Arbeitskraftebedarf der Branche bei niedrigem Tariflohnniveau 
zuruckzufuhren ... M8glicherweise sind daneben auch Produk- 
tivitatsunterschiede innerhalb des Zweiges eine Ursache fdr die 
grosse Soanne; denn obwohl die Unternehmenskonzentration in 
der Chemischen Industrie weit vorangeschritten ist, gibt es . •. 
in einigen Bereichen zahlreiche Klein- und Mittelbetriebe." 
Ibid., p.114.
2 1 5. Bee above, nevertheless there remained a core of chemical jobs 
which were unable to fill. _cf. "Mehr als 2500 Chemie- Arbeits- 
platze seit Monaten zu besetzen", Infobrief, 8/79? p.6f.
216. Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, 1978, op.oit., p.52.
217» Interview FTO 6, Aug.*77• For a further discussion of work­
place bargaining see Chapter 5 below.
218. Interview FTO 7? Aug.*77*
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Table 3.14*
Structure of wage payments at Agrochemie AG, in September 1978.(219)
Type of Payment Source *
Wage Tariff 53.0
Plus-rate payments Company 6.4
Leading hands/bonus Company 0.6
Night/weekend bonus Tariff 5.7
Overtime Tariff 1.0
Craftsmen*s bonus Company 2.0
Packing PBR payment Works Agr. 3.6
Shift bonus Tariff 2.8
Holiday pay Tariff 14.5
Sickness pay Law 2.8
Accident pay Law 0.2
Capital Accumulation payment Tariff 1.8
Call in pay Works Agr. 0.4
Travel money Works Agr. 0.5
Others - 4.7
100
+ Employers contributions to social insurance - 15 *1
There are three main sources of these payments. The first are tariff" 
payments that have been agreed upon between the trade unions and the 
employers* associations, or in the case of a company agreement 
(Firmentarifvertrag) with management. These forms of collective bar­
gaining are described and analysed in the next chapter. Another source 
is works agreements made between the works council and management. The 
company also makes unilateral voluntary payments for a number of criteria. 
Both these factors are considered in the chapter concerned with workplace 
relations.
219. Bata from company personnel department. The wage gap here is 
around 45 Per cent which is in line with the figure calculated 
for the chemical industry in general. However, only 20 per­
cent are plus-rate payments.
In summary, the various features of the economic development of the 
German chemical industry in the last decade have revealed that it was 
hit hy a minor recession in 1970 and then by the greatest depression 
since the S'econd World War in 1974/75* The main effects of this re­
cession were price increases, a drop in output, short-time working and 
unemployment in the chemical industry. However, some sectors fared 
less badly than others, provoking some industrial unrest in those
companies like BASF which were less severely affected and which
(220)recovered well*' '
An economic downturn of these proportions naturally had other conse­
quences for industrial relations both nationally and in chemicals.
Wage restraint was induced through union realisation that the member-
(2 2 1)ship was too frightened of unemployment to force large increases. 
However, the wage gap does not seem to have been greatly decreased by 
the recession.
Such eoonomic pressure, particularly as a result of international price 
competition, forced increases in productivity through investment and 
rationalisation. This also affected labour relations by strengthening 
fears of unemployment and by an increase in automation and plant size.
220. For a further discussion of the 1977 collective bargaining 
round see below and also Pbojektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, 
1978? op .cit., pp.II8-I8 5.
221. Another reason for wage restraint at this time is an attitude 
prevalent in the Chemical Workers * Union that it would be 
unwise "to slaughter the oow we want to milk". Interview 
FTO 4? Aug.*77*
In this chapter the complex inter-relationships between the tech­
nological characteristics, industrial organisation and the recent 
economic development of the West German chemical industry and their 
influence on labour relations in the industry have been discussed.
Advanced technology and continuous process production systems were 
seen to lead to a high degree of shift work, which itself affects 
industrial relations through the lesser awareness of shift workers 
on labour relations issues and their high job satisfaction based 
primarily on their earnings.
Technological progress was viewed both positively through its effects 
on working conditions and negatively because of the resultant re­
dundancies, circumstances directly experienced by many chemical 
workers•
The capital intensity of the chemical industry both increases manage­
ments* room to manoeuvre in negotiations due to the relatively low 
importance of labour costs whilst increasing the need for maximum 
usage of plant. Both factors would tend to be conducive to peaceful 
industrial relations.
The industrial organisation of the German chemical industry - highly 
concentrated, with numerous large companies and establishments - 
facilitates co-operation and co-ordinated action on the part of 
management. Company and establishment size also have a direct in­
fluence on the oo-determination rights available to the workforce
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(iv) Summary.
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and. indirectly on management policies towards the works council and 
unions-.
The workforce structure in chemicals also influences labour relations 
due to the high percentage of white-collar- and supervisory staff".
The main consequences of this are low union densities and harmonious 
relations between line management and the workforce.
The diversification of major chemical companies provides economic 
strength in times of recession, thus contributing positively towards 
the climate of industrial relations in these companies. The location 
of these companies in specific regions gives them a particular signi­
ficance in chemical industrial relations.
Despite two minor recessions the chemical industry in Germany has 
enjoyed rapid growth and economic strength, with a subsequent positive 
effect on negotiations, a topic considered in greater detail in the 
following chapter.
Collective bargaining in the West German chemical industry.
(i) Introduction.
Professor Clegg has recently defined collective bargaining as "the
whole range of dealings between employers and managers, on the one
hand, and trade unions, shop stewards and union members, on the other,
over the making, interpretation and administration of employment rules,
and the ’intra-organisational bargaining* that goes on within either
side over the approaches and responses that they make to each other*
It also includes bargaining between the two sides over the application
.of statutory controls As a result of the adoption of” such a wide
definition Clegg goes on to claim with apparent justification that
"the process of industrial relations is essentially a process of'
(2)collective bargaining".
To define collective bargaining in such terms may seem very attractive;
however, as far as West Germany is concerned, it only has limited 
(3)validity.' ' The reason for this can be traced to the different basis 
upon which relations between employers and employees are conducted in 
the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic.
(5 )The Collective Agreements Actw 'regulates which persons or associations
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Chapter 4 »
1. H.A. Clegg, 1979? op.cit., p*4*
2. Ibid., p.5*
3. Professor Clegg does not claim that this definition is universally 
acceptable.
4. Clegg has categorised two models, one based on statute law and the 
other on common law. The British system does not fit either model 
exactly but German may be classified as according to the statute 
law model. Ibid., p . 117 .
5. Tarifvertragsgesetz, 2 5.8.1969, (BGB1. IS*.1323) and revision on 
29.10.1974 (BGB1. IS.2879) as published in M. ICittner, Arbeits- und Cozialordnung, Third Edition, Koln, 1978, p.726ff. This 
matter is regulated by Para.2.1.
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are permitted to engage in collective bargaining. As far as employees
are concerned only trade unions may sign agreements whilst on the
employers side both single employers as well as employers* associations 
( 6 )may sign them. Furthermore, these rights are limited to such em­
ployers * associations- and trade unions which are associations according
(7)to provisions laid down in the constitution. ' In order to be an 
association in this sense the organisations are required to fulfil a 
number of basic conditions such as be independent from their opponents, 
not be limited to a single factory oiv company, and aim to regulate the 
conditions of employment in one or more branches of the economy/8)
In addition, those persons or associations which are permitted to
engage in collectives bargaining also have the right to do so without
(9)interference from outside parties. w J  In other words, as a result of 
the legal status afforded to collective agreements, the state has 
relinguished a part of its own legislative autonomy to a series of"
6. A. S'o liner, Arbe it sre cht, Fifth Edition, Stuttgart, 1976, p. 117* 
Baubler sees this as recognition in law of the superior power 
enjoyed by employers since they are not required to form assoc­
iations. W. Baubler, op.cit., p.60f.
7. The right of association is laid down in the Basic Law (Art.9
Para.3) and from this the right to form trade unions and em­
ployers,* associations as well as not to become members of such 
organisations is derived along with a'number of other implicationso 
cf. A. Rollner, op .cit., p«53ff? and H. Reichel, "Recent Trends
in Collective Bargaining in the Federal Republic -of Germany," 
International Labour Review, December, 1971? p.496ff.
8. E. Weber and W. Bitzer, Arbeitsrecht- und Sozialfibel, Fourteenth
Revised Edition, Koln, 1977? p.280f. For a more complete list of
such conditions which were derived during the Weimar Republic cf.
H. Weitbrecht, Effektivitat und Legitimitat der Tarifautonomie, 
Berlin, 1969? p.168.
9. This right is known in German as Tarifautonomie and can be implied
from the right of association in the Basic Law. C. Noe,
Gebandigter Klassenkampf, Tarifautonomie im der Bundesrexrublik 
Deutschland, Berlin, 1970, p.l7f« Also A. Sollner, op.cit., 
p.HOff.
independent persons and associations.^10  ^ It is in the light of this 
that the conditions imposed upon such parties become comprehensible.
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Besides regulating that collective agreements are binding in law, the 
Collective Agreements Act also specifies the form of agreements; that 
the conditions agreed upon are a minimum; that a peace obligation^11  ^
exists for both parties through the duration of the agreement and the 
circumstances under which the conditions in the agreement may be ex­
tended to cover all establishments in a sector of the economy as
opposed to the normal situation which limits the applicability of the
(1 2)agreement to the signatory parties and their members. J
Although works councils do bargain with management they are not assoc­
iations under the conditions of the law and therefore such negotiations 
cannot, in Germany, be considered to be collective bargaining. In this 
way, the separation of issues which are covered by the Works Con­
stitution Act and which may be regulated in the form of works council
(13)agreements from those negotiated by trade unions' "provides a useful
10. H. Weitbrecht, op .oit ♦, p.l8ff.
11. ffriedenspflicht. This means here that neither signatory parties 
or their members may engage in industrial action in order to 
change the conditions in the agreement throughout the course of 
its duration, and even beyond this until all reasonable attempts 
at negotiation have been made to effect a revisions of the agree­
ment . A. Bollner, op .cit., p.Slff.
12. cf. M. Kittner, op .cit., p.726ff. On this procedure, which is 
known in German as Allgemeinverbindlichkeit cf. G. Bchaub, 
Arbeitsrechtshandbuch, Second Edition, Miinchen, 1975? p.837ff.
13. In practice this separation is not always so clear. Collective 
agreements can regulate matters which affect all employees in a 
factory and may also cover a number of institutions which exist 
as a result of the Works Constitution Act such as arbitration 
boards (tarifliohe Schlichtungsstellen). A. S8llner, op.cit., 
p.122. On the other hand, works agreements may not regulate 
those issues usually included in collective agreements.
W. Baubler, op .cit., p.222f. Nevertheless, this later re­
gulation is occasionally ignored. Bee Chapter 5 below.
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means of dividing the analysis of industrial relations into two 
parts•
As a consequence of these restrictions, collective bargaining in West 
Germany can only be considered to cover negotiations between trade 
unions- and employers, whether individually - leading to the formation 
of company or works- agreements - or collectively in associations.
Negotiations with employers* associations can be conducted at any
level considered appropriate although the majority of agreements are
either regional or national and cover a specific industry or sector of
the economy. Furthermore, collective bargaining can cover a large
(15)range of issues both procedural and substantive' and may also be 
taken to include intra-organisational bargaining, so long as those 
organisations are bargaining associations in the eyes of the law*
The aim of this chapter is, therefore, to both describe and analyse 
oollective bargaining in the West German chemical industry according 
to this definition. It is proposed to consider collective bargaining 
in four sections although a great deal of overlap exists between these 
various forms of negotiations. An analysis of intra-organisational 
bargaining which is generally applicable to the various levels of 
negotiations is followed by a consideration of the regional bargaining
14* Negotiations between trade unions and employers are considered
in this chapter whilst relations between works councils and 
management are dealt with in the next•
15. Ibid., p.6lf and A. Sollner, op.cit*, p*122f.
process. Until very recently this was the most important form of
collective "bargaining in the chemical industry since., wages, salaries
(l6)and some conditions were negotiated at this level. ' Although 
regional bargaining may be declining in importance it still serves to 
illustrate the bargaining relationships which exist between the 
chemical employers and the Chemical Workers* Union.
The discussion of' collective bargaining continues with an analysis of 
national bargaining and is concluded by a consideration: of domestic 
bargaining as undertaken by the Chemical Workers * Union with individual 
companies which are not members of employers* associations. Finally 
in the light of this discussion conclusions are drawn about the con­
tribution collective bargaining makes- towards the regulation? of em- 
ployee-employer relations in the West German ohemical industry.
(ii) Intra-organisational bargaining.
Although the intra-organisational bargaining vfoich occurs both within 
the chemical employers* associations- and the Chemical Workers* Union 
prior to the opening of negotiations and during the bargaining pro­
cess is not carried out in isolation of what the other side has been 
doing, it is nevertheless dealt with separately in each of the two 
organisations for the sake of simplicity,
a. Chemical Workers * Union.
The range of intra-organisational bargaining in trade unions has been 
illustrated by Walton: and McKersie:
16. Wages have been negotiated nationally on three occasions. In
1975 the economic situation caused the union leadership to take 
over the negotiations and in 1978/1979? combination of the wage 
round with bargaining about conditions normally agreed nationally 
led to all negotiations being carried out centrally. This trend 
is discussed in greater detail below.
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"The organizations participating in labor negotiations usually lack 
internal consensus about the objectives they will attempt to obtain 
from negotiations, and this is especially true for labor organizations. 
Different elements of the organization may have different ideas about 
the priorities assigned to the various objectives being pursued, or 
they may disagree on what should be minimally acceptable for the total 
contract. Disagreement can also exist around strategies and tactics 
and around such questions as which items are distributive issues and 
which are problems with potentially integrative solutions. Similarly, 
there may be a lack of consensus about what type of relationship should 
be developed with the other party." (IT)
The position of the leadership within the Chemical Workers * Union has 
been considered above and here their attempts to co-ordinate bargaining 
between the various regions and factions in the union are also examined.
Until the early 1970*3 there was only ad hoc co-ordination of bargaining
in the Chemical Workers* Union. However, as- the employers had been
continually increasing their own internal oo-ordination it became
necessary for the union to react to this and to introduce rather more
(l8)stringent co-ordination.' ' The requirement became quite unequivical 
as a result of the oollective bargaining round in 1 9 7 1* In this parti­
cular year the first sizeable strike for fifty years occurred in the 
German chemical industry. -Four regions of the Chemical Workers* Union 
were eventually to come out on strike and yet the region Rheinland-
Pfalz, which is one of the three biggest and amongst the first to
(19)negotiate, decided to accept the employers* offer.' ' The employers 
and the press were able to make considerable capital of this and it
17. R . E .  Walton and R . B .  McKersie, A Behavioural Theory of Labor 
Negotiations, New York, 1965? p.28l.
18. Interview FTO 6, Aug.*77 and GB 69-7 1 , op.cit., p.307f.
1 9 . Dzielak et al., op .cit., passim and especially p.139*
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The initial aims of the increased co-ordination as presented in the
report to conference the following year included a consideration of the
economic and social situation in the industry, planning the dates for
negotiations, as well as guiding the demands and the final agreements'21^
The mistakes of 1971 bad provoked much thought within the union generally
and as a result of this a motion on the subject of the co-ordination of
(2 2)bargaining was brought to conference. " Conference decided to refer 
this motion to the NEC as the main guideline for co-ordination, ^21 but 
did not make the motion part of the bargaining guidelines. Although 
the motion sets out clearly what should happen in the way of co-ordination 
at various stages of the bargaining round it is not usually applied in 
its entirity.^4^
(25)Since then co-ordination of bargaining has increased steadily' ""with 
the central aim being to make decisions on the tactics and strategies 
required through the collective bargaining round. To carry this out 
the regional secretaries generally meet with the NEC some five or six
contributed to the failure of the strike.
20. Ibid., p.425 and Interview FTO 6, Aug. *77 » Also cf_. Chemie- 
tarifrunde 1971* op.oit.
21. GF'69-71? op .oit., p.308.
22. The origin of the motion was the Regional Committee in Nieder- 
sachsen, a region which generally shows progressive policy in 
collective bargaining (informal discussions and Protokoll 1972, 
op .oit., Anhang p.l8). For a consideration of the discussion 
of this strike at the National Conference in 1972 of. Dzielak 
et al., op .cit., p.419ff*
23. This was the recommendation of the Rules Committee and is 
illustrative of the influence of this committee at National 
Conferences. Ibid., p.250f.
2 4. For example, the referal back to the Vertrauensleute re­
commended .only occurs in Niedersachsen. Bee below.
2 5. The central negotiations from 1975 onwards might be considered 
to be an ultimate form of co-ordination.
Doubts about the efficacy of the system of co-ordination are raised, 
however, by experiences in the 1977 wage round. In order to gain further 
insight to the system of co-ordination and intra-organisational bar­
gaining in general, occurrences in this year will be considered as a
(27 )form of case study.'
The NEC and regional secretaries began holding co-ordination meetings 
for the coming wage round almost two months before the first agreements 
were terminated. They decided to recommend to the lay officers and 
other members of the organisation that a level of demands between 9 an<i 
9*5 per cent would be suitable. In all, seven meetings were held 
between NEC and regional secretaries through the course of the coll­
ective bargaining round and it was decided that any region who received 
an offer of 7 per cent from the employers was free to settle.
Given the relatively good economic forecasts at this time these re­
commendations from the NEC can be seen to be an attempt to keep a number 
of groups happy. By setting the limits for the demands fairly low (yet 
not too low) the NEC could avoid any criticism of endangering the 
economic recovery from sections of their own union and from the employers.
- 202 -
(26)times over the months of the annual collective bargaining round.
2 6. Interview FTO 11 ,  S'ep.,77»
27* Information for this section is based primarily on Projekt­
gruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, 1978, op.cit., pp.118-185 
and on interviews held just after the dispute situation was 
over.
2 8. Lay officers rights under the collective bargaining guide­
lines in the Chemical Workers' Union are discussed in greater 
detail below.
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On the other hand, by keeping the gap between demands and final level 
of settlement low, the NEC could hope to minimise criticism from within 
the union that they were prepared to accept offers which were too low.
In previous years such criticism had occasionally been voiced.^9)
Negotiations broke down in Nordrhein and Rheinland-Pfalz after two
meetings and the way things were developing - that is, towards a
dispute - were fairly clear. Despite this the Hessen region reached 
agreement at a third meeting. Since Hessen had achieved the 7 per cent 
limit set in the co-ordination meetings, and given the relative weak­
ness of the union in the Hoeohst works the acceptance is understandable. 
However, it did enable the employers once more to make vast public 
relations use out of the varying union standpoints.
Given this ocourrenoe the NEC's decision to prevent Nordrhein entering 
a dispute situation by use of the vote of their representative on the 
conciliation board also becomes comprehensible.^00  ^ Not only is the 
union weak at Bayer but by so doing they were able to limit the dispute? 
to Rheinland-Pfalz and concentrate their efforts there.
However, the union explanations of these moves used at a later stage,
which were that they had limited the dispute to Rheinland-Pfalz in order
2 9. Informal discussions.
30. In the Rheinland-Pfalz conciliation the NEC representative had 
not been prepared to follow their instructions to settle, for 
to have done so would have been totally against the feelings in 
the region. Such action would probably have cost this NEC 
member many votes when it came to re-election at the next 
national conference. For further details on conciliation see 
below.
to prevent a lock-out over a large area can be rejected as a bald excuse,
At no time have the chemical employers seriously contemplated the use 
(3l)of the lock-out. Not only does this go against their tactics of
( 3 2  )keeping plant running at all costs' but it would also be tech­
nologically very difficult since they would have to run down all the 
plants. Buch action would require the help of the workers which under 
the circumstances might not be forthcoming, even given the general 
co-operation between management and workforce in the German chemical 
industry.
This case study illustrates the situation that despite extensive attempts 
at co-ordination and considerable powers the NEC was not able to impose 
a unified course on the union. Whether criticism for this is laid at 
the door of Rheinland-Pfalz for trying to get a better agreement or 
Hessen for not being prepared to delay the proceedings depends on oneTs 
point of view.
An additional result of the failure of the strike in the chemical in­
dustry in 1971 was a formalisation of intra-organisational bargaining,
(3 3)the aim of which was to increase the involvement of lay officers.' '
In this way it was hoped that the level of demands would be more likely
-2 0 4  -
31. No employers'representative interviewed was prepared to admit
to a willingness to resort to the lock-out.
32. This was the policy in 1971 a-nti 1977* cf. Ibid., and Dzielak 
et al., op .cit., p.388f.
33. A study of the position of lay officers in the Chemical Workers*
Union dealing with many relevant issues may be found by con­
sulting: D.R. Ebsworth, "Lay Officers in the German Chemical 
Workers* Union: a Case Btudy", Industrial Relations Journal, 
forthcoming, 1980.
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to reflect the feelings of the rank and file members and that the lay 
officers would feel more committed to the demands. This latter factor 
is of considerable significance in the case of a dispute developing 
for the lay officers' support is crucial to the success of the sanctions.
After the NEC makes its recommendations on the level of demands the 
Vertrauensleute ^ ^debate them amongst themselves, and theoretically 
also with the members they represent. However, since many lay officers 
interviewed at Agrochemie AG did not consider that they represent parti­
cular groups of members, a degree of doubt must be expressed as to
( 35  )whether the lay officers discuss the demands with the members.'"'
It appears that factionalisation occurs to a certain extent within the
Fertrauensleute leading basically to the formation of two groups. These
groups have been called "Lohnwissenschaftler ", mainly highly paid
salaried staff and "Tarifpolitiker" who are primarily representatives
(36)of manual workers. ' The crux of the disagreement between these groups
is differentials. From 1973 to 1976 there was a tendency to have a
(37)minimum amount fixed into the percentage wage increase.' In 1976
34. Fertrauensleute is used here since these rights apply both to
lay officers and works councillors who automatically have the 
status of Vertrauensleute. cf. Ibid.
35• In fact, there is some evidence that lay officers' rights are
not used at all in some parts of the union, of. Projektgruppe 
Gewerkschaftsforschung, 1978, op .oit., p.123.
36. Ibid., p.l26ff. Translation of these terms presents some
considerable difficulties.
37* Ibid., p.122. An employers1 representative stated that as a
result of this the differentials between the top and bottom 
wage rates was now only 14 per oent as opposed to 22 per cent 
previously. He claimed this as one of the reasons for high 
wage gap since local payments were used to restore differ­
entials.. Interview ER 6, Aug.'77•
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disagreements between the two groups came to a head and were nearly
/ iO \impossible to reconcile. ' Since then the "Lohnwissenschaftler"
have apparently gained the upper hand for the demands made have only
(39)been for percentage increases.
Generally speaking the Vertrauensleute accept the recommendations of
the NEC as to the level of demands, 4^0 i^f sometimes somewhat grudg-
f Al \ingly.' The level of demands is usually debated at a meeting of
Vertrauensleute which is also attended by a district full-time officer 
whose job is normally to represent the position taken by the NEC, and 
to pass on the decision of the Vertrauensleute to the collective bar­
gaining committee. However, the Vertrauensleute do not have the right 
to determine the actual level of the demands. This is carried out by
the collective bargaining committee after collating the recommended
(42)level of demands from all the works.
During the course of the collective bargaining round there is a certain 
amount of reporting back to the Vertrauensleute and indeed to the members.
38. Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, 1978, op.cit., p.127*
39. of. Ibid., p.130, "Erste Lohn - und Gehaltsforderungen -
Spitzengesprache in Aachen"^ pressedienst, XIV/8, 29 .3.1978 
and "4,3 Prozent mehr Lohn und Gehalt-S'echs Wochen Urlaub 
fur all ab 1984 - Mehr zusatzliohes Urlaubsgeld," presse- 
- dienst, XV/20 , 26.3.1979»
40. Thus a breakdown of demands from chemical works in Hessen in
1977 shows that 64 per cent accepted the NEC's recommendations, 
21 per cent demanded more than was recommended with the highest 
demand 10*5 per cent (viz.NEC 9—9 * 5 Pe** cent). The remaining 
works wanted flat rate increases; also many of those works 
demanding more than recommended had minimum increases as a part 
of their demands. Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, 1978, 
op .oit., p.l24ffy own calculations.
41. In informal discussions the NEC recommendation was likened to a papal edict.
42. IG Chemie, Riohtlinien ffir die Tarifarbeit, valid from 1.1.1973, 
Para.VII•
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This is usually carried out "by holding meetings and "by distributing 
l e a f l e t s T h e  rights of Vertrauensleute here are limited to con­
sultation and information and yet even such relatively modest incor­
poration of workplace representatives into collective bargaining is 
unusual in Germany. In fact, one commentator has stated that:
"Of all the trade unions in the BGB, the Chemical Workers’ Union doubt­
less grants its Vertrauensleute the most extensive rights within the 
organisation." (44)
This statement may seem somewhat surprising but it has apparently been 
confirmed by the present research. The Vertrauensleute do also have 
certain additional powers which are of significance when accepting this 
evaluation and which should also be considered a part of intra-organi- 
sational bargaining.
In one region, Niedersachsen, of the Chemical Workers' Union the re­
gional secretary has instituted a policy of allowing time for potential
( a r )agreements to be referred back to the Vertrauensleute.' ' Use of such
procedures has been a subject of some considerable controversy within 
the union, although in Niedersachsen it is used for all major agree­
ments and it is felt that it would be impossible to revert to a system
43. Interview FTO 7? Aug.*77 and Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, 
1978, op .oit., p.!31ff. Also £f. Chemietarifrunde 1971? op.cit ♦, 
pp.304-321 and Arbeitsring Chemie, Bokumentation liber die 
Tarifrunde 1977 der chemischen Industrie, no place (Wiesbaden), 
1977, pp.27-31.
44* Author’s translation of "Zweifellos gewahrt innerhalb der im 
BGB zusammengeschlossenen Gewerkschaften die IG Chemie den 
Vertrauensleuten den grossten innerverbandlichen S’pielraum,"
0. Jacobi, "Die innerverbandliohe Btellung der Vertrauensleute 
in der IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik, in Ibid., W. Muller-Jentsch 
and E. Bchmidt (eds.), Gewerkschaften und Klassenkampf,
Kritisches Jahrbuch '73, Frankfurt, 1973, p.83.
45* This is known in German as an Erklarungsfrist. The regional secretary can base this action on a conference decision in 
1972, of. Protokoll 1972, op.oit., Anhang p.l8.
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which does not include referal hack to the Vertrauensleute)
During the time allowed to consult the Vertrauensleute a ballot is 
carried out to discover what the workplace representatives think about 
the proposed agreement. By chance the Agrochemie AG case study was 
carried out in this region. Apparently the unusualness of the rights 
was not appreciated by the Vertrauensleute there, as is indicated by 
the following statements:
"We're always asked what we think of the results and we never get what 
we originally wanted. But not much is going to change at this stage - 
it's a formal thing really." (interview VL 1, Oct.'78).
"When there's an agreement we have to say 'yes'. They don't really 
ever say 'no' here as we would have to go to a strike ballot or a 
strike and you can't know what might come of that." (interview VL 4, 
Oct.'78).
The regional secretary introduced this procedure for several reasons. 
Not only is he committed to internal democracy within the union but it 
also provides a very useful early indication of the feelings of the 
Vertrauensleute in the region. In this way it can serve as an early 
form of strike ballot, although he would not normally consider refusing 
the agreement unless it was rejected by over 75 per cent of Vertrauens­
leute ) The second statement above ceems to suggest that the system 
works as it is intended to do.
Other regional secretaries in the Chemical Workers' Union have rejected
46. Interviews FTO 5 and FTO 6, both Aug.'77*
47* Interview FTO 6, Aug.'77* This reflects the support which 
would be required for strike in the case of a strike ballot. 
However, if solidarity was required, especially in the case 
of domestic bargaining, he might consider rejecting an agree­
ment without this level of support.
this system as "too much democracy". Actually, the system does 
have a number of potential problems. According to its opponents it 
puts the collective bargaining committee in an awkward position since 
it might seem to the employers that the committee is unable to make 
the final decision. This might induce the employers to withhold con­
cessions in case the union decides it has to reopen negotiations as a 
result of reference to the Vertrauensleute . ) Other problems with
the application of this type of system of representational democracy 
can arise if the Vertrauensleute cease to represent the feelings of 
their members, something which is not unknown.Furthermore, should 
e.g. 60 per cent reject the agreement and the collective bargaining 
committee nevertheless accept it, then the Vertrauensleute are likely 
to be dissatisfied with their representatives on the committee. This
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could then lead to the ejection of experienced negotiators from the
(5 2)
(5l)committee, " "and since it takes times to gain experience and knowledge
in bargaining this could create problems for the senior negotiator.,
This system is an interesting extension of internal union democracy and 
it seems to function as intended by the regional secretary responsible 
for its introduction. At the same time problems with the application
4 8. For example, Interviews FTO 7? Aug.'77 and FTO 10, Fep.’77.
49. Interview FTO 7? Aug.*77• However, such difficulties have not
prevented the NEC using a similar system for their recent
national wages and conditions negotiations where they allowed 
the regional bargaining committees to ratify the agreement. 
"Tarifrunde Chemische Industrie - Tarifrunde abgeschlossen;
Alle Tarifkommissionen stimmten zu," pressedienst, XV/22,
2.4.1979.
50. Interview FTO 5? Aug.’77•
51. Interview FTO 1, Aug.’77 * The electoral system for the
collective bargaining committees is discussed presently.
52. Interview FTO 6, Aug.*77 *
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of the system could develop, although it seems more likely that a 
schism is far less likely to develop between full-time and workplace 
union officials- under such a system, and this kind of gain is worth 
slight risks.
In the Rules of the Chemical Workers* Union it is stated that:
"The members of the collective bargaining committees are to be 
elected at Vertrauensleute meetings and must be ratified by the 
district executive."(53)
It is here, therefore, that the real power of the Vertrauensleute
within the intra-organisational bargaining system is rooted for even
full-time officers^^who want a place on the bargaining committee must
be elected by the workplace representatives. At present, elections
( 5 5  )for the bargaining committees are held every four years.' "  A 
consideration of the type of officials elected onto the bargaining 
committees should prove enlightening.
53. Author*® translation of: "Tarifkommissionmitglieder werden 
in Vertrauensleute - Versammlungen gewahlt und bedurfen die 
Bestatigung durch den Verwaltungsstellenvorstand." IG Chemie, 
Satzung 77? op.cit., Para 13. These rights were also intro­
duced as a result of the chemical industry strike in 1971* 
cf. Bzielak et al., op .oit., p.424ff«
54* Except the senior negotiator who in the case of regional
bargaining is usually the regional secretary or his delegate; 
national negotiations are led by the NEC officer responsible 
for bargaining and domestic negotiations normally by a 
regional or district officer. Interviews FTO 6, Aug.*77?
FTO 10, Sep.*77 and FTO 17? Feb.*78 . Re-election is possible 
and many senior works councillors serve on the bargaining 
committees for a considerable period of time.
Interview BRV 1, Aug.*77*
55* Tarifriohtlinien, op .cit., Para.Vlll/7 .
- 211 -
Structure of the regional collective bargaining committee for the 
chemical industry in Hessen 1975/76. (5 6)
Table 4*1*
Total Number of Members 31
Full-time Officers
(Senior negotiator + 1 District Secretary)
2
Workplace Representatives 29
Works Councillors 
Of whom:
29
- full-time 20
- chairmen 19
- district committee members 23
- Regional/National EC members 7
Lay Offioers
Of the workplace representatives there were:
Workers 17Salaried Staff 12
Women 1
Youths 1
The under-representation of lay officers deserves investigation since
lay offioers would have the potential to numerically outnumber works
councillors at the meetings of Vertrauensleute* However, evidence
from Agrochemie AG seems to suggest that many lay officers do not
5 6. Pro jektgruppe Gewerlcschaftsf orschung, Vol.l, 1979? on .oit., 
p.132. There are a large number of collective bargaining- 
committees in the Chemical Workers' Union due to-the wide 
organisational range (see Appendix 1, Table 6). In the 
chemical industry there are 12 regional, 1 national and 
numerous domestic bargaining committees. Interviews FTO 6, 
Aug.'77 and FTO 10, Sep.*77* Since Hessen is one of the 
more important regions it can be expected to be fairly 
typical of this type of region.
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attend these meetings, especially when they work shifts. In addition,
works councillors usually have more experience, are better schooled
by the union and have what amounts to a monopoly of information as a
(57 )result of the Works Constitution Act.' ' Under such circumstances 
the under-representation of lay officers becomes less surprising.
The guidelines state that the size of bargaining committees should be
between 10 and 30 in the case of workers and staff negotiating together'
as is the case in the chemical industry/ 98) Generally there are about
(59 )30 on the committee according to respondents'and as indicated by 
the table.
The number of full-time officials on the committee is normally small,
for example, there were also only two on the committee in Nordrhein,
so the regulation specifying that full-time officers should always be 
( 6l)in the minority 'can be seen merely as a safeguard.
(62)The high percentage of salaried staff representatives' 'can be seen as
(63)ensuring that the interests of this minority group are not neglected' ' 
but since other minority groups such as women and youths are not
57• See Chapter Five below.
5 8. Tarifrichtlinien, op .cit., Para. Vlll/2. Reserve members are 
also elected in case the primary member is unable to attend. 
Ibid., Para. Vlll/6.
59* e.g. Interview FTO 10, Rep.,77* of. Also Tarifrunde ....”, 
pressedienst, XV/22, op .cit.
60. Interview FTO 9? Aug.*77*
6l♦. Tarifrichtlinien, op .oit., Para.Vlll/7•
62. Only 19 per cent of members in the Chemical Workers1 Union 
Hessen region are staff. GB 72-75? op .cit., p.293? own 
calculations.
63 . This is the opinion expressed in Projektgruppe Gewerkschafts-
forschung, Vol.l, 1979? op.cit., p.131.
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similarly over represented it is more likely to be a reflection of the 
strength of the salaried staff group within the union officialdom.^4^
A significant amount of power lies within the grasp of the collective 
bargaining committees since it is their task to decide on when to term­
inate agreements, on the type and level of the demands, to carry out 
the actual bargaining, to select the officials who enter into the 
detailed negotiations and finally to accept or reject the agreement 
proposed by their negotiators.v ^ }
Despite the background of the majority of the members on the oollective
bargaining committee there is some limited evidence that they are not
monolithic bodies, although generally the representatives of a different
policy to that of the NEC are in a minority. As a result the level of
demands, and type of demand reflects that recommended by the NEC and
(66)generally accepted by the Vertrauensleute. The NEC has also been 
able to win support for such matters as the conducting of national wage 
negotiations and for acceptance of the result of such negotiations. '
6 4• of. Dzielak et al., op.cit», p.38lf. At the same time, however, 
attempts are made to reflect the structure of the chemical works 
represented by the committees so that the employers arguments 
about various sectors of the industry can be met. Interview 
FTO 5 , Aug.'77*
6 5. Tarifrichtlinien, op .cit., numerous interviews and Projektgruppe 
Gewerkschaftsforschung, Vol.l, 1979? op .cit., p.l31ff*
66. £f. Ibid., 1978, op.cit., p.l29f.
6 7. A considerable amount of criticism arose out of the way in which 
central negotiations were carried out in 1 9 7 5* Subsequently, 
the NEC confirmed that this could only occur provided the re­
gional bargaining committees gave their permission. Protokoll 
1976? op .cit., p.552ff. However, in 1978 resort was once more 
made to national negotiations without prior consultation, al­
though agreement was given in retrospect c_f. "Tarifrunde chemische 
Industrie - Tarifkommissionen stimmen Ergebnis zu - IG Chemie- 
Hauptvorstand nimmt Tarifverhandlungeri an," pressedienst, XIV./13? 
17.4*1978. Again considerable criticism was voiced (e.g. Inter­
view BR 2, Oct.’78, also informal discussions) so that in 1979 
the NEC made quite certain that adequate consultation occurred.
cf. "Tarifgesprach ...." pressedient, op .oit., and "Tarifrunde 
abgeschlossen pressedienst, op.oit.
Although the senior negotiator seems to he able to exert considerable 
influence on the path taken by the bargaining committees because of his 
personal status and experience, and because negotiations in the latter 
stages are carried out primarily by him; however, the committee can 
exercise control on the proceedings. A good example of such an in­
stance is provided by the stance adopted by the Rheinland-Pfalz bar­
gaining committee in 1977 « The co-ordination guidelines permitted 
agreement once an offer of a 7 per cent increase was obtained from the 
employers, but after considerable debate the Rheinland-Pfalz committee 
instructed their senior negotiator not to accept anything below 7.3
per cent - a decision which determined the subsequent course taken
v +*• • (68)by this region. "
Although a simple majority is all that is required for the collective 
bargaining committees to make a decision,^^it is unlikely that a 
senior negotiator would accept such a decision for it is quite possible 
that the support of the rank and file members would be limited. One 
regional secretary said he would never accept anything below a two 
thirds majority - generally the majority is even more convincing, such 
as 90 per cent in 1977 in this same region.
Discussion of intra-organisational bargaining in the Chemical Workers’ 
Union has concentrated on a number of features. The NEC has increased 
its hold over bargaining throughout the union by employing several
68. Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, 1978, op .cit., p.136.
6 9 . Tarifrichtlinien, op .cit., Para.VI11/l3.
70. Interview FTO 7> Aug.’77«
methods. Co-ordination of bargaining between the various regions has 
been increased and on a number of occasions national negotiations have 
supplanted the regional ones. The NEC has also generally been able 
to gain acceptance of its proposals as to the type and level of demands 
put to the employers, even in the case of regional negotiations.
At the same time, however, Vertrauensleute - that is to say lay officers 
and works councillors - have extended their influence on bargaining.
The Chemical Workers’ Union has the most extensive consultation and 
information rights for workplace representatives of all the BGB unions.
The centre of this influence rests with the electoral rights which 
Vertrauensleute possess in respect of the collective bargaining committees 
although due to apathy and a lack of experience the lay officers are 
severely under-represented. The factional splits in the Chemical 
Workers * Union also have a significance as far as intra-organisation 
bargaining is concerned, particularly where debating the level of demands 
to be made to the employers is concerned.
The collective bargaining committees hold a position of some power 
should they be certain of support from the membership. It has been 
possible for committees to determine the course of negotiations despite, 
the influence which the NEC can exert through their representative on 
the conciliation board.
b. Chemical employers’ associations.
Intra-organisational bargaining in the West German chemical employers’ 
associations occurs within a relatively small number of bodies and on i:
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variety of levels. In increasing importance are the collective bargaining 
committees of the regional employers' associations, the bargaining feder­
ation between the three most important regional associations, Nordrhein,
( 7 l )Hessen and Rheinland-Pfalz,' 'the national collective bargaining committee
( '7 0 )and the Co-ordination Committee which is by far the most significant.'
The intra-organisational bargaining generally begins at a fairly early 
stage within the collective bargaining and executive committees of the 
various regional employers* association. The importance of large com­
panies on these bodies has been discussed above and it is likely that
such companies play a very important part within intra-organisational
(73)bargaining both regionally and nationally. '
The size of the regional collective bargaining committees on the em­
ployers' side seems to vary as there are around 12-16 members in Hessen 
and 30-40 in Nordrhein^4  ^ Usually the members of these• committees are
personnel managers of board level together with the senior official of
(75)the employers* association.'
Attempts are made to represent the regional structure of the chemical 
industry on the committee in order to be able to bring arguments from 
a number of angles when negotiating with the unions and also so that the
71. Tarifgemeinschaft, whereby the separate regional negotiations 
for these three associations are conducted by committees in­
cluding representatives of all associations and the agreements 
signed on behalf of all the three associations. Interview
ER 1, Aug.’77•
72. For the rules of this committee erf. Koordinierungsgrundsatze, 
op .cit.
73. of. Chapter 2, Section (iii)a.
74* Interviews ER 1, Aug.’77 and ER 7? ^ep.’77« Also cf. Projekt- 
gruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, Vol.l, 1979? op .cit., p.l20f.
75* Interview ER 1, Aug.*77*
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various sections of the industry feel that they are "being adequately 
(.76)represented.' '
The early discussions characteristically lead to an evaluation of the 
economic situation and of the possible level of concessions which might 
be feasible. The actual offers to be made are not decided, however, 
until a later stage in the negotiations. The three main regions are 
particularly influential as far as the early discussions are concerned 
since bargaining in these regions predates that in the others by one 
or two months and due to the concentration of chemical industry located 
there/77)
Not until the trade union has actually begun to make demands does the
f7 0ACo-ordination Committee meet, a^nd it lays down strict guidelines for
the conduction of negotiations based on the prior discussions which took
(79)place in the regional associations.
For national issues a corresponding collective bargaining committee exists 
on the employers' side which since it consists of the most important 
personnel directors in the chemical industry along with the most senior 
full-time officers is empowered to take decisions without referal to 
the Co-ordination Committee/80)
7 6 . Interview ER 6, Aug.*77•
77* Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, Vol.l, 1979? or .oit., 
p.125.
7 8. The structure and election of this committee are discussed in 
Chapter 2, Section (iii)a above. Also cf. Grundsatze, op .cit., 
Section.l(l).
79. Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, Vol.l, 1979? op .cit.,
p.1 2 6.
80. Interviews FTO 5 an-d FTO 7? both Aug. '77? UR 8, Sep.'77»
"During the actual negotiations the Co-ordination Committee is the 
actual body which makes the decisions on all matters that are re­
levant to the negotiations." (8l)
The co-ordination of bargaining on the employers * side in the chemical 
industry dates back to the beginning of the 1960*s. In 1962 the 
Meeting of Representatives of Member Associations^*^ of the Arbeits­
ring decided to introduce guidelines for the co-ordination of bar- 
gaining. There are apparently a number of reasons for the em­
ployers* desire to introduce co-ordination into collective bargaining. 
The major ohemical companies have establishments in a variety of regions 
and similar wage rises would be simpler to apply across each company 
than widely divergent ones.^^ Agreed rates of increase in wages also 
contribute to a reduction of competition for labour from one region to 
another in times of labour shortagewhilst in economic recessions the 
employers* are more able to act in a concerted way. " In general, 
however, the major advantages that the employers* associations seem to 
draw from closely co-ordinating their bargaining are the strength of 
solidarity and the unified application of their bargaining tactics.
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According to a recent research reports
There have been several examples which illustrate these points. During
the ohemioal industry strike in 1971 a Hamburg based chemical company
81. Author*s translation ofs W&hrend laufender Tarifverhandlungen 
ist der Koordinierungsrat das eigentliche Beschlussgremium, in 
welchem alle Massnahmen, die filr die Verhandlungen relevant sind, 
entsohieden werden." Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, Vol.l, 
19 7 9? op.cit., p.123.
82. ££• Figure 2.2.
83. 25 Jahre Arbeitsring, op .cit., p. 6.
84. Interview ER 1, Aug.*77* Nevertheless regional wage rates do 
vary considerably, cf. Zahlen zur Bozialpolitik, 1979? op .cit ♦, 
p.l8f. ~
8 5. Interview ER 1, Aug.*77*
86. Interview ER 4? Bep.*77.
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accepted a domestic agreement with the Chemical Workers' Union rathen 
than risk the consequences of the strike. As a result of this the 
company was expelled by its employers' association/87) Perhaps as 
a result of this prompt expulsion and the system of strike defence 
funds which made deviation from central policies more penal as time
progressed, this was the only firm to deviate from the unified employers’
(88)course.'
In both 1971 and 1977 The chemical employers were able to outmanoeuvre 
the union by inducing at least one region to come to agreement at an 
earlier stage than the others and then using this lack of unity on the 
union side extensively in their public relations campaign/89)
With very few exceptions the regional wage negotiations result in
agreements which are extremely similar from one region to another, if
not identical/90) Furthermore, unified activities on the employers'
side have been facilitated by the increasing propensity of national
wage negotiations, something which the employers would prefer to be a
(9l)permanent institution. The co-ordination, of bargaining on the em­
ployers' side has apparently proved its worth and the mechanism of this 
co-ordination therefore deserves further consideration.
8 7. Chemietarifrunde 1971, op .cit., p.38.
88. Bzielalc et al., op .cit., p.394f«
8 9* Ibid., p.139? Chemietarifrunde 1971, op.cit., p.226ff;
Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, 1978, 00.cit., p.l37f 
and Chemietarifrunde 1977, op .cit., p.45f‘f'»
90, For example, cf. "Tanifrunde Chemie 1977 erfolgreich beendet," 
pressed!enst, Vlll(?Xlll)/25, 28.6.1977 and Projektgruppe 
Gewerkschaftsforschung, Tarifoolitik unter Krisenbedingungen, 
Frankfurt, 1977? p*150*
91. Interviews ER 1, Aug.’77 and ER 4? UR 7? ER 8, ER 10, all 
Rep. '77 •
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Part of the strength of the co-ordination may he found in the re­
gulations which specify that each individual association must,for 
example 7inform the Arbeitsring of the termination of agreements by the 
union, the level of demands subsequently presented, the dates of all 
negotiations and preliminary discussions on the employers1 side and 
the associations must also immediately supply all information and docu­
ments to the Arbeitsring to enable it to judge the situation. ^
Furthermore, the Arbeitsring must be given the opportunity to take part
in relevant discussions and to present its opinions. The primary aim
of this attendance is to ensure that the guidelines decided by the
(93)Co-ordination Committee are followed.' 7 Before the negotiations 
actually take place the collective bargaining committee and the Co­
ordination Committee generally have a joint discussion of the situation 
to decide on tactics and the level of concessions which can be made.
In the oase that anything of significance is likely to occur during the
course of a particular negotiation then the Co-ordination Committee is
( 95 )present either in its entirity or else as a sub-committee.' Only the 
Co-ordination Committee or its sub-committees are empowered to make a 
decision about the level of concessions to be made, and if there is 
disagreement about the matter under consideration then a vote must be
92. Kordinierungsgrundsatze, op.cit., Section I (2,3). The argument 
presented here follows in essence information on the function of 
the Co-ordination Committee put forward in Projektgruppe Gewerk- 
schaftsforschung, Vol.l, 1979? op.cit., p,123f.
93. Koordinierungsgrundsatze, op .cit., Section I (4 )*
94* Interview ER 8, Sep.'77-
95* This sub-committee is known as the Beschlussgremium, or
Decision Body and usually consists of 5 members. Should parti­
cular representatives of the Co-ordination Committee not be 
able to attend then they may.delegate their voting rights to 
region. Koordinierungsgrundsatze, op .oit., Section I (l,5) and Interview er 8, Sep.’77.
taken. Although this is rare, it is not unknown/9®^
Within the Co-ordination Committee the three largest regions hold the
(97 )majority of the seats. ' However, in order to prevent these regions 
from dominating the committee entirely the smaller regions do possess 
veto r i g h t s . I n  the case, though, that a particular association 
has been unable to achieve agreement with the union within the guide­
lines laid down by the Co-ordination Committee, this same committee 
may release the association from the restrictions of the guidelines
provided that a simple majority of the representatives of the various
(99)members associations agree on such a course of action.
The influence of the Co-ordination Committee and also of the Arbeits­
ring in general extends to all the stages of the bargaining process, 
even during the joint conciliation meeting^100 o^r after its failure.
The Co-ordination Committee may still decide to refuse to permit con­
cessions which the association affected may desire to make.^101^
The Co-ordination Committee is the place where intra-organisational 
bargaining of significance to the way in which the ohemical employers 1 
associations conduct negotiations and the size and type of concessions 
they make primarily occurs. Results seem to indicate that this
9 6. Ibid.
97• 16 out o f  27* P ro je k tg ru p p e  G ew erk sch afts fo rsch u n g , V o l . l ,
1979? op.oit., p.124*
98. Ibid.
99. Koordinierungsgrundsatze, op.cit., Section I (5)»
100. Through the presence of senior representatives on the conciliation 
panel; for further discussion £f. joint conciliation, see below7.
101. Koordinierungsgrundsatze, op.cit., Section I (5)«
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bargaining is successful in achieving its aims which are the acceptance 
of unified policy by the various associations and the maintenance of 
this solidarity in its negotiations with the trade unions. Further­
more, in this way bargaining tactics have also been effective.
(iii) Regional bargaining.
In the West German chemical industry collective bargaining between the 
Chemical Workers' Union,^102)and the various employers' associations 
has occurred either at a regional or at a national level. There has 
already been a degree of discussion of the recent changes within the 
bargaining arrangements for the chemical industry whereby wage and 
salary negotiations, which have traditionally been held at regional 
level, have taken place nationally/108) One reason for the willing­
ness of the union leadership to agree to bargain nationally on wages 
and salaries in 1977 and 1978 was certainly the termination of the 
national agreement on general conditions of employment at the end of 
1977 / 10 )^ In this way the leadership was prepared to combine the 
wage round with the national negotiations particularly since the em­
ployers' agreed to a concession of an additional two days holiday even 
before formal negotiations had begun simply in order to persuade the
102. The strength of the German Salaried Staff Union in the chemical 
industry was discussed above (Chapter 2, Footnote 1?4)? and 
found to be of such an order that it is justified to ignore 
this union when analysing collective bargaining although neg­
otiations do take place with this union, cf. Chemie-tarif- 
runde 1977 ■> op.cit., p.20; Chemie-tarifrunde 1971, op .oit.,
p.49 and Dzielak et al., op .cit., p.38l. Except in the case 
of negotiations on wages and conditions of academic staff 
(see Chapter 2, Section (iii)b) the Chemical Workers' Union 
refuses to negotiate jointly with the DAG since the DAG has 
tried to make it seem as if the results of wage negotiations, 
etc. were a result of the .bargaining stance adopted by the 
BAG. Interviews FTO 4 and FTO 6, both Aug.'77; FTO 11, Sep.'77.
103. cf. Chapter 2, Section (ii).
104. of. Chemische Industrie? Arbeitspl&tze sichem und schaffen,"
pressedienst, XIIl/37? 30.8.1977.
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union to bargain all issues nationally.v J ' As the national neg­
otiations were not completely resolved in 1978^10^similar circum­
stances existed in 1 9 7 9*
However, with the resolution of the national issues during 19 79 1^0^  
there is theoretically no reason for wages to be negotiated nationally, 
at least for several years to come. It will be interesting to observe 
whether the employers are able to retain national negotiations which 
they find preferential or whether sufficient pressure will develop 
within the lower echelons of the union to persuade the leadership to 
return to regional negotiations. This latter course seems somewhat 
more probable since regional negotiations have been of considerable 
importance in the past and it is likely that they will regain some of 
their importance in the future. Furthermore, regional negotiations 
provide an excellent example of the relationships between the Chemical 
Workers * Union and the chemical employers’ association and many chara­
cteristics of this relationship as illustrated here are found elsewhere 
within the bargaining system. Regional negotiations are therefore dis­
cussed in some detail*
The intra-organisational bargaining in the two bargaining parties which 
was considered above forms an intregal part of the initial phase of 
negotiations. This initial phase might be described as Ta long 
overture 1.
105. Informal discussions provided this information. This provides 
an example of one of the rare instances of pre-negotiations 
which sometimes occur in Germany prior to the start of formal 
negotiations.
106. For a discussion of national negotiations particularly with 
reference to these questions see below,
107. of. "Geschafftl Fechs Wochen Urlaub,M 'Go, 4/79? p.If.
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In the Ohemical Workers* Union preparations for the annual regional 
bargaining round often commence many months before the round itself. 
Sometimes weekend conferences are held for lay officers and members of 
the collective bargaining committees in order to discuss the economic 
situation and its relevance to the negotiations.^
At an early stage data is also prepared by the economic research section 
of the union at the central office. Besides the economic state of the 
industry^109^many other factors relevant to the bargaining round are 
studied, such as union strength and the feelings of the shopfloor 
members.^ 110  ^ Meanwhile, the employers* associations are also pre­
paring extensive statistics on similar matters both regionally and 
nationally. Such statistics are, however, slanted from the employers*
point of view as the union*s data is chosen to support .their own 
(ill)position. In addition to the generally available public statistics,
the employers’ associations sometimes carry out surveys of their member-
f l l 2 )companies to gauge the situation by collating current information.' ' 
Approximately one month/118^before the current agreement is due to end
108. Interview FTO 7? Aug.*77 • Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, 
1978, op .cit., p.126 and J. Rauschel, op .cit., p. 96.
1 0 9 . A list of the type of data which is often prepared may be found 
in G. Himmelmann, op .cit., p. 137* If includes such things as 
developments in productivity, profits, prices, turnover, etc.
110. Interview FTO 6, Aug.*77•
111. Interview ER 6, Aug.*77«
112. However, the use of such statistics in negotiations is not 
without problems as the other side is often reluctant to 
accept their validity. Interview ER 7? Sep.*77•
113. This is the usual notice of termination required for wage 
agreements cf. Lohntarifvertrag, Gehaltstarifvertrag und
Abkommen uber die Ausbildunjs:sverigxitungen fur , die chemische und kunststoffverarbeitende Industrie des Landes Nieder- 
sachsen, Hannover, 15.6.1977? Paras 4/7 respectively.
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notice of termination of the agreement is sent to the employers' 
association by the union’s collective bargaining committee. If the 
demands are ready at this stage of the proceedings then they may 
accompany the notice of termination, otherwise they are sent to the 
employers’ association later.^104^
Another feature of the initial stages of each collective bargaining 
round is the commencement of the battle of words in the media. On 
the trade union side articles appear in the official publications) 
and the press are kept well informed of the situation through press 
circulars. The employers provide similar information to the 
press^^^as well as to managers and other groups through their own 
publications.^110  ^ Indeed, "after the trade union has made its demands
in the first three regions, the employers increase their public re-
of ho 
(12 0)
lations activities".^ 119  ^ Such activities may consist lding press
conferences, and giving interviews to important papers.
114* Interview ER 1, Aug.’77 • Also c f_. Pro jektgruppe Gewerkschafts-
forschung, 19 7$, op .cit., p.l29f* For a full range of the types 
of demands made in a particular wage round cf. Chemie-tarifrunde 
1971 ? op .cit., p.62ff.
115. For example cf. M. Kruper, "Kraftiges Lohnplus-notwendig und 
moglich," Gewerlcschaftliche Umschau, 2/77, p.2ff.
1 1 6 . Regular information is distributed of. "Jahresfibersicht 1977•
13 Jahrgang," pressedienst, Xlll/51, 29.12.1977*
117. cf.* Presseinformation des Arbeitsrings Chemie, in Chemie- 
tarifrunde 1971, op .cit., p.!97ff*
118. For an example for this tising a senior government minister to 
increase the effect cf. O.Graf Lambsdorff, "... wir setzen auf 
die gesamtwirtschaftliche Einsicht der selbststandig entscheid- 
enden Tarifparteien," Infobrief, 12/77> p.2f.
119* Author’s translation of "Naohdem die Gewerkschaft ihre Forder-
ungen fur die ersten drei Bezirke auf gestellt hat, verstarken 
die Unternehmer ihre Offentlichkeitsarbeit." Dzielak et al., 
op.cit., p.138.
120. of. Ibid and Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, 1978,
op .cit., p.134*
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Several commentators have held that before the formal negotiations take 
place there are informal initial meetings between trade union and em­
ployers' association representatives and that such contacts form an 
important and integral part of the collective bargaining system/121)
However, as far as the West German chemical industry is concerned such
initial meetings between employers* representatives and union officials
are certainly not institutionalised. Before the 1971 bargaining round
a number of such meetings did occur in order to discuss the employers*
proposals of a basio way to regulate relationships between the two 
(12 2)organisations.' 7 The Chemical Workers’ Union did not accept these 
proposals but did state at a second meeting with the employers that in 
principle they were prepared to hold central discussions on specific
(123)issues but that they rejected an institutionalisation of' such meetings.
Since this time there has been scant evidence of the occurrence of 
such initial meetings in the chemical industry/12*1) One reason for 
the general lack of such meetings in the ohemical industry may well be 
found within the collective bargaining guidelines of the Chemical Workers 1 
Union. These guidelines provide the Vertrauensleute with considerable
121. For example, G. Himmelmann, op .cit., p.l24ff and H. Weitbrecht,
op .oit., p.l43f* S'ee also Footnote 105 above.
122. One of the major aims of this "sozialpolitisohes Grundsatz-
programm" was an increased centralisation of bargaining.
Dzielak et al., op .cit. ♦ p.135*
123. Ibid., p,136f.
124* Not a single respondent mentioned such meetings when asked to 
describe the bargaining system and one respondent firmly 
denied that such meetings occur in the ohemical industry. 
Interview FTO 5? Feb.*7 8. On the other hand, another respondent 
stated that such initial meetings did occur in negotiations 
covering the rubber industry in order to discuss the application 
and detailed operation of a "local agreements clause" in the 
collective agreement. Interview FTO 6, Aug.*77*
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consultation rights and it is possible that meetings between union 
officials and employers1 representatives either centrally or regional 
might interfere with these consultation rights.
An example of agreement being reached centrally without proper use of 
the consultation procedures does exist. In 1977 an agreement on the 
provision of jobs for unqualified school leavers^12®^was signed by 
the union executive without consulting the lower echelons of the organ­
isation. This resulted in considerable annoyance in the union, not
(127 )about the content, but about the bargaining procedure. '
Naturally, certain contacts between the two organisations are unavoid­
able since they are necessary in order to arrange the dates of the 
formal negotiations, for example. Apparently such arrangements are 
usually made by telephone, a common form of contact between the two 
bargaining parties. ^12^  It is also possible that the coming bargaining 
round might be discussed should proponents of each side meet, which
they do quite regularly either in the course of their jobs - for
(129 )example at a labour court hearing - or socially. 1 Quite what 
contribution such discussions might make to the clarification of 
questions remains uncertain, however.
125. This opinion was expressed in Interview FTO 5? Feb.*7 8.
126. cf. "Chemische Industrie: Erstmals Tarifvertrag gegen. Jugend- 
arbeits 1 osigkeitV1 pressedienst, XI11/41* 13.9 .1977 •
127* Interview FTO 5? Feb.’78. 
1 2 8. Interviews FTO 6, Aug.*775 FTO 11, Sep. *77 &nd FTO 5? Feb.’78.
129. Interview FTO 10, Sep. *77*
a. The negotiation process/180)
The first phase of regional wage negotiations in the West German
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(131)chemical industry might he termed as a statistical confrontation.
In other words the first phase consists of the presentation of argu­
ments for and against wage increases based upon a whole battery of 
statistics prepared prior to the meeting by the respective organisations.
The length of this phase in the chemical industry depends on the position 
of the region within the order of bargaining. In the case of Nordrhein,
for example, which is one of the first regions to negotiate, a whole
0]
(133)
day may well Tie spent on this phase However, Bremen which is one
of the last regions to negotiate managed to complete all three phases
of the negotiations in one sitting in 1977 / 18^ ) This illustrates not
only that important precedents are set by those regions bargaining first
but also indicates that the first phase is probably relatively unimportant
in all but the regions which bargain first since similar data would be
presented in the various regions. As the employers tend to send the
(135)same representatives to most of the regions' "it follows that the 
significant negotiations are most likely to occur in Nordrhein, Hessen 
and Rheinland-Pfalz which not only negotiate first 'but also contain the
130. For an example of the usual order of each of the bargaining
areas within the negotiation process see Appendix 1 Table 15.
131* For a more general account of this phase of negotiations cf.
G. Himmelmann, op .cit., p.l36ff.
132. Interview ER 1, Aug.*77•
133. These three phases may be defined asi
1. statistical Confrontation.
2. Barter for Concessions.
3. The Time of Decision.
134* cf» Appendix 1, Table 15*
135. Interviews FTO 6, Aug. *77 and. ER 8, Rep.'77*
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highest concentration of chemical employment.
Before continuing with an analysis of the first phase of the negotiation 
process a number of factors are discussed which are applicable not only 
to this phase but more generally throughout the negotiations. )
The chair of all negotiations is held in rotation by the two bargaining 
parties with each side seated along the bargaining table opposite one 
another and taking up almost automatically the left and rights wings, 
as it were. ' Whilst such considerations might theoretically be 
of significance should, for example, the sun be shining in the eyes 
of one side or other, no particular importance was placed on them by 
respondents.
However, the actual place that the negotiations are held is sometimes 
important. From the union point of view it is generally useful to 
negotiate in an industrial area since it creates a more business-like 
atmosphere. Also if chemical works are located in the vicinity it is 
possible for the union members to demonstrate outside the building in 
which the negotiations are taking place, 1^19 t^his can put pressure on 
the employers and have a general influence on the climate of the negot-
136. cf. Chapter 3, S'ection (ii)d. This is also verified in practice
since the agreements reached in the other regions very rarely 
differ from those in the three main regions*
137. On these factors, see also G. Himmelmann, op .cit., p.l31ff.
138. Interview FTO 5> Feb.*7 8.
139. Demonstrators have occasionally travelled long distances for
this purpose, particularly at the later stages of the negot­
iations. In this way the selection of quiet towns some
distance from the actual region which is negotiating in order
to promote a climate conducive to compromise has not always 
been successful cf_. Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung,
1978, op .cit., p.143.
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iations. Furthermore, the co-location of the regional media is more 
likely to ensure adequate coverage of the negotiations. (1/10)
The wage round in the ohemical industry occurs annually from April to 
June, and this has a number of consequences for the negotiations. A 
selection of important industries bargain prior to the chemical in­
dustry and such agreements might tend to influence the expectations of 
chemical workers as to the probable size of wage increases to be agreed 
in their industry. Agreements in the engineering, iron and steel in­
dustries as well as public services are certainly used by the employers 
in their publicity to suggest a suitable level of agreements/1*11) In 
general there has also been a trend towards stressing the consequences 
of wage rises to the total economy as opposed to individual industries 
perhaps as a result of government and "independent" recommendations as- 
to the reasonable level of wage increases/ 1^ 2)
During the first phase of negotiations the whole of both collective 
bargaining committees are present together with a variety of experts on 
the economic situation/1*18) The negotiations are, however, generally
140. Interview FTO 5? Feb.*78.
141. £f. Landesverband Chemische Industrie, "Chemie im Lohnkonflikt" 
Advertisement dated 18.5*1977 reprinted in Ghemie-tarifrunde 
1977? op .oit., p.60.
142. Interviews FTO 12, Dep.'77 and ER 10, Rep.’77* The official 
reports included those of the Konzertierte Aktion, during its 
existence, and the "committee of experts" (Rachverstandigenrat) 
whose recommendations are usually given extensive publicity.
v of). Distribution of Jahresgutachten 1977/78 ties Raohverstandi- 
genrates zur Begutaclrbung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Snt- 
wicktung, Eine kurzere Fassung, by the Chemical Employers * 
Association via Infobrief. (12/77)• This same publication 
also emphasises the importance of economic forecasts, e.g. 
"Wirtschaftsinstitute: Gedanrofte Aussichten", Infobrief 
11/78, p.6ff. Other publications also discuss the importance 
of economic forecasts, £f). Wirtschaftswoche, Vol.32, No.l/2, 
1978, p.l6ff.
143« Interview FTO 5? Feb.'78.
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conducted by a relatively small group of senior officials on each 
side^144^although the presence of lay officers and managers from a 
variety of companies is useful in order to counter specific agree­
ments introduced by the other side.^14^
First the union attempts to justify the level of the wage demands which 
have been put to the employers. In order to do this a wide range of 
statistics on such matters as increased productivity, profits, etc. 
are introduced.^ 140  ^ In so doing the union collective bargaining 
committee will previously agree that various persons should present 
specific parts of the argument, so that "one person describes the 
situation in company X, another person describes the situation of a 
particular group of employees and a third person might say something 
about local bargaining ...." ^ 4 )^
Although the range of speakers is usually pre-planned, other members 
of the committee are not excluded from speaking should they feel they 
have a worthwhile contribution to make.
When the union has finished the presentation of its case the employers 
then defend their position by trying to bring forth statistics which 
"disprove" the union’s arguments.^ 1 4 The employers are, however, not
144* Ln fact, the economic experts generally present much of the
union’s point of view at this stage. Ibid. and Interview 
FTO 4 , Aug.’77*
145* Interview FTO 6, Aug.’77•
1 4 6. Interview ER 1, Aug.’77 and G. Himmelmann, op .oit., p*136ff.
147* Paraphrased translation of the statement in Interview FTO 5?
Feb."’7 8.
14 8. Interview ER 1, Aug.’77 anti G. Himmelmann, op .oit., p.137*
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always willing to remain on the defensive.^ 149  ^ One tactic used by 
the employers is to stress the poor economic position of specific' 
sectors of the chemical industry, such as synthetic fibres. They then 
argue that since these sectors are unable to pay the wage increase then 
the whole association cannot agree to increases which might cause bank­
ruptcy in some of the member f i r m s . Biiring the first phase of
negotiations the employers normally refrain from making an offer to
. (1 5 1) the union. " '
Whilst the two bargaining parties will probably disagree on the majority 
of the economic data presented the way in which this is done is im­
portant in preparing the climate of the negotiations to follow.^ ^  
Himmelmann has stated that the climate of the negotiations is crucial 
for the achievement of a compromise at a later stage of the neg­
otiations ,^53)
One element of the preservation of' a good climate in the negotiations, 
and indeed the maintenance of a working relationship, is apparently 
the avoidance of personal attack during negotiations. For this reason 
personal pressure is not normally brought to bear on the other side.^1^ 4^
The length of time which the completion of the economic discussion re­
quires is likely to determine whether the committees agree to adjorn
149• Ibid., p.145*
150. Interview FTO 7? Aug.*77• This system is sometimes called the 
"convoy system" - all ships have to maintain the speed of the 
slowest ship.
151. Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, 1978, op.cit., p. 135*
152. Interview ER 6, Aug.*77•
153. G. Himmelmann, op.cit., p.138.
154* Interviews ER 10, Bep.*77 and- FTO 5? Feb.’78.
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-the ne got i at ions until a later date' ^'or else to continue with the 
second phase of the negotiations. The major factor is certainly the 
position of the region in the bargaining order.
This system of bargaining whereby the economic background to the wage
round is discussed in detail before the real negotiations commence
seems to be taken for granted by both sides. It might be considered,
however, to be a part of the ritual of "bargaining in good faith",
the system both parties feel most likely to lead to a satisfactory 
(156)compromise.' v J
A question may be posed, though, whether the first phase of bargaining 
fulfils a function beyond a traditional flexing of the muscles. 
Himmelmann believes that it is impossible to conduct proper negoations 
until the subject has been discussed from both view-points. ^ ^  The 
first phase of bargaining certainly provides an opportunity for this*
The first phase also gives each side the chance to attack the other 
strongly at a time when they are unlikely to catxse real damage to the 
outcome of the negotiations since both sides seem to expect it to occur
/ -I c Q \and enjoy reacting to provocation.'  ^ Thus the opportunity exists 
for aggressions and tensions to be released and this probably facili­
tates the negotiations which follow.
155* Interview ER 1 , Aug.*77•
1 5 6. cf. G. Himmelmann, op.cit., p. 147*
157. Ibid., p.139 •
1 5 8. Interview ETO 5? Feb.*78.
( 1 5 5 )
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The first phase of the negotiations may also have the function of 
aligning members behind their respective organisations through the 
flood of press releases which normally accompany this stage of the 
proceedings . ^ ^
It seems, therefore, that the first phase does fulfil an important 
purpose within the bargaining round - one of assisting bargaining in 
good faith by improving the climate of negotiations through the re­
lease of tensions and the discussion of the situation in detail. An 
opportunity is also given to explain this situation to the members and 
the public in general.
Should there be an adjournment of the negotiations^^^then this pro­
vides both organisations with time to report back to their members and 
to plan tactics for the ooming negotiations.
The second phase of bargaining often coincides with the second meeting 
of the parties, at least in those regions which bargain first and which 
hence significantly influence the final level of agreements. In the 
remaining regions the second phase may be entered fairly quickly.
The second round of negotiations may well begin with the employers 
making their first offer to the union bargainers.^ 102  ^At this time
159* Tor example, of. "Wir fordern!", Gp, 4./77? P*3 and "German
employers say claims excessive", Chemical Age, 15.4*77? 
p.l. Another function of such publicity may be to show the 
members how much the respective associations or unions are 
doing for their members.
160. Usually for between one and twte weeks, of. Appendix 1, Table 15=
161. The union officials go to some lengths to report back to members 
as fast as possible, if possible by the shift change the next 
morning. Interviews FTO 6, Aug.’77 and BRV 5? Sep.f77*
162. Interview FTO 5 ? Feb.,77»
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it might he said that the negotiating range has been established with 
a minimum point of the employers * initial offer and a maximum of the 
original union demands 8 )
Borne other constraints do seem to limit the negotiating range too, such. 
as the official reports and recommended levels of agreement discussed 
previously together with prior agreements in other industries. In 
this way the range of agreements has been decreasing generally in 
recent years, particularly in the recessionary years.
Table 4.2.
Range of Wage Increases .
Year Lowest (#) Highest (#) Range (#)
1974 7 .5 14.5 7
1975 4.0 9 . 0 5
1976 5.5 6.5
9 .0  ( 7 . 5 ) (a)
1
1977 6 .0 3 ( 1 . 5 )
1978 4 . 0 7-5 3.5
1979(b) 4 . 0 6.0 2 .0
The consideration of primarily macro-economic criteria was rejected 
generally by both sides in the chemical industry, since it restricted
/ n gc \their freedom of action.
163. of. G. Himmelmann, op .cit., p.l45p»
16 4. Sources: Konjunkturberichte,
(a) The 9*0 pen oent was a 
single exception since 
all other agreements were 
7.5 PeT cent or below.
(b) Up until June, but most 
agreements made by then.
16 5. Interviews FTO 12, Sep.*77 and ER 10,"Pep.,*77• Nevertheless, 
the desire of the Chemical Workers1 Union to better the 
Engineering Industry agreement - understandable in the light
of the chemical industry's economic performance - was regretted by the chemical employers. Ibid.
4, 1974, pp.36-38.
2, 1976, pp.24-25•
1? 1977, pp.26-27•
4, 1977, pp .40-42.
4, 1978, pp .50-53 .
2, 1979, pp .50-52.
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Despite these restrictions the negotiations are carried out with fervour 
In this phase small negotiating committees actually engage in the 
"barter for concessions". The size of the committees varies but is 
rarely more than six or eight on either side/1^) The personalities 
selected for the more detailed negotiations seems to depend somewhat 
on the circumstances, although on the union side the regional secretary 
and other very experienced negotiators such as senior works council 
chairmen would be included.(l67)
These union negotiators function as elected delegates of the full 
collective bargaining committee to which they must report back and 
which is the only body empowered to take decisions/1^ 8) This is illu­
strated by the situation in the second negotiation for Rheinland-Pfalz 
during the 1977 wage round. The regional secretary demanded that the 
collective bargaining committee determine a level of increase at which 
he might accept an offer made by the employers in face to face negot­
iations. After a split vote the committee decided as a compromise that
he could not accept anything below 7*3 per cent. This decision which
0was •
(170)
was taken "unusually early in this case ^ $ 9  ) g .^le primary cause of the
course taken by Rheinland-Pfalz that year.
On the employers' side the six people might be "the president of the
166. Interviews ER 3, FTO 7 and ER 6, all Aug.'77♦
16 7. Interview FTO 5? Feb.'7 8.
168. Ibid. Reporting back usually occurs during breaks in negot­
iations which also provide an opportunity to reappraise 
the situation.
1 6 9. There was no third meeting between parties as is often the 
case. Ruch decisions are basically illustrative of the 
third phase of negotiations which is described below.
170. Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, 1978, 00.cit., p.136.
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employers' association, the director-general, an adviser on economics
and statistics and three personnel directors picked according to the
(171)selection of union negotiators . 7 These persons, no matter how
senior, are not able to decide on the level of concessions to be made,
this right remains the sole preserve of the Co-ordination Committee
which would also be present should it be likely that a critical
( 17 2 )decision need be taken.' 7
During this stage of the proceedings the aim is to force the opposition' 
to make a concession and then to bring agreement nearer through making 
a counter-concession. Once concessions are being made a bartering 
system develops with each side approaching the other's position.^ 110  ^
This system has been called one of "alternating moves".
Various tactics are used to put pressure on the other side. One of 
these is to threaten to break off negotiations and move to the next 
stage of procedure, the joint conciliation m e e t i n g . ) Both sides 
may use this tactic, or even threaten to move swiftly towards a dis­
pute situation, either a strike or a lockout. However, in the later- 
case such threats are most likely to simply to part of the "show" of
negotiations since there have been very few disputes in the chemical
•  ^ + (176)industry.'
171* Translation of statement in Interview ER 4 ? Sep.T77«
172. S'ee the discussion above.
173. Interview FTO 5? Feb.'78. Apparently the easier points are 
often dealt with first since less principles are concerned.
G. Himmelmann, op .cit., p. 152.
1 7 4. Walton and McKersie, op.cit., p.88. Such a system does not 
mean that for every 1 per cent concession on one side a 
corresponding 1 per cent concession is made by the other side.
175* As in the Rheinland-Pfalz example described above. Joint 
conciliation is discussed below.
1 7 6. The frequency of disputes in the chemical industry is dis­cussed helow.
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Indirect pressure can be brought to bear on the negotiators. Some­
times overtime bans are arranged by works councillors^^^or else 
short demonstration strikes or protest marches are held.^^ Although 
it would also be possible for the Chemical Workers * Union to ballot 
their members at any stage of the proceedings^9 t^here are no examples 
of it occurring unless it is a formal strike ballot/1®0^
Employers, on the other hand, sometimes use the threat of the necessity 
to introduce redundancies should the union achieve their wage demands, 
and since there is a great fear of unemployment, particularly in times 
of economic recession, this can be effective.^ ^
The second phase of negotiations is really only significant in the 
three regions Nordrhein, Hessen and Rheinland-Pfalz since it serves to 
narrow down the range in which the agreement will subsequently lie. 
Agreement in one of these regions fulfils a similar function for the 
remaining regions.
In the three large regions this phase often lasts for a long time with 
negotiations traditionally lasting until the early hours of the next 
morning. This is perhaps in order to tire the other' side and so in­
duce concessions which might not be made under other circumstances.
177* of. W. Baubler, op .cit., p.179^*
178. Until a recent decision by the Federal Labour Court such 
actions were considered illegal. Provided they are strictly 
limited in duration and in support of a collective agreement 
this is now no longer the case. of. 0. Jacobi, W. Muller- 
Jentsch and E. Bchnidt (eds.), Gewerkschafts-oolitik in der 
Krise, Britisohes Gewerkshaftsjahrbuch 1977/78, Berlin,
1978V p.210 and AS: 1 ARS 607/75♦
179. G. Himmelmann, op .cit., p. 159*
180. As in the oase of Rheinland-Pfalz in 1977? see below and
Chemie-tarifrunde 1977 1 op .cit., pp. 14-5 a*id 62-6 6.
181. Interview FTO 5? Feb.’78.
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A desire to try to complete the negotiations in this sitting may also 
he instrumental in causing long meetings/182) Another reason for 
such long negotiations might be the need to demonstrate the stance 
that the two organisations and their representatives are taking on 
behalf of the membership for the length and difficulty of the negot­
iations is often stressed in handbills/188^
The second phase of negotiations seems to he a part of the "custom 
and practise" of bargaining - the one where the two sides approach 
one another. Although this stage occasionally leads to be breakdown 
of negotiations, this is rare.
The third phase of negotiations might be termed the time of decision 
and it may be reached either on the first, second or third meeting, 
depending on the position of the region in the wage round, or the 
tactical situation,amongst other things. At this stage the union must 
decide whether to accept the employers? offer and the employers must 
decide if they are going to accede to the union demands or else to 
break off negotiations and move to the next stage of procedure, joint 
conciliation.
By this juncture negotiations are carried out hy very small groups of 
bargainers on each side, generally between one and three in size. 
Finally it is quite possible that only two people will actually be 
negotiating/1^) The aim of reducing the numbers is to allow more
182. G. Himmelmann, op.cit., p.l78f.
183. cf). Bezirk Hessen der IG Chemie-Papier-iCeramik, Neues vom 
Bezirk, 5/77? reprinted in Chemie-tarifrunde 1977? op.cit., 
p. 31.
18 4. Interviews ER 1 and ER 6 , both Aug.'77* Also of. Projekt- 
gruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, Vol.l, 1979? op .cit., p.133.
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efficient bargaining to be conducted. Although, given the actual 
location of the powers of decision, both sides will have to refer back 
before finally settling the issues, the negotiators can perhaps say 
things which might be difficult to say in the presence of colleagues 1 ^
By the time this critical phase of the negotiations is reached when 
the last points are being covered and the final 0.1$ being argued over1, 
it is also generally late at night.^100  ^ On the union side the collective 
bargaining committee must decide whether the members would be prepared 
to strike for a potential gain which is quite s m a l l . A t  the same 
time, the employers must judge whether the gains they would achieve by 
enforcing a lower wage deal are worth the costs of a strike.^100'* Such 
evaluations should primarily determine the course chosen.
If there is dissent either within the' union collective bargaining
committee or the employers 1 Co-ordination Committee then a vote is 
(190)taken.' For example, during the 1977 wage round the Hessen
collective bargaining committee decided to accept the employers offer- 
of 7$ by a majority of 27 to
1 8 5. Interview ER 3? Aug.T77•
186. Interview ER 6, Aug.’77 cf_. Pro jektgruppe Gewerkschafts-r
forschung, 1 9 7$, op.cit., p,137f*
1 8 7. The answer to this question is generally negative. Should the 
union actually decide that a strike is necessary then it would 
be better to pick an issue of principle as has recently been 
done in the German printing and steel industries.
188. For a consideration of this type of calculation £f. "Strikes - 
a break-down analysis", Personnel Management, Vol.19? 1977?
No.2, p.22ff.
18 9. Interview FTO 5? Feb.*7 8.
190. Interview ER 8, Sep.*77*
191• "Tarifrunde Chemie 1977# Erster Abschluss in Hessen, 7 Prozent 
mehr Lohn und Gehalt," pressedienst, Xlll/21, 28.4*1977*
Due to the procedural arrangements in the Gferman ohemical industry, a 
failure to agree in the negotiations leads not to a strike or lockout 
but to joint conciliation. Whilst this does lighten the responsibility 
carried by the committees, they must nevertheless weigh up the various 
factors very carefully for once it goes beyond open negotiations 
decisions can be taken, over which they have little direct control.
This is especially true as far as the union is concerned.
One trade union respondent described this decision process as a matter 
of balancing a number of interests. Examples of these are the potential 
gain, the achievable gain and the penalties likely to arise as a result 
of a poor settlement*(192)
It is probable that at the latter stages of the bargaining process, 
and particularly in face to face negotiations, the personalties of’ the 
individuals involved will have a significant influence on the outcome. 
The ability of all concerned to partake in a co-operative form of" 
bargaining and the degree of trust between the various negotiators is 
especially likely to be important.
Even at this stage in the proceedings there seems to be a certain show-
effect in the negotiations which must appear tortuous and difficult to
the members. Although the employers deny that they are bound by such 
considerations^^^^^they also stress the length and difficulty of the 
negotiations in their press releases• 1^9^ )
192. Interview FTO 5? Feb.'7 8. One consequence of poor settlements 
might be that members of the collective bargaining committee 
are not re-elected. For a further consideration of this
subject of. G. Himmelmann, op ..cit., p.l66ff.
193. Interview ER 3, Aug.'77•
1 9 4. cf. "Entscheidung in der Hessen-Ghemie," hessen chemie- 
aktuell, Wiesbaden, 28 April 1977? reprinted in Ghemie- 
tarifrunde 1 9 7 7? op.cit., p.28f .
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parties come to an agreement is the tactical situation in respect of
the other regions. It may he necessary for either side to delay a
decision or to try to force one since it could have an effect on the
(195)situation in the remaining regions.' '
Failure to delay agreement by moving to the next stage of procedure 
after the usual cooling-off period could cause problems for other- 
regions which are, for example, already committed to conciliation. 
This was the case in 1977 when Hessen took the wind from the sails of’ 
Rheinland-Pfalz's attempt to gain a higher-wage increase than the 
minimum specified in the union's co-ordination guidelines.^96)
The system of negotiations in the West German chemical industry is 
highly formalised. Although agreement is often reached during the 
process which has been described above, in regional wage rounds it is 
usual for one of the first three regions at least to go beyond this 
to the next stage of procedure, joint conciliation.
(197)b. Joint conciliation - a continuation of bargaining.
Arbitration has a long tradition in Germany^ 19^and this historical 
development is relevant today to attitudes concerning arbitration and
Another factor which can he important in influencing whether the
195. of. Ibid., p.30.
1 9 6. Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, 1978, op .cit., p.l83.
197. Generally the English translation of Schlichtung is "arbitration", 
but it will be seen that the system in the chemical industry 
approached "joint conciliation" much more closely.
1 9 8. For a full consideration of this rather complicated development,
see Ii. Raupach, Die Schlichtung von kollektiven Arbeits- 
streitigkeiten und ihre Probleme unter besonderer Beruck- 
sichtigung der deutschen Sntwicklung, Berlin, 1964? p«44ff*
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also to the form of arbitration. The economic, social and political 
climate during the Weimar Republic enhanced the development of arbi­
tration in a compulsory form. The arbitration regulations of 1923^9) 
together with a variety of amendments^200^enabled the government to 
regulate wages and the conditions of' employment.
As a result of this state regulation the two bargaining parties employers 
(associations) and trade unions, were not able to engage in free 
collective bargaining. Since the Second World War both trade unions
(2 0 1)and employers have been unified in their rejection of state arbitration 
for fear that they might once more lose their bargaining automony.
In the absence of state arbitration the Federal Labour Court has limited
the freedom of the parties to engage in industrial action in a number of
(202)ways. One of the principles decided upon by the Federal Labour"
Court is that industrial action*'200''may only be initiated after all 
possible means to bring about agreement have been attempted. This is 
commonly known as ultima ratio.^204^
199* Verordnung uber das Schlichtungswesen, RGB1, IS.1043.
200 • Erste (RGB1. 1931 S.l) und Zweite (RGB1. 1931 S'.521)
Verordnung uber die Beilegung von Schlichtungsstreitigkeiten 
offentlichen Interesses, as well as Vierte Verordnung des 
Reichsprasidenten zur Sioherung von Wirtschaft und Finanzen 
undgum Schutze des inneren Friedehs^ (RGB1, 1931 S.699)*
201. An example of this unified approach can be found in the 
Hattenheim agreement between the BBA and BGB of January 1950, 
together with the communique issued at the same time, cf,
H. Raupach, op.cit., p.76f.
202. Legislation on strikes and lock-outs is extremely complex. 
cf. W. Baubler, op .cit., p.l25ff*
203. In this context industrial action is also understood to in­
clude such measures as strike ballots. Ibid., p.71.
204* Ibid., p.127 and BAG AP Nr.43 zu Art.9 GG Arbeitskampf,B1.6R.
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According to Wiedemann and Rtrumpf this means that all collective bar­
gaining parties must negotiate an arbitration agreement if they intend 
to engage in industrial action/209) In addition, even if this agree­
ment subsequently permits the non-use of arbitration once negotiations 
have broken down, this clause is irrelevant if the parties wish to 
engage in industrial action. In other words,*it was believed that 
before an industrial dispute could legally take place, arbitration must 
take place/208) However, in 1978 there was a strike in the steel 
industry, an industry which has no formal arbitration agreement. No 
legal action was contemplated against the Metalworkers' Union, however, 
since there were extensive attempts to mediate in this dispute.
Respondents generally believed that this mediation (by politicians)
( 2 0 7 )had taken the.place of formal arbitration.' '
For the duration of arbitration or joint conciliation proceedings a 
peace obligation is in operation on both parties, as a result of the 
principle of ultima ratio and also because it is generally considered 
by the parties to the arbitration agreement to be the last chance to 
avoid a dispute / 208)
In addition to autonomous arbitration or conciliation agreed between 
the unions and employers certain Federal States in West Germany do
205. Wiedemann and Strumpf, Tarifvertragsgesetz mit Burchfuhrungs- 
und Nebenvorschriften, 5Th Edition, Munchen, 1977? p.289.
206. This is known as a Rchlichtungszwang which can first to traced 
to the arbitration regulation of 1920. of. H. Raupach, op.cit. 
p.50.
207. e .g. Interviews ER 1 and FTO 21, both Nov.'7 8.
208. In this way it is specifically incorporated into the current 
joint conciliation agreement for the chemical industry, cf. 
Schlichtungsregelung fur die chemische Industrie, Mainz,
29.1.76, Para.8.
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(209)parties in a dispute. However, these State arbitration services
have never been used in the chemical industry.^ 10^
have official arbitration services which they can make available to
The reason for the ohemical industry not requiring external arbitration
services may be found in the strength and successful application of
their own internal provisions. The ohemical industry was the first
major industry to sign an arbitration agreement after the Second World
War. In 1953 a procedural agreement was made as a part of the general
agreement on conditions of employment (Manteltarifvertrag)^ 211  ^ Later
(2 1 2)a separate agreement was reached' "although the provisions of con­
ciliation agreements until 1976 seem to have remained similar. Until
then conciliation took place at two levels for all issues which were
(213)negotiated regionally. " The previous conciliation procedure was 
protracted having five weeks of cooling-off period between the break­
down of negotiations and the national conciliation conference.
Decisions were very rarely achieved at the regional conciliation con­
ference since agreement had to be unanimous.'214  ^ Dissatisfaction grew
209. These States include Nordrhein-Westfalen and Rheinland-Pfalz, 
Interviews ER 1, FTO 7 and FTO 22, all Nov.’78.
210. Interviews FTO 12, Sep.*77 and ER 8, Nov.'78.
211. H. Raupach, op .cit.* p.83*
212. It is uncertain when this occurred for the first time. By 
1971 a separate agreement certainly existed. £f. Schlichtungs- 
vereinbarung ffir die chemische Industrie vom 13.1.1971.
213. For details of this type of agreement cfk Ibid and Chemie- 
tarifrunde 1971* op.cit., p.8ff, also Minutes of conciliation 
meetings covering Tarifgebiet Hamburg* -1970? Landesschlichtung 
(20.5*1970) and Bundesschlichtung (4/5*6.70).
214* For a counter-example, however, Rheinland-Pfalz reached agree­
ment during the 1971 wage round in the regional conciliation
conference. This lack of union solidarity in the face of' 
imminent industrial action elsewhere in the chemical industry 
weakened the union position. cf. Dzielak et al., op .cit., p. 394* —  —  -----
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on the union side with the length of time they were required to wait 
before starting industrial action since it was difficult to maintain 
militancy amongst their members during such a long period of time/219
At its National Conference in 1972 the Chemical Workers' Union voted
to terminate the current agreement on the first possible occasion and
to negotiate a new conciliation procedure which only involved a single 
(2 1 6)level. 7 In 1975 The previous agreement was terminated and a new
(217 )one was negotiated' 'which came into effect on 1st January 1976.
The new conciliation procedure may be represented systematically as 
follows 2
215. This experience was made especially during the 1971 strike. Interview FTO 22, Nov'.' '78.
216. Protokoll 1972, op .cit., p.457ff and Anhang, p,130ff.
217. For further discussion of these negotiations which were
carried out nationally, see below. This procedure is 
identical for both regional and national issues, although
the persons involved in conciliation do vary.
BI
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CONCILIATION PROCEDURE IN THE WEST GERMAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY 
(IN FORCE SINCE 1.1.1976) (218) '
Figure 4.1.
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218 Source: Schlichtungsregelung-1976,, op.• cit.
In the recent agreement there are two routes which theoretically might 
lead, to a conciliation hoard. (Para.l.Il). These are a "breakdown in 
negotiations as has "been described previously or a refusal to negot­
iate either about an agreement which has been terminated or about a
new agreement. However, this second clause was only ,inTroduced during
\
the last revision of the procedure and there are no known cases of it 
(219)being applied.' "  It is simply a safeguard to prevent either side 
from refusing to negotiate.
The agreement also states that the conciliation procedure is only
activated when one or both of the parties request it. (Para.l.Il).
As has been noted above, should either side subsequently intend to
engage in industrial action then this choice becomes non-existent.
In all but a very small number of cases, the conciliation procedure
has been used. S'uch cases where this has not happened are where the
(220)issue under negotiation has become obsolete' 'during the course of
the negotiations or if the issue has proved too complicated to negotiate
(2 2 1)satisfactorily at this level.'
After the request for conciliation has been made a cooling-off period 
of twenty-one days may occur before the board meets (Para.5*H)» The 
actual length of this period varies according to the tactical situation,
219* Interview ER 12, Feb.'7 8.
220. Ruch as where agreement in another region removes the contro- 
versal nature of the issue, or where legislation overtakes 
the negotiations. Interview ER 8, Nov.'7 8.
221. An example of this was regional regulation of the grades of 
payment for particular types of jobs. Interviews ER 13,
Feb.*78 and ER 1, Nov.'78.
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but generally the major part of the cooling-off period is used.^2*^
Sometimes the cooling-off period is extended by mutual agreement either-
as a result of tactical considerations or because of difficulties in
agreeing on a date which suits everybody. This has become particularly
problematic since the employers 1 representatives are often involved
in negotiations in a number of regions and because the union officials
also have more appointments arising from co-determination then pre- 
(22?)viously. The revision of the conciliation agreement in 1976 has
reduced the time before it is possible to call industrial action by 
two weeks, and from this point of view can he seen as an improvement 
as far as the Chemical Workers' Union is concerned.
The conciliation board consists of three members from each party in
dispute. (Para.4 .1 )* One of these three members is the representative
of the region in dispute and the remaining members generally come from
(224)elsewhere within the organisation;' "one of these two representatives
will certainly be an important personage nationally within the corres-
( P P5 )ponding organisations. " On the union side this is invariably the
National Officer for Collective Bargaining^22®^whilst the employers 
are normally represented nationally by the Director-General of the 
Arbeitsring.^ 22^^
222. Interviews ER 12, FTO 16 and FTO 5> all Feb.' 7 8 .
223. Interviews;ER 8 and FTO 7? both Nov.'78. This time is not
only used as a cooling-off period but can also be used to
mobilise support in the plants. Interview FTO 23, Oct.'78.
224* Very occasionally two union representatives come from the 
region in dispute. Interview ER 8, Nov.' 78 .
225.. Interviews ER 11, Feb.'78, FTO 23, Oot.'78 and ER 7? Nov.'78.
226. Hauptvorstandsmitglied fur das Tarifwesen.
227. Interviews FTO 17, Feb. '78 and ER 1, Nov.'78.
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It seems that the actual composition of the conciliation hoard i®
(228)determined centrally, in each organisation' 'although there is some 
contradictory evidence on this as far as the union is concerned. Rome 
respondents stated that the union representatives on the conciliation 
hoard were determined by the collective bargaining committee/229) Due 
to the importance of the composition of the conciliation board, and 
to the conciliation proceedings in general, this seems unlikely. In­
deed, a central decision would reflect the overall responsibility for
(230)
collective bargaining borne by the union's national executive committee.
On the union side the remaining members of the board are often the
regional secretary of the region in dispute, if he is not putting the
region's case to the board, together with a lay officer of some stand- 
(23l)mg* 7 The employers are further represented by senior personnel
(232)
managers who often hold a lay office within the employers' associations.
The importance of the composition of the conciliation board for the 
final agreement is illustrated by the 1977 wage round. In the Rheinland- 
Pfalz conciliation meeting representatives of the Arbeitsring ensured 
that there was less chance of an agreement over 7 per oent being achieved
"} v
by the union than there had' been in open negotiations due to the in-
(233)fluence of a representative of the central employers' association
228. Interviews FTO 23, Oct.'78, also BR.V 13, ER 8 both. Nov. *78.
229* e.g. Interview FTO 28, Oct.'78. One respondent did suggest 
that the collective bargaining committees could make re­
commendations, Interview FTO 22, Nov.*7 8. Since the con­
ciliators would.have to enjoy the confidence of the bargain­
ing committee this is a possible indication of the actual 
situation.
230. Satzung 77, Para. 13. Most, respondents stated that this is 
where the decision is- taken*
231* Interview FTO 23, 0ct.'78.
232. Interview ER 7, Nov. Vj8»-
233. Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, 1978, op .cit., p.l38f.
- 251 -
whilst in Nordrhein the union National Officer voted with the em­
ployers * representatives and thus brought about agreement in this 
region
The chairman of the conciliation board is elected from amongst the
six members of the board in every region. The chair is held by each
side in rotation at successive meetings. Normally the most senior
official of the three on the side with the chair becomes the chairman
since he is the most experienced and since his; prestige would suffer
with the opposition if this did not o c c u r . I t  follows, therefore,
that according to the procedure in the chemical industry there is no
neutral chairman or external arbitrator as is often the case in West- 
(237)Germany. 7 As a result of this the chemical procedure is termed 
joint conciliation as opposed to arbitration.
One reason for not choosing a procedure with a neutral chairman which 
was given by both employers^ 28®^and trade unionists^ 2^ 9^ is that such 
a regulation would be likely to diminish the sense of responsibility of 
the two bargaining parties. Bince these same parties must subsequently
234- Ibid., p.!39f. In Rheinland-Pfalz the National Officer had been 
unwilling to follow the NEC*s recommendations to vote with the 
employers due to the strength of the feeling amongst the union 
members. Interview FTO 17, Feb.f78.
23^ . Interviews FTO 17, Feb.*78 and FTO 28, Oct.*78.
236. Interviews FTO 23, Oct.^B and BRV 13, ER 1 and ER 7> all
Nov. f78. . . . .
237* Approximately 46# of a sample of 20 arbitration agreements 
(l6 national, 4 regional) collated by the EDA on I.6 .I968 
allowed for a neutral chairman. This includes the metal 
processing industry agreement,which covers around 4?3 
million employees. Btatistisches Jahrbuch 1979* op.cit.* 
p. 161, own calculations.
238, Interviews ER 11 and ER 13, Feb.'78; ER 1 and ER..8, Nov.’78.
239. Interviews FTO 5 and FTO 16, Feb.f78; FTO 28, Oct.*78 and
FTO 22, Nov.*78.
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put the agreement into operation,it is more likely to function as 
intended if both parties are fully responsible for it and thus committed 
to its success.
Furthermore, many respondents expressed the opinion that there was no 
such thing as a "neutral" chairman. Other industries had experienced 
problems in this area, and such external regulation was likely to lead 
to the type of developments that occurred during Weimar.^ 4°) Indeed, 
there were great similarities between the rejection of external in­
volvement in conciliation and between opinions expressed on state 
arbitration.^241^
In addition to these reasons, a number of respondents stressed, in 
the words of one regional secretary that:
"Someone from outside the industry can never understand the situation 
in the chemical industry." (242)
Problems might arise especially if the external arbitrator possessed 
an insufficient technical understanding of the industry to make a 
viable award if the subject matter was beyond a simple percentage wage 
increase. The lack of a neutral chairman to the conciliation board is 
to a certain extent, therefore, a result of the high degree of tech­
nology in the chemical industry.
The role of the chairman is to regulate the meeting,of the conciliation
240. Interviews FTO 28 and FTO 23, Oct.’lQ; ER'6, BRV 9, FTO 7 aud 
FTO 21, all Wov.*78. One consequence of the Weimar system was 
the parties often chose to avoid their responsibilities.
H. Raupach, op .cit., p.6 7*
241* e.g. Interview FTO 22, Wov.*78.
242. Translation of' statement made in Interview FTO 28, Oct.'7$.
-  2 53' -
"board, to keep the discussion moving and to attempt to "bring about 
agreement. Beyond this the chairman must also ensure that voting pro­
cedures are correct and that minutes are taken, in so far as this- 
occurs. The chairman will also invariably be the spokesman for his 
side whilst the deputy chairman from the other side is generally that 
side's spokesman/2*18^
Sometimes the chairman will control the proceedings very strictly and 
sometimes he will not. This depends somewhat on the personalities 
involved and on the general climate of the prior negotiations/244) 
Although the conciliation is often fairly informal in nature sometimes 
such a strict control is- exercised that the chairman insists on visits 
to the toilet occurring in pairs - one from each side - to prevent 
either side from taking up contacts with their own organisation/2*19)
It is possible for up to three representatives- to present the case for
each of the two parties to the conciliation board. (Para.6.l) and in
the most important cases: it is likely that full use will be made of
( 246 )this right by both sides.' ' The representatives of the particular^  
union region involved in the dispute are usually the regional secretary 
for this region, provided he is not a memberref the conciliation board, 
together with two delegates from the respective collective bargaining
243. Interviews FTO 23 and 28, Oct.*78; ER 7, ER 8 and FTO 22,
Nov. *78.
244* Interviews BRV 13 and. ER 8, Nov. *78.
245* There are regional differences in practice as well. Inter­
views FTO 23, Oct.*78 and FTO 22, Nov.*78. The more usual 
procedure is considered in some detail-below...
246. For example, cf. Niederschrift uber die Sitzung der Rchlich- 
tungsstelle der Chemischen Industrie fur Rheinland-Pfalz und 
das Saarland vom 9. Mai 1977? Reprinted in Chemie-tarifrunde 
1977 ? op .cit., p.32f.
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committee. 7 The employers generally use the Director-General of 
the regional employers * association and two senior personnel managers 
from their bargaining committee/240^
(247 )
The representatives of the parties are very important if the conciliation 
board refers the dispute back to the parties for further negotiations, 
since they then carry out these- negotiations/249^ Although this has 
happened it is rather unusual and very rarely do such negotiations 
actually lead to an agreement/290^
When the conciliation board initially meets it must first decide whetheir 
it is competent to deal with the issue and once this has been est­
ablished, the representatives of the parties are invited to put their
/pci ^
respective cases to the board. Both sides are present simultaneously
and put forward their cases concisely since the conciliators are quite 
aware what issues are involved/292^  Sometimes the board puts questions 
to the representatives of the parties in order to clarify certain points; 
after this the board requests that the party representatives withdraw 
and leave them to their deliberations. It is possible, however, for the
board to call the parties before it again should it be felt necessar;
247* Interviews FTO 17, Feb.*78; FTO 28, FTO 23, 0ct.*78 and
FTO 22, Nov.*78.
248. Interviews ER 11, ER 13, Feb. *7 8 ; ER 8, Nov.*78.
249* For such a possibility in the procedure, see Figure 4*1• 
Interviews ER 7> Nov.*78 and, FTO 23, Oct.*78.
250. Interviews FTO 28, Oct. *78 and ER 8, Nov.*7 8 . In the case of 
these negotiations breaking down, the conciliation board must 
reconvene within 7 days (Para'.6 .V) although, it .would usually do 
so the same day, should time permit. cf..Niedersohrift uber die 
Sitzung der Schlichtungsstelle der chemischen Industrie Nord­
rhein-Westfalen vom 10. Mai und vom 14* Mai 1977, reprinted in 
Chemie-tarifrunde 1977, o p . c i t p.34£f» -
251. Interviews-ER. 12, ER 13 and FTO 17, all Feb.-*7 8 .
252. This is one of the considerable advantages of such a system of'
joint internal conciliation.
253. Interviews FTO 23, Oct. *78; ER 7 , ER 8, BRV 9 , all Nov. *7 8 .
£253)
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Once on its own the conciliation hoard attempts to find a solution to 
the problems at hand. Whilst spokesmen generally exist on each side, 
all members of the board can make proposals about how to solve the dis­
pute. Buell proposals can also be made collectively by either side. 2^-74^  
Should a particular formula be formally proposed as a potential solution 
then a vote must be taken on this proposal. 7 This vote can either 
be secret or open in nature according to the wishes of the board al­
though the agreement specifies a secret ballot. (Para.7.111). There 
seem to be regional differences in the types of ballot used which pro­
bably reflect the personalities concerned. Another factor which can 
be important is the liklihood of' a majority decision arising. Where 
this seems possible then a secret ballot will most certainly be used' in 
order to give anonymity to the person who votes with the opposition.^ 2^ 6) 
Should at any s-fcage a majority be found for any formal proposals then 
the procedure is ended and hoth sides are bound to an agreement of the 
type specified in the proposal. (Para.7*11)• 2^9^ ^
Quite often such formal provisions are not required.(2^ 8) Usually the 
problem is discussed thoroughly from all aspects and potential solutions
254. Interviews FTO 17, Feb.'78; ER 1, ER 8, Nov.*78.
255. Interviews FTO 1 7 , Feb. *78; ER 1 and ER 1 4 , Nov.f78. Proposals 
of this sort are generally rare unless the climate is extremely 
frosty. Interview BRV 10, Nov.'78.
256. Interviews FTO 23, Oct.«78s BRV 13, ER 8 and FTO 22 all Nov.'78.
In the long term the secrecy cannot be maintained, however.
257* On at least one occasion a formal proposal has produced a
surprise agreement due to insufficient discussion amongst the 
individual parties causing unexpected voting behaviour.
Interview FTO 7? Nov.*78.
258. Proposals are sometimes made, however, although it is known
that they are bound to fail, in order that they will be entered 
into the minutes. Interview ER 8, Nov.^S. cf. Niederschrift ... 
Rheinland—Pfalz ... 9*5*1977* op .cit.
are voiced in the course of the discussion. ' Normally an attempt 
is made to sound out the feelings of the other side on particular 
features of a potential agreement by "thinking aloud ... and if there 
is no response it's as if nothing had been said ... This develops from 
personal relationships between members of the board." (26°)
Another method used to try to bring about agreement in the conciliation 
meeting is similar to that used in the open negotiations. Particularly 
at the latter stages of the sitting private discussions are held be­
tween one representative from each side, normally the two spokesmen/281)
During such discussions it is possible for each representative to really
(262)lay his cards on the table and talk very openly.' J In this way the 
final points of the agreement are often ironed out. This type of meet­
ing can occur after breaks in the conciliation sitting, perhaps on the 
balcony or in a corner of the room/283)
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(259)
When the conciliation board proceeds in this way which, in itself, is 
an indication that the climate between the parties is not particularly 
cold, agreement is generally achieved without formal proposals being 
made. The conciliation board comes simply to the conclusion that there 
is no longer dissent between the two sides. Under such circumstances
259* The starting point of these discussions is generally the point 
reached in open negotiations. Interview ER 7, Nov.'7 8 .
260. Translation of a statement by a national executive officer of 
the Chemical Workers' Union during Interview FTO 17, Feb.'78. 
Other interviews revealed that this was usual.
261. Interviews FTO 28, Oct.*78 and ER 8, Nov.'7 8 .
262. Such senior officials naturally know one another well and in
the ohemical industry seemed to have a good, mutually respect­
ful, working relationship.
263. Interviews FTO 7, BRV 8 and FTO 22, all Nov.'7 8 .
the ballot may just consist of nodding heads or raising hands when 
the agreement is proposed/2®4^
Separate discussions and meetings amongst the two parties are apparently 
a feature of conciliation boards in the chemical industry. Before the 
conciliation board sits the conciliators would certainly discuss the 
situation in considerable detail with the collective bargaining or co­
ordination committees. During such meetings the feelings of the committee 
and the climate on the shopfloor are reviewed together with the basic 
economic facts. In this way the conciliators gain an indication of 
where a suitable agreement might lie and which tactics to adopt.^ 2®9^  
Another aim of these meetings is to ensure a feeling of trust between 
the conciliators and the bargaining committees. This is necessary if 
the conciliation is to succeed in practice since the committee must 
believe that the conciliators achieved the best possible agreement. 2^®®^
Despite the lengthy preliminary discussions it is possible that the 
conciliation board should desire to report back to the committees or to 
clarify certain points of a potential agreement. In such circumstances 
the conciliation board may agree to hold additional discussions. 2^®^
264. Interviews ER 1, ER 14, FTO 7 and BRV 13, Nov.*78.
265. Interviews FTO 17, Feb.'78; FTO'28, Oct.»78 and FTO 22, Nov.'78. 
It seems likely that such meetings would be more important to 
the union due. to the higher degree of co-ordination on the em­
ployers* side. Also cf. Letter from the regional secretary 
(Engelmohr) of the Nordmark-Berlin region of the Chemical 
Workers* Union to all members of the collective- bargaining 
committee for the Hamburg region of the chemical industry 
dated 27-5-1970.
266. Interviews BRV 13 and FTO 22, Nov.*7 8 . This feeling does not 
always arise, however, when the agreements are made public. 
Interviews FTO 28, Oct.*78 and FTO 7? Nov.'78.
267. Interviews FTO 23? Oct. *78; BRV 13, ER 7 and ER 8, all 
No v.*78.
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Once more there are apparently differences in practice between regions 
in these matters for whilst some respondents stated that such meetings 
may occur several times during the course of a conciliation sitting, 
others likened the proceedings to a papal electionNevertheless,  
even when the board decides that such meetings should not occur there 
are occasionally "accidental" meetings in corridors, or communication 
by "flying telephone"
In especially critical cases, the union national officer responsible for- 
bargaining has telephoned orither the General Secretary or the whole full­
time NEC in order to discover their opinion on a particular potential 
(271)agreement. 7 The aim of this would be for the national officer to
check whether he should perhaps vote with the employers in order to
prevent a particular development which the senior union officials feel
unwisB. However, such a decision is not simple for the national officer
knows he must stand for re-election at the next National Conference.
An unpopular decision may well cost him many votes and so he has not
('272)always been prepared to accept the advice of the NEC.*' 7
Such measures are carried out either to increase the chance of an agree­
ment or to safeguard the position of the conciliators within the organ­
isation. In the past, the conciliation process as portrayed here has
268. Interviews FTO 23, Oct.*78 and BRV 13, Nov.*78. (both from 
Niedersachsen). -
269. e .g. Interview BRV 10, Nov.*7 8 . (from Rheinland-Pfalz).
270* Interview FTO 7? Nov.*78.
271. Interview FTO 17, Feb.*78.
272. Ibid. For example in the Rheinland-Pfalz conciliation during 
the- 1977 wage round.
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generally been successful. On very few occasions has agreement not 
been achieved either at the national conciliation meeting under the 
old procedure or at the current single-tier conciliation board/273)
Perhaps one major reason for the success of conciliation in the chemi­
cal industry has been the realisation that should it fail, the peace 
obligation ceases and industrial action could result. Since the 
Chemical Workers* Union is not very strong in two of the three largest 
chemical works in Germany it is likely that it would generally be
prepared to accept a slightly worse agreement than risk losing a 
(274)strike. Normally the chemical employers do not want to risk a
strike/279)
Another reason for the success of conciliation can be found in the 
room for manoeuvre between the bargaining parties in the chemical 
industry created by the eoonomic situation in the industry. 2^78) In 
addition, open discussion is enhanced as a result of the structure of 
the conciliation board, especially the presence of senior representa­
tives from both sides and the relationship between them. In this way 
agreement is more likely to be achieved at such a level than in negot*- 
iations'at a lower level.
273. As far as can be established, agreement has not been achieved
in wage matters on only four occasions in the chemical industry.
Hamburg and Hessen 1970 (cf. GB 69-71, op.cit., p.332ff),
several regions in 1971 (cf,* Bzielak et al., op .cit., p.l39ff),
Rheinland-Pfalz in 1973 (cf,. J. Rauschel, op.cit., p.98) and
Rheinland-Pfalz in 1977 (cf« Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, 
1978, op.cit., p. 139)*
274. Interviews FTO 23, Oct.’ 78 and BRV 9, Nov.*78.
275. Interview ER 8, Nov.*78. Bzielak et al. feel that the.em­
ployers chose to provoke a strike in 1 9 7 1* Op.cit., p.391ff*
276. Interview FTO 7, Nov.*78.
Furthermore, conciliation can he and sometimes has been used as a
(277)tactical measure within a wage round.' J Not only can time be gained -
in order perhaps to allow agreement in another region - but low offers
.by the employers in the early negotiations could be used to prevent 
agreement at this stage in the hope that union representatives from 
other regions or the NFC might be prepared to accept a lower agreement 
in the conciliation meeting.
This system of joint conciliation may be considered simply to be a 
slightly different form of negotiation to those which preceded it.
As one regional officer summarised;
"From its structure conciliation is often a continuation of bargaining 
with a smaller number of negotiators. The main reason for this is
the absence of a neutral chairman." (278)
Most respondents were prepared to accept this analysis of conciliation 
as a continuation of bargaining although certain qualifications were 
made. Conciliation does have a rather different character to the pre­
ceding negotiations, perhaps as a result of the voting system whereby
a simple majority of the conciliation board can bring about agreement 
(279)at any time. " Also, senior officials are involved together with
officials from elsewhere within the organisation and such persons are
likely to be able to view the issues more dispassionately than officials
( ? 80 )
immediately involved in the dispute.' J In this way conciliation may
277. Interviews FTO 23, FTO 28, Oct. *785 FTO 22, Nov.*78.
Apparently this was more frequently the case for regional
conciliation under the old procedure and this contributed 
to a devaluation of this institution. Interviews BRV 9> 
FTO. 7, both Nov. *78.
278. Translation of a statement in Interview FTO 23, Oct.'78. 
279- Interviews ER 1 and FTO 7? Nov.*78.
280. Interviews ER 7 a-ud ER 8, Nov. *78.
occur. Nevertheless, the conciliation procedure in the German chemical 
industry is primarily a continuation of bargaining.
In the past conciliation has played an important role in the collective
bargaining system in the chemical industry. The wage bargaining round
has often been decided by decisions taken during conciliation, usually
in Nordrhein, Hessen or Rheinland-Pfalz^ as these regions negotiate 
( P Al ^
first. 7 Conciliation is sometimes of importance beyond this. It
enables stronger co-ordination and control to be exercised by the senior
officials in the bargaining organisations Furthermore, since all
participants are aware that it is the next step in procedure after the
(282)
negotiations it can exert an influence over tactics during negotiations.
In recent years, however, conciliation seems to have lost importance, 
at least as far as wage bargaining is concerned/200^ The reason for 
this can be found in the introduction of national involvement in wage 
bargaining. Since^ under this system, the negotiations are conducted by 
people who would typically have been involved in conciliation on regional 
issues, there has been no need to move to the conciliation stage in order* 
to increase central control*
Most respondents, however, did not notice this trend away from con­
ciliation and believed that conciliation would be likely to retain its
281. Interview ER 1, Nov. *78. . - -
282. Interviews ER 7 and P*TO 7? Nov.*78. Some respondents believed 
that conciliation was too important and that this had led to
a devaluation-.of the negotiations. Interview FTO 22, Nov*'78.
283. There has been no conciliation on wage issues since 1977*
previous importance/28*1) It was also felt by some that, as a result 
of the failure of the economy to attain the growth rates it had pre­
viously enjoyed, conciliation would become more important/^ 89) Should 
there be a return to regional wage bargaining under a stagnant economy 
then it seems quite probable that conciliation will gain in significance 
as an alternative means of the senior officials exerting extensive 
influence on the negotiations.
c. Industrial action - the ultimate weapon?
Labour legislation in West Germany makes the use of industrial action
including strike ballots illegal until after the end of the peace
obligation. In practice the peace obligation usually comes to an end
when arbitration^  or joint conciliation in the case of the ohemical in-
dustryy has broken down/288) As a result of the success of the last
stage of procedure in chemicals this- has only occurred on four occasions 
( 2 87 )on wage matters. 7 The discussion here will, therefore, be primarily
based on occurrences during the 1971 and 1977 wage round since the other
. .. * . (288) two disputes were very minor..' 7
According to principles laid down by the BGB, member unions should hold
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284. Interview FTO 28, Oct. *78, ER 1, ER 7, ER 8, BRV 13, all Nov. *78.
285. Interviews FTO 23, Oct.*7 8 ; FTO 7, FTO 22, BRV 9, all Nov.’78.
286. cf. A. Rollner, op.cit., p.8lff. . .
287» cf. Footnote 272 (Chapter 4 ) above. Conciliation has failed
on other issues but since industrial action has not arisen 
as a result, the discussion here will be limited to wage 
matters.
288. The 1970 Hamburg dispute is nevertheless considered briefly
below. In 1973 national joint conciliation for Rheinland-Pfalz 
broke down late at night and a request was made to the NEC to 
carry "out a strike ballot. This request was immediately acceded 
whereupon the employers made an improved offer which was- accepted 
by the union collective bargaining committee. Subsequently 
there was considerable criticism of the result on the shop­
floor. cf. J. Rauschel, op.cit., p.98.
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Union revised its rules to allow itself the freedom of' choice whether
( 290)to ballot its members before calling a strike.' " Paragraph 15 of 
the Chemical Workers* Union rule book now states that "the NEC can 
decide whether to hold a ballot ... and whether 75 Pe** cent of those 
members who voted must be in favour of strike before a strike is called. 
In such circumstances at least 50 per cent of members entitled to vote 
must do so.»<291)
( ? 8Q )a ballot before calling a strike.' ""In 1963 the Chemical Workers1
In 1971 "the Chemical Workers* Union called a series of strikes in four
regions after the breakdown of the national conciliation boards without
first balloting their members. The chemical employers* association for
Nordrhein-Wbstfalen took legal action against the union for the choice
of such strike tactics and in order to be awarded damages to cover the
(292 3costs of the strike.' " "
However, a year later the Labour Court in Busseldorf decided that it was
289. G. Himmelmann, op .cit.* p.206.
290. Chemie-tarifrunde 1971* op.cit.* p.29* The Chemical Workers* 
• Union was the first German union to do this and hold a strike
under these provisions. Since then, the Printing Workers* 
Union has held a strike without balloting its members. 
Interview FTO 18, Apr.?78*
291* Author*s translation of "Per Hauptvorstand besohliesst ilber 
die ... BUrchfflhrung von Urabstimmungen ... Er kann die 
Burchfuhrung von Streiks davon abhangig machen, dass sich 
mindestens 7^  Prozent der an der Abstimmung beteiligten 
Mitglieder fur den Streik ausspreohen. Babei mussen sich 
mehr als 50 Prozent der Abstimimmgsberechtigten an der 
Abstimmung betelligenSatzung *77* op.cit.* p.2 5 .
Such provisions are normal for ballots in the BGB, cf.
G_. Himmelmann, op.cit., p.206f.
292. Chemie-tarifrunde 1971* op.cit«, p.30. For.a more complete 
list of the charges cf. Bzielak et al., op.cit.* p.436.
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All other complaints in the employers* action were found to be justi- 
(294)fied, however. As a result of the time that had elapsed since
‘the strike and a subsequent lack of public interest, together with the 
advantages that both sides were able to draw from the decision, neither 
side decided to challenge the ruling in the Federal Labour Court/2"^
possible for a union to hold a strike without balloting its members/290^
The use of industrial action without prior consultation of the member­
ship has a number of advantages and disadvantages which were clearly 
revealed by occurrences in the chemical industry strike in 19 7 1?
and the dispute in 1977 • Oue problem with calling strike ballots is
( 297 3that it takes a long time to organise' 7 'and during this time the
employers use every way possible to influence the workers against coming
out on strike. Although the union is also engaged in a fight to
motivate its members for a strike, the employers* propaganda is more
( ?Q8)extensive and more professional.' Therefore, the absence of a
ballot means that industrial action can be called very quickly, without 
prior warning, and in a way to cause maximum effect.
293* Landesarbeitsgericht Busseldorf, Urteil von 21.8.1972 (7 Ga 
1995/7 1 ) as published in K. Hernekamp, op.cit., p.67ff«
The argument used by the court was that provided a union 
was basically democratic then it could decide to take 
decisions in any way considered most appropriate.
294* Dzielak et al., op.oit., p.437*
295* Ibid., p.436f.
296. This.discussion is based on information presented by Dzielak 
et al. and in Chemie-tarifrunde 1971. Some direct consider­
ation of these factors may be found in Dzielak et al., op.oit., 
p.398ff. .
297. In 1977 the conciliation board for Rheinland-Pfalz broke down 
on 9+h May..The first ballots were not carried out until 23rd 
May. Chemie-tarifrunde 1977. op.cit., p.9£f« Union officials 
have learnt that this causes problems and know they must re­
duce this time. Interview FTO 12, Sep.*77«
298. cf. Chemie-tarifrunde 1977, op.cit., p.40ff and discussion 
below.
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On the other hand, this form of industrial action requires a very- 
disciplined union membership that is prepared to strike at the drop 
of a hat. This requirement is not met in the West German chemical 
industry where strikes are very rare, salaries high and union member­
ship low, particularly on the larger chemical works. For these reasons, 
the tactics were not successful in the ohemical industry. Due to the 
legalised nature of industrial relations in Germany, the employers were 
actually able to turn these tactics to their own advantage by stressing
the "illegal" and* undemocratic nature of the action in their public 
(299)relations work.' " 7
Since 1971jthe Chemical Workers* Union has not called a strike without 
prior use of the ballot. Apart from the developments in 1973 which 
have been described above, the only other call for a strike ballot in 
the chemical industry in recent years was 1977 for Rheinland-Pfalz• 
Whereas in 1973 the NEC had been able to give permission to hold the 
ballot within a couple of hours(3°°)in 1977 it took them three days/301) 
It must seem that the NEC was trying to win time, perhaps in order to 
delay matters for so long that the dispute would blow over.
The structure of the Rheinland-Pfalz region of the chemical industry is 
such that it is dominated by the BASF works in Ludwigshafen/302) The 
dispute was concentrated, therefore, around this works and the other
299* Chemie-tarifrunde 1971? op .cit., p.225ff*
3 0 0 .  J. Rauschel, op«cit., p.9 8 . .
301. Chemie-tarifrunde 1977? op.cit♦, p.12.
3 0 2 .  Around' 5 0 , 0 0 0  (Interview BRV 5, Sep.*77) of the 8 7 , 0 0 0  
chemical employees in this region work,for BASF,in ,,
Ludwigshafen. Zahlen zur Sozialpolitik, 1979, op.cit.,
p.6.
sites which were selected for inclusion in the strike ballot•^000^
Although feelings were apparently running very high amongst the union 
membership in BASF there was little militancy in the other works. The 
union needed time to increase the militancy in the remaining sites and 
this explains the delay necessary before holding the strike ballot. 
Meanwhile, this time enabled the employers* propaganda machine to start
i
working at full pace. The type of propaganda used by them is con­
sidered here in some detail in order to provide an insight into the 
effect it might have on the workforce.
Both the employers" association and the company engaged in a wide range 
of publia relations activities during the build up towards the ballot 
and before agreement was achieved. The employers* association con­
centrated upon providing guidelines for their member companies, press 
releases and on advertisements in newspapers together with articles in 
their own publications• por example, a guideline was issued to 
companies as to how to inform their employees that the employers were 
unilaterally increasing wages and salaries by the same amount as had 
been agreed in Hessen/306 ^
303. These works were selected according to the following criteria.
1. membership density; 2. results of a ballot of Vertrauensleute 
as a guide to militancy; 3. importance of works in the negot­
iations. Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, 1978, op.oit», 
p.144.
304. This explanation was given by the regional secretary for Rhein­
land-Pfalz, (interview FTO 12, Sep.*77)* Since it has been 
reported that he was not particularly in favour off a strike and
. also wanted to delay matters, the validity off this statement is 
uncertain, cf. Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, 1978, 
op .cit., p.142.
305_. cf. Chemie-tarifrunde 1977, op .cit., pp.56ff, 72f and 86fff.
306. Ibid., p.39. This tactic reduces greatly the amount that the 
union seems to be fighting for, .often .to an insignificant 
amount. For 1971* of. Chemie-tarifrunde 1971, op.oit., 
p.343'ff.
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BASF, as a large multinational company has a large public relations 
department which becomes particularly crucial in a potential dispute 
situation/307) Specific elements of the situation which were believed 
to be likely to lessen the willingness of the workforce to engage in 
industrial action received considerable coverage within the propaganda. 
Amongst other things, great stress was given to the agreements within 
other regions of the ohemical industry, to the high level of pay and 
welfare benefits provided by BASF which would be endangered if the 
company were to suffer the severe economic damage which might result 
from strike action. Extremists were also stated to be certain to ex­
ploit a strike situation for their own ends/308) Emphasis was also 
laid upon the loss of old age, sickness and unemployment benefits if' 
the strike were to last for a long period of time, as well as the effects 
of a strike on the benefits of' strikers who become sick or for employees- 
going on holiday, since the summer holidays were approaching/309)
This- information was distributed in the form of handbills. In addition 
a "personal" letter was sent by the chairman of the BARF management 
board to all employees. This letter was carefully composed to weaken
the willingness of employees to strike by stressing the economic con­
sequences of such action/310)
307. Interview CM 4, Sep.*77*
308. Chemietarifrunde 1977? op.cit., p.45ff*
309. For a full range of the consequences of strike action cf.
Arbeits- und sozialversicherungsrechtliche Hinweise fur am 
Streik beteiligte Mitarbeiterin Ibid., p.43f.
310. cf. Letter from Prof. B r. Matthias Reefelder to "Liebe 
Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter der Anilin" dated 16.05*77 
and reprinted in Ibid., p.48f*
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Foreign workers and apprentices were also singled out for particular
attention to "clarify" the situation for the former group and to "prove"
to the latter and their parents that it is illegal for apprentices to 
(31l)strike.' ' These communications aim to further increase the in­
security of these groups of employees, by stressing for example the 
high level of youth unemployment.^ 12^
BASF also directed their propaganda beyond the immediate workforce by 
using a series of large advertisements in the local newspapers in order 
to publicise their point of view.^18^  In this way indirect pressure 
could be put on the employees by influencing the opinions of family 
and friends in the locality.
During the 1977 dispute in Rheinland-Pfalz the press considered the 
potential strike situation highly newsworthy and this increased the 
effect of the employers7propaganda since, as might be expected, the 
union position was severely criticised and the potential effects of 
the strike were reported to be catastrophic. On the other hand the 
employers received a great deal of support from the press.^14^  The 
degree of satisfaction felt by the employers with this situation is 
reflected in the following statement made by a senior official of the 
Rheinland-Pfalz chemical employers * associations
"You will see if you look at the documentation of the 1977 wage round 
published by the Arbeitsring that the press does not portray the situ­
ation if any way subjectively, in any way at all. The reporting is 
purely o b j e c t i v e (315)
311. cf. W. Baubler, op .cit., p.142.
312. Interview CM 4 ? Sep.’77* Chemietarifrunde 1977* op.cit., 
p.50f.
313. Tbid.,-p.56ff*
314. cf. Ibid., p.l20ff.
315. Translation of statement made during Interview ER 10, Sep. *77*
This wide-spread barrage of propaganda issued by the employers * asso­
ciation and company management can be expected to have had some in­
fluence on the willingness of the workforce to strike. This effect 
probably increased with time as insecurity in the strength df their 
position grew as a result of the hesitant attitude of the union leader­
ship towards the strike/31^
Chemical Workers* Union policy on strike ballots has varied during the 
last decade and the tactic of not calling for a ballot as during the 
1971 strike was discussed previously. In 1977? however, the NEC agreed 
to carry out a strike ballot in Rheinland-Pfalz. Prior to the joint 
conciliation meeting a preliminary ballot of Vertrauensleute had been 
carried out, indicating where particular support for a strike lay. 
Feelings were found to be especially high at BASF, and this initial 
ballot was used in deciding which works to include in the actual strike 
ballot/31*7^
The strike ballot was carried out in 2(/31° ^ chemical works over the 
period 23rd-25th May - eleven days after the NEC had given permission. 
This delay was required since it took time to organise the ballot 
especially at BASF which is very large and complex and which refused
316. cf. Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, 1978? op.cit., p.145*
317* Ibid., p.144* This initial ballot might be considered to be a 
part of internal preparations for the strike ballot and there­
fore not subject to the peace obligation* The regional secretary 
called publically for such'preparations well,before the joint 
conciliation meeting was held, of. "Chemierunde zugespitzt",
0£, S/1977, p.3.
318. This is the union.figure (cf. "Hauptvorstand erteilt Streik- 
genehmigung," pressedienst, V l l l ( x i l l ? )  /23, 27.5*3-977)• 
According.to the.employers the ballot was carried out in 22 
works (Chemie-tarifrunde 1977, op .cit., p.14 )"? a research 
report accepted the union figure!(Projektgruppe Gewerk­
schaftsforschung, 1978, op .cit., p.145).
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permission for the union to carry* out the ballot at the place of 
work.^ 319) Since BARF also held contracts with all suitable hall® 
in the immediate area of the site, the union was forced to put up tents
in which to carry out the ballot. Time was also needed to motivate the
union members outside BASF^ 320) At the same time, this delay could
have been critical for the union since the employers were putting 
extreme pressure(321)on the workforce not to strike.
The ballot paper was worded in a rather unusual way for instead of"
stating a particular level of agreement desired, the original demand
and the employers* offer were repeated followed by the phrase;
"I am prepared to go on strike to prevent the employers from dictating
( 3 2 2 )the level of the wage increase.1* v J
This apparently reflects the attitude of the’regional executive who 
felt it would mislead the union members to strike for 9*5 per oent 
since this would arouse false hopes amongst the membership/323)
It is impossible to state whether the revision in phraseology had any 
influence, negative or positive, on the result of the strike ballot.
As shown in the following table the result was a resounding success 
for the union, perhaps as much to the surprise of the union as to the 
surprise of the employers.
319. On this, of. Chemietarifrunde 1977?hP*cit., p.63ff.
320. Interview FTO 12, Sep.*77*
321. This pressure included offering extensive financial benefits 
to workers prepared to work in the case of a strike, holding 
personal discussions with workers to try to persuade them 
against striking, etc. Interview BRV 5, Sep.*7 7 .
322. Author's translation of "Ich bin bereit,.zur Burchbreohung 
dieses Lohndiktats in den Streik zu treten.".Stimmzettel - - 
Abschrift,. reproduced in Chemietarifrunde 1977? op.cit., p.64.
323. Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, 1978, o p . o i t p.145*
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Results of the strike ballot for Rheinland-Pfalz 23rd-25th May,
19 7 7 . ( 324)
Table 4*3»
No of Percentage / <v
Works Turnout Yes No Abstentions' 7
1. District Results
Ludwigshafen 2 91.9 83.1 I6 .5 0.4
Mainz 7 95*2 78.0 21.5 0.4
Neustadt 3 89.3 72.? 26.7 0.6
Neuwied 4 97.9 83.6 15.7 0.7
Baarbr&cken/Tri er 1 79*4 79.2 20.8 -
Biershahn 3 93*3 86.3 12 .9 0.8
2. Overall Result 20 92.2 82.5 17 .2 0.3
3. BASF Result - 9 2 .1 83.4 16 .2 0.4
Such a range of clear majorities ^ 2^ in favour of strike had the effect
of strengthening the resolve of the union members and led to an increased
mobilisation on the shopfloor .^ 2®^ However, this vote in favour of
strike seems to have been greatly influenced by the impression - false
as it transpired - that a successful ballot would force the employers
(327 )into making additional concessions.' J
Not only did this fail, the inaccurate picture presented by the strike 
ballot made it difficult for the union leaders to gauge the actual 
number of members prepared to strike. The regional secretary of’
324- Source: Chemietarifrunde 1977* op.cit., p.66.
(a) Including spoilt papers.
325* The required majority of 75 cent was not achieved in four 
works, three from Mainz (70-74 pe*“ cent) and one from Neustadt 
(ca 50 per cent). Projelctgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, 1978, 
op.oit.* p*146.
326. Ibid., P.147T.
327. This impression was gained "both hy the Projektgruppe Gewerk­
schaftsforschung (ibid., p.148) and myself.
-  272  -
Rheinland-Pfalz estimated that around half of those who stated they were 
prepared to strike in the ballot would actually have done so/328)
Meanwhile the employers were at pains to denigrate the success of the
strike ballot. They stated that the votes in favour of strike only
accounted for 45*6 per oent of all employees in the works which were 
(329)balloted.' "  Even at BARF which is fairly well organised, less than
( 330)half voted in favour of strike. 7 In their documentation the em­
ployers further stated that only 32.6 per cent of all employees in the
region were prepared to strike, but this argument is irrelevant, al-
( 331)though a clever use of statistics.' 7
Thus, although the only strike ballot carried out in the chemical in­
dustry was a success for the union, it did not succeed in bringing aboui 
an improved offer from the employers. It seems, then, that education 
of the membership is required should the union desire not to find
themselves in a similar situation of not knowing what percentage of
(332)their members are prepared to strike.' 7
The 1977 wage round in Rheinland-Pfalz chemical industry was also 
characterised by another common feature of collective bargaining in
328. Interview FTO 12, Sep.*77*
329« This is a reflection of the low degree of union density in the 
German chemical industry since these works were selected for 
their union strength and militancy. Chemietarifrunde 1977? 
op .cit., p.1 5 .
330. "Streik in der BASF?", BASF intern, Schnellinformation,
Werk Ludwigshafeny 27*5*1977? reproduced in Chemietarifrunde 
1977, op.cit., p.67*
331 • Ibid., p • 15 • . . .
332. Nevertheless, to have lost the strike ballot would have been a 
serious defeat for union, and the wave of solidarity arising 
from the good result could have been used to better effect.
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strike once started, seem difficult to resolve, then "political 
(334)mediation" 7often occurs.
Besides this example, political mediation has been of significance on 
at least two other occasions in the chemical industry. In 1970 negot­
iations failed in Hamburg, and joint conciliation was also unsuccessful. 
One week after the peace obligation had ceased and under the pressure 
of spontaneous stoppages, a meeting of both sides was held under the 
chairmanship of the Hamburg Labour Minister*. This meeting which had 
been requested by the employers led to an agreement. ^
Another example is provided biy the chemical industry strike in 1971# 
Intense political pressure was- put on both sides to settle, first at 
state level, but this was unsuccessful. Finally both parties were 
brought together nationally by the Federal Government under the chair­
manship of the President of the Federal Social Court and he managed to 
get the parties to agree to his recommendation for a settlement/336^
Political media,tion is important since it can bring the parties back to 
the bargaining table without either side showing weakness by requesting 
a re-opening of negotiations. Opinions of respondents on its desir­
ability varied but some considered that it was almost.inevitable should
333* Full details of how the 1977 dispute was finally resolved
can be found in Ibi-d. and Pro jektgruppe Gewerkschaftsf orschung 
1978, op .cit., p.l60ff.
334* This means mediation by politicians.or.other.public figures 
and is known in German as "politische Vermittlung".
335.. GB 69-71, op.cit., p.332.
336. Dzielak et al., op.cit., p.l50ff.
(333)Germany. 7 Should a strike situation seem to he developing or a
I
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an important industry approach a dispute situation. ' 7 Generally, 
then, political mediation was felt to he positive and not to destroy 
free collective bargaining provided it stayed within certain limits / 338)
In the period 1963 "to 1975 there were around four official strikes 
within the West German chemical industry but only one of these, in 1971, 
was as a result of a regional issue/339) There were also a number of 
unofficial strikes, most of them spontaneous in nature and limited in 
duration and extent. Some of these were in support of regional bar­
gaining such as a lightening stoppage of about 8000-12000 employees 
at BASF in 1977, one the day before negotiations were resumed/3^"0)
On other- occasions, the ohemical industry was influenced by the 
national situation as in 1969 when shox't strikes occurred in over 
40 chemical establishments /^4l)
Federal statistics state that since 1962 73 ohemical establishments 
have been affected by strikes and that just under two hundred thousand 
days- have been lost as a result/342) These figures are, however, an 
underestimate of the actual number of stoppages- as indicated by 1969 
which only records 9; single strike/3*13) The reason for this is the
337* Interview ER 8, Nov. *78*
338. e.g. Interview FTO 28, Oct.'78*
339* The remaining strikes were domestic issues. Furthermore, it 
is not always easy to allocate small companies to particular 
industries. IG Chemie, Geschaftsberichte, various years.
340* £f» Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, 1978, op.cit.,
p.l49f.
341* C[B 69-71, op.oit., p.305. On the September strikes of 
1969. cf). M. Schumann et al., op .cit.
342. Statistische Jahrbucher, 1963-1978.
343« Statistisohes- Jahrbuch, 1970, p.130.
(337)
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statistical definition of a strike which requires that a strike must 
result in more than 100 working days being lost if it lasts less than 
a day and/or involves less than 10 people.
It is of interest to reflect, therefore, why a strike occurred in 1971 
given that large strikes have not been called in the German chemical 
industry since the 1920*s. A number of factors seem to have contri­
buted to the occurrence of this strike.
The ohemical industry had been only slightly affected by the economic 
crisis of 1966/67 but suffered a minor recession in 1970 as a result 
of over-capacities of production. Furthermore the September strikes in 
1969 together with the minor disputes in the chemical industry during 
the 1970 wage round^ 8 /had served to increase the degree of militancy 
Within the union. This increase in militancy was accompanied by a 
fairly intense internal discussion in the union on such matters as 
domestic bargaining and the rights of lay officials
The Arbeitsring recognised the chance of the wage round developing into 
a dispute at an early stage, and given the economic situation calcu­
lated that it would be a good opportunity to reduce the influence of" 
the more radical group within the union by letting them lead the union 
into a defeat. The employers believed that this very split in the 
union could itself contribute towards defeating the strike.
344* There are no statistics whatsoever on overtime bans, working- 
to-rule, etc. Btatistisches Jahrbuch, 1979? op.cit., p*9I*
345.* O11 these disputes cf. Dzielak et al.* op.cit.* p.84ff.
346. This discussion was'not as strong as in the Metalworkers*
Union. Ibid., p*466f.
347* Ibid., p.391ff*
- 27 6 -
Under these circumstances strong resistance on the employers* side to 
the union wage demands can he seen to have "forced" the union to take 
industrial action at a time which was not conducive to victory. Not 
only was the economic situation in the chemical industry relatively 
poor, but the Chemical Workers’ Union was totally unprepared for wide­
spread industrial action/348^
Although the propaganda activities of the employers which were dis­
cussed above constitute an important part of their anti-strike defence, 
they do employ a wide number of other measures. These actions are co­
ordinated by the employers' associations through their guidelines for 
industrial disputes^ 349^ and by keeping in close contact with a company 
threatened with industrial action.
These guidelines are detailed, providing potential solutions to a large
number of problems which could arise before, during or after a strikel3^ 0^
Bue to its systematic layout going from the assumption that the aim will
(35l)be to keep the plants running' " "it allows for prior planning and fast 
reaction of an easily co-ordinated nature.
The basis of the employers* anti-strike measures is a plan of reaction 
to the union’s activities which is divided into four stages:
348. One reason for this was doubtless the union opinion that the 
Arbeitsring- would try to prevent a strike at all costs.
Ibid., p.396f.
349* Arbeitsring Chemie, Hinweise fur den Arbeitskampf, Heidelberg, 
1977 • (cited further, as Hinweise
350. For example it provides details for the erection of an office 
to run the strike defence, stating what.facilities and
provisions it is likely to require. Ibid., p.7«
351- Ibid., p.l.
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2. Defence measures when industrial action, and especially 
strike ballots are threatened.
3. Defence measures after the ballot and call for strike 
action.
4- Defence measures on strike action and during the s t r i k e 392^
The measures that are recommended fall into a number of categories such 
as technical and personnel plans, particularly with reference to safety 
cover; ensuring the running of power plants, the switch board and telex 
service; compilation of a strike documentation on which subsequent legal 
action or defence can be based; special treatment for various groups of 
employees and contact with the local authorities, especially the police 
force +53)
Furthermore, the guidelines also contain a number of procedures covering 
such matters as lockouts, defence against illegal strikes and details 
of the implication of strike law on conditions of employment and in­
surance/394^  The law has paid an important part in some past disputes
in the chemical industry. For example, in 1971 a large number of inter-
(355)locutory injunctions *^ ywere used against pickets; charges were also 
brought against pickets who used threatening behaviou/39d^ and the police
352. Author’s translation of "Vorsorgliohe Rahmenplannung fur den 
Arbeitskampffall, - Abwehrmassnahmen bei drohenden Arbeits- 
kampfen, insbesondere vor Urabstimmungen, - Abwehrmassnahmen 
naoh der Urabstimmung und naoh dem Streilcaufruf, - Abwehr­
massnahmen be im Ausbruch und wahrend des S'treiks." Ibid., p.2.
353» Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, 1978, op .cit., p.!52f.
354* Hinweise ..., op .cit., parts IV, V, VI and Vlll.
355» Einstweilige Verfugungen.
356. Chemietarifrunde 1971, op.cit., pp.28-33 and pp.77-116.
'* 1. Preliminary basic plans in case of industrial action.
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played a significant part in quelling some demonstrations.
The importance of such measures to the employers is illustrated by 
some of those used in the Rheinland-Pfalz dispute of 1977? and parti­
cularly by the high costs which the employers were prepared to incur. 
First the employers association ordered all its members to pay a
"voluntary" wage increase of 7 so apparently limiting the amount of
( 358 )the increase gained by the union. ' Second, choice of a policy of
keeping the plants running required ensuring access to the works and
an ability to remain in the works for longer than necessary. In order-
to keep pickets off works property^ the edge of the BASF property was
painted' with a blue line. Since the company owns property well outside
the normal fences and gates, pickets could be prevented from approaching
(359 )the works very closely.' Beds, food, drink, etc. were taken into
the BASF works in great quantities. In addition, large bonuses^ 3®1'* 
were offered to all strike breakers. Despite the fact that the strike 
did not take place these and other measures cost BASF around DM 2 
million,' "a figure which they would clearly have been prepared to 
exceed in order to win the strike.
357* Dzielak et al., op.cit., p.250ff.
358. CThemietarifrunde 1977* op.cit., p.Ilf. Although it can be 
argued that the employers would probably have had to pay 
this level of increase in arrears, by paying it ealier than 
required considerable loss of interest on investment was 
incurred. It also provides a good example of the solidarity 
with which, the employers acted.
35.9* Pro jelctgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung 1978, op .cit. * p.15 6 .
360. Interview BRV 5? Sep.f77*
361. Around 500 BM per week with more at weekends. Interview
ER 10, Sep.*77*
362. Interview FTO 12, Sep.^V*
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The early planning, abundant resources and centralised co-ordination 
of the employers* anti-strike measures all contributed to their un­
doubted success in the dispute situations in 1971 and 1977* One area 
in particular where the Chemical Workers* Union has to-date been unable 
to challenge the employers with any large degree of success(383)is that 
of safety cover. Generally the union has had to accept the employers' 
figures for the size of the cover required for lack of their own 
despite the fact that they have known them to be over generous/38*1)
A large number of men carrying out safety cover and who must therefore 
cross the picket lines can have a negative effect on the morale of the 
other strikers•
Regional bargaining has led to a very small number of dispute situations 
in the German chemical industry since the Second World War/389) On 
only one occasion has there been a strike of any significance. Never­
theless, given this limited experience of disputes, it seems that the 
employers and" their associations have been able to outmanoeuvre the 
Chemical Workers* Union. The primary reasons for this have been good 
preparation and planning, effective co-ordination between the regions, 
the employment of extensive resources to finance anti-strike measures, 
and an ability to understand the union’s weaknesses*
In 1971 the Chemical Workers* Union rejected the use of a strike ballot
363. One example of' success in this area during the 1971 dispute 
was described in Bzielak et al., op .cit., p.369f.
364. Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, 1978, op«cit., p.!58f.
365. The reasons for this are discussed in more detail in
Chapter 7«
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but found so many problems in calling their members out on strike 
that since this time it has been considered more important to hold a 
ballot than to gain the advantage of fast industrial action. This has 
perhaps also reflected the hope that by allowing time for a ballot, 
some other solution to the dispute might be found. One way in which 
this could come about is through political mediation which has been 
used successfully in the chemical industry. For the Chemical Workers1 
Union, therefore, strike action has certainly not been the ultimate 
weapon#
d. Summary.
Regional bargaining which has traditionally been concerned with wage 
issues illustrates the relationship between union and employers* assoc­
iations in the German chemical industry. This relationship is seen to 
consist primarily of the co-operative solution of potentially con- 
flictual issues#
Both sides make extensive preparations for the wage negotiations. Part 
of these preparations take the form of intra-organisational bargaining 
as has been described above, and the aim of which is to provide the 
organisations with a unified approach to the wage round. However, on 
the union side this has not always been so successful. Another function 
of the preliminary preparations is to provide the negotiators with the 
necessary ammunition with which to carry out their war of words.
In the chemical industry it is unusual for the union and employers * 
associations to come to agreement, even in part, before the "actual"
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negotiations have taken place. Generally, negotiations may be divided 
into a number of phases, particularly in those regions which bargain 
first, and also contain the largest concentrations of the chemical 
industry, so generally determining the level of the wage agreement for 
the industry.
The first phase may be classified as "a long overture" and it fulfils 
a number of functions. Not only does it allow for the release of 
aggressions and tensions between the parties at a time when this is
t
unlikely to cause serious harm to the negotiations, it also enables 
a full discussion of the issues- from both points of view. In addition
to this, these early contacts create the climate in which the subse­
quent more critical negotiations are carried out.
During the second stage of the negotiation process the two bargaining 
parties engage in a barter for concessions which normally begins with 
the' establishment of the negotiating range when the employers make 
their first offer to the union. By trading concessions the negotiators 
work towards an acceptable agreement which should be a reflection of' 
the power situation between the two organisations, or more accurately 
their separate evaluations of both their own and the other side's 
power. Other external factors do, of course, influence the level
of the final agreement such as the general economic situation, agree­
ments in other industries and attempts by government to control the 
level of wage increases.
366. In this way, wage negotiations have been likened to a game
of poker, cf• E.G. Vetter, Pokerspiel um den Lohn, Stuttgart,
1974.
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In the third, phase of negotiations either the final points of the agree­
ment are finalised, or else the parties must decide to break off the 
negotiations and move to the next stage in procedure, the joint con­
ciliation board. A number of considerations might lead to such a step. 
For example t^actics might well dictate that a delay is required before 
agreement is reached or else the employers might hope that they could 
get a better compromise from their point of view in the conciliation 
meeting than in open negotiations. Of course, it is also possible that 
agreement has simply been impossible given the climate of negotiations, 
however, this is probably rare.
The joint conciliation procedure has been very important in the chemical 
industry, for it has often been here that agreement has been achieved as 
far as the first regions to bargain are concerned. This procedure is 
certainly more near to joint conciliation than to arbitration due to 
the absence of a "neutral" chairman. This is a reflection of the 
technical complexity of the chemical industry and the desire of both 
parties to be fully responsible for any agreements in the industry, a 
desire born in the experience of state arbitration during the Weimar 
Republic.
The importance of joint conciliation is also reflected in the greater 
centralised control exercised over it7 particularly by the Chemical 
Workers* Union. In character the procedure is, though, little more 
than a continuation of bargaining at a slightly higher level and with 
a somewhat different character as a result of the ability of the board"
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to make a binding agreement by achieving a simple majority. However, 
the climate on the board has been known to vary from very informal to 
highly strained depending on the situation and the personalities involved
The negotiation system including the joint conciliation procedure seem 
to function well since both parties are apparently satisfied with it.
On the union side this is especially so; since the revision of the 
previous conciliation agreement in 1976. The employers, on the other- 
hand, preferred the original two-tier system.
Another reflection of' the successful functioning of the system is the
I
lack of disputes which have arisen from regional bargaining. This 
success can partly be accredited to the legislation which provides a 
procedural framework for the negotiations which is generally accepted 
uncritically in Germany. As such^ this is perhaps a reflection of the 
attitude towards legislation which is prevalent in the Federal Republic.
On the union side there are certainly grounds for dissatisfaction since 
until now they have scarcely been able to impose their will on the em­
ployers* associations in regional bargaining. This reflects the 
"balance" of power between the two sides. Negotiations between the 
employers* associations and the unions are not only conducted regionally, 
however, they also negotiate nationally and this topic is considered next
(iv) National bargaining.
The traditional separation of the rules of employment into procedural
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(367 )and substantive issues provides a suitable means of analysing 
national bargaining in the West German chemical industry. At this 
level both types of issues are of considerable importance whereas very 
few procedural matters are regulated in regional bargaining/3^ 0^
An excellent example of a procedural agreement in the German chemical 
industry is afforded by the conciliation regulation. The circumstances 
under which the conciliation agreement was recently renegotiationed 
were reviewed above/369) negotiations themselves were carried out
by experienced officials on both sides. For this purpose the employers
selected a special bargaining committee of ten from the full committee
from •
(371)
of thirty. The onion bargainers were selected the national
committee which negotiates conditions of employment
(372)
The agreement was negotiated in a way similar to that described above 
but due to the complexity of the subject and a number of controversial 
issues, five meetings were required before agreement could be achieved!3 3^^  
The issues which caused particular difficulties in the negotiations were 
the degree involvement of the central organisation, ^^ h^ow long the 
cooling-off period should be/3^ 5 ) t h e  possibility of an intermediate
367* H.A. Clegg, 1979? op.oit., p. If.
368. Such as the clauses concerning the notice of termination and 
earliest date of termination in wage agreements.. £f. Lohn- 
tarifvertrag ... Niedersachsen, 15*6.77? op.cit., Para.4•
369. See Section (iii)b.
370. Interview ER 14 ? Nov.*78.
371* Manteltarifkommission, Interview FTO 7? Nov.*78.
372. Interviews ER 12, Feb.*78 and FTO 28, Qct.*78.
373* Held over a period of about three months. Interview ER 1, 
Nov...*78.
374. Interview..EE 8, Nov.*78.
375. The original union resolution stated that the maximum length 
of this period should be one week. GB 72-75? op.oit., p.A.118.
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meeting/378) In the main a compromise was achieved between the two 
(377)positions.' 7 The significance of conciliation within the collective 
bargaining process has been illustrated above by considering its role 
within the system of regional negotiations. It is a very important 
extension to the legal procedural provisions for collective bargaining 
which makes a positive contribution towards the efficient functioning 
of the negotiating system.
Another example of negotiations on procedural issues which are being 
conducted nationally in the chemical industry is provided by the 
committee dealing with the question of unified pay agreements for blue-
/ inOV
and white-collar employees.' 7 These discussions which have already
been underway for two years may well take several more years to com- 
(379)plete, "'however, unified pay agreements remain one df the main long­
term aims of the Chemical Workers * Union in the area of collective bar­
gaining, as a result of their commitment to status harmonisation/380)
A large number of-substantive issues are negotiated at national level® 
Amongst these are the recent incidences of wage bargaining at this 
level which have already been mentioned. In 1975 Yhe Chemical Workers 
Union NEC decided that given the poor economic position they would be 
better advised to attain a moderate wage increase whilst at the same
376. Ibid., p.380.
377- Interviews ER 1, Feb.*78 and FTO 22, Nov.*78.
378. This committee has been discussed briefly above, see Chapter 
3, Section (ii)b. .
379. The original moves came as- the result of a motion at the 
National Conference in 1972. By 1976 two company agreements 
of this type had been achieved. GB 72-75, op.cit., p.359*
380. Interviews FTO 4, FTO 6, Aug. *77 and FTO 5, Feb.*78.
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time negotiating an agreement which would, improve the situation of 
permanent employees in the chemical industry who became unemployed.
The general agreement on conditions of employment in the chemical in­
dustry is- also negotiated nationally, with a revision of the agreement 
occurring approximately every five years/382^ Notice of termination 
of the agreement was served by the Chemical Workers1 Union on time in 
mid 1977 • The NEC recommended meanwhile that the bargaining committee 
should consider demanding measures which would reduce the pressure of 
unemployment/383^
The employers stated that they did not want to enter into negotiations 
on conditions of employment/384^ Eventually both parties agreed to 
combine these negotiations with the coming wage round/38-^ and this 
is the reason that national wage negotiations took place in 1978, and 
also in 1979? since the previous year only an interim solution was found
381. of. Ibid., p.374ff.
382. The bargaining is carried out by the autonomous-employers1 
national bargaining committee and the central union bargaining 
committee. Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, Vol.l, 1979? 
op.cit., p.l24f and Interview FTO 6, Aug.*77»
383. "IG Chemie-Hauptvorstand zur Entlastung des Arbeitsmarktes fur 
weitere Arbeitszeitverkurzung - Aufforderung an Tarifkommissionen", 
pressedienst, Xlll/29, 13.7.77. The bargaining committee subse- 
quently decided to press for a shorter working week, 6 weeks 
holiday and improvements in the fund for unemployed chemical 
workers. "Chemische Industrie - IG Chemie-Manteltarifkommission 
beriet Forderungen", pressedienst, Xlll/31* 21.-7.1977.
384. "Ungewohnliche Bitte an die IG Chemie: Rdcknahme der Mantel-
tarifkttndigung;7" Infobrief, 12/77. p.7. However, this request 
might simply have been a tactic in order to put pressure on 
the union leadership to accept national wage negotiations.
385* To help the union to accept this form of bargaining the employers 
offered two additional days holiday even before negotiations 
had officially begun, (informal discussions).
to be union's claims in the area of conditions of employment/388) In 
1978 the regional bargaining committees had the opportunity to ratify 
this agreement and although there was a four to one majority in favour 
of the agreement, the level of dissent in the union about the pro­
cedure used by the leadership was such that the following year full 
consultation took place.
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The results of the negotiations on conditions- of service in 1979 must 
be seen as a considerable success for the Chemical Workers' Union.
/ too V
After long and complicated negotiations' rthey received concessions 
on two issues of principle, a minimum of six weeks holiday from 1984 
and a reduction in the length of the working week for shift workers 
from 42 to 40 hours with a partial guarantee on stability of earning!889) 
In all there were about 20 revisions in the conditions of employment 
as a result of these negotiations/390)
That this number of changes can oocur in an agreement after a re­
latively short period of time reflects the complexity of the agreement 
itself. This agreement in its 1978 form constitutes a booklet of 
around 60 pages and covers a wide range of issues, such ass
386. Together with the increased holiday, improvements in the 
support for unemployed chemical workers and some changes- in 
wording were agreed. The agreement was terminable with one 
month's notice on 31.12.1978. "Tarifrunde chemische Industrie - 
Ergebnisse der Rpitzengesprache in Munchen," pressedienst,
XIV/12, 1 3 .4 .1978.
387. "Mehr Urlaub Gjd, op .cit.
388. For details of the negotiations of. "Konstruktives Tarifpaket," 
Infobrief, 4/79, p.lf*
389. The length of holiday increases in stages from 23 in 1979 up
to 30 in 1984, of.• "Pie wichtigsten Neuregelungen des Tarif- 
pakets," Ibid., p.2f.
390• "Konstruktives Tarifpaket," op.cit.
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1. Definition of industries and employees covered,.
2. Times of work,
3. Definitions of overtime, night work, etc,
4. Bonuses for overtime, shift work, etc,
5. Short time working,
6♦ Time off,
7. Sickness,
8. Payments after death,
9 . Conditions concerning commencement and ending of employment,
10. Holidays,
(391)11. Protection against rationalisation and job security.
Since 1973 this has been a joint agreement for blue- and white-collar
(392)workers' 7so that conditions of employment are generally the same for
these two groups of'employees. However, white-collar workers do still
retain some traditional priveleges such as not requiring a doctor's
certificate if away sick for less than three days whilst blue-collar
(393 )workers must supply a note on the first day of their absence.' *  J
Although the previous discussion has been concerned with periodic re­
visions of the whole agreement it is possible for single items to be 
negotiated at any time, for example in connection with the regional 
wage rounds/394^ However, these issues are generally an extension
391* cf. ManteItarifvertrag, 1978, op .cit.
392. GB 72-75? op*cit., p.360.
393. of. Manteltarifvertrag, 1978, op.cit., p.27*
394* Interview FTO 2, Aug.*77« An example of this is the agree­
ments made about an annual bonus of one month's earnings, 
as for Hamburg in 1970* GB 69-71? op.oit., p.332.
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an existing clause since the employers would not be bound to bargain
( 395 )about such an issue unless the agreement has been terminated.
of the agreement by an additional clause rather than the revision of
The range of the general agreement on conditions is of considerable 
importance since no chemical manufacturer who is a member of the em­
ployers* association may run his establishment at worst conditions. 
Sometimes, particularly in the larger chemical companies, these con­
ditions are improved, either voluntarily or by works council agree-
The general agreement on conditions of employment for academically
qualified staff' which, together with the salary agreement for this 
C 297 )
group' was seen as a reflection of the large number of such staff'
(? Q 8 )in the chemical industry,' "contains both substantive and procedural 
sections. On the substantive side it regulates conditions of commence­
ment and ending of employment, the conditions under which agreements 
on company secrets and a relinguishment of competition rights may be 
made, as well as holidays, etc. The procedural section of the agree­
ment provides a detailed conciliation procedure for both collective
395• B^ ubler, op.cit., p.122.
396* To use a simple example, one company, Kronos Titan GmbH, has 
introduced the regulation that blue-collar workers only need 
to produce a doctor’s certificate after three days absence. 
cf. Kronos Titan GmbH, Arbeitsordnung, Leverkusen, 8.10.75? 
p.20. (This is a works council agreement).
397* This agreement is the one example of annual national wage 
negotiations which are regularly carried out in the German 
chemical industry.
398. of. Chapter 2 Section (iii)b for details of these agreements 
and who negotiates them.
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and individual issues. This clause must he terminated separately from
the rest of the agreement and not until the end of the year following
(399)the termination of the remaining sections.'
A further instance of a national substantive agreement is provided by 
the agreement concerning the temporary employment of young people with­
out a secondary school certificate. This agreement was reached between 
the Arbeitsring Chemie and the Chemical Workers1 Union in 1977 and re­
vised in 1979/ 400^ Once more the NEC did not follow the full con­
sultative procedure and this created some considerable criticism within
.. . (401)the union. 7
A number of different forms of national bargaining have been discussed 
covering a large range of issues both substantive and procedural in 
nature. In the case of the general agreements on conditions of em­
ployment these are very important agreements although their significance 
is often underestimated amongst union members so that officials felt 
it unlikely that the membership would be prepared to strike to gain an 
improvement in them/402 ^
The conciliation regulations- have become an integral part of the
399* cf.-"Manteltarifvertrag fur akademisoh gebildete Angestellte ..." 
1976, op.cit.
400. cf. "Jugen&liche ohne Hauptsohulabschlusss Tarifvertrag 
novelliert," Infobrief, 5/79, p.6. Informal discussions in­
dicated that the idea for this agreement came from the em­
ployers and that the NEC were reluctant to accept it, despite 
the space it was subsequently given in union publications, 
cf. J. Walter, "Neuer Tarifvertrag setzt ein Zeichen," 
Gewerkschaftliche Umschau, 5/77, p.2f.
401. Interview FTO 5? Feb.*78.
402. e .g. Interview FTO 2, Aug.*77* However, were the economic 
conditions to worsen sufficiently then it is perhaps possible 
that the membership might strike to protect their'-jobs, as
did the German Steelworkers in 1979* Officials doubted this 
too, though. Interview BRV 5? S'ep.,77*
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procedure of collective bargaining in the German chemical industry 
and respondents did not feel that they would like a system which did 
not include it/*103) National agreements for academically qualified 
staff are a reflection of the' technological nature of the chemical 
industry which requires a large number of scientists, technologists 
and engineers. As a result of the successes achieved by.the Chemical 
Workers' Union in 1979, which took account of the poor employment 
situation, the union intends to concentrate its future bargaining 
efforts more solidly on the question of unified wage groups for blue- 
and white-collar staffs /4°4)
(v) Domestic bargaining.
Domestic- bargaining is bargaining between individual employers, either 
for the whole corapany(4°9)or for a single site/4°8)with the local 
trade union representatives. Since the Chemical Workers* Union no 
longer publishes figures for the number of such agreements within its 
organisational area it is impossible to gauge accurately the importance 
of domestic bargaining to the union either generally or in the chemical 
industry/407)
Although a large number of small ohemical companies are not members of
403. e_i£. Interviews FTO 23, Oct. *78? ER 1, ER 8, FTO 7, all
Nov.*78.
404* E. Grutzner, "Neue Schwerpunkte der Tarifpolitik, ** Gp. 5/79, 
p.4«
405. In this case the agreement which arises may either be known as 
an Untemehmenstarifvertrag or a Firment ar i f vert rag in German.
406. Haustarifvertrag.
407. However', over the period 1.1.66 to 1.1.69 971 domestic agree­
ments were signed by the union, this being 62 more than foir 
the previous three years; these figures refer to the whole 
organisational area and not just the chemical industry.
(IB 66-68, op.cit., p.264.
the employers* associations/4°8^ it is not known how many of them are 
organised "by the Chemical Workers’ Union, or if organised which com­
panies or works have succeeded in forcing the management to bargain 
with them.
Current estimates of the number of domestic agreements in various regions 
of the union vary somewhat, although once more there is no different­
iation between the various industrial groups. In Niedersachsen it was 
recently stated there were some 80-90 agreements/4°9 ^ whilst in Bayern 
there were 18 at the same time/410^
There are certainly very few such agreements with sizeable chemical 
firms^ 41^ and those which do exist, occur in companies which have a 
tradition of not belonging to employers* associations such as the 
multinational oil companies/412^
These companies whilst not really a part of the ohemical industry pro­
vide a good illustration of this type of bargaining. The agreements 
which are reached are usually very good from the union point of view for 
such companies have a strong economic position and are extremely capital
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408. See Chapter 2, Section (iii)a. Nevertheless, a recent re­
search report claimed that 99 Per oent of chemical companies 
covered by the federal definition are members of employers * 
associations, although it is not clear what the source of 
this information is. Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschpng, 
Vol.l, 1979? op.cit♦, p.118,
409. Interview FTO 6, Aug.*77• However, one estimate put the 
number in this region as high as 200. Interview FTO 5?
Aug.*77.
410. Interview FTO 10, Sep.*77•
411. Interview ER 1, Aug. *77•
412. Interview ER 6, Aug. *77*
intensive/413)with the consequence that labour costs are relatively 
unimportant compared with keeping the refinery running. In 1978 the 
length of holiday was extended to a minimum of 27 days^ 414)and in 
1979 a six per cent increase in wages was agreed/419)
The Chemical Workers' Union uses the same consultation procedures for 
domestic bargaining as described earlier in the section on intra-
»itA2
organisational bargaining. However, in this case the collect bargain­
ing committee is only elected from union members in the company or 
works concerned. Furthermore, the negotiations are usually led by a
(4 16)
regional or district officer from the area that the company is located.
The negotiations seem to follow a similar pattern to that discussed 
previously as it applied to regional bargaining. However, although it 
is probable that some companies possess them, no evidence of concil­
iation agreements could be found covering single companies or works. 
Indeed, not a single respondent was able to cite an example of a 
domestic conciliation agreement whilst one respondent wa,s able to 
point out that Texaco had been on strike in Hamburg without resort to 
conciliation/417)
This strike is by no means the only incidence of industrial action which
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413* cf,. B. Robak, op .oit., p.218.
414« "Internationale MineralSlgesellschaften, Tarifrunde erfolgreich 
abgeschlossen," pressedienst, XIV/4.2, 4.12.1978.
415* "Rechs Prozent mehr bei Mineralol," Gp. ll/79? P * 8 «  These 
examples illustrate the fact that domestic agreements cover 
a very wide range of substantive issues, cf. GB 66-68, 
op.cit., p.264*
416. Interview FTO 7, Aug.'77*
417. Interview FTO 28, Oct.*78. This example also seems to point 
to the fact that it is possible to hold industrial action
without prior conciliation or arbitration, of. Section (iii)b, 
above•
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has occurred, within the chemical and allied industries in Germany over 
domestic agreements in recent years. Between 1970 and 1975 at least 
six have taken place either to gain improvements in an existing agree­
ment or to force the management to concede an agreement with the union. 
Generally the1 union has been successful in these disputes /  410^
At one stage, particularly towards the end of the 1960's the Chemical 
Workers * Union was in favour of extending the range of domestic bar­
gaining in order to improve the agreements it held with the more
profitable companies. A number of resolutions were passed at union
.970 a 
(420)
conferencek419)and in 1 dispute occurred in the Hessen region
primarily on this issue.
These moves failed primarily as a result of determined resistance on 
the part of the chemical employers' associations who still reject any 
steps that the union might wish to make in this- direction. Although 
they admit that on occasions this form of bargaining would have the 
advantage of leading to more realistic agreements they doubt that the 
union would concede worse conditions simply because a company was in 
an unhealthy financial state. In addition some officials felt it 
would be foolish for single companies to take on the "whole" Chemical 
Workers' Union/421^  One main reason, of course, for the opposition of
4 18 . cf. GB 69-71? op .cit., p.329ff and GB 72-75? op .cit., p.383ff.
419* ©£• IG Chemie, Protokoll des 8. Ordentlichen Gewerkshaftstages
in Wiesbaden vom 31«8 . bis 6.9*1969, Hannover, 19^ 9? P‘4^ 5 
and the resolutions quoted there.
420. GB 69-71? op .cit., p.335f* Also of. W. Meissner and
L. Unterseher (eds . ), Verteilungskampf und Stabi lit at spoil tile, 
S'tuttgart, 1972? pp.l07ff»
421. Interviews ER 1 , Aug. *77 5 ER 10 , Step. *77 •
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the chemical employers * associations to such a trend is that it would 
remove the most important task from their jurisdiction.
In any case, in recent years domestic bargaining has lost some of the
support it once enjoyed in the union, although most officials admit it
does have some advantages, since the members can see exactly what the
union is achieving f'or them and since it leads to a reduction in the
wage gap. However, some union officers fear that these advantages
(422 )could only be won with a loss of solidarity within the union. J
Therefore, whilst domestic bargaining is very important for those 
members in companies which engage in it, on the whole it is not parti­
cularly significant within the collective bargaining in the chemical 
industry. It is also unlikely that the importance of domestic bar­
gaining will increase.
(vi) Conclusion.
This chapter has considered bargaining between the unions, primarily 
the Chemical Workers* Union and chemical employers* associations or 
the management of individual companies. Such negotiations are an 
integral and important part of industrial relations in the German 
chemical industry. This system of collective bargaining is based upon 
a range of legislation and judge-made law together with certain pro­
cedural regulations which have been autonomously agreed by the bar­
gaining parties, for example the conciliation procedure.
422. Interviews FTO 1, FTO 6 and FTO 7? all Aug.*77*
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Intra-organisational bargaining amongst the employers and their assoc­
iations seems to have led to an alignment of the individual companies 
behind the association officials. This has promoted a successful 
realisation of policy in the collective bargaining area since it has 
enhanced a unified, co-ordinated approach towards the unions. Some 
reasons for the employers* ability to achieve this may be fotind within 
the highly centralised structure of the associations, as well as the 
relatively small number of members within the associations/423^
The Chemical Workers* Union on the other hand has been by no means so 
successful in achieving a united front with which to face the employers. 
This reflects the ideological splits within the union that are partly 
traceable to the technological nature of the chemical industry, which 
creates a need for a large number of white-collar staff and it also 
reflects the regional differences in the chemical industry.
Three regions, Nordrhein, Hessen and Rheinland-Pfalz contain the major 
concentrations of chemical industry and each region is also the location 
of the main works of one of the three mammoth German chemical concerns. 
Although each company is widely diversified, there are significant 
differences in the production range^ 424^ for them to enjoy different 
economic circumstances. This situation, together with a higher order- 
of union organisation at BASF were the main reasons that Rheinland-Pfalz
423. i.e. The number of companies on the employers* side is much 
less than the number of union members, so that it is easier 
to oo-ordinate policy and action.
424* of. Table 3 . 4  above.
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However, this inability to maintain solidarity within the whole union 
has had damaging consequences on at least two occasions since the 
employers have been able to tactically outmanoeuvre the union and then 
point out the inconsistency of their stance with some success in their 
propaganda. The strength of the employers in dispute situations has 
also been increased by the partial failure of the union's internal 
consultative procedures which have resulted in a lack of knowledge of 
the support which sanctions might have on the shopfloor.
An awareness of these strengths and weaknesses by the bargaining parties 
has generally contributed to the low incidence of industrial disputes 
in the German chemical industry, although the employers were able to 
force the Chemical Workers' Union into a situation in 1971 whereby a 
strike became unavoidable. By careful selection of the timing of this 
dispute the employers were able to practically ensure their victory.
The major illustration of the relations between the union and the 
chemical employers was provided by a consideration of regional bargain­
ing, the main aim of which is to negotiate wage and salary increases. 
There is apparently an established pattern of bargaining which is 
accepted by both sides. Indeed, it might be stated that a considerable 
body of custom and practice exists in the way that negotiations are 
conducted. A high degree of respect seems to exist between the negot­
iators, who also have relationships of trust with each other in the main
Ruch interrelations are promoted by the frequent contacts between senior 
officials and they are conducive to peaceful industrial relations.
did not follow the general union policy in 1977•
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The most significant regional negotiations take place in the largest 
three regions, which also are the first agreements to he negotiated in 
each wage round. The remaining regions deny that their negotiations 
are a mere formality. Generally, however, the length of the negot­
iations in these regions together with their adoption of identical 
agreements to those reached in Nordrhein, Hessen and Rheinland-Pfalz 
point to the fact that they normally have little import. Despite this, 
in Niedersachsen the union has- adopted a fuller consultation system 
than used elsewhere in the union and in 1970 there was a minor dispute 
in the Hamburg region. It can be seen, therefore, that the remaining 
regions can follow a different course, especially on the union side, 
should they so desire.
Although a not inconsiderable wage gap exists in the German chemical 
industry, particularly for blue-collar workers/429 ^ regional wage 
negotiations provide the foundation on which the whole wage structure 
rests- and as- such they are very important. In fact, 'the workforce 
seems almost to take their annual wage increases for granted. If this 
ceased to occur through a breakdown in the bargaining system then it 
is likely that the degree of militancy in the workforce would increase 
markedly.
The desire of the bargaining parties to solve the problems that arise 
in negotiations amongst themselves via the joint conciliation procedure
425. of. Chapter 3, S'ection (iii)e.
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is a reflection of experiences with state arbitration during the 
Weimar Republic and of the technological nature of the chemical in­
dustry which might exclude an outsider from a sufficient understanding 
of the problems. This very desire to come to an autonomous agreement 
which is held by both parties fosters close relationships between the 
organisations' officials since the conciliators sometimes come under 
fire from their own ranks for a specific agreement. In this way 
conciliators from both sides may have to rely on the support of the 
other side to "prove" how difficult it was to achieve even such a 
relatively unacceptable agreement*
National bargaining plays a crucial part in employee-employer relations 
in the West German chemical industry. The conciliation agreement, an 
agreement which is itself a fundamental part of the bargaining system
•.t
which neither side would care to be without, is negotiated at this level'* 
Furthermore, the general agreement on conditions of employment for the 
whole chemical industry is negotiated nationally. These conditions, 
although occasionally bettered in some of the largest companies, apply 
in the vast majority of" oases. Since the agreement covers such a range 
of' issues, it is one of the linchpins of industrial relations in the 
ohemical industry. At the same time, however, a great many of these
(426)
conditions are taken almost for.granted by the employees in the industry.
Recently national bargaining has gained further in importance through 
the extension of national wage negotiations. Although such bargaining
426. cf. Appendix 3, Table 22, below.
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possesses a number of advantages for the union, since co-ordination 
of bargaining becomes easier and approximates that of the employers, 
it does contain potential hazards. The problems in holding a strike on 
a regional basis are quite monumental as are the costs. For a national 
strike these problems are increased many times. To-date even regional 
strikes have failed in the chemical industry; therefore the chances of 
the Chemical Workers' Union holding a successful national strike seem 
minimal. It would seem inadvisable, therefore, for a union to negot­
iate in such a way.
#
Domestic bargaining is critical for those members of the Chemical 
Workers' Union who work in non-federated companies. Strong resistance 
to domestic agreements by management, or even a refusal to negotiate 
with the union is likely in the long term to lead to sanctions on the 
part of the members.
The various levels of bargaining make a significant contribution to­
wards the peaceful nature of employee-employer relations in the West 
German chemical industry. A number of factors have been required to 
explain the nature of this bargaining. Not only is the economic 
state and technological nature of the industry relevant, the industrial 
organisation also plays some part. Furthermore, legal, social, 
historical and behavioural factors have also had a bearing on the 
bargaining system.
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In the previous chapter relations between the Chemical Workers* Union 
and the chemical employers were considered through a discussion of thep 
bargaining which takes place between them. Such negotitations^ ^might 
be classified as constituting the upper or supra-plant level of industrial 
relations in the chemical industry. Here, however, relations at the work­
place and within the works are examined. Workplace relations can be seen,
(2)then, as the second level of labour relations.' There are, of course, 
a great number of overlaps and interconnections between these two levels, 
which have been separated primarily for ease of analysis.
The data used in this chapter originates from a number of sources. 3Tn 
the first instance information from the A'grochemie AG case study will be 
used and supplemented by evidence from the background interviews on work­
place relations which were carried out in a wide range of chemical est- 
(3)ahlishments•'
The limitations of case study data have been discussed elsewhere and in
order to minimise them other survey material on workplace relations within
(4)the chemical industry has been taken into account for comparative purposes*
1. Except for domestic bargaining, which was shown to be relatively un­
important in the chemical industry.
2. The choice of the terms "upper" or "second" is not intended to indi­
cate the relatiye importance of the two levels.
3. For further details of the research method cf* Chapter 1, Section (ii).
4 . These other surveys primarily include: O.Blume, op.cit., Landwehrmann 
and Albring, op .cit«; H.Kotthoff, Soziale Wirksamkeit des Betriebs- 
verfassungsgesetzes, Teil A, Ergebnisse der Betriebsratebefragung, 
mimeographed report, University of Freiburg Institute of Industrial 
Sociology, 1976; E.Teschner, Lohnpolitik im Betrieb, Frankfurt, 1977*
Chapter 5 *
Workplace industrial relations in the West German chemical industry.
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dual system of employee representation which exists at the workplace*
On the one hand works councils may exist in establishments with ihe five
( 5 )or more permanent employees'whilst on the other the Chemical Workers'
Union has membership in around 1500 chemical establishments/0^ Thus
( l )the two forms of representation are works council and trade unions* 7
This chapter commences, therefore, with a discussion of works councils 
within the chemical industry; this discussion is followed by analysis of 
shopfloor unionism, and the relationships between works councillors and 
local union representatives. The consideration of workplace relations- 
continues with an assessment of the system of workplace bargaining which 
supplements regional or national collective bargaining. Finally, ther 
type of working conditions and job satisfaction in the chemical industry 
are portrayed. As a result of this discussion conclusions are then drawn 
about the contribution that workplace relations make to the overall system 
of industrial relations in the chemical industry.
(i) The works council.
The origin of the dual system of representation may be traced to labour 
legislation introduced during the Weimar Republic. } The Works Council
5* BetrVG, Para. 1, £f. F. Bleistein, Betriebsverfassung in der Praxis,
Bonn, 1974? p.Ilf. In the organisational area of the Chemical Workers' 
Union, the union has membership in 3175 establishments of which 2489 
have works councils. IG Chemie, "BR-Wahl 1978 - Schnellubersicht,u 
Der Betriebsrat, Vol.28, No.3, 1979> p.64*
6. GB 72-75) op .cit., p.267.
7. Amongst others, E.Teschner, (op.cit., p.2) argues in this way.
8. The origins of the works council are even further removed. For a 
recent review of this development cf. K.Koch, Trade Union Workshop 
Representatives (Gewerkshaftliche Vertrauensleute), in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, mimeographed report for the Anglo-German Found-/ 
ation for the Study of Industrial Society, no place (London), 1978, 
p.l3ff.
A major characteristic of industrial relations in West Germany is the
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f councils and led to an emasculation of the works council from the very
start through the requirements to co-operate widely with the employer on
productivity, labour saving methods and to promote peaceful industrial 
(9)relations.w 7
As Koch has reported, the early traits introduced into the works con­
stitution at the beginning still have a large impact today:
"The Works Constitution Act of 1952 incorporated the fundamental stipu­
lation that the works council must work in good faith, within its sphere 
of competence, with the employer, the employers' association and the 
trade union. The works council was charged with preserving peace in 
these matters and the right to call a strike was not given. The new law 
of 1972 still maintains this principle, to keep the peace by working 
'together in a spirit of mutual trust1 with the employer." (10)
Since the works council is bound in its actions by the provisions in the 
legislation and the trade union is not, this has led to a separation of 
the two forms of representation. In addition to the dual representation 
which results from the legislation, it also leads to an institutional­
isation of labour relations within the single works and the company and
to the main strength of employee representation resting with the works
(ll)counoil rather than the trade union.' It is this somewhat paradoxical
situation of a strong yet hamstrung works council system and its- conse­
quences which are considered here in some detail within the context of 
the chemical industry.
Act of 1920 halted the revolutionary trends adopted hy the workers1
9 . cf. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p.1 7 . This report also provides a useful summary in English 
of the main provisions of current works council legislation.
11. Dzielak et al., op .cit., p.lOOf.
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The works council is the representative of all employees in the works,
(12)company or concern 'who are not classified as senior managerial staff, 
(13)etc,. The works councillors are elected according to basic democratic
principles, 1^4 a^nd this has a number of consequences given the wide re­
presentative competence of the works council.
It is possible, for example, for a white-collar employee who is a member
of middle-management to be elected to the works council. Although such
status need not necessarily preclude a works councillor from fulfilling
his job, it seems likely that he would be more susceptable to management
arguments than is ideal in a works councillor. At Agrochemie AG this
situation existed as the head of a laboratory was the deputy chairman of
the council. Criticism was expressed from within white-collar circles
that this should be the case, especially where one respondent worked under
the works councillor. He did not feel that his superior could represent
his interests in the desired way. Nevertheless, since the majority of
the white-collar staff continued to elect the laboratory head, he had to
(15)accept the situation.
The electoral system can also lead to the underrepresentation of specific
groups in the workforce such as women, foreign employees or shift (esp-
(16)ecially production) workers. Sometimes the members of these groups
are not prepared to stand for election, or when they do, either not enough
12. These differences are explained presently.
13. For a full definition of the representative competence of the works 
council, of. BetrVG 1972, Para.5? and F.Bleistein, op.oit., p.22ff.
14. Some minority groups do have certain special representational rights, 
BetrVG 1972, Para.10, cf. Fitting et al., op.cit., p.l51ff» The 
electoral system is discussed more fully below.
15* Interview 016, 0ct.'78.
16. During the course of the empirical investigations all these oases 
were met.
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of the workforce know them and so do not vote for them' 7or else they
t iQ \
are not prepared to vote for members of these groups. 7 This type of 
situation is far from ideal if the works council is to carry out its re­
presentative role whioh as far as respondents at Agrochemie AG were con-
(19)cerned was the main task of the works council.
( i 7 )
These problems are not unique to the chemical industry although there arc 
a large number of shift workers within the production area of the industry. 
A possible solution might lie in changing the electoral system so that 
there is more direct delegation of works councillors. However, this is- 
unlikely to occur given the political nature of the act and the difficult­
ies this causes when being revised/20^ In any case it is debatable 
whether this might not be a retrograte step likely to lead to a lessening 
of solidarity amongst the workforce. Furthermore, the electoral system 
is already extremely complicated and additional complications would be 
unwelcome to practitioners/21^
17* At Agrochemie AG there was no works councillor in the main production
plants, and respondents blamed this on a lack of knowledge of person­
alities from one shift to another and a general lack of solidarity 
amongst shift workers. Interview M 8, M 9 and 031* all Oct. '780
18. Interview BRV 1, Aug.'77* In this way, in the organisational area of 
the Chemical Workers1 Union only 1 5 .4 per cent of works councillors' 
elected in 1978 were women compared with 26 per cent of enfranchised 
employees. Only 3.4 per cent of works councillors were foreign. 
"BR-Wahl 1978 - Schnellubersicht", op .oit.
19. Over 60 per cent of the works sample named this works council role. 
cf. Appendix 3, Table 30 below.
20. The best example of this in recent years is provided by the Co­
determination Act 1976. cjf. Chapter 2, Section (iv) above. Such 
delegation oan be organised originally into the union list as at 
BASF. Interview BRV 5> Sep.'77*
21. This complexity is illustrated by the length of the Chemical Workers' 
Union pamphlet distributed to works councils before the most recent 
election. This pamphlet was 86 pages long. cf. "Die Wahl des 
Betriebsrats", Der Betriebsrat, Vol.27, No.l, 1978.
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Another possible solution to the problem of -underrepresentation lies in
( 22 )the selection of a wider range of candidates by the Vertrauensleute.' '
Since there are similar problems of underrepresentation of the same groups 
within this circle and since personal ambitions are often closely assoc­
iated with the selection of candidates, this rarely happens. Other groups
may, of course, propose candidates for the works council election provided
(23)they can gather one hundred signatures. ' However, should the proposers 
also be union members, they risk expulsion from their union for proposing 
candidates who will oppose the official union candidates/24^ Since ther 
motivation of these unionists is often the improvement of the union position 
and works council representation, then such heavy handed reaction on the 
part of the Chemical Workers* Union is to be regretted.
The West German chemical industry has been seen to be characterised by a
sizeable number of large establishments and companies as well as a high
(25)percentage of white-collar staff.' " Both these factors seem to have 
some bearing on the form of works council election chosen, and conse­
quently this has an influence on the composition of the works council.
22. In the Chemical Workers* Union this group of officials which includes
the current works councillors, decides ,on the selection of potential 
works councillors. o_f. IG Chemie,RAohtlinien fur Betriebsratewahlen, 
no place (Hannover), 15*7 .1977•
23* Or those of one tenth of the enfranchised employees. For full details
of the legal procedure for proposing candidates cf. Fitting et al., 
op .cit., p.l68ff.
24. Interview FTO 4? Aug.*77• There have been several examples of this 
in the chemical industry, although they have often subsequently been 
reinstated by the Appeals Committee. Sometimes these anti-union 
lists have been reactionary as at Merck in 1972 (cf. "Betriebsrats- 
wahlen 1972",in 0. Jacobi et al. (eds), 1973? p.57ff* and Dzielak
et al., op .cit., p.455) and sometimes progressive as at Bayer in
1978. cf. E. Gipperich et al., Gewerkschafter fur einen besseren 
BetriebsratI , handbill, Leverkusen, 1978.
2 5. cf. Chapter 3, Section (ii) above.
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Although there is no data available with which to test the hypothesis, it
(26)seems that in large establishments list elections generally take place
In any case^ this is logical since there is more chance of opposition
groups gathering the necessary support. Limited data from Hoechst AG
also seems to' support this hypothesis, for both blue- and white-collar
(27)groups.' Furthermore, in large companies such as Hoechst and Bayer
the election turnout is very low compared with elsewbere in the industry,
(28)perhaps as a result of list elections. 7 Generally the turnout is just 
below 80 per oent, with more blue-collar than white-collar workers voting^
In the organisational area of the Chemical Workers * Union the union has
mostly been able to achieve its aim of a joint election for blue- and white-
collar workers.(3°) Thus^ in 64»2 per oent of oases in 1978 joint elections
were held. Nevertheless, particularly in the larger companies a sufficient
majority for joint elections is rarely achieved and this possibly reflects
(31)the strength of salaried staff organisations in these works.' 7 Another
26. The election may be either according to lists of candidates proposed 
hy organisations or groups, or else for individuals if only one list 
is submitted. For further details cf). "Die Wahl des Betriebsrat", 
op .cit., p.46f.
27. cf. Personalbericht Hoechst 1977? op.oit., p»55*
28. Thus, in 1978 only 69*5 per cent of the main Ho-echst- works voted, 
whereas some works achieved well over 80 per cent. Ibid., p.57«
The Leverkusen district could only achieve a turnout of 59 *7 per 
oent in the same year. Per Betriebsrat, Vol.38, No.3, 1979? P*67«
29 . Ibid., p.64. However, throughout the Hoechst company the white- 
collar turnout was higher. Personalbericht Hoechst 1977? op .cit«, 
P«57«
30. This is general BGB policy (Interview FTO 5? Feb.*78) and is also 
laid down in the Chemical Workers* Union guidelines on works council
elections, cf). Richtlinien fur Betriebsratewahlen, op .cit., Para.4«
For the legal regulations which determine the possibilities, cf, 
Fitting; et al., op.cit., p.l68ff. The trends in types of elections 
may be found in Appendix 3, Table 5•
31. The German Salaried Staff Union for example supports the principle
of separate elections. of,. BAG, Programm der BAG zur Gesellschafts- 
politik, Hamburg, 1976, p.l4f.
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of the Chemical Workers* Union to achieve joint elections at Pelikan in
Hannover, a much smaller works where the MG is very strong. * Other
reasons for failure to achieve the aim of joint elections are a lack of
interest in the elections, something which the author observed personally
(33)in 1975 an(i lack of sufficient propaganda on the union part.
Naturally, where a number of different lists exist, the works council is 
likely to be subsequently composed of a number of factions. If there are 
sufficient such factions which unite together then they can sometimes 
wrest control of the works council from the Chemical Workers* Union/34^
In the oase of a joint election, the Chemical Workers* Union is more 
likely to achieve high representation since they normally receive more 
support from blue-collar workers who also generally outnumber the white- 
collar staff.(3^ )
The actual composition of the works council seems to depend on a wide range 
of factors such as local trade union traditions, size of establishment and 
the personalities involved. There are no figures available for the chemi­
cal industry itself, but the breakdown of works councils in the organisa­
tional area of the Chemical Workers* Union is given in the following table.
indication of the importance of this factor was provided by the failure
32. Interview FTO 5? Feb.'78.
33. This was felt to be the reason for failure to achieve joint elections 
at the Agrochemie AG case study works - a small site - in 1978. 
Interview BR 2, Oct.*78. For the percentage of respondents who 
turned out in..the actual election cf. Appendix 3? Table 32 below.
The actual turnout was 89 per cent. Interview 019, Oct.*7 8 . For
a discussion of this discrepancy cf. Chapter 1, Section (iv).
34* As at Merck in..1972. 0. Jacobi et al. (eds) 1973, op .cit., p. 63®
35• ££• "BR-Wahl 1978 - Schnellubersicht", op.cit.
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Results of works council elections according to BetrVG 1972 in the 
organisational area of the Chemical Workers' Union. (36)
Table 5*1*
Representa­
tives Unorg.
0 r 
IGCPK
g a n i
Other
DGB
s a t i 
DAG
0 n s 
VAA CGB^
1
Others
Workers No 767 10192 88 3 43 8 i
1972 $ 6.83 91.89 0.79 0.03 - 0.39 0.07 j
1975 No 642 10226 72 10 59 2
$ 5.83 92.87 O.65 0.09 - 0.54 0.02
1978 No 770 10486 80 19 1 52 20
$ 6.74 91.76 0.70 0.17 0.01 0.46 0.18
Salaried
Staff
1972 No 1134 2899 40 373 1 10 21
$ 25.32 64.75 O.89 8.33 0.02 0.22 0.47
1975 No 1067 3573 38 309 8 8 15
$ 21.26 71.20 0.76 6.16 0.16 0.16 0.30
1978 No 1209 3800 50 300 27 9 41
$ 22.24 69.90 O.92 5.52 0.50 0.17 0.76
Total
1972 No 1891 13091 128 376 1 53 • 29
$ 12.15 84.08 0.82 2.42 0.01 0.34 0 .18
1975 No 1709 13799 110 319 8 67 17
$ 10.66 86.09 O.69 1.99 0.05 0.42 OolO
1978 No 1979 14286 130 319 28 61 61
$ 11.74 84.71 0.77 1.89 0.17 0.36 0.36
36. Source: Ibid.
GB 72-75? op.cit., pp.406 and 418°
(a) Sometimes abbreviated CGD - Christliche Gewerlcschafts'beyv/CA^ nq
Deutschland.
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years and this is a reflection of the increased number of opposition lists
(37)which existed in this election. 7 Not only did unorganised works coun­
cillors gain in strength once more but the growth of the VAA, an organi- 
sation which represents the interests of senior staff,' 7is most notice­
able. Nevertheless, the Chemical Workers* Union dominates the works-
(39)councils together with other BGB unions.' "
This strength was reflected at the Agrochemie AG case study works, for 
example, where the whole works counoil were members of the Chemical 
Workers* Union. Even under such circumstances, however, it would be a 
mistake to view works councils as monolithic organisations for it is 
common for factions to form within the councils. Reasons for this can be 
organisational, ideological or simply personal* Statements from the 
Agrochemie AG works illustrate this:
"There was a split in the works council at the initial meeting. An 
attempt to replace the chairman failed. However, afterwards we have to 
work together or else we can*t get anything done." (40)
"I don’t sit on any of the committees ... I was forced into opposition 
as I didn’t think the chairmanship should remain on one hand or be in­
herited, so I was the opposition candidate. Generally, there’s no 
conflict now." (41)
When such splits in the council persist through the period of time it is 
in office i^t can greatly handicap the works council. There are, however,
37• W. Vitt, "Betriebsratswahl 1978 trotz grosserer Schwierigkeiten ein 
Erfolg fur die IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik", Ber Betriebsrat, Vol. 28,
No.3, 1919, P.55.
38. cf. Chapter 2, Section (iii)b above.
39. BGB unions often stand together on the same platform when a company
covers more than one industry, cf. Chapter 2, Footnote 379*
40. Interview BR 2, Oot.'78.
41. Interview BR 5? Oct.*78.
A greater fragmentation of works councils is visible in 1978 than in other
-  311  -
occasions when such opposition may well be quite justified, if the works 
councillors are monopolising power for their own ends, for example.
This often leads to a weakening of the trade union and alienation between 
the works counoil and the workforce and it is then common for active 
trade unionists from within the same union to oppose the works council 
majority/42'
Once the election has occurred, "the legal position of the works council 
is characterised by a certain aloofness from the workforce. The works 
constitution scarcely intends that all or part of the workforce should 
be actively involved in the representation of their interests. For 
example, although the works assembly can send resolutions to the works' 
council and given an opinion of its decisions, it cannot instruct the 
works council what to do. The peace obligation forbids the works council 
from mobilising all or part of the workforce in order to strengthen their
/ y* \
negotiating position." ' 7
Therefore there is generally very little contact between works councillors, 
particularly the full-time ones^ 44^ and the workforce after the election.
42. This is the situation at Bayer AG, Leverkusen at present (Personal 
observations and informal discussions).
43. Author's translation of: "Die rechtliche Stellung der Institution 
Betriebsrat gegenuber der Belegschaft ist durch eine relative 
Abgehobenheit von ihr gekennzeichnet. Eine aktive Einbeziehung der 
Belegschaft oder Belegschaftsteilen in die Interessenvertretungs- 
politik ist in der Betriebsverfassung kaum vorgesehen. So kann 
g.B. die Betriebsversammlung dem Betriebsrat zwar Antrage unter- 
breiten, oder zu seinen Beschlussen Stellung nehmen, sie kann ihn 
aber nicht verbindlioh festlegen. Die betriebliche Friendenspflicht 
verbietet dem Betriebsrat jede Mobilisierung der Belegschaft oder 
Belegsohaftsteilen zur Starkung seiner Verhandlungsposition".
Dzielak et al., op .cit., p.102.
4 4 . A number of the works council are released from their previous jobs
to carry out representative duties on a full-time basis. This, number 
varies according to the size of the works, csf, BetrVG 1972 Para.38, 
and Fitting et al., op.cit., p.364ff.
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Shift (especially production) work further increases the problem for the 
full-time works councillors are only available during the day. It might 
take several weeks therefore for a shift worker to bring a problem to a 
full-time works councillor/4^ )
At Agrochemie AG there was some considerable criticism of the amount of 
contact the full-time works council chairman had with the workforce.
"There are very rarely discussions since the works council chairman^ 4®^ 
doesn't come around the plants very often. Perhaps we've so few 
problems that he doesn't have to talk to us." (47)
"In the mines the works councillors used to come around and discuss our 
problems every day. That's what I miss here - you only see him when the 
elections are coming up." (48)
These statements seemed to reflect feelings in general and the visits of
the chairman to the plants prior to the election were rather like adding 
(4 9)
insult to injury. Whilst it is possible to spend too much time touring
the plants at the cost of other important tasks/ °^^a lack of contact
45* Often there are no works councillors on a particular shift or within
a specific production area. This was the case at Bayer AG and was-
one of the reasons for the formation of the active trade union 
opposition list for tb,e works council election in 1978. (informal 
discussions).
4 6 . Since there was only one full-time works councillor at Agrochemie 
AG, he was often referred to as "der Betriebsrat" - the works 
councillor. Interview M 9? Oct.'78.
47. Translation of a statement from Interview VL 1, Oct.'7 8 .
48. Translation of a statement from Interview M 4? Oct.*7 8 .
49* Similar results were reported in A. Home, Der beklagte Sieg, 
Villingen, 1964? p*l89 and in H. Kotthoff, op .cit., p. 89 where 
the chemical industry was reported to have the least frequent visits 
of works councillors to the plants, (in a sample of a wide range of 
different sized companies from the metal processing, chemical, tex­
tile, printing, food processing and timber industries of Sudbaden,
This study is in effect a revision of Blume's original investigation. 
cf. 0,Blume, op.cit. ) H. Kotthoff, op .cit., p.Iff.
50. Such works councillors are sometimes called "back-slapping socialists" 
or "Schulterklopfsozialisten"•
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(51)chemie AG to resentment and alienation amongst the workforce. ' Never­
theless, very few respondents actually challenged the value of the
institution of full-time works councillors at Agrochemie AG even after
‘ . (52)exercising a certain amount of criticism. 7
between the full-time works councillors and the workforce led at Agro-
Should an employee at Agrochemie AG have problems then he has to visit
the works council during consultation hours (rather like a doctor) which
are held every week. However, not many employees seemed to make use of 
(53)this opportunity" 7- perhaps because the works council was not available 
at the time when the problem was most pressing.
In addition, Kotthoff’s study reveals that works councils in the ohemical
industry do not inform the workforce of important occurrences to the same
extent as those in other industries/ 94) This seems to reflect badly on
the qualities of the works council in general as this is an important
(55 )indicator of behaviour.' 7 Similar circumstances were met at Agrochemie
AG where the works council seemed reluctant to pass on information even
(56)to the union lay officers. Indeed, one works council respondent re­
fused to answer a number of questions on discussions held in the council,
51. For- example: "I’m not very satisfied with the chairman. He’s for­
gotten that he used to be a craftsman and what it’s like. What’s 
more, he always replies, * 1 don’t know’, when you ask him a question." 
From Interview 040, Oct.’7 8 .
52. cf. Appendix 3, Table 36 below.
53. Interview BR 1, Oct.’78.
5 4 . H. Kotthoff, op .cit., Graphik Nr. 54*
55. Ibid., p.87f.
5 6 . These attitudes and the problems they can cause are discussed in
more detail below.
(57)
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claiming they were secret.
Another recent investigation indicates that the degree of information 
amongst the workforce on a variety of topics affecting their work varied 
considerably* However, it did confirm that the works council was not an 
important source of information, nor were works assemblies. The major 
source of information was the management heirarchy. ^ 8 )
Under these circumstances it is not surprising that Kotthoff should re­
port that most senior works councillors from the chemical industry did
not consider that the works council was well informed of what was going
irce,
(60)
(59 )on amongst the workforc "or that the workforce had much confidence
in the works council.
Landwehrmann and Albring have indicated that neither works assemblies
not notice-boards are particularly important as sources of information
(6 l)for the workforce.' " These results seem to be confirmed by the Agro-
57* Interview BR 2, 0ct.*78. This is not true (cf. BetrVG 1972, Para. 
1 2 0 ) unless the matter has specifically been declared to be a com­
pany secret by management* Such ignorance (real or feigned) could 
easily lead to conflict between lay officers and works councillors«
5 8 * Landwehrmann and Albring, op.oit., p.32ff. It might be borne in
mind, however, that this study was heavily supported by the chemical 
employers. Ibid., p.8 f and "Information und Mitwirkung-Ergebnisse 
einer Umfrage bei Chemiebesohkftigten," Infobrief, il/77* p.6 .
59* Only 9 per cent of works council chairmen and 22 per cent of deputy 
chairmen claimed the works council was well informed. The chemical 
industry lies much lower than the other industries. H. Kotthoff, 
op .cit., Graphik Hr. 55*
60. Once more the chemical industry comes off worst. Ibid., Graphik 
Nr.57* However, these results do contrast strongly with the general 
satisfaction amongst the Agrochemie AG workforce with the work of 
the works council which seemed to act in a similar way to that por­
trayed here. cf. Appendix 3, Table 33 below. It was also seen that 
these evaluations do not necessarily agree with the findings on the 
effectiveness of works council representation in the chemical in­
dustry. See below.
6 1 . Landwehrmann and Albring, op .cit., p.37*
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chemie AG case study despite claims to the contrary by workplace re- 
(62)presentatives.' There was no association between the reading of
notioe-boards or attendance at works assemblies and knowledge of the
(63)works councils rights or roles. 7
However, similar factors did emerge when considering reasons for the 
inadequacy of both these forms of disseminating informatiom. As far as 
notice-boards are concerned, there seemed to be an insufficient distri­
bution through the production plants, so in such cases the grapevine 
takes over.^^
In the case of works assemblies, an immediate difference in attendance is
found between the "acid plant" which might be considered a typical pro-
(65 )duction plant and between the works sample. 0  Hence it was hypothesised 
that shift workers found it very difficult to attend works assemblies, 
and this was confirmed by crosstabulation followed by the chi-squared 
test for association which was significant at the 1 per cent level.
An explanation for this association can be found by considering the time
that works assemblies are held and the shift system. The assemblies are
held at 2.30 pm and thus the shift who cease work at 2 pm can attend with 
(66)ease. 7 However, due to the manning levels most of the late shift cannot
62. Interviews VL 1, VL 3, VL 5, BR 1, BR 2 and BR 4  all Oct.'78.
63* cf. Appendix 3, Tables 26 and 35? chi-squared tests having been 
carried out after crosstabulation.
64* Interviews VL 3, VL 5 and M 10, all Oct.’78*
6 5 . of,. Appendix 3, Table 35 •
66. This attendance is paid at normal rates. BetrVG 1972, Para. 44? 
cf. Fitting etal., p*410ff.
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be released to attend. The night shift (due to start at 10 pm) must 
come in midxiray through their rest-time and the free shift on a day when 
they would otherwise not need to come/87) As many workers have to 
travel some miles to attend, it is not really surprising that very few 
besides the early shift attend. However, the works assembly is trans­
mitted via close circuit television to the workshops for the maintenance 
(68)workers.' 7 Although there seems to be little relationship between 
attendance at works assemblies and knowledge of works council rights 
and roles, the privileges enjoyed by craftsmen might contribute to their 
being better informed/89)
This infrequent attendance of works assemblies is reflected in the
range of answers provided by Agrochemie AG respondents about the fre-
■e he!
(71)
quency with, ’which the assemblies are ld. which here was every three
months as regulated by legislation.
Elsewhere in the ohemical industry there is some evidence that, in some
5 0  per oent of works, assemblies are not always held as frequently as
laid down in the Works Constitution Act. In this, however, the chemical
(72)industry does not seem to be markedly worse than other industries.' 7
One solution to this problem may be found in the provisions which'permit
6 7 . e.g. Interviews VL 3, 007? 012, 014, 015, 035? 043? all Oct.’7 8 .
68. Interviews BR 5? M 10? Oct.f78*
6 9 * See below.
70. cf,. Appendix 3? Table 34* Chi-squared test showed an association 
between attendance and knowledge of frequency at the 3$ level of 
significance. 88 per cent of respondents who always attended 
answered correctly compared with 68 per cent of those who only
do so occasionally.
71. BetrVG 1972, Para.43.
72. H. Kotthoff, op .cit., Tabelle Nr.1 9 .
separate assemblies to be held for eaoh shift' 7but at Agrochemie AG, 
a small works, there was no interest for this/*74  ^ Furthermore, works 
assemblies should be made more interesting by inviting a wider range of 
speakers and by ensuring that any questions asked receive a satisfactory 
answer•
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(73)
The Works Constitution Act 1972 gives the works council a wide range of 
responsibilities and rights. In addition to such general tasks as en­
suring that all laws, safety regulations, collective agreements and works
(75)council agreements are enforced, V7these rights and responsibilities 
include "a number of rights of co-determination, consultation and in­
formation ... in the areas of social policy matters, personnel matters-
(7 6 )and economic matters." 7 This constitutes the second level of co- 
(77)determination 7and provides the works council with the majority of its 
potential teeth, given the limits of co-operation with management and the 
peace obligation which have previously been discussed.
Works councillors interviewed saw their role primarily in the light of 
this legislation. Their main tasks were to regulate the problems and 
grievances of the employees and to represent their interests. Particular
73. BetrVG 1972, Para.42.
74. Interview VL 5? Oct.*78*
75. For a full range of such general tasks c£. BetrVG 1972, Para.80, 
also Fitting et al., op .oit., p.6l7ff. As discussed later, in
this way the works council, a non-union institution, is respons­
ible for ensuring that union agreements are enforced.
7 6 . K. Koch, op .cit., p.20. Koch gives further details of these rights 
which are not listed here since they are discussed where relevant. 
In the legislation these rights are primarily regulated in the 
BetrVG 1972, Paras. 8 7 , 91-99? 102 and 106. Particular emphasis
can be given to works council rights on dismissals, cf. Para.102.
77. For the first level cf+ Chapter 2, Section (iv).
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stress was given to negotiations and the preliminary work for them, 
committee work, personnel matters such as dismissals, working conditions
(7 8 )and safety. This latter area received considerable emphasis in a
number of interviews reflecting perhaps the potential hazards in the 
chemical industry.^9)
Kotthoff has discussed the difficulties in both portraying the range of 
activities in which works councillors are involved and in assessing their 
effectiveness/80  ^ Due to limitations of time and resources the empirical 
studies were restricted to an evaluation of the works council by one work­
force in particular and to works councillors own assessments of their role
and efficacy. It has been shown, however, that works councillors do not
(8l)give an accurate picture of their effectiveness in interviews. J The 
employees* assessment of works councils remains of considerable interest, 
however, and this chapter will concentrate on their views together with 
some of the most important works council tasks which can be illustrated 
with the help of empirical as well as secondary data.
In order to compare the findings at Agrochemie AG with those of Blume, 
identical wording was chosen for the initial question on the role of the 
works council/82  ^ In general Blume fs results were confirmed, allowing 
for the rather different nature of the works sample at Agrochemie AG
7 8 . This paragraph is a distillation of a large number of statements,
mainly from the following interviews: BRV 1 , Aug.’77? DRV 5? Sep. *77? 
BRV 15, Nov.*78 and BR 1, Oct.*7 8 .
79* Interviews BRV 1, Aug.'78; BR 2 and BR 3, Oct.*78. Safety is dis­
cussed in greater detail "below.
80. H. Kotthoff, op.cit., p.101.
8 1. Ibid., p.132.
82. cf. Appendix 2.1, Question 2 8  and 0. Blume, op.cit., p.22.
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which specifically included high percentage of those people involved in 
workplace industrial relations who might, therefore, he expected to have 
a high degree of knowledge of this important issue. However, as Blume
/ qt \
found' 'in the majority of cases, respondents did not define thu works
council’s role in terms of the legislation hut simply that it should
represent the employees’ interests/84) These general answers seemed
normally to hide / a lack of detailed knowledge since 4 3  per cent of the
works sample was only able to name one or less than one role. There was,
however, a limited degree of detailed knowledge particularly amongst those
respondents heavily involved in workplace industrial relations>although
very few respondents could name more than four individual groups of 
( 8 5  )tasks. Of all specific issues, the personnel co-determination tasks
were best known and this undoubtedly reflects the importance of thi®
(86) area*' 7
Blume assumes that the order of answers reflects the wishes of employees
(87 )rather than the actual tasks carried out.' "  This is uncertain. Two 
recent surveys in the chemical industry have dealt directly with this 
question but led to widely different results, although both report some 
differences between actual and desired activities. One survey gives wage 
issues as the most frequent activity of the works council whilst stating 
that the issue that respondents most desired to be regulated was the
83. Ibid., p.23»-
8 4 . cf.* Appendix 3, Table 30.
8 5 . Around 15 per cent. Ibid., Table 31.
86. Ibid., Table 30.
8 7 . 0. Blume, op.cit., p.23«
question of bonuses. 7 The other survey finds the most important issue 
and the issue which respondents most desire to be important to be identi­
cal. This issue is that of wage group classification and bonuses/89^
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(88 )
The most important issues seem either directly or indirectly to be con­
cerned with questions of material benefits, thus basically confirming one 
of Blume 's main results/9°) jn ohemical industry this certainly re­
flects the freedom of movement left for management in the larger and more
(91)profitable companies by the collective agreements. 7
Despite the lack of detailed knowledge of the works council role or any
degree of specific knowledge of the co-determination rights of the works
(92)council,' "employees are basically satisfied that the works council had 
enought rights in order to carry out their task. At Agrochemie AG over
7 5  per oent of respondents were satisfied with the current rights of the
.red i
(9 4 )
(93)works council' "compar with below 6 0  per cent of a rather wider sample
of chemical employees
88. E. Teschner, op .cit., p.l40f. This survey compares a number of in­
dustries, one of which is chemicals, but.there is only one ohemical 
establishment in this part of the survey.
8 9 . Landwehrmann and Albring, op .cit., p.8 2 f. This survey covers five 
widely different ohemical establishments.
90. 0. Blume, op .cit., p.36.
91. This willingness on the part of management to negotiate with the
works councils over material issue places works coundillors who
are usually also union officials in a paradoxical position. Such 
agreements weaken the position of the union whilst strengthening 
that of the works council. Most works councillors choose to 
strengthen their own position in order to ensure their o\m re- 
election. Interview BRV 1, Aug.T77 and H. Kotthoff, op.cit., p.78f.
92. cf. Appendix 3, Tables 40 and 41* This lack of knowledge was by no 
means the sole preserve of respondents uninvolved in workplace in­
dustrial relations. It even extended to many works councillors 
themselves•
93. cf. Ibid., Table 38.
94* Landwehrmann and Albring, op.cit., p.8 4 * This compares with 6l per
cent of a sample of BASF workers being satisfied with the provisions 
of the BetrVG 1952. Schumann et al., op.cit., p.1 9 8 .
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officers and works councillors is, however, by no means so great.
Particular criticism was reserved for the extent of co-determination
rights in the oase of dismissal and the lack of co-determination on 
(95 )economic i s s u e s . O n  the other hand, some local officials felt it
was more important to exhaust all the rights under the present law rather
than to fight for additional ones/98) There is certainly considerable
(97)evidence that this is not done." '
As far as can be ascertained from the limited data available(98)the
employees in the chemical industry are more or less satisfied with the
way in which the works council fulfils it’s role. Limited criticism
was expressed about the amount of contact between the workforce and the
(q q )works counoil and there are isolated complaints of corruption."
This generally positive evaluation of the works council must have a 
positive influence on the attitudes of trade union members towards trade 
unions since the Agrochemie AG study confirmed the common finding that
The support for the Works Constitution Act 1972 amongst trade union
95. Interviews FTO 1, FTO 6 , both Aug.*77; FTO 10, BRV 4 , Sep.*77;
BR 3, VL 3, Oct.*78. Also H. Kotthoff, op .cit., p.l6 f.
9 6 . e.g. Interview BRV 5? Sep. *77• One lay officer even stated that 
"to give the works council any more rights would be like turning 
it into management. Interview VL 5? Oct. *78.
97* cf.* H. Kotthoff, passim and especially pp.101-134*
9 8 , Most surveys do not touch on this question for some reason.
Hartmann feels that the omission of this area from Blume *s study 
represents a fear that widespread criticism might have been re­
vealed, something which would have been unpleasant for the trade 
union sponsors of the study. H. Hartmann, "Works Councils and 
the Iron Law of Oligarchy", BJIR., Vol.XVII, 1 9 7 9 ?  P « 7 3 .
99* Appendix 3,* Table 33, Interviews VL 1, 006, 016, 038, etc. 
Oct.*78 and Schumann et al., op .cit♦, p. 196.
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there is little differentiation "between the works council and the trade
(100)union on the shopfloor.' 7
Given the importance of the works council to shopfloor attitudes on 
unions, then union attitudes about the main tasks of the works council 
are of interest. The journal for works councillors in the Chemical 
Workers1 Union placed particular stress in the following area after the 
last election/301^
(1) exercising strict control over dismissals through full use
of co-determination rights;
(2) not to see their role as that of mediator between employer
and employees but as the representative of the employees;
(3) the relinquishment of the works councils1 defensive role and
to move onto the offensive by use of a carefully planned 
action programmeJ102>
(4 ) the explanation of works council work so that employees can
understand it.
The importance of the works council to the Chemical Workers' Union goes 
beyond this, however. The union's only real chance to recruit members 
is to co-operate with the works councils / 103^and this is the root of
100. This was often apparent during the time spent at Agrochemie AG. 
cf. 0. Blume, op .cit., p. 23. Where a bad.works council exists, 
this would equally have negative effects for the union, as do 
the limitations under which all works councils work•
101. G. Rose, "Die Hauptaufgaben der Betriebsratearbeit 1978-1981,"
Der Betriebsrat, Vol.27, 1978, No. 3/4, p.l69ff.
102. An example of such an action programme was provided in the same 
edition, cf. W. Dreibus, G. Rose, H. Weisner, J. Walter, "Beisuiel 
eines Arbeitsprogramms fur Betriebsrate," Ibid.., p.l73ff.
103. H.-E. Treu, Gewerkschaft und Betrieb, mimeographed report, University 
of Munster, Institute of Economic and Social Sciences, 1978, p.4 0 . 
(This report is Part Il(a) of a report called organisations- 
strnkturelle Wandlungsurozesse in westdeutschen Gewerkschaften 
1960-1975, by W. Str^eck, E. Treu and H. Bayer, mimeographed 
report, Berlin and Munster, I9 7 8 .
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the works councillors* power within the organisation. The source of 
this power is somewhat diverse. Firstly the works council is the only 
legitimate body which can negotiate directly with management. On top of 
this it enjoys a monopoly of information from management^104^as well as 
preferential information from the union. Furthermore, the Works Con­
stitution Act also empowers the works council to monitor the application 
of collective agreements and laws within the works, both areas where the 
union was more responsible originally for the regulations than the works 
council. The Act also provides the works councils with the necessary 
material support in terms of facilities (release from work, offices, 
secretarial and expert support, education courses) which are necessary 
determinants for the continuity of representation and professionalisation 
of the works councillors/ 1 0 5) Finally^there is no strong trade union 
tradition in the ohemical industry. As a result of this monopoly of 
representation and the fulfilment of trade union tasks within the est­
ablishment the works council has a large influence on the extent of 
development of actual union representation - specifically lay officers - 
in the works/10®^
The position of works councillors in the chemical industry is strengthened
4
104* Dzielak et al., op.cit., p.l02f.
105• Ibid., p.114* During the course of investigation carried out by 
the author no dissatisfaction was expressed about the level of 
faoilities which sometimes exceeded the legal requirements, such 
as by making a secretarially qualified works councillor the works 
council secretary - in effect an additional full-time works coun­
cillor. Interview BRV 15, Nov.*78. Few problems were experienced 
even in the time of Blume *s investigation except in smaller est­
ablishments. 0. Blume, op .cit., p.93ff.
106. Dzielak et al., o p . c i t p.114* Similar conclusions may be found 
in H.-E. Treu, op .oit., p.22. The relationships between works 
councillors and l&y officers are discussed in more detail below.
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particularly through management policies of co-operation and negotiation 
with the works council. The economic development of the chemical industry 
and the inability of collective agreements to fully exhaust the room for 
negotiations regionally or nationally is of relevance inthis connection! 1 0 7
The key position of the works council in the chemical industry for the 
union is reflected in the influence of works councillors on trade union 
policy and their strength at all levels of the organisation from the dis­
trict to the national executive/108) In fact, the district committees 
are almost entirely controlled by the works councillors since this is the 
committee which above all others determines the direction of local union
policy. Membership on this committee is crucial, therefore, to maintenance
.oil 
(110)
of power.009) The significance of the dominance of the works counci
over collective bargaining committees has been discussed elsewhere.
The works councillors also have a considerable representation at National 
Delegate Conferences/111) Thus, it is possible for works councillors to 
exert extensive influence on union policy.
The domination of the local union apparatus by works councillors ensures 
that the majority of contacts between full-time union officials and work­
place representatives involve works councillors. Full-time officers
107* Ibid., p.39f»
108* Dzielak et al., op .cit., p.115. This seems to be a general
phenomenon, cf. J.Bergmann et al., Vol.l., 1975? on.cit., p.303*
109. Interview FTO 18, Feb.*7 8 . Since works council chairmen are 
often the most experienced and senior representatives it is 
logical that the District Conference should elect them to the 
executive. Interview FTO 6, Aug.f77»
110. of. Chapter 4? Section (ii)a.
111. Projektgruppe Gewerkschaftsforschung, Vol.l, 1979? op.cit., p.152.
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generally attend all works council meetings and there is constant contact
(112)by telephone between the district officials and works' councillors.' 7 
In the light of this discussion the general association amongst the work­
force between the works council and the union is quite understandable.
Nevertheless, these close connections between union and works council
do not mean , that the works councils always pursue union policies within
their own establishments. On the contrary, in the larger chemical oom- 
(113)panies, 7works councils are renowned for following policies which 
take account of the requirements of their own establishments/114  ^ In­
deed, this type of action is required by the Works Constitution Act 
and the choice between "Betriebsegoismusw and union policy is one of 
the classic dilemmas for works councillors/119  ^ When management is 
prepared to make significant concessions to works councillors as is 
often the case in large chemical works, many works councillors feel 
they would be fools not to accept since they would be likely to en­
danger their own positions in this w a y / 110^
What type of relations develop between works councils and management in 
the chemical industry? There are a number of basic types of contact that
112. Interviews-FTO 1, Aug. *77 anti BRV 5? Sep. *77* Also, many 
statements at the Agrochemie AG case study works.
113* Perhaps with the exception of BASF, where a functional co­
operation exists, cf. H.-E. Treu, op .cit ♦, p.41f*
114. Such behaviour is known in German as "Betriebsegoismus".
115. The relationship between a low degree of union organisation 
in a workforce and the "betriebsegoistische" policies of its 
works council is quite logical, therefore, cf. H. Kotthoff, 
op.cit., p.7 &f*
1 1 6 . e.g. Interview BRV 1 , Aug.f77• Examples of such* concessions can
be material benefits for- the workforce or a cadre of plant re­
presentatives throughout the works, cf. Chapter 2, Section (ii). 
Treu sees this development as the only instance of the legal 
separation of workplace representation and union representation 
outside the- workplace leading to the formation of a non-union 
representational cadre. H.-E. Treu, op.cit., p.40f.
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management and which depend to a certain extent on the structural organi-
(117)sation of the works council. ' 7
can occur which influence the type of relations between works council and
The structural elements of the works council usually include a chairman,
/ *| *1 Q \
a deputy chairman, a works committee,' .specialist committees, the
economics committee and joint commissions. Contacts can occur between
management and any of these persons or groups of people as, indeed,
management can meet the whole works council at one time. The legislation:
simply states that management and works council should meet at...least once 
(119)a month.' Evidence seems to indicate this is the approximate fre­
quency of meetings between management and the whole works council. How­
ever, the importance,of such meetings decreases with increasing size of 
company/ 1 2 0  ^ sinoe in medium-sized companies contacts between the chairman 
and management are important whilst in the largest companies' the committees 
and joint commissions carry out muoh of the work/121^
Works councils generally lay down their own rules under which discussions 
and negotiations may be held between their own sub-organisations and 
management. In this way it may decide on which issues specific committees
117* The major determinant of this seems to he size of establishment
and chemical sites are usually quite large, cjf. H. ICotthoff,
op.oit., p.8 ff.
118. The size of this committee, which is in effect the executive
committee of the works council varies from 5 *&° H  depending on 
the size of the works council, cf. BetrVG 1972, Para. 27*
119• This took place at Agrochemie AG and at most other smaller sites 
visited and is also confirmed in H. Kotthoff, op .cit., p.8 .
120. They are unimportant in sites with more than 600 employees,
•Ibid., Graphik Nr. 12.
121. Ibid., Graphik Nr, 13. These committees are of particular im­
portance in the ohemical industry. Numerous interviews and Ibid., 
Graphik Nr. 14? 15*
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on what matters the chairman can come to an agreement with management <.
Such decisions together with the election of chairman, deputy and all
committee members are generally taken at the initial works council meeting
(122)immediately after the election.' 7
may take decisions without prior referal to the full works council or
In the chemical works studied in greater detail it was not permitted for
(123)the works council chairman to meet management on his own. This seems
to be a common means of preventing distrust developing between the body 
of the works council and the chairman. At Agrochemie AG meetings between 
management and the full-council had been introduced shortly before the 
study with a similar aim. These meetings were apparently successful, 
leading to an open exchange of information/124) These findings are re­
flected in a general rejection of personal dealings between the management 
and chairmen in the ohemical industry/129) However, the same sample of 
respondents did not really consider that meetings between management anti
/ n Of\ )the full council were particularly appropriate either, 7thus reflecting 
the strength of the committee system in the chemical industry.
In all but the smallest chemical establishments a large amount of works 
counoil work is carried out on committees. At Agrochemie AG there were
122. Interviews BR 1, BR 5, both Oct.*78? BRV 15, BRV 18, both Nov.*78,
123. Interviews BRV 5, Sep.’77, BR 1, Oct.’78 and BRV 18, Nov.’78.
However, in some larger chemical companies such contacts seemed 
to exist. BRV 1, Aug.’77•
124* Interviews BR 2 , M 7, both Oct.*78.
125. H. Kotthoff, op .cit., Graphik Nr. 17. It is normally permitted
for two works councillors, often chairman and deputy chairman, 
to meet management.
126. Ibid., Graphik Nr. 18.
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four committees, at another company with around 1 0 0 0  employees there wero
eight whilst the works councils of all the three largest chemical com-
( 1 2 7 )panies have around thirteen committees. 1 7 The range of these committees 
is remarkably extensive covering such issues as personnel matters, train­
ing, safety, payment systems, canteens, employees' suggestions for im­
provements, etc/ 12°^
These committees generally meet management responsible for the particular 
area concerned and if the committee has decision making ability, which is 
common in such areas as company housing, hardship funds, etc., then the 
committee is likely to have an equal number of works council and manage­
ment members/129^
On the management side these committees are manned primarily from the
personnel and social departments with various specialist sections covering
their own areas of responsibility, together with safety engineers and
similar experts as required/13*”^  The works council manning which is
determined at the initial meeting of the works council after the election
may be decided according to the specialist skills of the individual works 
(131)councillors. 7 This leads to a sharing of the work load in a relatively 
even way and to a more effective handling of the subject matter/132  ^On
127* Interviews BR 1, Oct.'78; CM 11, Sep.*77; BRV 1 , Aug.'77;
BRV 5, Sep.'77 and CM 9, Nov.'78.
128. Numerous interviews and documents from Hoechst AG and Kronos 
Titan GmbH.
129* Interviews CM 12 and BRV 18, Nov.*78.
130. Interviews BRV 1, Aug.'77; &R 3, and BR 2, Oct.'78; CM 9 , Nov.'78.
131. Interviews BRV 4, Sep. *77 and BRV 15, Nov.'78.
132. Thus the Hoechst AG works council which has 43 members, 20 of 
whom are full-time, shared the work load so that full-time works 
councillors were on 3 . 7  committees on average (max.7 ? min.2 ), 
whilst non full-time councillors were on 2 committees each on 
average, (max.5? min.l). Hoechst AG, breakdown of Betriebsrat, own calculations. - —
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the other hand, it is possible for ideological splits or personal dis­
likes to influence the voting behaviour at the initial meeting so that 
particular individuals or groups do not receive the responsibility which 
their ability or mandate would entitle/133) This is probably unusual. 
One management respondent believed the composition of the committees to 
be very significant for:
"experts meet experts and carry out important tasks. It becomes a non- 
ideological forum and is one of the secrets of .social peace." (1 3 4 )
Much detailed work is carried out on these committees particularly in 
preparation for meetings. At the meetings, the frequency of which can 
vary considerably, negotiations take place and compromises are agreed, 
so that either a decision can be taken or else a recommendation made to 
the works committee or works council for a decision/139) Much every 
day business is conducted between the works committee and the correspond­
ing management organisation which is sometimes known as the personnel 
committee. This might be made up of senior personnel and production 
managers together with supporting staff/138) As far as negotiations be­
tween the works council and management are concerned, these are probably
(137 )the most important bodies in the larger chemical companies.' 7 
According to the Works Constitution Act all companies with one hundred or
133* Interview BR 5, Oct.*78, and E. Gipperich et al., op.oit.
134* Interview CM 9? Nov.’78.
1 3 5 * Such procedures seem to vary greatly from one company to another.
Sometimes decisions can be taken provided they are unanimous,
other issues are always reserved for either the works council or
the executive board. Interviews BRV 5, Sep.f77? BRV 16, and 
CM 9, Nov.’78.
136. Interviews CM 9, OM 12, BRV 16, all Nov.’78.
137* Interview BRV 5, Sep.*77* On workplace negotiations, see below.
more employees must have an economics committee/138  ^ This requirement 
is certainly not fulfilled although the number of large companies without 
such a committee^which is responsible for consultation on the economic 
state of the company/ 1 3 9  ^ is fairly small/ 1 4 0  ^ This committee is
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supposed to meet once a month but this frequency of meetings is very rare.
(141),
(142)
Five meetings per year seem quite usual/ 1 4 1  ^ although by no means all
companies have as many as four per year.
Trade union full-time officials may not sit on the economics committee 
although the Ohemical Workers* Union does employ two officers to advise
lay members/143  ^ The works council may choose experts - often senior
»
managerial staff-to sit on the committee and advise them, and this is 
not unknown/144  ^ In such circumstances a high degree of trust must 
exist between the senior staff concerned and the works council. However, 
in other cases the works committee assumes, more or less, the function 
of the economics committee / 14^) Unless there are no senior staff who 
can be trusted^this type of policy is short sighted since it is unlikely
138. Wirtschaftsausschuss. BetrVG 1972, Para.106, of. F. Bleistein, 
op .cit., p.2 5 7 *
139* Th® Act lays down that the company must inform the committee of 
any issues which affect the employees interests in good time and 
in detail. Particular mention is made of the financial state, 
the production programme, rationalisation, changes.in production 
methods, plant closures, etc. Ibid.
140. In a recent survey 70 per cent of chemical companies had an 
economics committee compared with 5 5  Pe** cent on average.
H. Kotthoff, op .cit., Graphik 21. This may well be a reflection 
of the size of chemical companies.
141* Interviews BRV 1, Aug.*77 and CM 11, Sep.*77*
142. In Sudbatien 8 6  per cent of chemical companies held meetings of 
their economics committee. This compared with 6 4  per cent
on average. H. Kotthoff, o p . c i t Graphik Nr.22.
143. Interview FTO 4> Aug.*77•
14 4 . Interview CM 14, Nov.*78. For the legal regulations, cf. BetrVG 
1972, Para. 107.
145* Interview BRV 1, Aug.*77*
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that many works councillors will possess the expertise to understand the 
economic data presented/148)
Although very few complaints were voiced about the degree of information 
provided by the employers to the works council in general or the economics 
committee in particular some doubt about this still remains/147) The 
depth of knowledge of works councillors which is certainly not ideal is 
also of relevance in evaluating such matters/148)
The committee system which operates as a result of the Works Constitution 
Act in a large percentage of chemical companies might be considered to 
constitute a major pant of the formal system of industrial relations at 
the workplace/149) Much of the smooth running of workplace industrial 
relations in Germany, particularly in the chemical industry where this 
committee system is well established, must be accredited to the almost 
automatic solution of problems by what amounts to a bureaucracy created 
for this purpose/190)
However, parallel to this formal system there also exists an important 
informal system. Rome respondents stated quite categorically that it was 
far easier to discuss problems and to find solutions to them with a small
146. On the qualifications of works councillors cf. H. Kotthoff, op.cit., 
p.67ff.
147* of. Ibid, Graphik 32, 33 and 34*
1 4 8 . The inadequacies in this area were often revealed in the un­
structured interviews with works councillors.
149* The other major part of the formal system are the negotiations
carried out between the works council and management, only 
certain of which occur within the committee system.
150. Through the whole system of co-determination at the workplace
many issues such as dismissals, job evaluation, pay problems, 
rationalisation, etc. are dealt with automatically. However, 
the efficacy of the system varies somewhat, of. H. Kotthoff, 
op.cit., p.lOlff.
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group of senior works councillors. Small groups facilitated frank and 
open discussion In this way there is constant informal contact
between works council and management quite independant of the formal 
discussions. "This prevents problems from building up and leads to a 
constant solution of problems and helps to foster a relationship of 
trust, •• together with a knowledge and understanding of your 
opponent,«^1 5 2 )
This statement also reveals the characteristic pluralist view of in­
dustrial relations in West Germany which emerged on many occasions. 
Although the two sides of industry see industrial relations in this 
light, in the chemical industry there seems to be a recognition of the 
validity of the other side’s opinion from their point of view. This 
leads to oo-operation, trust and an attitude of joint problem solution 
"since, above all, both sides want to reach agreement. The employers 
know that it is impossible to run a business in the long term without 
the agreement and co-operation of the employees’ representatives. On 
the other hand, the works council is forced to make agreements since the 
employers control a whole range of privileges and benefits which they 
can award voluntarily but upon which the works council cannot insist 
(e.g. plus rate payments). Therefore the works council cannot maintain 
conflictual strategies in the long run since this would lead to disad­
vantages for the workforce as the employers would refuse to pay voluntary 
benefits .»^53) situation often leads to an informal exchange of
151. e.g. Interview CM 12, Nov.*7 8 .
152. Translation of a statement in Interview CM 9? Nov.*7 8 .
153. Translation of a statement in Interview FTO 18, Feb.'78.
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concessions by both sides which enhances the possibilities of achieving 
agreement 3 154)
The system of the bureaucratic handling of a wide range of issues super­
imposed hy an informal system which also functions to this end, and large 
pressures towards coming to agreement provide some explanation of the
relative infrequency of overt industrial conflict at the workplace in 
(155)West Germany. In the chemical industry, this system has operated
under conditions of rapid economic growth and expansion over a period of 
many years. These economic circumstances have also enhanced the trend 
towards oo-operation and agreement particularly since the collective 
agreements left scope for many companies to bargain locally. The peace 
obligation on the works council and the lack of close contact between 
council and workforce generally prevent the works council from forcing 
particular issues and this also increases the trend towards co-operation® 
Bureaucratisation of works council tasks also seem associated with 
aloofness from the workforce yet with efficient problem solution.
Over a number of years there has been evidence of entrenchment of works 
councils in their posts Recently one commentator even suggested
and subsequently argued that works councillors have developed an immunity 
from replacement by re-election via a professionalisation of their key 
members Although it was necessary to introduce a number of other
154* Interviews FTO 9? Aug. *77 and CM 11, BRV 5 ? S'ep.’77*
155* There is further consideration below of the lack of overt conflict 
when the role of the works conciliation committee (Einiffun^sstelle) 
is considered.
1 5 6 . cf. 0. Blume, op.cit., p. 62.
157* D- Hartmann, 1979? op .cit. This article defends a previous claim
that works councils are subject to Michels * Iron Law of Oligarchy.
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factors(198)to fully explain the degree of entrenchment amongst works 
councillors, Hartmann summarised that:
"a high level of qualification amongst councillors goes together with 
large size of firm, superior efficiency of the works council, and ex­
tended tenure of the council chairman. A low level of skills, notably 
those transmitted in formal training, is associated with small firms, 
inefficiency in the council and reasonably frequent turnover amongst 
council chairmen." (1 5 9 )
Inhthe chemical industry, the works councillors seem generally to follow 
the first series of criteria(180^although crass counter-examples are 
sometimes m e t / 181) In Kotthofffs survey of five industries, works 
councils in the chemical industry were rated the second most efficient 
after the metal working industries. In addition to those factors listed 
above which have an influence on this efficiency the most important was 
the strength of trade union organisation in the workplace and the system 
of union representation which exists/182) It is to these topics, there­
fore, that our attention is now turned.
1 5 8 . These factors were management support for the works council - for
an example from the chemical industry cf. Personalbericht Hoechst 
1 9 7 7 , op .cit., p . 5 6  - the development of organised-support by the 
Vertrauensleute and the neutralisation of rival institutions - 
there are numerous examples of this in the ohemical industry too, 
cf. H.G. Lang, "Gewerkschaftsausschlusse in Hoechst - die IG Chemie 
statuiert ein 'Exempel," in 0. Jacobi et al. (eds), 1978, op .cit., .
p,176ff.
159* H. Hartmann, 1979, op.oit., p.77* This statement is based on
Kotthoff*s research which has been cited on numerous occasions.
160. cdf. H. Kotthoff, op.cit., especially Graphik 4 6 , 47 and 52.
161. As at Agrochemie AG where one works councillor was elected without 
any prior experience of industrial relations or knowledge in this 
area. Interview BR 3, Oct. *78. Generally, works councillors should 
previously have served as lay officers before being put forward as 
candidates for the election. On selection of candidates in the 
chemical industry cf,. Richtlinien fur Betriebsratewahlen, op .cit.
162. H. Kotthoff, op.cit., p.l31ff.
/ i G63)(ii; Workplace trade unionism.
Although the union density in the organisational area of the Chemical 
Workers' Union was high soon after the formation of the German Trade 
Union Confederation it began to decline quite rapidly so that by the 
middle of the 1960's it was around 50 per cent/104  ^ During this period 
of time there was a vast expansion of chemical industry and a large in­
crease in the workforce /   ^ Since the works constitution provides-
representation at the place of work and wage increases in the chemical 
industry have regularly exceeded average increases/100 ^ there seemed to 
be little reason for employees new to the chemical industry to join the 
union. In this way, trade union traditions, which had not been strong 
in the chemical industry during the Weimar Republic, did not develop in 
the post-war period.
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These developments were accompanied by a general trend towards centrali­
sation and rationalisation of the organisational structure in the German 
trade union movement /  ^ ^  ^ Chemical Workers* Union policies on workplace 
representation must be seen in the light of these circumstances as an 
attempt to counterbalance these trends/100  ^ In the main these policies
163* This discussion is limited to the Chemical Workers' Union since 
this is the sole union of particular importance. S'ee above.
1 6 4 . cf. Appendix 1, Table 2. The industrial union membership density 
at Agrochemie AG was around 90 per cent (interview BR 1, Oct.*7 8 ) 
and that of the respondents 91 per cent (together with 4 per cent 
VAA, of. Appendix 3, Table 6 3 ).
165* cf. Zahlen zur Sozialpolitik, 1979? op .cit ♦, p.7* Much of this 
expansion took place in the white-collar sector which has been 
traditionally hard for trade unions to organise.
166. Dzielak et al», op .cit., p.537*
16 7 . H .- E .  Treu, on.cit., p.12.
168. One particular solution to this problem was seen as collective 
agreements to ensure the rights and responsibilities of Vertrauens­
leute . To-date attempts to introduce such agreements in the chemical 
industry have failed. GB 72-75? op .cit., p.372ff. For the argu­
ments of the Metalworkers' Union in this context cf. M. Weiss, 
Gewerkschaftliche Vertrauensleute. Koln, 1978.
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could be summarised as an endeavour to strengthen the local union organ­
isation and increase union- membership through the development of a 
system of'workplace representation. The success of these policies has 
been limited, however
In the previous section there was some discussion of the dualism of re­
presentation at the workplace in Germany and the strength of' the works 
council system based on statute was considered. At the workplace the 
Chemical Workers * Union is represented by a group of officials known as 
Vertrauensleute, a term which covers a multitude of different groups 
including the works councillors who are union members and the workplace 
representatives who are elected by the union members and who will be 
called lay officers/111^
In Britain one of the primary roles of a shop steward is to represent those
(1 7 2 )members who elect him*' Although, as far as the German Chemical Workers 
Union is concerned, lay officers are elected or at least ratified <173>
I6 9 * For the numerical developments in this area see Appendix 1, Table 4* 
Nevertheless, there is evidence that chemical workers still see 
trade unions as extremely necessary, cf_. Appendix 3, Table 17*
170. Other groups covered by this term are organised youth representa­
tives, representatives for handicapped persons, and plant repre­
sentatives so nominated. IG Chemie, Richtlinien f-fir gewerk- 
schaftliche Vertrauensleute, no place (Hannover,), 14*12.1976,
Section I and "IG Chemie Beirat tagt in Essen: Anderung der 
Satzung besohlossen", pressedienst, XV/24? 5 *4 *1 9 7 9 *
171* For the reasoning behind this choice of terminology of.
31 .R. Fbsworth, "Lay Officers on.cit.
172. cf. H.A. Clegg, 1976, op .cit., p.20ff.
173. Elections theoretically take place but often there is only one
candidate. Sometimes there are no candidates at all and a member 
must be persuaded to take on the task. In such circumstances there 
if often no election, just an informal agreement that x shall be­
come the lay officer. Interviews FTO 6, Aug.*77? VL 1? Oct.’/S?
BRV 17, Nov.'78. Elections are only held in works with 150 or 
more employees-. On the election procedure of. H. Kramer, "Was
bei der Wahl der Vertrauensleute zu beachten ist," Gewerkschaft-
liche Umschau, 4/79* p«5ff« In 1979 elections took place in
around 1 0 5 0  works, with around 2 5 0 0 0  lay officers being elected.
"IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik schliesst Vertrauensleutewahlen erfolg- 
reich ab", pressedienst. KV/7 0 , 6 .1 .2 .1 9 7 9 .
by a group of union members^174^for this purpose, this group represent­
ational role does not seem to exist in practice. At Agrochemie AG 
respondents considered themselves more to be the representatives of 
the trade union in the works and all the members in general rather than 
one group in particular / 179)
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One indication of this lack of group representational role is provided
( 17  6 )by the absence of re-elections' 'if a lay officer is transferred to 
another shift or plant. This can leave a group without' a representative
and cause another to have a superfluity of them, since the transferred
(177)lay officer retains his post.' ' As elections are currently held 
every four years, a group might be without a representative for sometime 
This situation is likely to contribute to weakness in the trade union 
position within the works.
The Chemical Workers* Union specifies that there should be one lay
/ j 7 o \
officer per twenty union members. At Agrochemie AG',, however, there
was nearly double this proportion of lay officers whilst another works
(179)had approximately the proportion specified.' 1"  Nevertheless, lay 
officers are rarely spread evenly through the workforce since union member­
ship is lower in certain categories of employees, particularly white-collar
1 7 4 * Such a group might be a department, a shift, a plant or a particular 
occupational group.
175* Interviews VL 2 and VL 4, Oct.*78.
176. The guidelines do allow for the possibility of a re-election but 
leave this to the discretion of the local district Vertrauens- 
leute-Richtlinlen,op.cit., Section l(2).
177. Interview BRV 17, Nov.*7 8 , 031, M 8 , Oct.*78.
178. Vertrauensleute-Richtlinien,op.cit., Section l(5)*
179. Interviews BR 1, VL 4 , Oct . * 7 8 5 BRV 17, Nov.*78.
staff and w o m e n . T h i s  is one 'ref the reasons for there being less 
lay officers from these groups than there are from the workers / 181)
Despite the low number of lay officers in some groups of the workforce 
the Chemical Workers* Union seems to have proportionally more than in
(1 8 2 )many other unions.' It might seem that such preconditions would’
augur well for a strong lay officer organisation and effective represent­
ational work. However, this is rarely the case in the chemical industry 
and the reason for this should be considered.
One significant cause can be found in the dualism of representation in­
herent at the workplace. As a result of legislative backing which pro­
vides recognition as well as a large range of legitimised activities, 
the works councils are in a much stronger position at the workplace. 
Provided there is co-operation between both bodies, the strength of
the works council system need not necessarily be to the detriment of the 
lay officers and the local union organisation. However, should the works 
council view the lay officers as a rival organisation and decide not to 
pass on information to them, or involve them, even indirectly, in neg­
otiations then the lay officers* position can be considerably weakened.
As one lay officer at Agrochemie AG put it;
"We don’t really find out what’s going on - I think they're bound by con­
fidentiality, (1 8 4 ) so they don’t pass on information to us ... There*s no 
real relationship of trust." (1 8 5 )
180. erf. Appendix 1, Table 3.
181. cf. H. Bayer et al., op .cit♦, IG Chemie Tables lV-3,4*
182 Of the six unions investigated by Kotthoff in the Sudbaden area, 
the Chemical Workers* Union was the only one which had more lay 
officers than works councillors. Ibid., op .cit., Graphik Nr.45a.
183. The vast majority of works councillors are union members,
cf. Appendix 1, Table 5*
1 8 4 . See Footnote 57 above®
18 5 . Translation of a statement in Interview VL 1, Octc’78.
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by questions to respondents at Agrochemie AG on grievance handling. Not
a single respondent stated that he went to his lay officer in order to
(1 RP ^seek aid for his problems. Furthermore, other surveys confirm that
the lay officers are not important in this context in the ohemioal in-
( "| Rrj )dustry. 7 It would, in fact, be difficult for the lay officers work­
ing in production to deal with a member's problem promptly since the 
production system rarely permits an operator to leave his area of work 
because it is necessary to monitor the plant more or less continually.
In addition, the level of manning, the size of the primary work groups^1* 
and the isolated nature of many production jobs in the chemical industry 
also hinder the lay officer from becoming active in grievance solution. 
Approximately half of the workforce at Agrochemie AG might be considered 
to be in the type of job that makes it very difficult for their lay 
officer to offer immediate assistance.
One possible reaction of the trade union members to this set of tech­
nological constraints can be to elect their shift supervisor to be the 
/ "i 8q )lay officer. ~7 The reasons for this seems to be that the foreman is 
not required to work in one particular location, indeed, he must spend 
much of his time touring the plants talking to the operators and as a
186. For personal problems ca.25 per cent turn to the works counoil and 
38 per cent to management. For work problems oa.10 per cent go to 
the works council and 83 per cent to management. cf. Appendix 3, 
Tables 23 and 24*
187. Landwehrmann and Albring, op.cit., p.92f and F. Furstenberg, 
op«oit., p.263.
1 8 8 . Some indication of this is provided in Appendix 3, Table 39*
1 8 9 . This situation was discovered at Agrochemie AG. It is impossible 
to say exactly how many of the lay officers were also shift super­
visors but it was at least 10 per cent. It is uncertain whether- 
this is a general phenomenon.
The limitations of the representative role of lay officers were revealed
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member of the management heirarchy he might well have the power to 
regulate grievances himself. A supervisor is also likely to have more 
experience and to be more highly trained. Both might be advantageous 
in the role of lay officer. This duality of function which is possible 
due ito industrial unionism did not seem to cause a conflict of interests, 
since as one supervisor/lay officer put its
"I do my job and outside work (my emphasis) on the side, I *m a lay 
officer. This shouldn’t affect the firm, should it? ... No, I don’t 
represent a work group. We're a sub-division of the union so that they
know what's going on in the works." (1 9 0 )
Were this lay officer to be deeply involved in workplace industrial re­
lations then a duality of function as the immediate superior and repre­
sentative of a group would be most likely to lead to a conflict of 
interests. Its absence provides an indication of the role of lay officers.
In the non-produotion areas, two situations are apparently typical.
Generally the white-collar sections are poorly organised and represent-
(191)ational activities are weak for this reason.' 7 1 In the workshops’, an 
area of traditionally strong union organisation, the lay officers are 
more able to carry out their function, as indeed are the works councillors. 
The reason for this is the way in which work is organised which allows for 
movement around the workshops and the whole production site. The effect 
of these different circumstances is illustrated in the following table.
190. Translation of statement in Interview VL 2, Oct.'78*
191. H.-E. Treu, op .cit., p.41*
Table 5*2
Satisfaction with representatives fulfilment of function by work 
group classification at Agrochemie AG.
Maintenance Workers Process Workers
Lay officers 90$ 6 2 $
do job
Works Councillors 8 9$ 54$
do job
It is likely that technological constraints on the work of representatives
in the production area and more developed trade union traditions in the
workshops contribute to these differences. Despite these differences,
(192)direct criticism of the lay officers was unusual, 7 yand most of it itfas 
centred on the lack of information passed on by them/193 ^ There seem 
to be a variety of reasons for this.
First, workplace organisation in the production side is becoming in­
creasingly synonymous with sparsely manned plants and small primary work 
groups. Also the noise level is often very high/194  ^ These factors have 
the effect of making communication difficult. Next, technology limits the 
ability of lay officers to wander from one man to the next in order to 
disseminate information since he must do his own job. Third, lay officers
192. cf. Appendix 3, Table 11.
193. Interviews 016, 031, 0 36, 040, M 9> all Oct.'78. The passing
on of information by means of discussion, explanation and distri- . 
bution of trade union literature is supposed to be one of the 
main tasks of lay officers. Vertrauensleute-Riohtlinien, op.cit., 
Section V(9)»
1 9 4 * la 1 9 7 7  38 per cent of occupational diseases registered in the
chemical industry were as a result of noise. BG Chemie, Jahres-
bericht *77? op .cit., p.31, own calculations.
are often kept rather in the dark about matters by the works council 
which has what amounts to a monopoly of information. Therefore, the lay 
officers do not have much information to distribute. A general lack of 
knowledge about the trade union, its structure and function further com­
pounds these difficulties. Finally, a number of lay officers seem dis­
interested in fulfilling the post and simply do not do their jobs. Since 
many do not really want the job in the first place, this is perhaps not 
too surprising.
Despite this, the members generally felt that the union was aware of
(195)what their interests are, " ' i n  other words, that the lay officers were
passing information upwards, if not down to them. This does seem more
likely, at least for the officers who attend meetings, although the
greater commitment of lay officers sometimes leads to a somewhat inaccurate
picture of members interests arriving at the union offices/198) However,
there was greater scepticism about the primary interests of trade union 
(197 )officials. Around half of the Agrochemie AG respondents believed
that some union officials always think of their own interests first whilst 
others do so occasionally.(^8) The feeling that human nature was re­
sponsible for this was expressed, but rather less often than at BARF
(199)after the September strikes. "
195* Over 75 Pei> cent of respondents at Agrochemie AG believed that 
the unions knoxtf the members* interests, cf. Appendix 3, Table 
18. This compares with 8 4  per cent at BASF about ten years 
previously. Rchumann et al., op.cit., p.2 2 8 .
1 9 6 . Interview FTO 16, Feb.'78.
197* It became clear that at Agrochemie AG trade union officials were
understood by the respondents to mean works councillors primarily 
and also lay officers, rather than full-time officials. In this, 
the findings seem to differ from those in Rchumann et al., op.cit c, 
p.67f and 227.
1 9 8 . cf. Appendix 3, Table 25*
199* Interviews M 4  and M 8, Oct.*78. For BASF, cf. Schumann et al.,
p.67f.
The guidelines for lay officers state that they should fulfil a number 
of other functions such as the organisation of new members, the coll­
ection of dues and the monitoring of the amount paid. However, in a 
works like Agrochemie AG with a low labour turnover^200^and a high union 
membership density, the organisational function has lost its importance. 
Particularly in the larger ohemical companies this is not the case, 
since the level of organisation leaves something to be desired/201^
The main reason for this was said to be an insufficient number of
(202)organisers in the Y-ast spread of plants on such a site. ' However, 
the degree of effort of trade union organised works councillors at two 
of the main companies does not seem to be very great/203 ^
Traditional methods of dues collection have lost their importance in 
the Chemical Workers* Union since 1 9 6 4  and some form of check-off system 
is generally in u s e / 204  ^ This was certainly the case at Agrochemie 
AG and although the check-off has many advantages for trade unions} it 
removes the need for regular contact between officers and the members. 
Such contact can be used for the exchange of information/20*^ It is 
common for the same level of dues to be paid by all the members in the
200. cf. Appendix 3, Table 61.
201. The membership density in 1975 at Hoechst was 35 per cent, at
Bayer 39 per cent and at BASF 6 5  per cent. Projektgruppe Gewerlc- 
schaftsforchung, 1 9 7 7 ? op.cit., p.111.
2 0 2 . At Bayer, Leverkusen, there are about 500 individual plants.
Interview BRV 1, Aug.*77*
203. Informal discussions.
204* cf. H. Bayer et al., op .oit ♦, IG Chemie Table II-14*
205* On the check-off erf. A.I. Marsh and J.W. Staples, Check-off
Agreements in Britain, Royal Commission on Trade Unions and 
Employers* Associations, Research Papers 8 , 1 9 6 8 .
works as opposed to the level which is specified in the rule book/200^
Even lay officers do not always seem to pay the correct dues, although
(207 )they and works councillors are required to do so.' 7 Most members are 
unwilling to pay the full level of dues since they do not think that they 
are likely to go on strike and since, in their opinion, the only reason 
for paying very high dues would be to ensure a high strike benefit/200^
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The rights and responsibilities of Vertrauensleute within the Chemical
Workers* Union in the collective^bargaining system have been discussed 
(209 )above.' J The workplace representatives of this union have the most 
extentive consultation and information rights in the BGB, and they also 
have the right to elect the collective bargaining committees. These 
rights were increased after strong pressure from within the union as a 
result of their weakness compared with the works councils particularly 
during the 1971 chemical industry strike. It was also hoped that in­
creased involvement of the Vertrauensleute would lead to a greater 
commitment amongst the officials for any industrial action that might 
occur and that such action and collective bargaining in general would 
be a more accurate reflectionof membership wishes. It does not seem, 
however, that these aims have been achieved to any great extent.
206. This is 1 per cent of gross earnings, IG Chemie, Satzung *77. 
op .cit., Para. 10. In fact, at Agrochemie AG, a sum approxi­
mately 40 per cent lower on average was paid. Increases in dues
oause much complaint but rarely lead to resignation. Interviews
VL 1, VL 4, Oct.*78.
207« Interview FTO 6, Aug.’77 and Feb.*78.
208. Interviews VL 5? Oct.'78 and FTO 6, Feb.'78. Strike benefit, is
calculated according to the level of dues paid, c_f. IG Chemie, 
Satzung *77, op.oit., Para. 27* At Agrochemie AG the amount of 
benefit paid would "only" have been 45 Pe^ cent of the median 
net income (Appendix 3? Table 60), as opposed to approximately 
80 per cent if the correct level of dues had been paid.
209. cf. Chapter 4> Section (ii)a.
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Meetings of the Vertrauensleute are held fairly regularly within the
chemical industry although the frequency seems to depend on the works^210)
and' the period of time between the meetings varies considerably with the
(21l)annual rhythm of union affairs.' Several meetings will probably be
held prior to, during and after the annual wage negotiations. A district
(212)official is always present at the meetings' 'which are generally held 
in the evening after the day shift has finished work. Some companies 
do allow the Vertrauensleute to meet during working hours(213)and plant 
representatives usually enjoy this privilege which is one way of ensuring 
a higher turnout at the meetings / 214) attendance at the meetings,
which are often held in company rooms, varies according to the agenda 
and to the length of time that the lay officers have been in office/219) 
As this time increases enthusiasm seems to wan and attendance drops 
o f f / 218)
210. At Agrochemie AG about 6 meetings are held per year, at another 
works visited 10 were held whilst Bayer has about 4-5 in "the
" evenings and 2X30 department meetings in working time. Interviews 
BR 1, Oct.*78; BRV 17, Nov.*78 and FTO 9 , Aug.*77- The guidelines 
only state that regular meetings should be held. Vertrauensleute- 
Riohtlinien, op.cit., Section IV.
211. Interview BR 2, Oct.*78.
212. This is one reason for the relative infrequency of meetings since 
each official in the district to which Agrochemie AG belongs is 
responsible' for about 6000 members in ca. 16 different works.
GB 72-75, op.cit., passim, own calculations.
213. Interview BRV 17, Nov.*78.
214* In such circumstances the mass of more moderate officials are
present as opposed to only the more politically active ones who 
are certain to attend most meetings. Interview FTO 9 , Aug.*77*
215* Interview BR 1, 0ct.*78. This respondent stated attendance was 
generally 70 per cent. The lack of complete attendance is re­
flected, however, in the repeated underestimation of the number 
of Vertrauensleute at Agrochemie AG. Several estimates were 50 
per cent below the actual number. Interviews BR 3, VL 3, 0ct.*78o
2 1 6 . At the beginning^at Agrochemie AC^  75+ per cent attend but by the
end it is about 30 per cent. Interview BR 2, Oct.*7 8 . A more
general statement claimed an attendance of 4 0 - 5 0  per cent.
Interview FTO 1, Aug.*77*
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since some will be on shift at the time of the meetings, and manning
levels together with workplace organisation make it unlikely that an
official could he spared from the plant, even if he were prepared to
lose his wages for the duration of the meeting, as could happen if the
( ?  1 7 )foreman decided to dock them. Foreman/lay officers on shift cer­
tainly could not abandon their plants/218) There was general under­
standing amongst the workforce for the shift Vertrauensmann1s problems
in attendance which are increased by the distance many must travel for 
(219)the meeting. The different attendance rates are probably also re­
flected in the assessment of the fulfilment of their tasks by the 
members/220^
Meetings are arranged between the district office and the.chairman of
the lay officers who runs the lay organisation in the workplace together
with an executive committee the size of which depends on the number of 
(221)Vertrauensleute.' At Agrochemie AG the executive committee seemed
to have no particular function, although it can have an important in-
( 222 )fluence on the policies adopted by the lay organisation.' ' The number
217. Interview VL 1, Oct.*78.
218. Shift attendance problems are analogous to those for works 
assemblies except that none of the production shifts has just 
stopped work so that the problem is exacerbated. See above.
219. Interviews Oil, 016, 020, 033, Oct. *7 8 .
220. See Table 5*2 above.
221. At Agrochemie AG there were three on the committee (interview
VL 4? Oct.*7 8 ). Actually there should have been five given the 
number of officials. Vertrauensleute-Richtlinien, op .cit.,
Section III.
222. For the role of the executive committee cfi Ibid., Section Vlll.
For the role of one such committee in a strike situation and the
effect of the strike on the subsequent structure of the committee 
cf. Dzielak et al., op .cit., p. 177 444Tf.
In any case, it is never possible for all the lay officials to attend,
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of works with a lay officials * executive committee is increasing al­
though it remains, like the number with lay officers, quite small in 
(223)percentage terms• ' There are sometimes a large number of works
councillors on the lay officials1 executive committee but some have
(224)decided that there must be a majority of lay offioers on the committee. 7 
Occasionally works- councillors are simply not permitted on the committee 
at all in order to ensure the independence of the lay officers from the 
works council and to counteract the-works council’s influence/229^
There is a far greater degree of contact between union full-time 
officials and the executive committee, particularly in the case of the 
chairman who is elected by the committee. The executive committee is 
especially important in the larger works where it is very difficult 
for full-time officers to maintain contact with the whole body of the 
lay officers/220^
Matters discussed at the meetings of’ Vertrauensleute cover the whole
range of trade union policies such as the drafting of union lists of*
(227)candidates for elections;' 7the election of delegates to a large 
number of representative bodies including the collective bargaining 
committees; debates on collective bargaining and recommendations for 
the level of demands to be made together with the preparation of works 
assemblies.
223# It seems certain that all sizeable works would have both lay
officers and an executive committee. In 1975 31*7 per cent of 
works in the organisational area of the Chemical Workers’
Union had lay officers and 73.7 per cent of these (23*4
per cent of all) had an executive committee. H. Bayer et al.,
op.cit... IG Chemie Table 1V-5*
224* Interview BRV 1 7 , Nov.’78*
2 2 5 . Dzielak et al.. op .cit., p.276f.
2 2 6 . Interview FTO 6, Aug.*77*
2 2 7 . Such as to the works- council, the supervisory board, etc. 
(Personal observations).
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and probably elsewhere is particularly interesting and deserves further
consideration. It seems that the works council report to the assembly
is discussed in advance by the Vertrauensleute and statements as well as
(228)questions from the floor are pre-planned.' 7 Although this is reminis­
cent of "rigging" the works assembly it could be an effective tactic for 
asking management awkward questions and for showing the works council in 
a good light. This would help their re-election but means, in effect, 
the subordination of the lay officers to the works council.
Very few lay officers at Agrochemie AG except the most senior ones
claimed that they spent on average more than about one hour per month
fulfilling their duties. This was sometimes supplemented by attendance
( 229 )of union courses in the weekend or evening.' 77 However, once more, 
such times are especially inconvenient for shift workers so that they
often could not attend even if they wanted to. At Agrochemie AG most
lay officers had attended one or two courses but frequently many years 
previously.(230  ^ There seems to be no solution to this problem unless 
a collective agreement is achieved which guarantees release from xvork 
for lay officers to take part in union training courses.
228. Interview VL 5, Oct.*78.
229. Such courses are provided by all the districts in the Chemical
Workers’ Union. They cover a large range of issues such as 
unemployment, labour law, collective bargaining policies, union 
organisation in the workplace etc. In larger districts courses 
are held for the lay officers or works councillors from specific 
works so that relevant issues can be covered. For example, cf.
IG Chemie, Verwaltungsstelle Leverkusen, Bildungsqrogramm, 
Winterhalbjahr 1978/79*
This preparation of xrorks assemblies which took place at Agrochemie AG
230. Interviews VL 1, VL 4 , VL 5, Oct.*78.
A picture has emerged in which the lay officers do not appear to perform 
an important function in workplace industrial relations, although they 
are involved in the trade union bargaining machinery* Another measure 
of their importance would be management attitudes towards them. At 
Agrochemie AG one works manager summed up the general management attitude 
both here and elsewhere concisely:
"I have very little to do with them - I don’t even know who they are 
and I don’t even try to find out." (231)
This lack of contact between lay officers and management at all levels 
was apparent throughout the case study and it is indicative of the role 
of lay officers in the works.
There are numerous reasons for the weak position of lay officers in work­
place industrial relations. As far as those lay officers who are em­
ployed in production are concerned the main reason can be traced to the 
technology of the chemical industry. Workplace organisation and manning 
levels make it difficult for the lay officers to be called in to settle 
grievances and for them to pass on information to their constituents.
Shift work is associated with continuous process technology and it impairs 
the ability of lay officers on shift to attend trade union meetings and 
training courses. Thus these lay officers are hindered in the fulfilment 
of their functions by the technological constraints of the industry im 
which they are employed.
In white-collar areas, particularly offices, the union is poorly organised
231. Translation of statement from Interview M J, Oct.'78*
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and. there are very few lay officers. In such groups^it is easier for 
those lay officers there, are to fulfil their function since they are not 
restricted by their normal jobs in the way a production worker is. In 
the workshops, a traditional union stronghold, evidence seems to suggest 
that the lay officers function relatively effectively.
However, the degree of interest of lay officers in their post is generally 
low and this could well be due to the low competence given to them to 
deal with "real" issues, such as handling grievances and negotiations at 
works level. Such issues remain the sole preserve of the works council 
as a result of the Works Constitution Aot 1972, and as one lay officer 
saidt
"Experience to date shows that we don't really need any lay officers at 
all since the works council does everything." (232)
From the union point of view this is certainly not true but it is under­
standable why it might seem to be the oase on the shopfloor. For, 
despite the extent of rights and responsibilities of the works council, 
the peace obligation hampers the mobilisation of the workforce by these 
officials. On the other hand, lay officers are unaffected by such con­
siderations and so become very important in dispute situations. In the 
chemical industry a healthy economic growth and the capital intensive 
nature of the industry has usually enabled the employers to pay reasonable 
wage increases without the trade union having to resort to strike action. 
The 1971 chemical industry dispute revealed the importance of the lay 
officers and the local union organisation in general but also their
232. Translation of a statement from Interview VL 3, Oct.’78»
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inability on the whole to cope with the situation. This resulted in 
an increase of lay officers rights and their involvement in collective 
bargaining.
Conflict sometimes arises between the works council and the lay off- 
( 2 3 3 )icers. ' This is often provoked by works council attitudes towards 
the lay officers which extend to a lack of co-operation and willing­
ness to supply information. In the words of one works councillor at 
Agrochemie AGs
"The relationship is not so bad although the lay officers want to direct 
the work of the works council. This is not their job, nor is it their' 
job to do the work of the works council. They should bring us their 
problems." (234)
This statement expresses the arrogance and elitism of many works 
councillors but also reflects the actual situation that the works 
council constitutes the centre of the system of representation of 
employees* interests at the workplace. This might only be challenged 
by a highly developed lay officers* organisation with a structure that 
enhances an exchange of information, oo-operation and solidarity amongst
its m e t e r s .U35)
However, particularly on the larger sites, the works council requires 
the support of the lay officers in order to be able to oarry out their
233. Here, the terms works council and lay officers are intended to 
mean the majority of these bodies. Conflict can, of course, 
also arise between minorities but this is generally less im­
portant. According to the guidelines, both groups are supposed 
to provide mutual support for each other. Vertrauensleute-
Richtlinien, op.cit., Section VI.
234* Translation of a statement in Interview BR 1, Oot.*78. At 
one time it was hoped that the lay officers in the Metal 
Workers * Union would serve as watch-dogs over the works 
councillors, of. B. Miller, op.cit., pp.337-340
235* Dzielak et al., op.cit., p.123.
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own tasks effectively/238) The formation of a second power centre in
the representational organisation in the workplace by the lay officers
has generally been short-lived since in order to change the works council
policies they are forced to become members of the works council them- 
i (237)selves. '
Relations between works councils and lay officers might best be described 
generally as "antagonistic co-operation"^238)since both require the support 
of each other. Indeed, sometimes the lay officers receive a great deal of 
assistance from the works councillors;
"We give the lay officers confidential information, even from the super­
visory board, since sitting on this board is a political activity and 
the information is necessary." (239)
Without such levels of support from the works councils the desired ex­
tension of the role of lay officers in the Chemical Workers’ Union is 
probably doomed to failure•(2^0) ig a^s0 important in this context 
that serious attempts are made to modify the system of plant representa­
tives that exists in the major chemioal works/241) However, such moves 
do not enjoy the whole-hearted approval of many works councillors, a very 
powerful group in the union, sinoe it could lead to a diminution of their 
own power.
236. This is one of the main reasons for the works councillors fostering
the development of plant representative systems when the union has 
been poorly organised. However, such systems often hinder the 
subsequent development of union lay officer organisations, cf. 
Protokoll 1976, op.cit., p»520ff and- "Die Ergebnisse der 2 . 
Bundesarbeitstagung der IG Chemie-Papier-ICeramik in Munchen. 
Gewerkschaftliche Umschau, 6/1978? Dokumentation p. XIYf.
237* Dzielak et al., op.cit., p.124*
238. H. Hartmann, 1979? op.cit., p.7 8 .
239* Translation of a statement from Interview BRV 18, Nov.’78.
240. H.-E. Treu feels that attempts to date have failed. Ibid., p.76.
2 4 1 * In 1 9 7 6  4 2  chemioal works had plant representatives as opposed
to union lay officers. Protokoll 1976, on.cit., p.521.
The ambivalent position of the union in the workplace becomes clear/242  ^
It is crucial for the Chemical Workers' Union to have an effective 
organisation at the workplace. Because of legislative restrictions the 
works councils are unable to fulfil this role and therefore a strong 
system of lay offioers is required. This explains the steps towards in­
creasing the rights and involvement of this group in the early 1 9 7 0 's. 
However, on the other hand, many full-time union officials do not want
to give the lay officers too many rights since this might endanger their
(243)
long-term strategies which require the union to have a "mediator role."
A very strong lay officer organisation would also be likely to imperil 
the position of the works council in the workplace.
(iii) Workplace bargaining.
The previous discussion of the role of the works council in the chemi­
cal industry has illustrated the multifarious and constant nature of 
the contacts that take place between its members- and management/244^
It has been seen that such contacts can be formal, for' example on joint 
committees, and informal in character. In this way it can be said that 
bargaining is always taking place in some form between the works council 
and management. The more formal side of this system of bargaining is 
considered here in greater detail since it is the source of many of the 
"rules which govern employment.h ^24^)
242. Also of. H.-E. Treu, op.oit., p.78.
243- Kirkwood and Mewes, 1976, op.oit., p.297*
244. The role of management within the company and in workplace
industrial relations has been discussed elsewhere, cf.
Chapter 2, Section (iii)b.
2 4 5 *  H.A. Clegg, 1976, op .cit., p.l. Thus the section will con­
centrate on bargaining which is likely to lead to a works
council agreement rather than bargaining over individual 
issues which are often regulated by the committee system 
described previously.
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Workplace bargaining might he considered to he an extension of national
and regional collective bargaining between trade unions and employers *
associations. The importance of this level of bargaining has already
been illustrated in the discussion of earnings in the chemical industry
( 2 A 6 )whioh showed that a large wage gap exists. " The domination of this 
sphere of bargaining on the employees* side by the works council reflects 
the characteristics of the dual system of representation at the workplace 
in Germany. As a result of the Works Constitution Act 1972 this bargain­
ing operates under a strict set of legal limits and is highly institution­
alised in nature with the works counoil being forced to operate between
the legal requirements, the expectations of the workforce, trade union 
(247)policies' "and their own specific interests.
Although it has just been stated that the works council bargains on 
behalf of the workforce, the system is actually rather more complicated 
than this for negotiations .can occur at a variety of levels. The level 
at which the negotiations are carried out depends on the importance and 
scope of the issue involved/248)
At the time of the investigations at Agrochemie AG there were nine works
council agreements in operation. Of these nine agreements six had been
signed by the company works council - e.g. the conditions of service 
( 249 )agreement' - and three by the council for the actual works at which
2 4 6 . cf> Chapter 3, Section (iii)e.
247* E. Teschner, op.cit., p.89ff.
2 4 8 . There are three possible levels - works, company or concern.
249* Arbeitsordnung. In order to maintain the anonymity of Agro­
chemie AG it is not possible to cite these agreements in the 
usual way.
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the study was- carried out. An example of this type of agreement is pro­
vided by bonus schemes for the bagging and loading section of the work­
force .
Due to the size of works councils and their impracticality, therefore, 
in negotiations, the actual bargaining is usually conducted by the works 
committee^29°^at whatever level. In such cases the decision on whether 
to accept a particular agreement will usually be taken by the full works 
council. When the decision lies with the company council - on which the 
works councils from all the individual establishments are represented - 
then time is normally allowed for the matter to be discussed in the 
individual councils/291  ^ Should any particular works- council then feel 
that its interests have not received the necessary consideration then 
its representatives on the company council must make this point and 
attempt to get the council to modify its stance/292^
At Agrochemie AG the vast majority of works council agreements are signed 
on behalf of management by the executive board. A small number of ion- 
important agreements can be made by local management provided that the 
amount of money involved is small. The locus of such powers of decision 
within the management hierarchy will undoubtedly vary from company to 
company. However, here local management were not even able to take on 
new labour without the sanction of the central personnel department/293^
250. In intermediate sized companies negotiations are sometimes con­
ducted by the full-time works councillors of whom there are a 
small number. Interview BRV 15, Nov.'78.
2 5 1 * Such occasions may also be used to consult with the union lay 
officers although it is not clear how often this occurs.
252. Interviews BR 1, BR 3, M 7? Oot.f78. On the company works
council cf. BetrVG 1972, especially Paras. 47 anti 51*
253. This decision was made by the executive board member responsible
for personnel matters and often took several months, thus
causing great inconvenience. Interviews M 2 and M 7? Oct.’7 8 .
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In the larger chemioal companies the personnel department seems to he 
responsible for negotiations with the works council and for the prepara-
( OCX/) )tion of agreements. 7 y These agreements would subsequently be ratified
by the executive board if found to be satisfactory. Similar consultation
to that in which the works council engages, occurs on the management side
to ensure that site managers have no violent objections to the potential 
(255)agreement. 7
The negotiation process ^itself seems to be relatively informal in 
nature as a result of the relationship which develops between the two 
sides. Frequently the works council is required to take the offensive 
and make a case for an agreement on a particular issue to management.
The following statement from a works councillor in the chemical industry 
illustrates that the case may be put in a variety of ways depending on
( p0r7 3the type of issue involved. 7 7
"I refuse to negotiate solely according to the laws. We demand, desire 
or request - there are these three categories. Then it’s up to the 
other side to prove that it’s unfair, that we don’t need it or that 
we’re not doing it." (2 5 8 )
254* Personnel departments seemed primarily to be responsible for
personnel administration tasks as well as the whole range of
issues arising from the Works Constitution Act. Interviews 
M 3? M 5, Oct.’78. In the larger companies training and social 
matters are sometimes separated into different departments. 
Interviews BRV 1, Aug. *77 and. CM 8, Nov. ’7 8 .
255* Interview M 5> Oct.’7 8 .
2 5 6 . Data on this is generally quite inaccessible and this topic has
consequently been ignored in most of the secondary literature.
257* The works council may have equal co-determination rights, limited
rights or no rights at all on the issue in question.
2 5 8 . Author’s translation of: "Ich habe es abgelehnt, immer gleich nach
den Gesetzen (BVG) z u  verhandeln. Wir fordern, wunschen- oder 
bitten - diese drei Kategorien gibt es. Und dann soli uns der 
andere Teil erstmal nachweisen, das ist nicht gerecht, das brauchen 
wir nicht, das tun wir nioht." from E. Teschner, op .cit., p«96.
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After the works council has put its case then there is normally a de­
tailed discussion of the problem which will most probably be inter­
spersed by meetings for internal consultation on both sides. This may
involve referring to the trade union or to the employers’ association 
(259 )for advice. In this way negotiations are usually very protracted,
indeed on certain issues they may last for several years, particularly 
when complicated matters or principles are involved/2®0)
One reason for negotiations often lasting such a time is that the works 
council "doesn’t have many means of exerting pressure on management.
Both sides tend to rely upon the legislation. We normally negotiate 
until we reach agreement but this can take years." (2^ )
Some works councils - usually ones that work closely with the lay 
officers and which have good lines of communication to the workforce - 
do try to put as much pressure as possible on management if the negotia- 
tions do not make much progress.' J In such circumstances spontaneous 
stoppages are not unknown, often with the secret support of the works 
council•
However, other works councils, particularly those in the larger chemical 
companies, choose to see themselves as a mediator between the interests
259* Interviews CM 12, BRV 16, Nov.*78.
260* At one chemical works visited the negotiation of the disciplinary 
procedure had taken seven years. Interview BRV 18, Nov.’78.
261. Translation from Ibid.
262. This experience can then be put to good use should dispute 
situations develop as a result of collective bargaining.
Dzielak et al., op.cit., p. 347*
pendancy between works council and management, which has been facilitated 
by the economic strength of the chemical industry and the collective 
agreements covering large regions, ensures that the two sides co­
operate with each other
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(?6 ^ )of the workforce and the management. In any case the mutual de-
Employees in the chemical industry remain, nevertheless, fairly satis­
fied with the degree to which the works council puts the workforce ’s 
case to management. At Agrochemie AG less than 10 per cent were dis­
satisfied with the works council's determination to represent their 
( J
interests 'although the same question revealed a greater dissatis-
faction at BASF some years ago. J At the same time, however, quite
a considerable percentage of respondents at Agrochemie AG did not know
how works council agreements were negotiated although most read them
(?67 )when they were posted on the notice boards.'
Before considering further the means of bringing about agreement when 
the negotiations do not provide a solution, some indication will be 
given of the range of works council agreements that exist in the chemical
263. Ibid., p.348* Teschner, op .cit., p.94? Kotthoff's data is 
somewhat contradictory. Ibid., Graphik Nr. 49— 55 cent of
works council chairmen in the chemical industry considered that 
the works council is more on management's side than on the side 
of the workforce• However, Graphik Nr. 4 8 — 8 2  per cent of them 
believe that the works council should not be a mediator between 
the two sides.
2 6 4 * ~ cf. Ibid., Graphik Nr. 27*
2 6 5 * of. Appendix 3, Table 37*
2 6 6 . 27 per cent. Schumann et al., op.cit., p. 197* Other surveys
seem to have avoided this question.
2 6 7 . of. Appendix 3, Tables 2 6  and 27* There was quite a high level
of correlation between the basic knowledge of the negotiation 
process and professional training (Table 5 8 ). Kendall's corre­
lation coefficient was =0.3147 which was significant at the 
0.1 per cent level. Furthermore, works council agreements were 
only mentioned by 23 per cent of the works sample when questioned 
on works council roles, cf. Table 30.
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industry. It is actually possible for either side to request negotia­
tions and an agreement on almost anything but there is no way that either
(268 )side can be forced to accept such an agreement. One management
respondent at a large ohemical company claimed that the majority of 
works council agreements at that company were of the voluntary type/2®9)
At Agrochemie AG five out of nine of the works council agreements in 
force at the time of the study influenced the level of income of some or 
all the employees in the works. Most were bonus payments but one pro­
vided extra holiday for shift. workers(together with the additional holiday 
pay) whilst another dealt with payments of travelling expenses. Although 
the cost of the extra holidays could not be quantified from the data
available, the other four agreements amounted to 4*5 per cent of the
(270)gross wage bill at the time of the study.
The other agreements at Agrochemie AG covered such matters as time and 
method of payment of wages, times of work and the major agreement on con­
ditions of service. This latter agreement is of considerable importance
(271)and can be found in some form in the vast majority of companies. 1 '
No general survey was made of conditions of service agreements in the 
ohemical industry. However, those which were studied had a very similar
2 6 8 . On- voluntary works council agreements cf. Fitting et al., op.cit., 
p.668ff•
2 6 9 . Interview CM 9? Nov.*78.
270. This information was provided by the personnel department. On 
the legality of monetary works council agreements of. Fitting 
et al., op .cit«, p.600f.
2 7 1 * No company visited was without one although this does occur 
sometimes when renegotiation takes longer than expected. If 
the issue concerned is one where the works council has full 
co-determination rights then a post-contractual obligation 
exists. Ibid., p.599*
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form and some details of one of these agreements' 'are given here to 
provide an illustration of them. The introduction of the agreement 
provides an interesting insight into the ideology of the works con­
stitution:
"Management and works council have signed the following agreement on the 
basis of mutual trust for the good of the company and its employees, to 
keep the peace at work and to ensure an orderly maintenance of work."(273)
This agreement has twelve major sections and comprises a booklet of twenty- 
five pages. The agreement covers the conditions for commencement of 
employment, probation; general rights and duties arising from the con­
tract of employment and including a basic grievance procedure; time at 
work and periods of absence; time and method of payment; holidays and 
sickness; general rules of behaviour, accident prevention; conditions of 
work for trainees; a suggestion scheme; a disciplinary procedure and’ 
conditions for cessation of employment. Further details cannot be given 
in a concise way. However, some general trends which emerge are constant 
reference to the regulations of the works constitution and other statutes, 
as well as collective agreements. The conditions of service might be 
seen, therefore* as providing rules for the application of these regula­
tions and guidelines for many of the circumstances which can arise during 
employment.
The grievance procedures laid dbwn in such agreements are rather general,
( 272)
272. Bayer AG, Arbeitsordnung, Leverkusen, 1.1.1970. Rome 75000 
chemical employees worked under the conditions of the agree­
ments studied.
273. Author's translation of "Vferksleitung und Betriebsrat haben auf 
der Grundlage gegenseitigen Vertrauens zum Wohle des Unternehmens 
und seiner Werksangehorigen, zur Gewahrleistung des Betriebs- 
friedens und eines geordneten Arbeitsablaufs die nachstehende
Arbeitsordnung vereinbart." Ibid., p.l.
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providing a basio right of complaint and a selection of persons to whom 
the grievant may turn. This choice normally includes management - 
initially the immediate superior - and the works council, although
occasionally the personnel department may be specifically mentioned/2"^4 )
Sometimes management undertakes to inform the works council of any
grievances brought to them unless the grievant specifically disallows
( 275 )this.' Many chemical companies also reserve the right of employees
to take their grievances as far as.the company executive board if no
(276)solution can be found with more junior management.
Most works councils and management also agree to try to resolve all 
problems internally before resorting to external procedures for grievance
solution such as the works conciliation committee, and the labour court
(277 )except in unfair dismissal cases. This regulation reflects a
general unwillingness in the German chemical industry for external
involvement in disputes. This rejection of third party intervention
.ttituc 
(279)
(778)was found in the joint conciliation procedure "and in at ittides to­
wards the utilisation of the works conciliation committee.
Borne companies go so far as to create their own joint committees for 
the solution of grievances which are supposed to take precedence over"
274* As at Agrochemie AG.
275* Kronos Titan GmbH, Arbeitsordnung, op .cit., Para. 8.6.
276. At Agrochemie AG and Interview CM 9? Nov.*78.
277* Bayer AG, Arbeitsordnung, op .cit., Para. 7*4 and Kronos Titan 
GmbH, Arbeitsordnung, op .cit., Para. 8 ,7 .
278. cf. Chapter 4? Section (iii)b.
279* Many interviews, e.g. FTO 18, and ER I, Feb.*78. This is one 
of the main reasons for the infrequent use of conciliation 
committees in the chemical (and metal working) industries. 
This committee is considered in greater detail below.
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the works conciliation committee. These committees which are composed 
of an equal number of works councillors and managers decide issues by 
simple majority. Although used infrequently^they do solve disputes 
which would otherwise have required third party intervention to resolve!200
Although such formal grievance procedures exist their usage seems slight, 
at least at Agrochemie AG, where this matter was considered in some depth. 
There was-r.a considerable lack of knowledge on procedures even amongst 
lower management to whom it seems the majority of the workforce turn when 
they have problems/201  ^ The ability to go either to management or the 
works council in order to settle grievances is taken for granted and not 
treated as a part of the formal grievance procedure which itself might 
be seen as an extension of the legal provisions and procedures.
The Works Constitution Act 1972 provides an institution for the re­
gulation of disputes between the works council and management. Such a 
dispute may he an impasse in negotiations which, of course, cannot be
resolved through the use of industrial action as a result of the peace 
(282)obligation.' 7 The Act distinguishes between compulsory and voluntary
280., Interviews BRV 5, Aug.'77 and BRV 13, Oct.'78.
281. . of. Appendix 3, Tables 23 and 24* Also of. Landwehrmann and
Albring, op .cit., p.92f.
282. Some reference has already been made to this body which has 
been translated here as a works oonoiliation committee. The 
legal provisions may be found in BetrVG 1972, Para. 76, Also 
cf. H.J. Bischoff, Die Sinigungstelle im Betriebsverfassungs- 
recht, Berlin, 1975* The information presented here on works 
conciliation committees in the chemical industry was prepared 
by the author as a part of a comparative investigation of 
conciliation and arbitration in West Germany and the United 
Kingdom. The research on West Germany is being directed by
Karl Koch at the University of Surrey and is financed by the
Federal Trust for Education and Research. The author grate­
fully acknowledges this support which enabled him to conduct 
discussions with twelve respondents directly on the issue of 
conciliation in the chemical industry. The data presented 
here is based primarily on these interviews and other inform­
ation collected during the studv The official research report is forthcoming.
works conciliation committees. The latter occur most infrequently, and 
may only take place if both parties request its formation and agree to 
abide by its ruling.
A decision arrived at by the compulsory procedure on the other hand, has 
the status of a binding works council agreement. Under the compulsory 
procedure it is possible for the management or the works council to 
demand that a works constitution committee sit to resolve the disagree­
ment between them on a total of eighteen specific issues/283) In effect, 
the works conciliation committee is responsible for deciding disputes 
over interests whilst the Labour -•Court has jurisdiction for disputes 
over rights as well as considering appeals about the decision made by 
a works conciliation committee•(2^4)
Although the law provides for permanent works conciliation committees 
to be formed, this is unusual for the Chemical Workers1 Union and the 
chemical employers1 associations reject their formation as unnecessary 
and advise their members accordingly. Works conciliation committees are 
formed, therefore, as they are required.
The committee is composed of an equal number of assessors from the em­
ployers and the works council together with a neutral chairman. Rhould
2 8 3 . cf. Appendix 1, Table 16. In theory the works conciliation
committee could deal with any unresolved issue arising from
the Works Constitution Act but excluding matters originating 
from collective agreements and issues falling within the 
jurisdiction of the Labour Courts.
2 8 4 . Either side may appeal within two weeks if it feels that a
mistake has been made in the procedure, that the decision 
reached is outside the range of competence of the committee 
or if it considers the decision unreasonable. Challenges 
are unusual and rarely succeed.
- 364 -
the two sides he unable to agree on these issues then the matter is 
referred to the Labour Court which makes a binding decision/289)
Exhaustive empirical data on conciliation committees does not exist for 
the chemical industry or for any other sectors. Nevertheless, a number 
of limited surveys have been carried o u / 288)and their results are 
basically comparable. In the vast majority of cases the chairman chosen 
for the works conciliation committee is a labour court judge or someone 
with legal training. Respondents felt that these judges, whilst not 
necessarily neutral, would possess sufficient knowledge to ensure that 
the procedure was adhered to closely. The chairman may well either be 
responsible for inducing the parties to come to agreement voluntarily 
or else he may have to decide to support one side or the other to re­
solve the dispute* Hence, the choice of the chairman is of considerable 
importance. In the chemical industry examples are known, however, of 
chairmen without legal qualifications. Occasionally professors, 
economists or other authorative personages, such as a work study expert 
in a job evaluation case, are selected.
In the chemical industry there are generally three assessors from eitheir 
side. The works council might be represented by the works council chair­
man, an expert on the subject from the council and a union advisor who
2 8 5 . For the procedure cf. Appendix 1, Table 17• The importance of 
legal institutions in industrial relations is well illustrated 
by the position of the Labour Court in this procedure.
2 8 6 . By the German Trade Union Confederation (1 9 7 6 ), the Chemical
Workers' Union (1976) and from IG Metall, Geschaftsbericht
1974-1976, Frankfurt, 1977? p.358. ' ’ “ “
may well be a lawyer. The company would normally nominate senior per­
sonnel managers and company lawyers together with a representative of 
the employers* association if a union official is present. Any of 
these personalities could put the case to the committee for their re­
spective side. Indeed, in practice there is little differentiation 
between assessors and party representatives once the. conciliation 
committee has begun to consider the issue. This informal atmosphere 
is enhanced by the knowledge on both sides that the committee must 
reach a decision somehow and that obstructive attitudes would only make 
the task more difficult. Very senior managers from the executive board 
are rarely involved in the conciliation procedure although the per­
sonnel director "would direct his puppets from the background."^20"7^
Once the chairman has called the conciliation committee together- the 
issue is put forward from the point of view of both sides and discussed 
in detail. It is quite possible that the chairman will separate the 
two parties and try to mediate between them and so bring about a 
voluntary agreement.
According to the provisions of the Acts
"The works conciliation committee shall make its decision by a majority 
vote after oral proceedings. The chairman shall not participate in the 
initial vote. In the case of a tie the discussion shall be resumed and 
the chairman shall participate in the second ballot. Decisions of the 
works conciliation committee are to be recorded in writing, signed by
287. Interview BRV 12, Nov.*78.
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However, in practice, either the parties come to a voluntary agreement or 
else the chairman has to impose an agreement - he does this by taking 
side with one of the parties in the second ballot. Indeed, a threat to
do this may induce a compromise solution. Assessors from one side do
not vote with the other side in the first ballot since this would mean 
the end of their career either in management or as a representative of 
the workforce. Once there has been a tie in the first ballot the comm­
ittee moves very fast to the second vote. Although it is not possible
to support statistically^ it seems that voluntary agreement is more common 
in the ohemical industry than agreements imposed by the chairman.- Such 
an agreement is also far preferable to both sides and this provides 
motivation for them to reach an agreement.
The role of the works conciliation committee can only be understood by 
taking the broader context of workplace industrial relations into con­
sideration. The Works Constitution Act can be seen as an instrument for 
the prevention of overt industrial conflict at the workplace and the 
conciliation committee is an integral part of this system.
In the course of our investigations it became clear that the frequency 
of usage of works conoiliation committees as a means of resolving in­
dustrial conflict is remarkably low when the range of possible issues
288. Author’s translation of: "Die Einigungsstelle fasst ihre Besohlusse 
nach mundlioher Beratung mit Stimmenmehrheit. Bei der Beschluss- 
fassung hat sich 4er Vorsitzende zunachst der gtimme zu enthalteny 
kommt eine Stimmenmehrheit nicht zustande, so nimmt der Vorsit- 
zende nach weiterer Beratung an der erneuten Beschlussfassung 
tell. Die Besohlusse der Einigungsstelle sind"schrift.lich 
niederzulegen, vom Vorsitzenden zu unterschreiben und Arbeitgeber 
und Betriebsrat zuzuleiten." BetrVG 1972, Para. 76(3).
the chairman and distributed to both employer and works council."' '
is considered. "  It must be concluded, therefore, that the vast 
majority of works council agreements are established in the normal 
course of negotiations between management and works council#
Nevertheless, the works conciliation committee certainly has a greater-
importance than might be suggested by a simple consideration of its-
absolute frequency. The reasons for the infrequent use of the works
conciliation committee are complex but deserve some brief consideration
here. The rejection of third party involvement in labour relations is
particularly strong on both sides of the chemical industry and certainly
accounts in part for the rarity of this form of dispute settlement.
Furthermore, the need to resort to a works conciliation committee for
the resolution of a dispute is seen as a failure of the parties to deal
(290)with their own problems' 'and to be increasing the level of conflict
considerably and so arouses public interest in internal works pro­
cedures - an unwelcome occurrence. Compromise, furthered by the ethos 
of the works constitution, is generally preferable to both sides than 
this level of conflict.
In addition, conciliation awards are sometimes regarded as a test case 
which can be subsequently applied in other companies. This can lead to 
a form of "case law" as it is understood in Britain and may account for 
the reluctance of many employers to use the conciliation committee. 'This
2 8 9 . The DGB found that around 700 disputes were dealt with by a 
conciliation committee between 1972 and 1975* Letter dated 
9.12.1976 from DGB, Abt. Arbeitsrecht to the Bundesministerium 
fur Arbeit und Sozialordnung. For the same period of time 
there were 117 cases in the organisational area of the Chemical 
Workers' Union where over 3000 works councils exist. IG Chemie 
survey, op .cit.
2 9 0 . As has been seen above a whole bureaucracy exists in the larger 
works to carry out this task.
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( 289 )
costs which can be involved in a conciliation case, the larger share
(29l)of which the employer has to meet. 1
reluctance on the employers' part is undoubtedly increased by the high
It is uncertain whether there is correlation in the chemical industry 
between the incidence of works conciliation committee and company size. 
However, it does seem that the larger companies resort far less fre­
quently to this committee than do medium sized firms, which are perhaps 
run by a single manager or owned by a single family. This type of com­
pany still often resent their loss of authority as a result of the in­
stitution of the works council. In very small companies the works council 
may simply not be effective enough to insist upon the establishment of 
the conciliation committee. Works council weakness is, in fact, another- 
factor of the low incidence of works conciliation committees.
Whilst under the Works Constitution Act 1952 the primary issues of con­
ciliation committees were payments by result and working times/292) the 
new extended regulations and the increase in works council rights have 
altered the committee's locus of activity. Under the present provisions.
it seems that about half of the issues to oome before the works con-
(293)oiliation committee are concerned with social compensation plans. 7 '
291* Costs in excess of DM 100 000 are not unknown. The main oost
arises from the chairman's fee which is assessed according to 
the value of the issue to be resolved. Assessors also receive 
fees unless they are part of the company. Recently the NEC of 
the Chemical Workers' Union and the Arbeitsring agreed that union 
representatives should not demand fees. This agreement was widely 
rejected within the union since it was felt that conciliation cases 
should be made as expensive as possible for the employer thus in­
ducing him to accede to works council demands.
292. H.J. Bischoff, op.cit., pp.166-183.
293. All surveys to date have given this result. Sozialplane, BetrVG. 
1972, Para.112. Such plans have the character of a works council 
agreement. On the question of social compensation plans in the 
chemical industry, erf. Per Betriebsrat, Vol.2 6 , No.4? 1977*
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In essence this is a dispute between management and works council over
(294)the level of redundancy payments. '
The different economic conditions which have prevailed in West Germany 
since 1 9 7 4  have certainly been a major cause of the frequency with which 
redundancy has become an important issue. Since the amount of money in­
volved in such social compensation plans is usually extremely high, the 
employer may feel that his potential gain far exceeds the likely cost of 
the conciliation committee. The works council, on the other hand, is 
unlikely to be awarded less than the employer has offered in the prior 
negotiations. Whilst the works council lacks genuine co-determination 
righis on the question of redundancy, it can make it as expensive as 
possible for'1 the employer and as painless as possible for the employees 
through obtaining a good social compensation plan - often with the help 
of a conciliation committee.
In the chemical industry no other issues are considered to a similar
degree by the conciliation committee although payment by results and
(295 )working times remain relatively important. It seems, then, that
the works conciliation committee is used to resolve questions in which 
a great deal of money or basic principles are involved. Sometimes, 
th® works council may also call for a conciliation committee for tactical 
reasons* Should elections be approaching it may want to demonstrate to
294* Since the initial decisilon to make employees redundant is -*■
considered under the Works Constitution Act 1972 to he an 
economic one, the works council only has rights of inform­
ation on it. BetrVG 1972, Para.106.
295* IG Chemie survey, oq .cit.
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the workforce that it is representing their interests to the fullest 
extent possible* On the other hand, it is often useful in negotiations 
for the works council - and to a lesser extent for management - to threaten 
to establish a conciliation committee to resolve a dispute. This threat 
is particularly credible if either side has previously been prepared to 
use this procedure*
The existence of the provisions for resolving disputes by the works con­
ciliation committee is crucial to the maintenance of peaceful industrial 
relations at the workplace since it deals with a number of potentially 
explosive issues* In addition both parties are aware that the other side 
may use it should they be unwilling to compromise in negotiations and it 
therefore enhances such compromise solutions*
Some indication of the potential importance of the labour courts in the 
regulation of disputes at the workplace is provided by the extent of 
revisions to the Labour Courts Act required by the introduction of the
/ OQ ^
Works Constitution Act in 1972. However, this legislation has now
been in force for eight years and a large number of such disputes which
( 297 )are mainly concerned with rights have meanwhile been clarified.'
As a result of this the labour courts are only rarely used in the 
chemical industry to solve disputes.^ 7 The courts do seem to have
2 9 6 . jcf. Fitting et al., op .cit., p.8 4 8 ft.
297* A range of the most important legal decisions on the Works
Constitution Act may be found in: Vereinigung der Arbeit­
geberverbande in Bayern (Arbeitskreis Arbeitsrecht), 
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz 1972 Rechtsprechung, 6 th Edition,
Munchen, 1978*
298. Similar factors to those above, but particularly the rejection
of third party intervention in disputes, seem to be relevant
when considering the reasons for this. Interviews CM 11,
Sep.,77; CM 8 , BRV 1 8 , Nov.*7 8 .
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The role of industrial action in the support of workplace issues has not
been considered systematically for the chemical industry, although Dzielak
et al. do mention some examples* They find that experience locally of
this type of action is very important when the workforce is called out
(299)in support of a union wage claim.' " '  However, either these disputes 
are not reported by management to the authorities or else they are so 
small as not to be included in federal strike statistics for there has, 
officially, been no industrial action in the chemical industry for a 
number of years/300) The mobilisation of the workforce by the works 
council is expressly forbidden in the Works Constitution Act and could 
lead to the dissolution of the council.^301) Such occurrences are ex­
tremely rare, and when they do happen the union is placed in the inen- 
viable position of not being able to support the strike because it is 
illegal and to support it openly would risk having to pay damages to 
the employer/302)
Workplace bargaining in Germany takes place within a highly institu­
tionalised legalised system. It covers a very wide range of issues which 
influence not only the conditions under which the employees work but also 
their level of earnings. Workplace bargaining plays, therefore, a
299* Dzielak et al., op.oit., p.347f*
300. The last mention of the chemical industry in federal strike 
statistics was in 1972. Statistisches Jahrbuch 1974? op.cit., 
p.151. Furthermore, the use of industrial action is often re­
jected by a large number of employees in the chemical industry. 
cf. Appendix 3? Tables 13, 14? 15? E. Teschner, op.cit., 
p.l35fB a*id Rchumann et al., op .cit., p.2l8f.
301. cf. BetrVG 1972, Para. 23.
302. Such problems were experienced at Michelin in 1978.
a certain importance, though, in the regulation of unfair dismissal cases®
significant role within the system of industrial relations. In parti­
cular it strengthens the mutual dependancy of works council and manage­
ment to adopt concessionary solutions in the regulation of issues at the 
workplace•
(iv) Conditions of work and .job satisfaction.
The diversity of the chemical industry has been discussed previously and 
it was seen that generalisations about the industry and the types of work 
undertaken should be avoided. The limitations imposed upon this study 
makes a consideration of conditions at work and job satisfaction parti­
cularly difficult. It was decided that a limited duplication of some of 
Furstenberg's investigation of the social position of chemical workers^303) 
might provide some additional insights into these questions as well as 
some more current data.
Furstenberg claims that work in the chemical industry does not lead to 
alienation since most employees have some degree of influence on the way 
in whioh they carry out their work. Whilst the technological process is 
seen as a major determinant of the way that work is performed, manage­
ment style also' has a large effect on the degree of autonomy at work/304) 
The validity of these conclusions was reconsidered within the confines 
of the Agrochemie AG case study.
303. This investigation was carried out in 7 different plants during 
1 9 6 6  and covered 601 chemical workers. A wide range of pro­
duction technologies were incorporated too.. F. Furstenberg, 
op .cit., p.l3ff. The different nature of this survey from the 
one undertaken at Agrochemie AG may, however, account for some 
of the different results.
304. Ibid., p.213ff.
Some indication of the variety of .jobs in a chemical works is provided by 
job functions of the respondents/309  ^ It is possible to summarise some of 
the basic characteristics of the main categories of jobs. This is import­
ant in trying to find an explanation of the influence that job breakdown 
has on attitudes, job satisfaction and a variety of other variables/300^
Process work is basically non-manual in nature except for a small number 
of jobs within the production system and except for short, sometimes very 
intense periods of manual work during cleaning and maintenance periods. 
Normally the main tasks of the chemical process worker are to ensure that 
the plant is functioning in the way required for a specific operation. 
This supervisory control may involve the use of physical checks - dials, 
valves, levels, e t c .- or of simple chemical analysis. It is likely 
that the job instructions leave a certain amount of flexibility in the 
way that the individual operator actually carries out the checks pro-
(3 0 7 )vided that the safety regulations are complied with.' 7 This seems
305. cf. Appendix 3, Table 1. Due to the disproportionate stratified 
nature of the works sample, the proportions of the various groups 
interviewed do not correspond to those on the actual workforce. 
The actual workforce structure was approximately:
Process/Packing 42 per cent
Craftsmen 20 per cent
Laboratories 5 P®** cent
Admin. & Management 20 per cent
306* The social background of the respondents seems to be closely 
associated with the jobs they perform as might be expected.
This was particularly true - chi-squared association at 0.0 
per cent level - of father’s profession (Appendix 3, Table 57)? 
schooling (Table 5 6 )? training (Table 5 8 ) and age (Table 53).
3 0 7 . There was a far higher awareness of safety regulations than job 
instructions at Agrochemie AG and this contrasts strongly with
Furstenberg*s results, cf. Appendix 3? Table 2. These differ­
ences are difficult to explain but probably result from a number 
of factors such as differences in work autonomy, increased safety 
training, changes in safety legislation and public debate of 
safety in the chemical industry, cf. Koch and Vahrenholf, 
"Chemie: Das imheimliche Risiko", Article in three parts, fftern,
7.9*1978, pp.66-77? 14.7.1978, pp.6 6 -7 6 ; 21.7.1978, pp.1 2 0 - 1 2 8 . The case study was carried out within a month of these articles 
appearing.
to be the main reasoning behind Furstenberg1s rejection of alienation 
amongst chemical workers.
Each operator tends to have his own sphere of responsibility in a work­
ing place that may well be quite remote from other operators since 
central control rooms were not a feature of workplace organisation at 
Agrochemie Ag / 3°8) The following statement illustrates this point 
although it is a rather extreme example«
"I*m usually on my own in a plant that is about 100 metres long and 2 5  
metres wide. I have to move around doing the checks ... However, I 
can't leave the controls - there are no breaks so we have to work 
straight through and eat as we work." (309)
The main consequence of this form of workplace organisation is isolation 
from other workers and representatives. Furstenberg has hypothesised 
that these circumstances together with rapid technological change are 
likely to demand individual rather than collective reactions on the part 
of the workforce/310) This seems to be supported by evidence at Agro­
chemie AG where there is a greater rejection of strike action amongst 
process workers than amongst craftsmen/311) Furthermore, it seems 
likely in the light of evidence from Agrochemie AG that shift work,
308. For an indication of the size of primary work groups cf. 
Appendix 3, Table 39*
309. Translation of a statement from Interview VL 3, Oot.'78.
310. F. Furstenberg, op.cit., p.228.
311. Thus only 30 per cent of process workers were prepared to strike 
as a last resort compared with 5 0  Per cent of craftsmen. 
Alternative phraseology for this question which stressed the 
eoonomic consequences of strike action produced similar results. 
In this case no process operators were prepared to strike 
whilst 20 per oent of craftsmen were. _cf. Appendix 2.1.1, 
questions 14 and 22. It is not suggested, however, that these 
are the only factors which could cause this. Different back­
grounds ( 7 0  per cent craftsmen from industrial background 
compared with only 40 per oent of process workers) and the 
ideological differences which might result could also be 
important, for example.
which is inseparatable from chemical process technology, increases 
this isolation and contributes towards less efficient work by the 
operators’ workplace representatives.
On the other hand, there seemed to be an awareness of the technological 
interdependance of the various plants and sections so that "if one 
person leaves his place the whole plant can be messed up."^312) This 
awareness of individual responsibility may well have positive effects 
on job satisfaction and other attitudes such as commitment to the 
company.(313  ^ Awareness of the size of responsibility and the need to 
prevent accidents or waste could, however, lead to mental stress for 
the process workers.
It is even more difficult to generalise about the type of work under­
taken by craftsmen in the chemioal industry than it is for process 
workers. Not only is there a diversity of production technology which 
could result in many different jobs, but a wide range of trades and 
skills also exist within the craft area. It seems common for there to 
be central workshops, specialising in particular trades together with 
a small number of general maintenance men who work shifts/314)
At Agrochemie AG the craftsmen spend part of their time working in the 
workshops and part carrying out jobs on the production plant itself.
312. From Interview VL 5> Oct.*78*
313. The close contacts between shift management and process 
operators could also be significant here. However, further
data is really required to clarify these hypotheses.
314. Interviews CM 11, CM 16, Rep.’77; M 11, Oct.’78; CM 9, Nov.'78.
-  376 -
Even in the latter case this work often requires a mate' "as well as 
discussion with the craft and process supervisors or perhaps the operators 
themselves* In this way, craftsmen's work in chemical industry is often 
linked with communication and does not, therefore, result in isolation 
in the same way as process work sometimes does. The type of jobs which 
craftsmen have to perform oan vary considerably depending on personal 
ability and training from highly skilled precision work to extremely 
hard manual work. It was not clear, however, whether particular craft 
attitudes to the performance of less skilled jobs existed. No examples 
of this were met and there also seemed to be certain flexibility in 
process operators undertaking minor repairs. All these features have 
apparently led to more efficient maintenance work in Germany than in 
the U.k / 31®) Craftsmen remain the core of union organisation at the 
workplace. Skilled workers have a tradition of union membership in 
Germany, perhaps partly as a result of union youth work amongst apprentices.
There has already been certain consideration of differences in attitudes
between craftsmen and process workers at Agrochemie AG. There was also
an association between job satisfaction, which was generally high, and
(317)the type of work performed. Prom observation of the data it seemed
that job satisfaction was greatest amongst process operators and decreased
315* Craftsmen tend to specialise on certain areas and thus the
team sent on a particular job may vary. Some less qualified 
mates do exist but it is unusual. Interview 017, Oct.'78.
316. Chemical Manpower in Europe, op.cit., p.15*
317. According to a chi-squared test of association which was 
significant at the 2 per cent level, cf. Appendix 3,
Table 6•
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through the groups craftsmen and white-collar staff/"518) A full
explanation of this is difficult, particularly since so few non-
managerial white-collar staff were interviewed. A partial explanation
may he found, however, by considering the relative levels of earnings
of process workers and craftsmen. Despite being more highly qualified,
median earnings data revealed that craftsmen earned around DM 222 less
per month than process workers. This difference can be traced primarily
(319 )to shift premia and associated bonuses,' "but might still provoke dis­
satisfaction amongst craftsmen. In general, the workforce at Agrochemie 
AG seemed satisfied with their level of earnings^820)and this is perhaps 
a reflection of the rural location of the works since agricultural 
earnings are often much lower/821)
Job satisfaction was measured in Fiirstenberg’s study in a much more
(322)sophisticated way.' Although there were variations from one plant
to another, the level of job satisfaction was, on the whole, high. 
However when he tried to analyse this data for association between job 
satisfaction and basic characteristics of the respondents, the results 
were rather confusing and contradictory/828)
318. Df this trend is taken to a logical (?) conclusion the rather 
unlikely hypothesis can be generated that job satisfaction 
decreases with increasing seniority. This hypothesis was not 
significant when tested for correlation (Kendall’s non-parametrie 
test). Furstenberg claims - within the production area - that 
job satisfaction increases with a higher position in the heirarchy.
F. Furstenberg, op .cit«, p.l9 8 f.
319* The improved wage levels of workers in high technology industries
have been mentioned elsewhere, cf. L. Stettner, oq .cit., p.164*
320. cf). Appendix 3, Tables 4 and 4 6 .
321. Agricultural earnings just exceeded DM 1 5 0 0  (gross) at about
the same time- as the case study was carried out. SJB 79?
op.cit., p.456.
322. cf. F. Furstenberg, op .cit., p.l99ff*
323. Ibid., p.205f.
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At Agrochemie AG an attempt was made to classify some of the components 
of job satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Unfortunately this attempt was 
not altogether successful since many respondents were unable to split 
the evaluation of their work into a number of factors. Nevertheless, 
the primary cause of job satisfaction was found to be job content whilst 
the major cause of dissatisfaction was shift work/324  ^This seems to 
indicate a contradiction since process (i.e. shift) workers were generally 
more satisfied with their work. However, attitudes to shift work seemed 
to indicate that whilst many shift workers disliked this form of work 
they were prepared to accept it because of the rate of payment/329^
This would suggest that earnings are a very important component of job 
satisfaction, something which was supported indirectly by respondents1 
statements:
"There are always problems as long as the money is not right, but if 
the money’s right there are no problems." (326)
"As long as the wage is right, the power of the trade union is reduced.
Although some respondents were unable to name factors which made their 
work difficult, working conditions were criticised most frequently. In 
the works sample half of the complaints were centred on this area whilst 
in the acid plant the percentage exceeded three quarters/320  ^ This 
would seem to indicate that work was more unpleasant in the acid plant 
than elsewhere in the works since there was no other association between
D27
324* cf. Appendix 3, Table 7«
325. ,cf. Ibid., Table 8 and Chapter 3, Section (i).
326. Translation of a statement from Interview VL 2, Oct.’78.
327* Translation of a statement from Interview M 7? Oct.’78.
328. cf_. Appendix 3, Table 5«
the factors which made work difficult and the type of job performed. 
Observation supported these results since dust levels were sometimes 
high and changes in process technology and raw materials had worsened
(3 2 9 )conditions. This illustrates the intimate connections between pro­
cess technology and working conditions. Technological change is supposed 
to lead to improved working conditions^330^and this has, perhaps, been 
the case at Agrochemie AG even though there seems to be room for further 
improvement. The amelioration of conditions in the production area is 
suggested by the less negative attitudes of process workers to tech­
nological change compared with those of craftsmen/331) On the other- 
hand, there was only a relatively small increase in mental stress at 
Agrochemie AG as a result of technological change. The greatest in­
crease in stress has resulted from decreased manning levels/332)
Another recent survey investigated stress and working conditions in a
variety of chemical establishments. In this case, mental stress was a
clear feature of work in the chemical industry as a result of constant
supervision of the plant. In addition conditions such as dirt, dust,
( °33)heat and noise also created problems in a large number of cases. '
In general, these results and those at Agrochemie AG seem to indicate 
that technological progress has not improved working conditions in the
chemical industry to the degree which is sometimes claimed. At the same
329. Interviews M 10, 023, 033, 041, Oct.'78.
330. L. Stettner, op.oit., p.l63f.
331. 100 per cent of craftsmen believed that technological progress
would have some negative results compared with only 6 4  per cent 
of process workers. For the overall results to this question 
cf. Appendix 3, Table 10.
332. of. Ibid., Table 3.
333. Landwehrmann and Alhring, op.cit., pp.64-70, 101-2.
time, furthermore., mental stress is often a feature of work in the chemical 
industry.
There is a close association between working conditions and safety.
This is a question of considerable importance in the chemical industry
with its numerous potential hazards/334  ^ However, a study of industrial
relations does not allow the possibility of a detailed consideration of
this problem. Nevertheless, at Agrochemie AG it was clear that most 
(335)respondents' ^7were quite aware of the necessity to obey safety re­
gulations and legislation/330 ^
There is generally close co-operation between works councils and manage­
ment on safety matters. Joint committees often exist to inspect the
plant, prevent accidents and investigate the cause of all serious
(337)accidents that do occur. The primary reasons for accident happening
were felt to be carelessness and disregard at safety instructiore as well
334* For a recent analysis of this problem and the chemical employers' 
response to this analysis cf. Koch and Vahrenholt, Seveso ist 
uberall, Koln, 1978 and Verb<and der Chemischen Industrie, Seveso ist 
nioht uberall, Frankfurt, 1978. Around 5*4 per cent of chemical 
workers are in constant contact with any of twelve carcinogic 
or other very harmful substancres. "Wie sicher ist der Chemie- 
besch&ftigte," Infobrief, 7/79?
335. cf. Appendix 3? Table 2.
336. Werksriohtlinien zur Unfallverlrtltung, 1976. These guidelines 
are quite detailed and compromise, a ten page booklet. Also 
Arbeitsstattenordnung, 20.3.1975 (BGB1. 1,729) and Gesetz 
uber Betriebsarzte, Sioherheitsingenieure und andeie Fachkrafte 
fur Arbeitssicherheit, 12.12.1973 (BGB1. 1,1885).
337• Many respondents stated that it was impossible to eliminate 
accidents and occupational illnesses entirely despite the 
extensive safety equipment and clothing provided without cost, 
bonuses for wearing safety equipment and the large number of" 
safety representatives. Interviews CM 12, BRV 1 5 , Nov.*78;
M 1, M 5? BR 2, BR 3, Oot.'78. On safety training cjf. BG 
Chemie, op.oit., p.33f*
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as technical failure of equipment.
Although it is not contended here that safety precautions in the chemical 
industry are beyond improvement, comparison of the industry's record 
with that in other branches shows that the chemical industry does not 
produce an especially large number of accidents or industrial illnesses. 
Table 5.3.
Industrial accidents and industrial illness in the chemical industry 
in comparison with total industry. (3 3 9 )
Chemical Industry Average Total Industry
Year Industrial Industrial Industrial Industrial
Accidents (a) Illness(a)________ Accidents______ Illness
i9 6 0 2 . 3 9 (3 0 ) 0.16 (12) 3.22 0.42
1 9 6 5 2 . 2 4 (3 0 ) 0.11 (13) 3.03 0.32
1 9 6 6 2.22 (2 8 ) 0.12 (11) 2.97 0.30
1 9 6 7 2.12 (2 8 ) 0 . 1 5 (12) 2.96 0.29
1 9 6 8 2.06 (2 9 ) 0 . 1 5 (11) 2 . 6 5 0.26
1 9 6 9 1.93 (2 8 ) 0.12 (15) 2.48 0.24
1 9 7 0 2.19 (28) 0.11 (18) 2.55 0.22
1 9 7 1 2 . 2 9 (26) 0.13 (13) 2.61 0.24
1 9 7 2 2.11 (27) 0.14 (11) 2.51 0.24
1 9 7 3 1.98 (26) 0.12 (13) 2.37 0.24
1 9 7 4 2.04 (26) 0.16 (!3) 2.40 0.28
1 9 7 5 2.15 (23) 0.22 (1 0 ) 2.30 0.29
1 9 7 6 1.51 (30) 0.17 (13) 2 . 0 5 0.30
1 9 7 7 1.55 (27) 0.22 (14) 2 . 0 9 0.36
338. Interviews M I 8, I 10, Oct.'78. Many cases result in minor 
injuries and do not lead to compensation. (Compensation was 
paid in only 2.7 per cent of accidents in 1977? Ibid., p.19? 
own calculations). An example of technical failure was given 
by one respondent at Agrochemie AG and it is reproduced here 
in order to provide an insight into the way that accidents 
can occur:
"A vessel containing concentrated nitric acid at 40 atmospheres 
pressure had been fitted with new valves which were made of 
two metals. This caused a voltage difference and led to 
corrosion. I was examining a valve and thought that it did 
not look right so I touched it. This caused the screw thread 
on the valve to come away and 5 0  kg of acid hit me in the 
face." Interview M 9? Oct.'78.
339* Zahlen zur Rozialqolitik, 1979?- op .oit., p.6l.
(a) The quotients are the number of compensated oases per
1000 injured persons and the figure in brackets indicates 
the position of the chemical industry out of 36 sectors.
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The ohemical industry has maintained a relatively constant position and 
has improved its record in the field of■industrial accidents along with 
industry in general. As far as industrial illnesses are concerned, there 
has apparently been a reversal in trend since 1974* The reversal may 
be a result of changes in legislation concerned with the duty of em­
ployers to report cases in their establishments/340) Although there 
does not seem to be an association between the number of accidents re­
quiring compensation and economic recessions, the number of accidents 
reported^341)like the percentage of persons who are i l / 342)declines 
considerably during economic recessions. This most probably reflects 
fear amongst employees that absenteeism through illness or minor 
accidents could endanger their jobs. It might be concluded, however, 
that despite the hazardous nature of work there, the chemical industry’s 
safety record is quite good.
Although labour intensive conveyor belt operations are not particularly 
typical of the chemical industry, they are common in certain sectors —  
pharmaceuticals, and other consumer orientated branches - as well as 
packaging and loading. At Agrochemie AG fertilizers were bagged and 
loaded into railway cars or lorries in this way. Such work has trad­
itionally been primarily manual, and very streneous, although in recent 
years some operations have been mechanised/343) Technological advance 
can lead here to a decrease in manual work but can also complicate or
340* cf. BG Chemie, Jahresbericht 1973. no place (Heidelberg), no
date (l974)> p*4*
341* cf* Ibid., p.26 and BG Chemie, Jahresbericht ’77. op.cit., p.24*
342. cf. Zahlen zur Sozialpolitik, 1979? o p .oit., p.6 3 .
343* Interviews M 12, Aug.'77 and CM 11, Nov.’7 8 .
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increase the tempo so that the actual advantages of technological pro­
gress for the employees are dubious/844) Despite the very limited 
investigation carried out into this type of environment it seems that 
industrial relations in this type of plant or sector are often worse 
than those in other types of chemical plant/849) Furthermore, previous 
data on pharmaceutical production also illustrates how different atti­
tudes can be in works which predominately use this type of production 
technology.^848)
The extent of white-collar employment in the chemical industry, the
reasons for it and the consequences that it has for labour relations
in the industry have been discussed previously. Due to the wide range
(347)of white-collar jobs it is not possible to consider the conditions 
under which white-collar workers are employed beyond saying that they 
mainly work in laboratories and offices. Technological change has 
been gaining momentum in these areas in recent years, for example 
through word processors and automatic analytical techniques^ so that 
large changes could soon take place in the conditions and type of' work 
in the white-collar sector of the chemical industry/848)
The level of earnings in the chemical industry seems to be one of the
344* For a similar example in a British context of). Nichols and 
Armstrong, op.cit., p.24f*
345* respondent also stated that this was the case. Interview
CM 11, Nov.*78.
346. of. F. Furstenberg, op .oit., passim (data for Betrieb G).
347* For example^ erf. Bayer (Zentrale Personalabteilung), Richt-
beispiele fur Angestelltentatig.keiten, no place (Leverkusen), 
which is a booklet 112 pages long.
348. On the union reactions to these problems cf). H. Wiesner,
"Das Problem unserer Zeit - Rationalisierung und Auto­
mat isierung," Gewerkschaftliche Umschau, 3/1978, p.5ff 
and K. Hofer, "Buros-Bildschirme - Belastungen," Ibid.
5/79, p  *2ff.
main elements of job satisfaction. Since a high proportion of welfare 
benefits have a monetary content /  349)it is possible that they also 
contribute to the high degree of job satisfaction. However, at Agro­
chemie AG, many employees seemed unable to categorise the welfare bene­
fits which they received^39°)although their evaluation of the benefits 
was very positive/391) Scarcely any respondents desired a change in
the status of these benefits so that they become protected by collective 
• ( 3 5 ?  )agreements, "indicating a lack of awareness of the basic vulnerability 
of voluntary benefits/393)
However, the primary aim of welfare benefits from the management point
of view, which is to create a permanent workforce, has certainly been
achieved at Agrochemie Ag / 394) This is perhaps reflected in the general
belief that the company would stand by them in case of personal diffi-
(355 )culties and that their jobs are basically secure. " The general 
validity of this data is uncertain but ii shows that it is possible to 
create a permanent workforce even under conditions of "zero" unemploy-
f V
ment that existed in Germany between i9 6 0  and 1973*
There are a wide range of different conditions of employment and types 
of jobs in the chemical industry. Although technological progress may
349* F* Teschner, op .cit., p.83ff.
350* Most respondents were only able to name the pension scheme cf. 
Appendix 3, Table 50*
351. Ibid., Table 43.
352. Ibid., Table 51*
353* As it is, both legislation and collective agreements have greatly
reduced the range of voluntary benefits. E. Teschner, op.cit., p. 8 3 *
354* Less than 10 per oent of respondents had worked at Agrochemie AG 
for under five years, cjf. Appendix 3, Table 61.
355* Ibid., Tables 16 and 44*
356. Zahlen zur Sozialpolitik, 1979? op«cit., p.9*
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have brought a number of improvements in these conditions, many jobs 
are performed in unpleasant surroundings. Despite this many chemical 
employees are satisfied with their jobs, perhaps as a result of the high 
level of their earnings. Widespread job satisfaction is bound to have 
a positive effect on the climate of industrial relations in the chemical 
industry.
(v) Summary.
Workplace industrial relations in the German chemical industry are 
characterised primarily by a dual system of representation of employees’ 
interests. The two types of representatives at this second level of 
labour relations in Germany are the works council and the- local union 
organisation in the form of lay officers*
Works councils have their origin in the labour legislation of the Weimar 
Republic and today much of their strength is owed to the support pro­
vided by legislation and the established existence of' this institution* 
The Works Constitution Act 1972 provides a bureaucratic system for the 
regulation of disputes which occur between management and the works 
council which at the same time creates a mutual dependency between these 
two bodies. In addition to this formal system, informal relationships 
develop between the works council and management as a result of frequent, 
close contacts. In this way the superimposing of formal and informal 
systems enhances a co-operative attitude towards dispute solution at 
the workplace. This is illustrated by the way in which domestic bar­
gaining occurs and by the relative infrequency of works conciliation 
committees or industrial action.
In the chemical industry the collective agreements between employers * 
associations and unions cover a wide range of companies. Since the 
employers are insistent that the agreements do not drive the most un­
profitable firms into bankruptcy, management in the more profitable 
companies is provided with a great deal of financial flexibility in 
their relations with the works council# Given the increasing consider­
ation of macro-economic conditions in collective bargaining and the 
corresponding disregard of the economic state of particular industries, 
the relative strength of the chemical industry has further increased 
the flexibility of management in their local relations with the works 
council, particularly in the larger companies. Furthermore, the capital 
intensive nature of chemical production results in the relative unim­
portance of labour costs and the necessity to achieve maximum usage of 
plant. In this way management gains additional room for manoeuvre 
although at the same time the need to co-operate with the works council 
is increased#
Thus, management has the ability to make concessions when negotiating 
with the works council and to provide it with a wide range of benefits, 
many of which are voluntary, and which the works council, therefore, may 
not insist upon. This results in a system of co-operative solution of 
industrial conflict between works councils and management in the German 
chemical industry.
This situation naturally has a large number of consequences for the 
position of union representatives at the workplace; a position which 
can best be described in the chemical industry as one of weakness.
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The relationship between works council and lay officers might be depicted 
as "antagonistic co-operation" since despite the dominance of the former 
body, it does require some support from the union lay officers in order- 
to fulfil its tasks. To ensure this support the works councillors in 
the larger chemical establishments have developed a system of plant 
representatives elected by all employees as opposed to solely union 
members. Whilst the plant representatives are intended to have a position 
subordinate to the works council, the union lay officers generally ful­
fil a similar role.
In addition to the isolation of lay officers from "real" industrial 
relations issues at the workplace, a number of economic, structural 
and technological features of the chemical industry have further con­
tributed to the weakness of union representation at the second level 
of labour relations®
The economic strength of the chemical industry has enhanced the achieve­
ment of satisfactory collective agreements without resort to strike 
action, yet it is during dispute situations that lay officers gain 
particular importance due to the legal restrictions upon the involve­
ment of works councillors in industrial action.
The chemical industry has a high percentage of white-collar employees 
who are traditionally hard to organise in Germany. As a result union 
representation is poor amongst this group of employees. Furthermore, 
due to the system of plant representatives in the larger chemical 
companies, local union organisation is generally poor in these com-
- 388- -
panies whioh are crucial for the ability of the Chemical Workers* Union 
to strike successfully.
Within the production sectors of the ohemical industry workplace organ­
isation and manning levels hinder the involvement of lay officers in 
grievance solution and the distribution of information to the member­
ship. Furthermore, in continuous process plants shift work impairs 
the ability of lay officers to attend trade union meetings and training 
courses. Therefore, lay officers who are employed in producing chemicals 
can be prevented from fulfilling their function by the technological 
constraints of the industry in which they worko
In consequence, effective trade union representation at the workplace 
is normally only to be found in the craft areas of the chemical industry 
since communication is often an integral part of the job and as a result 
of trade union traditions amongst skilled workers.
Case studies have indicated that the level of job satisfaction in the 
ohemical industry is high and suggested that the main cause for this 
might be the level of earnings and other material benefits. The 
relatively low level ‘of manual work in the chemical industry was another 
component of job satisfaction whilst dissatisfaction resulted from work­
ing conditions and shift work® Technology, therefore, has both positive 
and negative effects on job satisfaction with collective and workplace 
bargaining both contributing considerably towards satisfaction and so 
helping to create a peaceful climate in which industrial relations take 
place•
An appraisal of industrial relations in the West German chemical 
industry.
The central hypothesis of this study is that the technical nature, in­
dustrial organisation and the economic state of the ohemical industry 
all have a signifioant influence on the practice of labour relations 'in 
the industry. In addition, however, the first part of the investigation 
which dealt primarily with the situation in the West German chemical 
industry has demonstrated that political and legislative developments as 
well as behavioural factors have also affected industrial relations there. 
Although there is considerable interconnection and overlap between these 
factors, their influence on chemical industry labour relations is reviewed 
here separately for the sake of simplicity.
Behavioural factors which are difficult to quantify since they can vary 
from person to person may have a particular influence on collective 
bargaining. This is enhanced by the way in which senior officials are 
responsible for the latter stages of negotiations and therefore exert 
a considerable personal influence on the results. Beyond this, there 
also seems to be a marked fear of causing either inflation or unemploy­
ment amongst employees in the ohemical industry - doubtless as a result 
of experiences during the Weimar Republic - and this has consequences 
primarily on their attitudes to the way in which collective bargaining 
is conducted during economio recessions.
Industrial unionism is an important feature of labour relations in West 
Germany. The rationalisation of union organisation after the Becond
Chapter 6
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World War and the restoration of the pre-Hitler system of employers' 
associations has enhanced the development of orderly collective bargain­
ing in the post-war period.
The range and system of collective bargaining are also greatly influenced 
by legislation. Indeed, one of the characteristics of labour relations 
in Germany is the importance of legislation and the significance of' 
government intervention. In the collective bargaining area, legislation 
has resulted in binding collective agreements, regulations about the 
form they must take, who may make such agreements and a peace obligation 
on both sides for the period of validity of agreements. Legislation has 
further split industrial .relations into two levels by removing a large 
range of issues from the sphere of responsibility of the trade unions 
and by creating a works council system to deal with these matters.
The works constitution has led to the dual representation of employees 
interests at the workplace and has, in the chemical industry, been partly 
responsible for the weakness of shop-floor trade unionism. Furthermore, 
works councils in the chemical industry have created with management a 
bureaucratic system for the co-operative regulation of industrial con­
flict at the workplace. Sh.ould this system fail to solve these conflicts, 
legislation also provides additional mechanisms for their resolution in 
the form of the works conciliation committee and the labour courts.
Labour court judgments have gained particular importance in strike law 
since they have extended and applied the basic legal provisions and’ 
become, in effect, judge-made lav?.
Another example of the influence of legislation on industrial relations
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This has extended the involvement of both trade unionists and works 
councillors in company management, and so increased the information 
available to these bodies. Such involvement has enhanced co-operation 
between managers and senior officials and together with the information 
gained by the trade unions can certainly have an influence on the climate 
and results of collective bargaining. At the workplace it can lead to 
a greater understanding of managementrs problems by the works council. 
However, in its present forms, supervisory board co-determination does 
not provide either trade unions or works councils with the ability to 
force a particular course of action or prevent another. Nevertheless, 
as a result of the size of many chemical companies, the recent extension 
of representational rights of employees on the supervisory board was an 
extremely controversial'issue.
The climate of collective bargaining in the ohemical industry has also 
been positively affected by its stable economic position and its rapid 
expansion which has continued with two exceptions for the last thirty 
years. This economic situation has provided management with scope to 
make concessions to the unions in both regional and national bargaining, 
leading to high wage levels and generous conditions of employment ex­
emplified by the holiday provisions. As a result, relations between the 
chemical employers * associations and the Chemical Workers * Union are 
respeutful and co-operative.
On the other hand, there have been differences in the economic develop­
ments of various sectors of the chemical industry. Only the most mammoth
in West Germany is proved by co-determination on supervisory boards.
-  392 -
companies have highly diversified product ranges and are cushioned from 
these structural weaknesses. The employers* associations have, there­
fore, been unwilling to sign agreements which are likely to endanger 
the eoonomic positions of companies whose main operations are concen­
trated in economically weak sectors of the industry, such as man-made 
fibres• As a consequence of this and the wide scope of most collective 
agreements in the chemical industry, many company managements are pro­
vided with considerable room to manoeuvre in their negotiations and 
relations with the works counoil* In this way, the healthy economic 
state of the chemical industry has aided co-operative concessionary 
relations both at the workplace and in collective bargaining. Never­
theless, when economic recessions have occurred, disputes have arisen. 
Thus, the 1971 chemical industry strike was certainly caused in part by 
the minor chemical industry slump in 1970, and the 1977 Rheinland-Pfalz 
"dispute" caused by this region*s rapid recovery from the economic de­
pression of the mid 1970*s.
From a historical point of view the economic development of the chemical 
industry has had a number of consequences for industrial relations which 
are currently relevant. The industry developed rather later than did 
the heavy industries. Therefore, one consequence of the late industrial 
revolution in Germany, trade union weakness, was especially marked in 
the chemical industry. Despite rapid union expansion during the early 
part of the Weimar Republic, disputes in chemical companies usually re­
sulted in defeat for the unions. This reflects the strength of manage­
ment resistance to unionism which was often co-ordinated between com­
panies; a course of action facilitated by the high concentration in the
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industry, above all during the Weimar period. The present ideological 
splits in the Chemical Workers1 Union may be seen as the post-war equiva­
lent of a fragmented union movement.
The rapid growth of the chemical industry has provoked large labour 
requirements, often on green field sites. As a result, chemical manage­
ment has traditionally used an extensive system of welfare benefits in 
order to attract the necessary labour and to create a stable workforce.
i
These aims have generally been achieved in recent years and such measures 
have probably helped to prevent the establishment of strong trade union 
workplace organisations particularly in the larger chemical companies, 
where welfare benefits exist on a very large scale.
The West German ohemioal industry has a structure which might be chara­
cterised as consisting of a small number of enormous companies - histori­
cally the decartelised IG Farben - together with a large number of middle- 
sized and small manufacturers of specialised chemical products. This 
has influenced industrial relations in a variety of ways. Co-ordinated 
management resistance to unionisation has previously been mentioned but 
this co-ordination is now most important within the employers' assoc­
iations, especially as far as collective bargaining is concerned. In 
addition, the relatively small number of important chemical companies 
has enhanced trends towards effective centralisation within the associations
The size of chemical companies has implications for industrial relations 
beyond the importance of the company in the employers' associations.
For example, the company size determines directly what form of co-
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determination applies within the company and how extensive the provisions 
of the works constitution are, since only establishments with more than 
one hundred employees are required to form an economics committee. 
Furthermore, the character of industrial relations at the workplace seems 
to vary with the size of the establishment. Management policies in large 
companies are usually extremely sophisticated, and the works council 
bureaucracies effective. As a result disputes rarely seem to develop. 
Similar peaceful relations are usually met in small companies where 
personal relationships gain particular significance. Sometimes disputes 
do arise, however, in middle-sized companies, especially when they are 
managed by a single executive, who may well own the company. As has been 
discussed above, increased size often leads to increased diversity of 
production which in turn may provide increased economic stability for 
the company.
Labour relations on large production sites deserve some further con­
sideration. Such sites are characterised by a highly complex technologi­
cal organisation with a large number of interconnected production plants 
which may well be scattered over a large physical area. Capital in­
tensity is generally another feature of such sites. Under such circum­
stances it becomes very difficult for the trade union to organise strikes, 
not only because of the technical complexity but because communication is 
very difficult due to an inadequate number of union workplace representa­
tives - it is on these sites that plant representatives are most common. 
However, due to their size, these sites are crucial to the employers.
If the trade union is ever to be successful in an industrial dispute in
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the chemical industry, then it must develop a system of effective strike 
action on these sites.
The workforce structure of the chemical industry has several effects on 
industrial relations. The main characteristic of this structure is the 
large number of white-collar employees. This has been explained by 
considering the technological nature of the industry which requires ex­
tensive research facilities, analytical production control, large sales 
organisations in some sectors and a great number of scientifically 
trained managers. However, white-collar staff have traditionally proved 
extremely difficult to organise and this is doubtless one reason for 
present trade union weakness in the industry. Another consequence, 
where white-collar workers have joined the industrial union, has been 
ideological differences within the union. Despite this, the Chemical 
Workers' Union has adopted policies which have led' to widespread status 
harmonisation between blue- and white-collar workers and which may, in 
the future, lead to unified pay agreements for both groups®
The nature of ohemical production is such that there are relatively few 
skilled workers who have completed apprenticeships; these workers tradi­
tionally form the centre of trade union support amongst the workforce. 
-Continuous process technology and high technology production lead to 
shift work, scattered workplaces and small work groups. This, from a 
trade union point of view, can cause poor communications, isolation and 
a lack of solidarity. On the other hand, regular contacts between the 
workers and management as a result of work organisation foster good re­
lations between these groups.
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The reasons for the large number of managerial and other senior staff, 
many of whom have academic qualifications have already been considered 
during this chapter. The size of this group has certain specific effects 
on industrial relations. The chemical industry is the only German in­
dustry with collective agreements.for staff with academic qualifications. 
These employees also have their own representative organisations, a 
union to engage in bargaining with the employers' associations which has 
a very high membership density and company consultative committees to 
deal with more specific issues. Both these types of organisation have 
received increased impetus through the Co-determination Act 1976 which 
gives senior managerial staff special representational rights.
High technology industries such as chemicals are by their very nature 
capital intensive. This has consequences for the industrial organisation 
since large companies are required in order to finance the necessary in­
vestment and research. In addition, labour costs are relatively un­
important whilst maximum utilisation of plant is a high management 
priority. These latter factors are likely to increase the willingness 
of management to co-operate with the representatives of their employees 
and to make concessions to them.
Chemical technology also leads to a wide range of different types of jobs. 
However, these jobs are generally less manual than those in other in­
dustries and technological change has resulted in some improvements in 
working conditions. At the same time, though, these changes have led to 
increased stress, to more shift work and to increased capital intensity.
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The technical complexity of the chemical industry has also contributed 
towards a rejection of third party involvement in dispute regulation 
whether in the form of state arbitration, the use of external arbitrators 
in the joint conciliation procedure or in the low incidence of work 
conciliation committees and labour court cases#
Industrial relations in the West German ohemical industry can be 
characterised as co-operative in nature as a result of legislation, the 
economic state of the industry, its technology and industrial organi­
sation. These factors are also primarily responsible for one of the 
most striking features of chemical industry labour relations - trade 
union weakness, particularly at the workplace.
1'NDU
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE WEST GERMAN
AND BRITISH CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES
VOLUME 2
DAVID RAYMOND EBSWORTH
II
PART TWO - COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
The previous part of this study has concentrated on examining in­
dustrial relations in the West German chemical industry. In the 
present chapter comparisons are drawn between the situation in Germany
as it has been portrayed above and industrial relations in the British
chemical industry, using information which has been gleaned primarily
from two academic studies^^and empirical investigations carried out
(2)as a part of this dissertation. "
In this way, chemical industrial relations can be compared and con-
(3)trasted under two very different labour relations environments' "with 
the aim of developing hypotheses about the general nature of industrial 
relations in the chemical industry. In order to achieve this aim, 
the comparison will focus upon a number of important features of in­
dustrial relations such as trade unionism, employers* associations and 
management whilst at the same time incorporating collective bargaining, 
workplace relations, industrial organisation and the economic develop­
ment into the analysis.
(i) Basic characteristics of the chemical industry and its industrial 
relations.
Although the British chemical industry is not as important as its German 
counterpart to the total national economy/4 )ii does have a crucial
1. Gill et al., op .cit., and P.C. Verma, op.cit.
2. See Chapter 1, Section (ii) above.
3. The main differences in the two systems are the importance that 
legislation has traditionally played in labour relations.
4 . See Chapter 1.
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position within the economy as a supplier and consumer of a wide range 
(5)of p r o d u c t s . T h e  economic state of the chemical industry has con­
sequently been influenced by the overall economic climate in Britain,
particularly during the 1960Ts when "almost all European nations re-
(6)corded a faster growth in chemical output than in Britain."' ' However, 
the growth rate of the British ohemical industry when compared to the 
British national economy has exceeded that of the chemical industries 
in the United States, Germany and Japan compared with, their national
(7)economies•' 7
The basic indicators of this economic development are presented in 
the next table•
Table 7*1*
Economic indexes for the British chemical and manufacturing 
industries 1 9 6 8 - 1 9 7 8  (1 9 7 0 =1 0 0 ). (8 )
Year Production Index 
Chem. Man.
Price
Chem.
Index 
Man.
Export Volume 
Chem.
Index
Man.
1968 90 96 94*7 89.9 86 88
1969 95 100 95*5 93.4 95 99
1970 100 100 100.0 100.0 100 100
1971 102 100 1 0 8 , 2 1 0 9 . 0 110 110
1972 108 102 113.7 1 1 4 . 8 1 1 8 112
1973 121 111 118.9 123.2 1 4 3 128
1974 128 108 1 5 2 . 8 1 5 2 . 0 1 6 9 135
1975 116 101 188.7 1 8 8 . 7 1 4 2 130
1976 131 103 216.6 221.3 1 7 2 •- (a)
1977 135 104 2 5 1 . 1 265.1 195’ -
1978 137 1 0 5 271.3 289.2 2 1 5 —
5. cf. Reuben and Burstall, op.cit., P .107ff.
6. Ibid., p.113.
7. Chemical Industries Association (CIA), making success happen, 
London, no date (1977?)? p.6.
8. Sources: CIA, UK Chemical Industry Statistics, Eighth Edition, 
London, 1976, pp.15? 20, 2 8 . (cited below as Chem. Stats.); 
Chemicals SBC, UK Chemicals 1975-1985? London, 1976, p.16; 
"Chemicals: disruptions in first quarter depress output," 
Trade and Industry, 20.7*1979? p«148ff., own calculations
to convert from base 1 9 7 5 = 1 0 0  to 1 9 7 0 =1 0 0 .
(a) Figures no longer available.
As in Germany the chemical industry in Britain was severely affected 
by the world-wide recession during the mid 1970's. A similar vast 
increase in the price of chemical products is apparent and in Britain 
as in Germany there was a delay before the full effects of the re­
cession hit the chemical industry. The chemical industry does, however,
seem to have recovered from this recession and the traditional patterns
( q  )of economic growth and stable prices have reasserted themselves.' 7
In Germany the association between the healthy economic state of the
chemical industry and collective bargaining in that industry played
an important role. However, in Britain, incomes policy has restricted
free collective bargaining throughout the majority of the last two
decades/10  ^ This has not only removed much of the controversy from
(ll)national negotiations in the chemical industry' 7but it also limited
(no)the range of bargaining which could be carried out l o c a l l y ~ w at 
least until productivity criteria were re-introduced in 1 9 7 7  / 10^
9. For the German developments cf. Chapter 3, Section (iii).
In 1979 there were extremely large increases in naphtha 
prices which can be expected to cause the price of organic 
chemicals to rise once more. cf. S. Cameron, "Naphtha rises 
start new ICI price round, "Financial Times, 23.5*1979? p.10. 
S'imilar fears were expressed in Germany cjf. "Auf Erdol 
angewiesen - Wandel im Energieverbrauch," Infobrief 2l/l979,
P*2.
10. On this subject cf. H.A. Clegg, 1979? op .cit., p.345ff anti 
C. Crouch, The Politics of Intiustrial Relations, Glasgow, 
1 9 7 9 ? passim.
11. Interview MAN 9? Bec.*77*
12. Interview MAN 6, July ’79*
13. H.A. Clegg, 1979? op.cit., p.353* Productivity bargaining 
was once well established in the chemical industry since 
there are a number of similarities between it and the oil 
industry in which it was first applied in Britain, cf.
A. Flanders, The Fawley Productivity Agreements, London,
1 9 6 4 . A further discussion of productivity bargaining may 
be found below.
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This could well explain why the difference between the average earn­
ings of British chemical workers and those of workers throughout the 
economy was not very great in 1 9 7 6 / 14 ) Since the relaxing of incomes 
policy around this time, chemical workers1 earnings have increased at
a faster rate than earnings in general so that by April 1979 they were
(15 )
6 . 9  per cent above the average level.' "" In this way, British chemical 
workers begin to approach the position of their German counterparts as 
a group of employees which earns well above the national average/1®) 
Such a situation might well be expected in the chemical industry as a 
result of its capital intensive nature with its resultant reduction 
in the importance of labour costs.
High earnings can, naturally, have a great influence on job satis­
faction within an industry# When, however, incomes policy restricts
the freedom of the bargaining parties to adopt the type of' agreements
(17)which they desire, "developments can result - a reduction of differ­
entials, for example - which can cause numerous problems when the 
policy is terminated, allowing a return to free collective bargaining.
For this reason, national negotiations in the chemical industry en-
(1 8 )countered considerable problems in 1 9 7 9 *
14* At this time the earnings of male manual workers in the chemical 
industry were 4*8 per cent above the national average. British 
Labour Statistics Handbook 1976, London, 1978, p«24? own cal­
culations. ”
15* Department of Employment Gazette, Vol. LXXXVII, 1979? P«977? 
own calculations.
16. For earnings in the German ohemical industry cf. Chapter 3?
Section (iii)e.
17. One way out of this problem was to take the amount of increase 
provided by the national pay award and distribute it in a 
different way than foreseen in this award as the result of’ 
local agreements. This ploy was used at Growmore Ltd, for 
example. Interview MAN 3? June *79*
18. Interview MAN 6, July *79*
industries and the chemical industry is no exception to this. Not
(19)only do a wide range of payment systems exist, "there are also 
numerous types of agreements, e.g. company, works, national and 
sectoral. The picture is usually complicated further by separate 
agreements for general workers, craftsmen and white-collar employees 
in so far as this latter group is covered by collective agreements.
As a result, there are four main national agreements in the ohemical 
industry at present:
a. The Chemical and Allied Industries, Joint Industrial
Council Agreement/20)
b. The Chemical and Allied Industries, Agreement for Engineering
(21)and Building Trades Craftsmen;
(2?)c. The Drug and Fine Chemical, Joint Conference Agreement;
(23)d. ICI national company signatory unions agreement.' 1
Despite this rather complicated situation which reflects the union
19. cf. C. Gill et al., op .cit., p.129*
2 0 . cf. Agreement of December 1976, it covers around 6 0 , 0 0 0  general 
workers in the Heavy Chemicals, Fertiliser and Plastics areas 
of the industry in conforming CIA member companies only. (On 
this subject see belox-f). Interview MAN 9? Dec.,77*
2 1 . cf. Agreement of September 1977? covering around 1 2 , 0 0 0  crafts­
men in a variety of trades throughout the same companies as the 
JIC agreement. Ibid. However, this agreement applies generally 
for craftsmen in the Chemical and Allied Industries (except ICl). 
Interview TU 14, June *7 8 .
22. cf. Agreement of January 1976, covering 1 8 , 0 0 0  general workers 
in the pharmaceutical, cosmetics and toiletry sectors of the 
industry. (About 30-40 companies). USDAW document, dist­
ribution of I.B.g. Study "Pay in Pharmaceuticals" (March 1976), 
Manchester, 4.5*1976, p.2 .
1
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Fragmented, collective bargaining is common in British manufacturing
23. Covering 52,100 weekly paid employees of whom 15,000 are crafts­
men. C, Gill et al«, op.oit., p.8 9 .
- 6 -
structure within the chemical industry as well as its industrial 
organisation/24^  basic breakdown of earnings in the chemical and 
allied industries is possible.
The wide range of earnings in the British chemical industry is clearly
demonstrated as is the importance of plus-rate payments from a variety
of sources^/9 Ijocal agreements seem to account for around 30 per cent
of average weekly earnings for male chemical workers. At Growmore Ltd.
managers confirmed that similar circumstances existed, whereby the
local agreements constituted an even higher percentage of the pay
packet, this probably being a reflection on the concentration of chemi-
(26)cal industry in the area. Nevertheless, trade union'national
officers with a greater overview of the situation corroborated the re-
(27 )lative importance of local agreements within the chemical industry.
Local agreements are a more important source of earnings for blue-
oollar workers in the British chemical industry than is the case in
Germany where such extensive local payments are only made on the
(28)largest chemical sites. These differences are not only a re­
flection of the two collective bargaining systems - in Germany the 
most significant level of bargaining for wages is the regional level -
but also of the strength of workplace trade unionism in the British
(29)and German ohemioal industries.'
2 4 . On the industrial organisation of the British chemical industry 
cf. P.O. Verma, op.cit., pp.103-249*
25* See Table 7*2 overleaf.
2 6 . Interview MAN 6, July *79 and MAN 7? April 1978.
27* Interviews TU 9? Jan . * 7 8  and TU 13, Aug.*78.
2 8 . The German local payments originate from a number of sources,
such as works council agreements and; primarily, voluntary pay­
ments from management.
29* See be1ow•
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Terms and conditions for white-collar staff are standardised through­
out the majority of British chemical companies. The chemical industry 
provides a good example for the recent spread of bargaining within the 
white-collar sector. Around 90 per cent of this bargaining is multi­
plant in nature with the remaining 10 per cent being limited to single 
establishments!80) This latter situation might occur where white- 
collar unionism has only developed on a single site within a company 
but to such a level that it would be impossible to refuse recognition/ 81)
The rise of white-collar unionism in the British chemical industry is 
discussed in greater detail elsewhere but it has certainly been en­
hanced by the growth in white-collar employment from around 2 5  per
(32 )cent of the workforce in 1948 to over 40 per cent by 1976. The
current workforce structure of the German chemical industry has de­
veloped in a similar way to this particularly when regional variations
(33)are taken into consideration. 7 In Germany, industrial unionism in 
an industry with a high concentration of white-collar workers which 
are poorly organised, has led to status harmonisation in the form of 
joint negotiations and agreements for both white-collar and blue- 
collar workers. In Britain also, there is more equality of conditions
30. Interview TU 10, May *7 8 .
31. This issue does lead to rivalry between various unions which 
could recruit white-collar chemical employees and can also 
lead to disputes with management. Interviews TU 6 and TU 7, 
June *79* On legal recognition procedures cf. 0. Kahn-Freund, 
Labour and The Law, Recond Edition, London, 1977? p.68ff, 
also from an employees point of view, J. McMullen, Rights at
V!ork, London, 1978, p.240ff.
32. Gill et al.. op.cit., p. 155* Bain considers high employment 
concentration to be conducive to unionisation although he 
notes the chemical industry* as an anomaly since for 1 9 6 4
he calculated a membership density of only 3.7 per cent.
G.S. Bain, The Growth of White-Collar Unionism, Oxford,
1970, pp.36, 72-81.
33. cf. Table 3.3*
between staff and payroll in the ohemioal industry than in almost any
/ 7 j \
other industry, but it is exactly this erosion of differentials
that has been one of the contributory factors causing the large rise
(35)in white-collar union membership in the chemical industry. 7 It is 
possible, therefore, were differentials between white and blue-collar 
workers in the German chemical industry to be reduced considerably 
that this would provide an impetus for increased membership in the 
German Salaried Staff Union.
As a result of the fragmentation of bargaining in the British chemical 
industry which includes separate agreements for general workers and 
craftsmen, it is to be expected that different wage rates exist for 
these groups. These variations are considered in Table 7*3.
Traditional skill differentials have generally been maintained in the 
British chemioal industry partly through higher basic earnings and 
partly through greater overtime working. This contrasts with the 
situation at Agrochemie AG where shift premia raised the earnings of 
those workers on a continuous 3-shift system above those of craftsmen. 
This greater resilience of traditional skill differentials in Britain 
is almost certainly a result of craft unionism and its defence of 
craft principles despite willingness to accept productivity deals which
-  9 -
35, Interviews TU 2, TU 4, TU 6, TU 7? MAN 4, all June *79 5 
TU 10, May '78.
34* Interview TU 11, June '78.
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were designed, to reduce the differences.
Although the data used in this table is from a survey the exact de­
tails of which are unknown, its size should permit a certain level of 
confidence in the results. It must be assumed that stratified sampling 
was used in order to create an accurate picture as far as the summary 
of results is concerned. It follows, therefore, that the number of 
the various groups surveyed should give an indication of the structure 
of the male blue-collar workforce in chemicals. It reveals that pay­
ment -by-re suits systems are not especially important in the chemical 
industry and that, as might be expected from the technological nature 
of chemical production, continuous 3-shift working is the most common 
type amongst general workers. The scope of shift-work in the pro­
duction area is also shown by the small percentage (32$) who work 
days. In all over 50 Per cent of the workers sampled are shown as
being engaged on some form of shift work and the survey does not allow
(38)for craftsmen who work shifts.
As in Germany, shift work can lead to problems although the emphasis 
is somewhat different. Whilst the German union officials often
37* At ICI, for example, although craftsmen’s earnings generally 
remained above those of general workers, of. J. Roeber, 
op.cit., pp.38ff, 117? 134? 140? 189? 195* For historical 
views of bargaining and earnings in the chemical industry 
of. NBPI, Report No.105» "Pay of General Workers and Crafts­
men in ICI Ltd.", Cmnd. 3941? London, 1 9 6 9  Verma,
"The Chemical Industry" in S'.W. Lemer, J.R. Cable and
S. Gupta (eds.), Workshop Wage Determination, Oxford, 1 9 6 9 ? 
PP.95-157. .. —
38. At one company visited just under 10 per cent of craftsmen 
were employed on shifts. Interview7 MAN 1, May ’78. This 
is apparently the overall position in the industry.
Interview TU 11, June ’7 8 . Some staff, of course, such as 
supervisors, technicians, etc.work shifts too. Interview 
TU 10, May ’7 8 .
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complained of the difficulties in communicating with their members on 
shifts, this view was rarely expressed by the union side in Britain/39  ^
Perhaps this indicates the strength of local officers in the two 
countries. Management did, however, state that it created communi­
cation difficulties for t h em/40  ^ This might be either a reflection 
of a greater awareness of the need for direct communication as opposed 
to formal consultation procedures on the part of management or it could 
reflect less successful use of shift supervisors for this task in the 
United Kingdom/41^
The main motivation for chemical employees' willingness to work shifts 
is apparently based upon the higher earnings, in Britain. No other 
advantages were mentioned as at Agrochemie AG, where the rural location 
resulted in many workers owning small holdings. It is also less usual, 
in Britain^ for workers to have to visit public offices which only open 
during normal working hours, than is the case in Germany and this removes 
an occasional advantage in being a shift worker. Shift differentials 
seem to be the cause of dissatisfaction and disagreements between 
various groups in the chemical industry with day workers and craftsmen 
considering them to be too high and shift workers believing them to be 
too low. This can lead both to inter-and intra-union disputes/42  ^
Differentials may be a greater problem in the British chemical industry
3 9• However, it can occur that shift workers have no contact with 
convenors for two weeks at a time. Interview TU 5? June *79•
40. Interview MAN 1, May '78 and MAN 6 , July ’79.
41. Further discussion of the role of management in the British 
chemical industry may be found below.
42. Interviews TU 1, May ’7 8 ; TU 3,  TU 4 , MAN 4 , June ’79* (General 
workers - both day and shift - are usually organised by the same 
union, whilst craftsmen belong to their respective unions).
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than the German because of a possible general dissatisfaction with 
the level of earnings in Britain* At Agrochemie AG, employees were 
generally satisfied with the amount that they earned/43^
Shift work is required by the technological - as vie 1 1  as the economic - 
constraints of the chemical industry. Not only do chemical plants 
often take days to start up or shut down, the capital investment 
levels^44^required for a capital intensive industry like chemicals 
mean that . "base chemical plants have to run at 9 °+ per cent capacity 
in order to reach the break even point."^49  ^ As a result of this, 
management’s flexibility of action is reduced, although the relative 
unimportance of labour costs counterbalances this to a certain extent.
In Britain many respondents stressed the positive effects of high tech­
nology on industrial relations. These positive effects seemed to be 
caused by a number of factors such as high earnings, increased job 
satisfaction through decreased monotony and manual work and through 
the greater skill levels required amongst the workforce; high technology 
production also seems to increase the number of workers- with scientific 
and engineering training/40^
S'ome British respondents did mention that high technology was often 
associated with rationalisation as a result of technological advance,
43* For a consideration of shift work in Germany cf. Chapter 3,
Section (i). On earnings, Ibid, Section (iiije.
44* In 1975? British chemical industry accounted for 17 per 
cent of all manufacturing investment, although there are 
fluctuations in this level. Chem. Stats., op.cit., p.l8 .
45* Interview MAN 5> June *79*
46. Interviews TU 1, May ’7 8 ; TU 2, MAN 3, MAN 4 , June ’79; TU 11,
June ’78; TU 13, Aug.’7 8 ; MAN 7, Apr,’78; MAN 9, Dec.’77.
In general this did not seem to create particular problems and some
( An }involvement of shop stewards certainly occurs in such areas. It
is also proposed that a committee be set up in the near future by the 
CIA and the unions to provide guidance and advice on the probable 
effects of technological progress in the industry. Such consultative 
procedures, the healthy economic state of the ohemical industry and 
union attitudes to change may lie at the heart of the unproblematic 
technological advance/48)
Evidence did emerge, however, which supported the view of Gill et al/ 49) 
that there are a large number of heavy, dirty, unpleasant and monotonous 
jobs in the chemical industry, despite the improvements which have taken
place over the years/90) The. British and German chemical industries
display in this instance a further point of similarity.
Chemicals production in Britain is typically carried out by small groups
of workers scattered through complex, dispersed production sites.
Respondents often believed that these small groups enhanced stable
industrial relations through making control and communication more
( 5 1 )simple for management, and reducing anonymity. 7
The workplace organisation as it is found in chemicals seems to weaken
47* Interviews TU 1, May ’78; TU 6, MAN 4? June *79*
48. Interview TU 3, June *79•
49* Gill et al., op.cit., p.234f*
50. For example erf. Ibid., p.l38f. For a more general historical 
view of the development of British chemical production cf.
P.C. Verma, 1 9 6 6 , op .cit., p.52ff and T.I. Williams, The 
Chemical Industry, c. 1953, reprinted Wakefield, 1972.
51. Interviews TU 1, May *78; TU 2, TU 4 , TU 6, MAN 3, MAN 4?
June *79.
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and communication and by decreasing the direct influence of the shop
steward over the men, since contact is less frequent than might be
(52)the case in large workshops.' 7
The basic characteristics of the British ohemioal industry appear, 
therefore, to influence labour relations in a generally similar way 
to the influences exerted by those in the German chemical industry on 
labour relations there. The differences which emerge, such as union 
structure for example, seem to result from differences in the total 
national industrial relations systems. Thus a comparison of trade 
unionism will be made at this juncture.
(ii) Trade unionism in the chemical industry.
When compared with the relatively uncomplicated nature of trade unionism 
in the West German chemical industry, the situation in Britain might 
seem confused and unintelligible. In fact, this is not the case at all; 
the present structure of trade unionism in the British chemical and 
allied industries can be explained by considering the development of 
the British trade union movement and collective bargaining in the 
chemical industry. A major feature of this develop is its continuity, 
whilst in Germany the trade union movement was dissolved in 1933? 
suffering a break of sixteen years before the re-establishment, of a 
national union organisation with a rationalised, industrial union 
structure.
the strength of the union by increasing the difficulties of recruitment
52. Interviews TU 10, May ’7 8 ; TU 11, TU 14, June ’78 a~nd 
m i  6, June ’79.
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Due to difficulties in defining the chemical industry 'and to var­
iations in the internal structure of British trade unions it is im­
possible to accurately assess the extent of union organisation in the 
industry. Price and Bain estimated the union membership density in 
chemicals to be 51*4 per cent in 1974/ 94  ^ This represents a fairly 
rapid rate of growth from the mid 1960*s and through the 1970*s/")
It can safely be assumed that the union membership density of the 
chemical and allied industries has further increased since 1 9 7 4  due
(5 6 )to an increasing number of union membership agreements and as a
( 57 )result of increasing unionisation amongst white-collar staff,'71'
Since the proportion of white-collar staff is high in chemicals, then 
the union membership density in this industry may now be approaching 
the average membership density in private manufacturing industry 
more closely than in 1 9 7 4 *
Since Verma reported estimated union membership in chemicals industries
(53)
53. of). Chapter 1, Section (i).
54* P« Price and G.S. Bain, "Union Growth Revisited: 1948-1974 
in Perspective," BJIR, Vol. XIV, 1976, p.339f‘f»
55• Verma estimated the union membership density at around 2 0
per oent in 1 9 6 6 . (P.C. Verma, 1966, op.cit., p.260) which
seems to be 'an underestimate when compared with Bain and 
Elsheikh*s calculations of 32.8 per oent unionisation in 
1961 and 40.7 per cent in 1971* G.S. Bain and P. Elsheikh, 
"An Inter-Industry Analysis of Unionisation", BJIR, Vol.XVII, 
1979, p. 1 3 8 .
5 6 . For example of. Shell U.K. Ltd., Union membership agreement,
w.e.f. 1 .6 .1 9 7 7 » A union membership agreement for 101 was
concluded in 1 9 6 9  as a part of the WSA negotiations.
J. Roeber, op .cit., p.328ff.
57* Interview TU 10, May *78. Farther discussion of this growth
in white-collar union membership may be found below.
58. of. Price and Bain, op.cit.
for 1 9 6 7  / 99^additional amalgamations and changes in name have taken 
place. The- Chemical Workers’ Union^®°)was amalgamated into the TGWU 
in 1972 ending a long series of inter-union disputes between it 'and 
the main process unions which succeeded in preventing the CWU from 
representation on the JIC. This amalgamation probably brought the 
TGWU around 7000 additional members in the chemical industry/®1)
Process or general workers in the chemicals and allied industries are 
organised primarily by the TGWU and the GMWU in the Heavy Chemicals 
sectors and USDAW whose membership is concentrated in Fine Chemicals. 
There seems to be a degree of uncertainty about the number of members 
in the respective industrial groups of these unions as data collected 
as a part of this study does not agree with that presented by Gill 
et a l / ® 2^
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5 9 * Ike estimated membership was as follows:
"General Workers
Transport and General Workers’ Union 
National Union of General & Municipal Workers 
Union of Shop, Distributive & Allied Workers 
Chemical Workers 1 Union 
Salt Unions
Craftsmen
Amalgamated Engineering Union 
Electrical Trades Union 
Other Engineering Unions
Building Workers
National Federation of Building Trades Operatives 3 000u
P. Verma, "Multiple Unionism: a Study of Trade Unionism in 
the British Chemical Industry." Indian Journal of Industrial 
Relations, April 1972, p.552.
60. Not to be confused with the German Chemical Workers’ Union 
(IG Chemie). An account of the struggle between the CWU 
and the larger unions may be found in S.W. Lerner, 'Breakaway 
Unions and the Small Trade Union, London, 1961, pp.13-65*
61. Gill et al., op.oit., p.147*
6 1  000 
5 0  0 0 0  
1 5  0 0 0  
12 000 
4 000
1 5  0 0 0  
6 000 
3 000
6 2. Ibid., p.124.
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At the end of 1976 the Chemical, Rubber Manufacturing and Oil Refining
(6 ^ ^Industries Group of the TGWU had just below 140 000 members.' 7 The
GMWU claims to be the "leading union across all sectors of the chemical
industry"^°4 ^but the membership in its chemicals, rubber and glass
group is uncertain.' USBAW organises some 162 000 industrial workers
although it is very difficult to say how many work in the chemical and
allied industries. There are 18 600 members in the chemical company
branches but there are also members "buried" in general branches, so
(66)that membership may be of the order of 22-23 000. 7 These three unions
bargain together on the JIG with the TGWU supplying the union chairman 
and on the Drug and Fine Chemicals Joint Conference where USBAW is 
dominant Z 0*7 ^
The size of other unions which organise process workers in the chemical
industry, such as the Union of'Salt, Chemical and Industrial General
/ 58)Workers which is recognised by ICI, 'is uncertain but their member­
ship is probably very limited.
6 3 . cf. TGWU, Report and Balance Sheet 1976, London, no date, p.97*
6 4 . D. Basnett (General Secretary), in GMWU, UK Chemicals:
The Way Forward, Esher, no date (1977).
6 5 . Gill et al. claim this group has around 120 000 members and
this is probably of the correct order, although doubt must 
exist about the veracity of this figure due to inaccuracies
in their estimations for the TGWU and USBAW.
66. Interview TU 14, June *7 8 .
6 7 . Although they are not covered by the CIA.there are several
other bargaining bodies which might be classed to be parir
of the chemical and allied' industries such as the Paint,
Varnish and Lacquer, National JIC, the Gelatine and Glue 
Joint Council, and the Soap, Candle & Edible Fats JIC.
Interview MAN 9> Bee.’77« Their existence is a result of 
the resistance of these sectors of the industry from being 
incorporated into the JIG at the time of their foundation, 
perhaps from fear of under representation of' their specific 
interests. R. Charles, The Development of-Industrial Re­
lations in Britain, London, 1973, p.150.
68. J. Roeber, op .cit., p.21.
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The only other unions which organise manual chemical workers are the 
craft unions which organise the respective skilled maintenance workers 
and other skilled operatives. Five unions negotiate with the CIA for 
the craftsmen at national level: AUEW; EEPTU; the National Union of 
Sheet Metal Workers, Coppersmiths, Heating and Domestic Engineers; 
the Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers, Shipwrights, Blacksmiths and 
Structural Workers; and the Union of Construction Allied Trades and 
Technicians / 6^)
As the names of these unions suggest there have been a considerable 
number of amalgamations within the craft area bringing a certain amount 
of rationalisation with it. On all but the largest sites, or those 
with considerable construction work being carried out, the only two 
craft unions of importance are the Engineers' and Electricians' Unions. 
However, national officers in neither union were able to state what 
their chemioal industry membership amounts to since these unions have 
a branch structure which is based upon where the members live rather 
than where they work/70) It can be assumed, though, that the member­
ship density in the craft regions of the ohemical industry approaches 
1 0 0  per cent since craftsmen are not limited to working in one parti­
cular industry and may well require a union card should they change 
jobs. The high membership density amongst craftsmen is probably
partly a result of craft attitudes and traditions which have been
(7l)maintained with the aid of rigorous apprenticeship schemes.'
6 9 . Agreement for Engineering and Building Trades Craftsmen, op .cit.
70. Interviews TU 4 and TU 5? June *79* This is doubtless one 
reason for the demise of the branch as a power centre within 
these unions with the growth in importance of the workplace 
organisation.
71. H.A. Clegg, 1976, op.cit., p.30.
-  20 -
Until very recently union membership- within the white-collar sector
(72)of the ohemical industry was almost non-existent. However, by
1976 ASTMS was claiming a membership of 51000 members in chemicals^3)
and two years later as many as 75 members/^4 ) ASTMS seems to be
the dominant white-collar union in chemicals for although other unions
(75  )have established some membership within the industry, ""about three 
quarters of white-collar union members in the chemical and allied 
industries apparently belong to this union which was only founded in 
1 9 6 8  as an amalgamation of ASSET and AScW.^®)
Trade unionism within the British chemical industry might be summarised 
as being fragmented with union membership of varying densities in the 
prrocess areas split between TGWU, GMWU and USBAW, very high member­
ship densities in the craft area in the respective unions and rapid 
growth in the white-collar sector led primarily by ASTMS. This con­
trasts very considerably with the situation in Germany where the Chemical 
Workers’ Union, an industrial union, attempts to organise process, 
craft and white-collar workers in the same union with varying degrees 
of success. The only other union in the German chemical industry with 
significant membership caters for senior staff since the German Salaried 
Staff Union has so few members it refuses to reveal the number. The
72. In 1 9 6 4  it was calculated to be 3.7 per cent. G.S1. Bain 
op.oit., p.35°
73* USBAW doctiment, op.cit., p.20
74* Interview TU 10, May ’7 8 .
75* cf* Gill et al., op.cit», p.163*
76 . ASTMS, Annual Report to Tenth Annual Conference at Brighton 
1978, London, 1978, p.8 . In 1 9 6 8  the union had around 
70,000 members. Interview TU 10, May ’78. White-collar 
unionism is discussed further below, also cf. Gill et al.,
op.cit., pp.153-199°
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development of unionism in the German chemical industry has been 
(77 )portrayed above' 'and a brief consideration of the evolution of 
unionism in the British chemical industry follows for comparison/78)
As in Germany, the British chemical industry only developed after the 
industrial revolution had been underway for sometime, and its most 
rapid growth has taken place in the twentieth century. One comment­
ator recently observed that in the 1920Ts "the chemical industry was
too new, scattered and diverse to have built up any tradition of trade 
(79)unionism."' Whilst issue can be taken with the claim that chemical 
production was scattered - there were distinct concentrations in the ■ 
north-west - the other factors did influence the growth of trade 
unionism.
One important inhibitant to the spread of trade unionism within the 
process side of the chemioal industry was the severity of the working 
conditions, making employment in the industry the last resort. At a 
time of heavy unemployment amongst unskilled labourers from whom the 
industry recruited its workers, labour fluctuation rates were extremely 
high. These conditions were not conducive to the development of trade 
unionism so that it "made very little progress amongst chemical workers 
in the early and mid-nineteenth century, apart from a minority of 
craftsmen associated with the industry who repaired machinery and 
plant."
77. cf. Chapter 2 (ii).
7 8 . The majority of the data for the history of process and craft 
unionism in chemicals is taken from Gill et al.*s authoritative 
account, erf. Gill et al., op.cit., pp.137-150*
79* To affect the nascent man-made fibres industry. B.C. Coleman,
Courtaids- - An Economic and Social History Volume II, Oxford,
1 9 6 9 , p.168 cited in Gill et al., op.cit., p.l37f*
80. Gill et al., op.oit., p. 139*
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been argued, lived in closed communities; a factor which could have
(8l)encouraged the growth of trade unionism. However, these unions
were small and their regional spread extremely limited. Most were 
subsequently amalgamated into one of the larger general unions.
Indeed, amalgamation has continually played a role in rationalising 
and stabilising unionism in the British ohemioal industry/02^
/ on ^
The so-called "nev-unions" often developed as a result of disputes 
and spread throughout the locality, as organisors tried to gain support 
by acquiring members in factories associated with the establishment in 
dispute. The aim of this was to prevent strike breaking by recruiting 
the mass of labourers. Chemical works are often located near ports, 
which were one of the centres of this "new-unionism", and in this way 
unionism spread to chemical workers. In particular this occurred 
during the second stronger wave of recruitment by the "new-unions" 
around 1 9 1 1 .
The unions that made the most progress in the chemical industry were 
those that had existing centres elsewhere and included Will Thorne Ts 
Gasworkers and the National Amalgamated Union of Labourers. This
was the situation when " World War One ushered in considerable changes
One exception to this was amongst salt workers in Cheshire who, it has
8 1 . And militancy, cf. C.ICerr and A .Fie gal, "Industrial Conflict and Its 
Mediation," American Journal of Sociology, 1954, p.l91f.
82. Uee the fate of the British Chemical Workers’ Union described 
above, for example.
83. of. H. Pelling, A History of British Trade Unionism, Third 
Edition, Harmondsworth, 1976, p.97ff*
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in the chemical industry, producing in its essential form the national 
collective bargaining machinery and trade union structure in existence 
today." (8<1)
These changes were primarily the result of state intervention which 
favoured the introduction of collective bargaining, provided com­
pulsory arbitration services and supported union recruitment policies.
In Germany the necessities of the war economy provided a similar impetus 
for state recognition of trade unions and this led to a concomitant 
surge in union membership.
In Britain, as in Germany, a chemical employers* federation was formed
at this time and the wages committee of this body together with Bevin
( ^were approached by Askwith after the first Whitley Report with a
view to establishing a joint industrial council for the industry.
(86)Whilst Gill et al. stress the importance of state intervention 
another author views the employers* and unionists* willingness to 
accept the proposals as the most important factor leading to the form­
ation of the Heavy Chemicals J i c / 87)
The executive board of this body was composed of representatives of 
the Chemical Employers * Federation and the unions which included Bevin *s 
Bock, Wharf, Riverside and General Workers* Union; the National Union
8 4 . Gill et al., op .cit., p.142.
8 5 . Interim Report on Joint Standing Industrial Councils, Cmnd.
8608, London, 1917? cf. J.B. Seymour, The Whitley Councils,
London, 1932 and R .  Charles, op .cit. ,  p*94ff*
8 6 . Gill et al., op.cit., p.143.
8 7 . R. Charles, op.cit., pp.138, 141? 147*
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of General Workers; the Workers* Union and the National Amalgamated 
Union of Labourers. Union recognition in the chemical industry was 
obtained therefore by union leaders who had their power base in other 
industries. This shows that on the process side of the industry 
"there was very little impetus or self-starting to union growth."^88)
The immediate post-war years were characterised by wage cuts, member­
ship loss in the trade unions and increasing trends of industrial 
concentration amongst chemical manufacturers. Despite the burden put 
upon the JIG by the regular wage cuts the unions held to their belief 
that national negotiations were the best means of resisting them. 
However, it became increasingly clear that a rationalisation of union 
structure was necessary if the JIC's were to survive.
In 1922 the Transport and General Workers* Union was formed under 
BeyinTs leadership by amalgamating a number of general worker unions. 
Later the Workers* Union became financially insolvent and was in­
corporated into this union greatly increasing its membership in the 
chemical industry/89) The National Union of General and Municipal 
Workers was formed one year after the TGWU, its main parent organi­
sations being the NUGW and NAIJL which both sat on the Heavy Chemicals 
JIC.
"The amalgamations and national bargaining in chemicals were mutually 
sustaining. The survival and influence of the chemical and other 
JIC’s were instrumental in the amalgamations of the TGWU and NUGMW, 
while union mergers x^ ere one reason why the chemicals JIC was able 
to stagger on. Above all, however, the JIC survived because the 
employers wanted it to survive." (9 0 )
88. Gill et al., op .cit., p.143*
8 9 . As did the TGWU’s amalgamation of the Chemical Workers' Union 
much more recently.
90. Ibid., p.145*
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In Britain, as in Germany, the 1920’s were a time of intense economic 
competition and increasing concentration in the chemical industry.
The process of concentration culminated in the formation of Imperial 
Chemical Industries in 1926. In order to keep price competition based 
on wage cutting to a minimum, the employers’ federation which was 
dominated by the larger companies wanted to maintain uniformly effect­
ive national wage rates subject to district variations. Hence their 
desire to ensure the continued existence of the JIC. Thus, employers 
who had been traditionally opposed to unions ensured the survival of 
trade unionism amongst chemical process workers.
After the formation of ICI, however, its ’’increasingly progressive 
labour policies ... imposed strains on the Council since the firm em­
ployed over half the wage-earners in the industry. In 1931? ICI decided 
not to reduce shiftmen’s rates, in 1 9 3 2  it introduced a shorter working 
week and in 1933 it gave an increase in wages spontaneously. The
decision of the ICI to give a common basic rate whatever the district
(91)in 1936 produced the break which was inevitable.”' 7 This was the 
origin of national collective bargaining for ICI as a company, which 
is one of the current features of bargaining in the British chemical 
industry.
Management policies of this type within the largest company in the 
industry succeeded in causing a large decrease in union membership 
which was perhaps felt to be unnecessary by many workers given the 
system of works councils which had been introduced in 1927• These
91. R. Charles, op.cit., p.1 7 8 .
committees had no negotiating rights hut dealt with complaints and
(92)the regulation of welfare and fringe benefits.' 7 Here remarkable
similarities with the situation in Germany are apparent. Management
in both countries employed analogous social paternalistic policies to
create loyalty amongst their workforces and weaken the hold of the
unions. Furthermore, the agents of this influence were basically
similar works council schemes, the major difference being the legisla-
(93)tive backing and greater scope of the scheme in Germany." 7 These 
policies at ICI were undoubtedly one reason for the low degree of union 
organisation for many years within the British chemical industry.
Neither this type of policy nor the absence of a separate craft trades 
agreement until 1 9 4 4  undermined craft unionism within the chemical in­
dustry in general, or ICI in particular/94) In fact, "in relation 
to the general tenor of the argument, that chemicals union structure 
was largely determined by the hold which the general unions gained over 
the JIC and this in turn by employer and state stipport for collective
bargaining at crucial junctures, the craft unions appear as deviant 
(9 5 )cases".'" However, this is a general tendency within British in­
dustrial relations.
Trade unionism seems to have remained weak, and limited to the national 
level, in the British ohemical industry for many years. This is reflected
92. J. Roeber, op.cit., pp.22, 25ff»
93. With the growth of workplace union organisation during the 
1950's these works councils at ICI lost their influence and 
meaning. Ibid., p.27*
94. Ibid., p.22 and Gill et al., op .cit., p.148*
95. Ibid.
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has altered radically, however, during the last two decades with the
chemical industry being affected by the general upsurge in workplace
labour organisation/90  ^ The general survey material on this de-
(97 )velopment was recently duplicated for the chemical industry 'and 
this provides confirmation that shop-steward organisations and plant 
level bargaining as well as grievance handling are widespread through­
out the chemical industry although activity increases generally in 
larger establishments/90^
in the lo’-T membership densities within the industry. This situation
The relative unimportance of PBR systems-.within the chemical industry
( 9  q)has been noted above' 'so that the source of the stimulus to work­
place unionism must be sought elsewhere. Productivity bargaining was 
first applied in Britain within the oil industries and soon it found 
extensive application within other capital intensive industries, in­
cluding chemicals/100^
96. It would be beyond the scope of this thesis to consider 
this general trend, which is well-known. For a recent 
review cf• H.A. Clegg, 1979? QP .cit., Chapter 2.
97• This survey covered 126 chemical establishments employing 
around 6 0  0 0 0  workers and reflecting the diversity and 
complexity of the British chemical industry by region, 
section of the industry and grades; of employee. Gill et a.l., 
op.cit., pp.6 3 f, 1 2 8 . ?
98. cf. Ibid., pp.128-137.
99* It was confirmed by Gill et al . 1 £f. Ibid., p.129.
100. B. Towers, "The Nature and Developthent of Productivity
Bargaining,” in Ibid., T-G- Whittingham and A.VI. Gottschalk 
(eds.), Bargaining for Change, London, 1972, p. 28f, They 
define productivity bargaining ”as a process taking place 
at plant, company (where the firm is multi-plant) or in­
dustry level in T*hich workers agree to accept changes 
(varying ”idely in both scope and depth) in the organi­
sation and deployment of the labour force and in return, 
are awarded compensating cash and'W non-cash benefits.”
Ibid ., p . 26.
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Prior to the introduction of productivity bargaining by management, 
the economic situation and tightness of the labour market had increased 
the influence of shop stewards in workplace industrial relations/101) 
Motivation for management to introduce productivity bargaining can 
be found in a desire to reduce labour costs and to regain control of 
industrial relations in a planned w a y / 102) In fact, it served to 
institutionalise and strengthen the trends towards the decentral­
isation of power within the trade unions, and in chemicals to provide 
the springboard for a rapid increase in trade union membership.
It is interesting, therefore, that productivity bargaining spread 
rapidly in capital intensive industries like chemicals where labour 
costs are relatively unimportant^103)and where trade unions were not 
particularly powerful at the workplace. However despite this, pro­
ductivity bargaining became very widespread within the industry/104) 
although the influence of government support for this form of negot­
iation should not be underestimated. For three and a half years in 
the late I9 6 0 *s productivity bargaining was one of a small number orf
101. cf. H.A. Clegg, 1979? op.cit., p.!2ff.
102. Gottschalk and Mee, "Productivity Bargaining, the Management 
Function and the Behavioural Science," in B. Towers et al., 
op?cit., p .loof and P.B. TcKersie, "The Significance of 
Productivity Bargaining in Great Britain," in B.C. Roberts
(ed.) Industrial Relations: Contemporary Issues, London,
1969? p.2 2 0 ff.
103. It has been estimated for example that in British Rail a
5 per cent increase in wage rates adds 3 per cent to total 
costs, but in a modern oil refinery the same increase in 
costs would allow a 2 0  per cent increase in wage rates.
Jones and Golding, "Productivity Bargaining," Fabian Rerearch 
Series No.257, London, 1 9 6 8 , p.2 .
104’« In 1971 61 per cent of companies under the Heavy Chemicals 
JIC were covered by some form of productivity bargaining.
A.I. Marsh, "The Contribution of Employers' Associations," 
in B. Towers et al., op.cit., p. 8 6 .
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criteria which made pay settlements above the ’ceiling* level per­
missible. The N3FI and otheir government agencies also provided advice 
and support for productivity agreements/109)
Another factor which may have aided the spread of productivity bargain­
ing within the chemical industry was the policy of the trade unions in 
the industry towards it. The NUGKW, ESTU/PTU and USUAW approved whole­
heartedly of this type of bargaining and the TGWU gave its conditional 
support/108) Initially employers * associations had been opposed to 
productivity agreements since they foresaw a further diminition of 
their influence in bargaining® However, by 1 9 6 7  the Chemical Industries 
Association negotiated a framework agreement on productivity bargaining 
with both process and craft unions which have otherwise negotiated 
separately/107)
Productivity bargaining has been considered to be one of the most im­
portant factors to influence industrial relations in Britain during 
the 1 9 6 0 * s / 1 0 8 ) As far as trade unions in chemicals are concerned,
the number and locus of the majority of these agreements made it im­
possible for them to be negotiated by full-time union officials either 
nationally or locally. As a resultjproductivity bargaining increased
105* J.F.B. Goodman, "Government Agencies and Productivity Bargaining," 
in Ibid. ,p,+243ftThe importance of this factor is illustrated by 
the rapid demise of productivity bargaining once this support 
was withdrawn and by its rebirth under the latter stages of the 
1974-1979 Labour Government’s incomes policy.
106. 13.?. Somerton, "Productivity Bargaining and the Trades Unions",
Lbid., p.6 3 f,Uor an earlier account of these attitudes cf.
Pod. Verma, 1966, 00 .cit., pp.2 7 0 ff., and 289f.
107 - H.A. Clegg, 1979? op .cit., p.73* cj). A.I. Marsh, 1972, op .cit.
108. e.g. Gottschalk and Mee, op.cit., p. 103.
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the level of management with which shop stewards were negotiating thus 
increasing their status and providing recognition for their role within 
workplace industrial relations. Shop stewards were accepted hy manage­
ment as the representatives of their work groups and were also faced 
with the problem of having to negotiate on a new range of substantive 
issues such as job evaluation and work study which might previously 
have been outside their experience/109) Furthermore, the position of 
shop stewards was guaranteed since management required their support 
to maintain and implement the agreements over a period of several years.
It can be keen, therefore, that the explanation of the development of 
trade unionism in chemicals put forward by Gill and his colleagues 
based upon employers' and state support for collective bargaining^110) 
is more generally applicable than envisaged by them since it also 
applies to productivity bargaining whilst they were referring solely 
to national bargaining.
In Germany productivity bargaining between management and unions would 
be impossible because of the works constitution legislation which places 
many of the issues tackled under productivity bargaining within the 
sphere of responsibility of the works council/111) Furthermore,I
i
109. For a general account of these trends cf. T.G. Whittingham, 
"Productivity Bargaining,'Full-time officials and Shop 
Stewards," in B. Towers et al., op .cit., p.6 8 ff .These trends 
are illustrated at ICI in J. Roeber, op .cit., and S. Cotgrove 
et al . ,  o p .cit.
110. Gill et al., o p . cit., p.1 4 8 *  For a case study of the growth 
of unionism in a chemical works which illustrates the im­
portant role played by management and where a numerically 
strong yet impotent workplace organisation developed cf_
Nichols and Beynon, o p  .cit., p.l09ff*
111. Such as overtime, redeployment, reductions in manning, hours 
worked, work study, introduction of new technology, etc.
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union membership clauses, which were sometimes incorporated into the 
productivity agreements in order to induce the unions to make counter­
concessions, are illegal in Germany and so this means of strengthening 
unionism cannot be used there. In Germany, state involvement in in­
dustrial relations has served to increase the effects of technology 
and management policy by further weakening workplace unionism. In 
Britain, on the other hand, state involvement was first responsible for 
helping to create national negotiating machinery and then supported 
management1 pbliby "strong unions at the workplace in
order to achieve agreement with the workforce and subsequently to 
operate the agreements. In this way the difficulties imposed on trade 
union organisation by the production technology, the lack of trade union 
traditions and management resistence have been overcome.
Joint union negotiating committees were believed to be a prerequisite 
for productivity bargaining,^112^and recent survey data indicates that 
it has left a legacy within the chemical industry for almost half of 
establishments had a joint negotiating committee. In this case no 
particular trend could be determined between the existence of such 
committees and the size of the establishment/"^3  ^ In this way the 
formal divisions within union organisation are oftep overcome. EvenII
where joint committees do not exist there is often extensive co-operatioi
( 1 1between the lay officials representing general workers and craftsmen.
112. Donovan Research Paper No. 4? Part 1, Productivity Bargaining, 
London, 1967? ?*9ff.
113* Gill °t al., op .cit., p.130.
114. Unless otherwise stated this information was collected on visits 
to a number of British chemica,! companies but is based primarily 
on extensive interviews with union convenors at Growmore Ltd.
Other case studies of workplace unionism in the chemical in­
dustry may be found in: I. Boraston, H.A- 01 egg and LI. Dimmer, 
Workplace and Union: a Ftudy of Local Relationships in Fourteen
Unions, London, 1975? PP«76ff, 99f‘f‘*
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To-date there is less oo-operation between these groups and staff re­
presentatives - as shop stewards within the white-collar sector are 
usually known. This reserve may well be caused by the vigorous re­
cruiting drives of the white-collar unions like ASTMS which bring 
them into rivalry with the more established unions. Nevertheless, it 
would be a mistake to over emphasise the importance of formal union 
structure in workplace industrial relations.
Shop steward organisations now exist in chemical establishments of all
sizes, with the average number of workers represented by one steward
in the order of 37/ 119  ^ However, the full-time convenors, - i.e«.
senior stewards - who have been elected by the body of the shop stewards
(116)
to represent them, are only found in the larger chemical establishments.
Where full-time convenors do not,exist management is often prepared to
give the more senior stewards considerable time-off for their duties.
On the larger sites, such attitudes towards releasing stewards seem
widespread, for as one industrial relations manager put it:
"We give them as much time-off as they need, though I do sometimes 
wonder if we go too far. Nevertheless I'm a great believer in full­
time lay officials especially in big plants. This prevents being 
confronted by amateurs who don't have time to prepare their work 
properly." (1 1 7 )
1 1 5 . Depending on size of establishment the mimber varied between 
31 and 41? although no pattern emerged. Gill et al., op .cit., 
p.131, own calculations. At Growmore Ltd. in a works with 
around 1 1 0 0  employees, these results were basically confirmed 
as the ratio was 4 4 *1 *
116. These full-time convenors are released from their jobs and
provided with office facilities by management; they are also 
paid by management in a similar way to works councillors in 
Germany. However, their role is determined by agreement and 
custom and practice rather than legislation. For survey 
data, cf_. Ibid.
1 1 7 . Interview MAN 3, June *79*
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In this way it is probable that most stewards at Growmore Ltd. were 
released for between 2 and 5 hours per day in order to fulfil their 
representative function/ll8) The extent of release for union act­
ivities was a legacy of the negotiations for the productivity agree­
ment where most stewards were engaged full-time on this task. This 
led later to a formal system of full-time convenors. Thus, in a 
similar technological environment to that at Agrochemie AG although 
on a larger site, British trade union lay officers spend daily almost 
as much time on union activities as German lay officers do every month. 
This clearly indicates a different level of involvement on the part of 
union lay officers at Growmore Ltd., a level which in terms of time
spent exceeds that of all but the most senior non-full-time works 
(119)councillors. 7
It is impossible to generalise on the nature of shop steward elections 
in the chemical industry, since there seem to be variations between 
localities, unions and from year to year. Some elections are held at 
the workplace, others in the branch, and their frequency varies con­
siderably. One reason for variations in the frequency of elections is 
the lack of alternative candidates, so thart the election simply becomes 
the ratification of the existing steward. Elections are sometimes only
1 1 8 . It seems to have evolved at Growmore Ltd. that many shop
stewards work in jobs from which they can be easily released. 
Manual union policy there also prevented chargehands from 
becoming stewards since it was felt impossible "to ride 
two horses at once". This contrasts considerably with 
the situation at Agrochemie AG.
119* The role of works councillors and German union lay officers 
in workplace relations are discussed in Chapter 5 above.
held when a steward resigns^120^or when the work group becomes extremely- 
dissatisfied with their representative and can propose an alternative 
candidate.
After a new steward has been elected he^121/will often need almost a 
year in order to learn the job and for the majority of members to know 
him and trust his ability. What tasks do shop stewards fulfil in the 
chemical industry for which they are released from work and which takes 
so long to learn?
The shop steward is primarily a representative of a group of employees.
Practice seems to vary whether stewards represent a particular work
group, shift or department or whether they are elected on a factory- 
(122)wide basis. In any case stewards generally come to represent
the group with whom they work or have most contact. The steward's 
main task seems to be to deal with grievances by bringing them to the 
attention of management,if they consider them justified and should 
they not be able to solve the problem with plant management^ taking 
it, along with the convenor, to more senior or specialist industrial 
relations mana-gement. If this fails to bring a solution to the grievance
120. Even this does not always lead to elections. If nobody is 
prepared to take the job, the group may go without a steward 
for sometime, or else the previous incumbant will be per­
suaded to reaccept office.
121. The male pronoun is used here, since most manual employees 
in the chemical industry are male except in certain sectors 
such as pharmaceuticals. Even where high concentrations
of female workers exist, male representatives are often 
elected. Interview TU 1 , May '78.
1 2 2 . Por another recent account of shop steward activities, 
but within the engineering industry cjf. B. Partridge,
"The activities of shop stewards,” Industrial Relations 
Journal, Vol.8 , No.4, 1977/78, pp.28-42.
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it would probably enter the appropriate disputes procedure. (1 2 3 )
Gill et al. have investigated the nature of grievances which come to 
the attention of industrial relations managers, and their results are 
reproduced here in order to give some indication of the range of these 
issues.
Table 7*4*
Percentage of ohemical establishments where industrial relations 
managers report the incidence of grievances ( 1 2 6  respondents). (124)
Grievance Frequent
- ................. - .............................  $
Occasional
*
Rare
t
Pay claims 29.4 55.6 1 0 . 3
Pay errors 0.8 47*6 4 6 . 8
Loss of pay 0 18.3 37*3
Minor pay change 0 23.0 7 2 . 2
Job grading 1 5 . 0 36.5 43.6
Work allocation 11.9 34.9 60.3
Working conditions 2 2 . 2 47*6 25*4
Work standards 4.0 1 9 . 8 63.5
Timekeeping 1 9 . 0 4 8 . 4 2 7 . 8
Overtime 18.3 6 3 . 5 13.5
Discipline 1 6 .7 6 5 . 9 12.7
Elsewhere working conditions and job grading have been established as
the main causes of grievance claims in the chemical industry. (1 2 5 )
It also seems, however, that those issues which are concerned with
material rewards are also often the cause of grievances.
Although the shop stewards sometimes negotiate as a group, or more
123. Disputes procedures are discussed in greater detail below.
124* Gill et al., op.cit., p.133, own calculations.
125* A.W.J. Thomson and V.V. Murray, Grievance Procedures, 
Farnborough, 1976, p.80.
frequently in the form of a joint negotiating committee^12°^with man­
agement, more frequent contacts take place between the convenors^12"7  ^
and industrial relations managers. These informal contacts appeared to 
be crucial for the efficient function of workplace industrial relations 
and led at Growmore Ltd. to an open, mutually respectful attitude be­
tween convenors and the industrial relations manager. Such meetings 
allow for detailed discussion of questions without being formally 
binding on either side since each side is bound respectively to the 
policy of the company or the shop stewards committee. Nevertheless, 
many problems were apparently prevented from coming to a head at these 
informal discussions.
This discussion of the role of shop stewards in the chemical industry
has concentrated on manual unions. It has become clear that without
(1 2 8 )the backing of formal legislation,' 'shop stewards have achieved a 
representative function and an involvement in industrial relations which 
far exceeds that of union lay officers in Germany and which approaches 
the position of works councillors. However, since shop stewards are 
not restricted by law in the use of sanctions and may often rely upon 
high union membership densities, their position is probably much 
stronger 'than that of vrorks councillors even when their extensive
126, For the range of such negotiations which are concerned parti­
cularly with financial issues as well as the organisation of 
work cf. Gill et al*, op.cit., p*133.
127• Generally a pair of convenors is involved since this prevents 
suspicion between the union lay officers. If the vrorks is not 
large enough to have two convenors from each of the major union 
groupings, then craft and general worker convenors will often 
meet management together.
128. Except where they have recently taken over the role of safety 
representatives, something which seems quite common, cf. V.A. 
Broadhurst, "What the manager needs to know about safety reps", 
Works Management, Aug. 1978, p.30ff.
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co-determination and consultation rights are taken into consider- 
(129)ation. One reason for this could "be that shop stewards in Britain
exercise legitimate authority through their constituents.
The discussion of trade unionism in the British chemical industry has 
concentrated on manual employees. One of the striking features, how­
ever, of recent labour relations in this industry has been the rapid 
growth in union membership amongst white-collar workers. This compares 
with the situation in the German chemical industry where, although 
there has been some growth in recent years / 180)with the exception of' 
supervisory and managerial white-collar grades, white-collar employees 
have been particularly difficult to recruit as union members/181)
These difficulties have been experienced by both the German Salaried 
Staff Union and the Chemical Workers* Union, whilst the Association’ of 
Salaried Academic and Senior Managerial Staff in the Chemical Industry 
has been able to expand its membership considerably over the last twenty 
years/182) Given the fragmented nature of white-collar union organ­
isation in Germany and in Britain it is not possible to give an 
accurate assessment of the union membership density within this group 
of chemical employees. Despite this, Gill et al. have demonstrated that 
there has been a rapid growth in Britain, so that by 1975 36 per cent
129• The use of industrial action in the chemical industry is
reviewed below. On participation and consultation in the 
British ohemical industry cf. R. Pennock, "ICI*s total 
approach", Industrial Society, Feb.1978? p.l4f? 6IA,
Submission to the Committee of Inq,uiry on Industrial De­
mocracy, Doc. 103/76, London, 25.3.1976 and GMWU, UK 
Chemicals: The Way Forward, op .oit., p.49ff«
130. of. Appendix 1? Table 3*
131. cf^ . Chapter 2, Section (iii)b.
132. cf). Appendix 1, Table 10.
of staff in CIA federated firms were covered by collective agreements;"' 
S'ince this time, empirical evidence seems to indicate that white -collar 
union densities in chemicals have continued to increase/134)
Besides AS'TMS, the chemical membership of which has been detailed above, 
the main unions to organise white-collar chemical workers are the white- 
collar subsiduaries of the three general unions with extensive member­
ship in chemicals: the Association of Clerical, Technical and Super­
visory Staffs (TGWU); the Managerial, Administrative, Technical and 
Supervisory Association (GMWU) and the Supervisory, Administrative and 
Technical Association (USTSAW). In addition to these unions, the 
Association of Professional Scientists and Technologists (APS'T)/139) 
which might be described as the British equivalent to the VAA, has 
around 8000 members almost entirely within the chemical industry/13®)
APST oan trace its origins to 1971 and the British Association of
Chemists, a fairly insignificant professional association which amal-
( 137)gamated with APST soon after its birth in 1970. Nevertheless,
its success has been limited mainly to IGI.
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133. This does not include ICI establishments where considerable 
white-collar union recognition has now been granted. Gill 
et al., op .cit., pp.l58f and 1 7 8f.
134* Particularly Interview TU 10, May '78.
135* One respondent stated that this organisation has now been
renamed the Association of Managerial and Professional staffs. 
Interview MAN 6 , July *79* Also cf. M. Weaver, "Unions 
’Would you strike? 1 survey among managers", Daily Telegraph,
1 2 .1 2 .1978, p.6 . ‘ “
136. Gill et al., op .cit., p.l69ff«
137• The Royal Institute of Chemistry played a leading role in
the foundation of this organisation which retains strict 
entrance qualifications like the VAA. Both might be termed
white-collar "craft" unions. Gill et al., op.oit., p*173ff.
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The main factors influencing white-collar union membership in Britain 
have been identified as employment concentration, employer recognition 
and government action, although this same study established that the 
chemical industry was an exception since despite good pre-conditions 
for extensive union organisation caused by high employment concen­
tration, union membership was low/13°^
"The most useful of Bain's variables in explaining the relatively under­
developed state of staff unionism in chemicals prior to 19&4 is employer 
recognition. Generally speaking, chemical employers were unwilling to 
recognise the independent white-collar organisations which attempted to 
recruit in the industry and encouraged as alternatives the formation of 
dependent organisations more amenable to company control." (139)
Employers' attitudes in the chemical industry were subject to continuous 
revisions during the 1960 's as a result of alterations in the attitudes 
of white-collar workers towards union membership^ 140^ and because govern­
ment intervention has supported extensions of collective bargaining to 
the white-oollar sectors/141^
The disparity of attitudes amongst chemical employers still present in 
1972 prevented a national "framework" agreement from being agreed with 
the unions. The CIA did, however, issue a revised document on recogn­
ition in March 1973, the principle aim of which was to ensure that the
138. G.S'. Bain, op .oit., pp. 78 and l83ff.
139* Gill et a l ., op.oit., p.157*
140. These changed attitudes were provoked by the reduction of' 
status enjoyed by white-collar staff; loss of differentials 
mainly caused by incomes policy and productivity bargaining, 
growth of the white-collar sector and increasing bureaucracy
in this area leading to anonymity; increased fear of redundancy 
and legislation leading to a formalisation of employment re­
lations as well as the feeling of need for the professional 
assistance of a trade union when dealing with employers.
Ibid., p.l64f and CIR Study No.3? Recognition of White-collar 
Unions in Engineering and Chemicals, London, 1973? Paras.18-22.
141. This includes the Donovan Commission, the Industrial Relations 
Act, the CIR, and ACAS set up under the avispices of the 1974 
Employment Protection Act.
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"development of collective bargaining for staff in the chemical in­
dustry is orderly, having particular regard to the need to minimise 
the risks of inter-union conflict and fragmented bargaining, whilst 
recognising the individual’s rights to belong or not to belong to a 
trade union." ^42)
Empirical investigations have indicated that the principles of this 
policy are generally followed within the chemical industry, with 
white-collar unionisation being allowed to develop "naturally, site 
by site .... although we might intervene to prevent multi-unionism 
becoming a problem." 1^/18)
In order to facilitate this "natural" development a "binary formula of 
recognition was confirmed"/144) As the first stage a union might be 
given representational rights for a particular group of staff if the 
union’s membership was insufficient to justify negotiating rights 
which are the seoond form of recognition/149)
This policy has remained intact since then and has served to guide 
management in their approach to staff unionism. Collective bargaining 
has developed in a multitude of ways and at a variety of levels, such 
as site, division or company. Although this does not always conform 
with CIA recommendations/ 148)union growth is rarely uniform throughout
142. CIA policy document on white-collar union recognition, March 
1973, cited in CIR Study No.3, 00.cit., Para.112.
143. Interview MAN 6 , July *79*
144* Gill et al., op .cit., p.16 6 .
145* UIR Study No.3, op.cit., Para.118.
]4 6 . Which are "that negotiating rights should only be granted at
the level in the company at which the pay and conditions of
the staff concerned are determined." Ibid., Para.128.
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multi-site companies and some management feel it unwise to force the 
issue in areas of under-developed unionisation or to delay recognition 
too long where the union is particularly strong/14^
The "battle for recognition" by white-collar unions sometimes leads to 
intense inter-union rivalries / 14-0 ^ particularly as a result of the 
"general union" recruiting policy of ASTMS which is often quite 
aggressive. Although the "battle for recognition" can take a variety 
of forms, it has been summarised that "this- process of staff unioni­
sation in the chemical industry can be said to possess several features. 
Firstly, unions compete among themselves or form ’consortia’ to recruit 
sizeable' memberships and thus present themselves to employers as 
credible candidates for recognition. Secondly, employers attempt to 
influence their staff and the unions seeking to recruit white-collar 
workers in order either to postpone the introduction of collective 
bargaining for staff or to ensure that the advent of union recognition 
and negotiating rights is accomplished in a way that is least harmful 
to managerial interests." 1^4^
In Britain and in Germany various alternatives of union membership are 
offered to white-collar workers in the chemical industry. German em­
ployees may choose between industrial union, general white-collar union 
(BAG) or "craft" white-collar union (VAA) membership, provided that they
147. Interview MAN 7? Apr. ’7 8 .
14 8 . For an example of this, _cf. Gill et al., op .oit., p.l78ff'.
149. Ibid., p.168.
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are suitably qualified for the latter. British chemical staff also 
have the choice of general white-collar union membership (ASTMS),
"craft" staff union membership (APST) or they may join the whit e-collar 
subsidiary organisation of other unions active in the chemical industry. 
The development has taken rather different courses in the two countries, 
reflecting the general nature of union organisation in each country.
Industrial unionism is now firmly established in Germany but it has 
generally been unable to organise large numbers of white-collar staff 
who show a traditional antipathy to union membership. Although the 
VAA has gained considerably in strength over the last two decades, 
this has probably been caused more by the political discussions con­
cerning the role of senior staff in industry particularly in connection 
with oo-determination. It remains to be seen whether *bhe Co-determination 
Act 1976^ 19°)will bring further increases in the membership of this 
organisation. The VAA has also received positive encouragement in 
employers' association publications in order to channel senior white- 
collar staff who have shown increasing trends towards collectivisation, 
towards the VAA rather than the Chemical Workers* Union or the German 
Salaried Staff Union. This collectivisation is further enhanced by the 
large employment concentration of senior white-collar staff in chemicals.
So far the trends towards status harmonisation between white-and blue- 
collar workers in the German chemical industry have not led to increased 
recruiting by the DAG, a white-collar union dedicated to protecting-
150. The full provisions of this Act only took effect in 1978*
within the Chemical Workers’ Union. Should the reduction in differ-
(1R1)entials between these groups increase considerably, 7 'and were either 
the employers or government action to encourage white-collar workers 
to join unions, then there would seem to be a good chance that the 
German Salaried Staff Union might gain considerable membership within 
the chemical industrj7. Such a development would indicate an inability 
of the industrial union to represent the interests of disparate groups 
of members.
The possibility of such developments is indicated by the situation in 
Britain where incomes policy and productivity bargaining resulted in 
the erosion of differentials and staff status whilst government inter­
vention has encouraged extensions of bargaining to the white-collar 
sector. This caused modifications in employers' attitudes towards 
staff unionism and has led to rapid union advances in recruiting white- 
collar workers. Those organisations which purport to represent staff 
interests in general or in particular have been especially successful 
in recruiting members and this has produced a situation anologous to 
that in the manual sector where general unions represent production 
workers and craft unions represent the skilled maintenance and build­
ing operatives.
Had a comparison of trade unionism in the British and German chemical
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staff status. It has, however, led to increasing intra-union conflict
151. Between i960 and 1978 differentials between average monthly 
earnings for white-and blue-collar workers in the German 
chemical industry were reduced by 5 per cent. Tables 3.12 
and 3.13, own calculations.
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industries been carried out at the time of VermaTs investigation into 
chemical industrial relations in Britain/192'/he similarities between 
the situation in the two countries would have been remarkable. Unions 
bargained with employers not within the establishment but at levels 
remote from the workplace - in Germany nationally and regionally whilst 
in Britain industry and company bargaining occurred at national levels. 
Union workplace organisation was weak and lacked traditions except for 
skilled manual workers.
A number of factors common to both countries were responsible for these 
similarities. The economic take-off of the chemical industry lagged 
behind that of other heavy industries and labour turnover was high as 
a result of poor working conditions and the unskilled nature of pro­
duction work. This hindered the development of trade union organ­
isations and also induced employers to introduce paternalistic yet 
progressive labour policies in order to retain workers. This had the 
additional advantage for the employers that it created loyalty for the 
company amongst the workers and countered the growth of trade unionism.
With increasing automation and technological advance chemical production 
technology has also contributed towards union weakness at the workplace. 
Working groups are small and scattered so that communication and re­
cruitment is difficult. Regular personal contacts between workers and 
management lead to a personalisation rather than a collectivisation of 
industrial relations. Other consequences of chemical production tech­
nology can be the rather low manual job content for unskilled workers
152. P.O. Verma, 1966, op .cit.
and improving working conditions. These circumstances together with 
above average earnings made possible by the successful economic growth 
and capital intensive nature of the industry encourage job satisfaction 
and reduce the motivation for union membership.
The workforce structure of the ohemical industry generally includes 
only small numbers of craftsmen who have strong trade union ties and 
large numbers of white-collar workers who traditionally were difficult 
to recruit into the unions. This further contributed to trade union 
weakness in the chemical industry.
Government intervention in industrial relations has had considerable 
influence on trade unionism in the chemical industry in both countries, 
although its effects have been very different. In Germany the est­
ablishment of works council legislation at the time of rapid growth 
in union membership prevented the unions from gaining an important 
direct role in workplace relations. This situation was revived after 
World War Two and has been partly responsible for the weakness of trade 
union organisation at the workplace and their exclusion from involve­
ment in workplace relations. In Britain, however, government inter­
vention resulted in the establishment of collective bargaining for the 
industry and hence in the involvement of union leaders, the main locus 
of whose organisations were other industries, in chemical industrial 
relations. This, together with subsequent support from employers, was 
responsible for the development of the structure of manual trade unionism 
within the British chemical industry, a structure which is very dis­
similar to that in Germany.
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These structural differences reflect overall disparities in the de­
velopment of trade unionism in the two countries, for whilst this 
development has been continuous and unbroken in Britain the dissolution 
of trade unionism under Hitler and its subsequent re-establishment in 
1949 resulted in the adoption of an industrial union system in West 
Germany. The importance of formal trade union structure should not be 
over-stressed, however, although it naturally has consequences for 
industrial relations. Nevertheless, a unified union movement may be 
split by internal dissent whilst a multi-union organisation may co­
operate and co-ordinate its action, as is often the case in workplace 
relations in the British chemical industry.
These similarities have been greatly reduced, however, by recent in­
dustrial relations developments in Britain. The growth of workplace 
bargaining and increase in importance of shop steward organisations 
during the post-war period of full employment created the pre-conditions 
for the establishment of strong workplace union organisations in the 
chemical industry. This did not take place, though, until the advent 
of productivity bargaining, a form of negotiation introduced by the 
employers and supported by government. Productivity bargaining led to 
an increase in- the importance of shop stewards, for it was with this 
group of union representatives that management was forced to negotiate 
productivity agreements. Management also required the assistance of a 
strong shop steward organisation to ensure the implementation of agree­
ments and this has proved to be the springboard for the development of 
effective workplace union organisations within the chemical industry. 
Employer recognition and government intervention were required, therefore,
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before unions were able to overcome the constraints which up until 
this time had limited their growth. The same factors were also instru­
mental in providing the climate for the recent rapid growth in white- 
collar union membership in the British chemical industry.
The influence of management and employers' associations on industrial 
relations has often been apparent during this consideration of trade 
unionism in the chemical industry. It seems appropriate, therefore, 
to discuss their industrial relations role in greater detail.
(iii) Management in the chemical industry.
Biscussipn of the role of management within labour relations in the 
West German chemical industry revealed that they had a positive in­
fluence on the climate of" relations due to their regular contacts with 
the workforce. This is particularly true of supervisors. The per­
sonnel function is firmly established in all but the smallest est­
ablishments, since it is the part of the management organisation which 
deals with the works council, and hence with a wide range of legal, 
personnel administrative, welfare and training issues/193^
Multi-national companies are extremely common the chemical in d u s tr y 4  ^
It might be expected, therefore, that management practices have a certain 
amount of international character to them. On the other hand, it is
153. Chapter 2, Section (iii)b.
154* of« R* Robinson, The Nature and Extent of Employer organ­
isations the British Chemical Industry and its Multinations, 
unpublished MA. dissertation, University of Warwick, 1976, 
and Chapter 2, Section (ii)c.
-  48 -
possible that management practices could, diverge widely within a single 
country due to the importation of management practices from the parent 
countries of a wide range of multi-national concerns. Although neither' 
of these hypotheses has been tested empirically, limited case study 
evidence seems to point towards the former. Since managerial organ­
isation can be considerably influenced by production technology/1" )  
and chemical process technology is international in character, the 
chances that management practices could be transferred internal ionally 
are further increased. Limited verification of this is provided by
f 1 q- £ V
the apparent applicability of some of Woodward ’s findings to both
British and German chemical companies visited in the course of this
v, (157) research.
Nevertheless, in recent years the character of management organisation 
vrithin the British chemical industry has undergone considerable changes 
specifically with respect to the specialist personnel management function 
This is illustrated by two statements from the Growmore Ltd. case study 
works;
"There have been a lot of changes on the management side in the last 
four years. We now deal with the Industrial Relations Manager rather 
than the Engineering or Works Manager, and he is the only one who can 
talk money". (1 5 8)
"An industrial relations manager is a must in any factory of size now, 
for he provides me with information and advice ... they are now an 
essential member of the management team although they’ve only arrived 
in the last four or five years". (1 5 9)
155* of. J. Woodward, 1965 and 1970? op .oit ♦
1 5 6 . Concerning the length of the management hierarchy, the range 
of control of first-line supervisors, the form of decision 
making and the importance of specialists. Ibid., 1965? p*50ff. 
For a brief discussion of this cf_. P.C. Verma, 19 6 6, op.cit., 
p.251ff.
157* More specific research in a number of countries would test 
the validity of these hypotheses.
1 5 8. Interview TU 4 ? June f79•
159* Interview MAN 4? June ’79*
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The rapid expansion of the personnel and specialist industrial relations 
function- has been demonstrated in a recent survey of 126 chemical est­
ablishments. Until the S'econd World War there was little call for 
personnel managers in industry generally and the situation in chemicals 
was certainly no different. S'tate involvement in industrial relations 
during the war, together with an increasingly complex wage system,
and changing i\Torkforce structure provided the stimulus for this ex- 
(160)pansion After the war this trend increased with the expansion
of workplace bargaining, the growth of union demands for involvement
‘or mat:
(162)
/ •» /j *! \
and inf tion 'and the expansion of industrial relations legis­
lation#
Personnel or industrial relations specialists have become customary 
in ohemical establishments*
Table 7*5*
Chemioal establishments with staff employed full-time within the 
personnel/industrial relations function. (163)
No. of Workers 
Employed in 
Establishment
No. of 
Establish­
ments
Percentage 
of Est.with 
Per ./i .R. 
Manager
Percentage 
of Est.with 
Per./I .R. 
R'taff
Percentage 
of Sst .with 
IPM
members
1~99 24 • 25.0 66.7 4.2
100-299 42 42.8 92.9 19 .0  -
300-599 28 57.1 96.4 71.4
600-999 12 91.9 100.0 91.7
1000+ 20 100.0 100.0 65.O
Totals 126 56.3 90.5 42.1
160. Gill et al., op .cit., p.l6ff.
161. Interview MAN 4? June '79*
162. Interview MAN 9, Bee . ’77 •
163. Gill et al., op.cit., p.64f, own calculations
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This level of industrial relations staffing may represent a large in­
crease hut it is not very high when compared with the situation in 
engineering. A large survey of engineering establishments carried out 
at the end of the 1960fs showed that 87*3 per cent of them had a de­
signated personnel manager although only 68 per cent of these managers 
were involved full-time in personnel work/3°4  ^ Whilst the author has 
no empirical data to support the hypothesis, it seems likely that since 
this survey was carried out the level of industrial .relations staffing 
in engineering has increased further/109'* In the light of this com­
parison, the staffing of industrial relations in chemicals is still 
fairly underdeveloped.
Part of the explanation for the different levels of industrial re­
lations staffing in the two industries may lie in the technological 
differences between the two industries. Due to the extremely high 
capital intensity of chemical manufacture, wage costs constitute a 
relatively small amount of total costs. This might lead to low in­
dustrial relations staffing. However, as another author comments,
"the capital intensity virtually necessitates continuous production 
in order to spread the heavy fixed costs over as high an output as 
possible. Stoppages of work are ruinously expensive"^ 100^ so that the 
prevention of strikes remains the highest priority of industrial
164* A.I. Marsh, "The staffing of industrial relations management 
in the engineering industry," Industrial Relations Journal,
Vol.2, No.2, 1971? pp.14-23, partly own calculations. Note? 
the comparisons carried out by Gill et al. (o~o..cit., p.66ff) 
are based on misinterpretations of Marsh's results.
16 5 . One reason for this supposition is the increase in labour 
legislation since this time which has made the employment 
of specialists even more necessary, cf. Ibid., p.73f.
166. Ibid., p.67*
relations managers in the British chemical industry/1®^) There would 
therefore seem to he a great incentive to invest in personnel ex­
pertise, but this has not taken place.
Since the chemical industry in Britain has been relatively strike 
free/1®8)it is possible that the staffing of industrial relations 
could be kept to a minimum for many years. Certain other factors 
could also have helped to keep the need for personnel specialists low. 
Process technology common in chemicals appears to be conducive to in­
dustrial peace and good industrial relations/1®9 ) Furthermore, until 
recently trade unionism was we ale at the vrorkplace in the chemical in­
dustry and almost non-existent amongst white-collar staff so that ' 
pressure on management may not have necessitated industrial relations 
specialists. The changes in the level of union membership amongst 
chemioal employees and the greater involvement of union officers in 
vrorkplace relations probably account partly for the recent growth of 
industrial relations management in the chemical industry.
Until now no differentiation has been made between personnel and in­
dustrial relations functions. In practice, whilst many personnel 
managers undertake industrial relations activities as a part of their 
job, it is rarely true that industrial’relations managers are involved
in personnel administration or training, although they may be respons-
(l70)ible for welfare, safety, etc. In the German ohemical industry,
1 6 7 . 36.5 per cent of respondents gave this as their first priority 
compared with 24*6 per cent who named containment of labour 
oosts. Ibid., p.68, own calculations.
168. See below,
16 9 . J. Woodward, 1958, op .cit., p. 1 5 *
170. Information gathered in visits to several British chemioal 
companies.
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and particularly in large establishments there is a great deal of 
specialisation within the personnel and welfare functions, although 
there is no industrial relations specialisation as such since this 
concept does not exist there. Nor is it really necessary since re­
lations with the union at the workplace are practically non-existent 
and relations with the works council are considered a part of the 
normal personnel function*
In the British chemical industry the tone of management policies on 
labour relations was often set early in* individual companies’*de­
velopments. Whilst the origins of these policies sometimes vary con­
siderably, a number of trends can be ascertained. Many companies 
adopted a "traditional paternalistic style in labour affairs ... No 
specialist labour relations job existed on the company's organisational 
chart but nevertheless directors and managers were expected to implement
an explicitly formulated labour policy as a complement to their spec-
(l7l)ialist functions..."' 7 This labour policy was akin to the master 
and servant principle stressing the virtues of obedience to supervisors, 
and a rigid militaristic discipline at the workplace. Gradually wel­
fare and fringe benefits were developed and included a whole range of 
sporting, social and cultural activities. Conditions and terms of 
employment were determined - and improved - solely on the initiative 
of management. Collective bargaining generally did not take place, 
although many companies decided to participate in the industry-wide 
collective bargaining machinery developed during and after the First
- 52 -
171. Gill et al., op .oit., p.55^f«
World War. However, plus-rate payments were often made to retain
loyalty and remove motivation for union membership which was resisted
(l72)from a fear of loss of control. This retarded the growth of
trade unionism within the industry, although the situation has now 
changed radically since management often needed strong union organ­
isations with which to engage in productivity bargaining.
Although some companies like Boots attempted to develop an "industrial 
community11 with a more refined form of paternalistic welfare / 178)which 
whilst not so extensive approached the form of social paternalism found 
in the German chemical industry at the time. Such developments might 
have occurred many years previously and the personnel practice® in the 
industries become accordingly more refined. However, some of these 
policies and particularly the paternalistic ones are frequently en­
countered in the chemical industry in the' present day/174)
Although not always typical of the chemical industry, "IGl has the 
most deeply embedded industrial relations traditions in the chemical 
industry and due to the policies and practices originating in the 
Brunner-Mond combine can be considered to be the ’founding father’ 
and the model of chemical industrial relations. As the paradigm of 
chemical industrial relations, therefore, whose labour policies have 
had a vital influence in setting the tone of relationships between 
employers and unions throughout the chemical industry, it is difficult 
to conceive of any significant innovation in chemical ind\xstrial re-
172. Ibid., p#56ff.
173. I b i d . ,  p .5 9 f f *
174- Interview MN 3, June ’79* cf.0 FoeBer, op . c i t . ,  p.45^f«
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lations which does not originate with the Id group or is not soon 
replicated within it."
Brunner-Mond was- responsible for the reduction in shift length from 
12 to 8 hours, and in cutting the length of the working week, whilst 
intensifying the workload to offset the effect on labour costs . Such 
policies had repercussions throughout the industry; other initiatives 
stemming from Brunner-Mond/lCI include fostering a national employersf
t -I rj /? V
organisation, and the Mond-Turner talks.' ' Within IGI this con­
sultative tradition became well established with the works council 
system which could deal with a range of activities, such as "the 
comfort, safety, health and well-being of all employees ... including 
matters affecting sport and recreation; the ways and means by which
time, material or expense may be saved; the administration of the sick
(177)benefit, benevolent and hospital fund schemes."' These cotmcils 
were excluded from considering terms and conditions and could not 
engage in negotiations• During the 1930Ts Id defied CEF policy, 
improving wages and conditions unilaterally, often in works otherwise 
surrounded by high unemployment.
"Benign paternalism thus constricted the potential area of negotiation. 
As the Chief Executive of the Central Labour Department put it in 1928: 
’the value of the company benefits, priveleges and concessions depends 
on the workers recognising them as voluntary acts by the company and 
not as the product of negotiations with the trade union’" (17 8)
175* Gill et al., ou .cit., p.121.
176. Ibid., p.82ff and H. Pelling, op .cit., p.l88f.
177. From W.J. Reader, Id: A History, Vol.II, Oxford, 1 9 7 1,
p .6 1 .
178. Gill et al., op.cit., p.8 7 .
Union membership stagnated or declined as a consequence of these 
policies until after the Second World War.
In recent years consultation and participation have gained support
within the chemical industry as a whole. The CIA advocates its member
companies develop "systematic consultative procedures to cover all
employees, whether they are blue-collar, white-collar or members of
management, to ensure that all have an opportunity to influence decisions
(179 )which affect them." The major stimulus to the expansion of such
consultative procedures, which seem to be quite widespread in the 
chemical industry, was productivity bargaining which led to both formal 
and informal procedures for consultation/100^
Come doubt must remain, however, about the efficiency of these committees 
especially on the process side where shift work creates problems for 
communication/10"*^ These committees have retained the principle of 
not permitting negotiations with .the representatives / 102^ who are often 
shop stewards or convenors. Company, group and divisional committees 
provide the opportunity for these lay officers to exchange information 
outside the official meetings and can be used to co-ordinate strategies 
around the company.^ 103^  The range of issues considered on consulta­
tive committees varies, as does the willingness of management to release
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179* GIA Code of Practice on Communication and Consultation,
March 1975? quoted in CIA, Submission to the Committee of
Inquiry on Industrial Democracy, op .cit., p.6 .
180. Ibid., Interview MAN 10, Jan.’78.
181. Interview MAN 1, May *78.
182. Interviews MALT 6 , July *79? MAN 7? April *78; TU 9 , Jan. *78; 
TU 11, June *78.
183. Interviews TU 2, TU 3, June ’79*
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information; in multinational corporations this seems to he parti­
cularly limited/184)
The consultative procedures in the British chemical industry have 
developed as a result of union pressure and management’s belief in
(1 Art )
their usefulness.' These voluntary mechanisms contrast consider­
ably xrith the situation in West Germany where co-determination and the 
works constitution,based upon legislative regulations,dominate the 
scene. Although industrial democracy was once a topic of controversy 
within British industry both amongst managers and trade unionists, it 
seems most unlikely that any legislation on this topic will enter the 
statute books in the near future. It is even less probable that the 
Bullock proposals^ 188)wi 11 be adopted and this xsrill please both em-
/ *1 Q*"7 ^
ployers and unionists in the chemical industry.' 7
Whilst "the chemical industry has a fairly well developed system of 
consultation, ICI have the best since they have committees coming out
/ -1 Q o N
of their ears right up to central level."' 7 Despite ICI’s apparently 
enlightened progressive approach, one featixre of their current in­
dustrial relations management policy reflects the traditional antipathy 
towards trade unionism/189)
184. Interview TU 14, June ’7 8 .
18 5. For example, cf). Gill et al., op .cit., p. 68 and J. Roeber,
op.cit., p.256f f .
186. cf). Lord Bullock (Chairman), Report of the Committee of Inquiry 
on Industrial Democracy, op.cit.
18 7 . cf). GMWU document, The GMWU, the Bullock Report and Industrial
Democracy, Esher, 1977 and- "Bullock sparks chemical reaction,"
Chemistry and Industry, 5*2.77? p*88.
188. Interview TU 13? Aug.’78. cf. "Bullock: Examination Continued,"
IDS’ Brief 103, Feb.’77? P*3f.
189. C. Gill, R.R* Morris, J. Eaton, "Managerial Control and Collective 
Bargaining: some ’political’ aspects of job evaluation in a multi­
site enterprise," Personnel Review, Autumn 1977? P*54*
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Job evaluation has a long history at I d  where it has avoided being 
eroded by market pressures because of the stable or declining work­
force in chemicals accompanied by higher unemployment levels nations 
ally/190) The IOI scheme is a form of unilatural regulation which is 
under the control of management:
"Firstly, management has taken the initiative in the inception of the 
schemes and the formulation of their guiding principles ... S'econdl.y, 
central and divisional personnel departments administer the operation 
of the schemes. Thirdly, managerial personnel staff and the assess­
ment panels (l9l) deliver the final judgment." (1 9 2 )
Gill and his colleagues have viewed this system of job evaluation as a 
form of "employer conciliation" and it certainly seems to function as 
such since it is used by management to regulate situations rtiioh might 
lead to industrial action in a x-ray where a constitutional decision is 
given after a cooling-off period that could extend for five m o n t h s / " 3)
At the same time, hoxrever, it would be misleading to present the I d  
job evaluation scheme as totally within management control. The unions 
have consented to the system and do provide representation for their 
members whose jobs are being reassessed. Furthermore, should disagree­
ment arise from the assessment the unions are involved in both informal 
and formal disputes procedures which also apply in these cases/194)
In the German chemical and allied industries job evaluation techniques 
are becoming increasingly more common. In 1971 some 22.5 per cent of
190. Ibid., p.52f.
191. Which are composed entirely of senior management. Ibid. p.53.
192. Ibid., p.54*
193. Ibid.
194* Ibid., pp.54-56.
type of job evaluation whilst 48.6 per cent of establishments had an
(195)incentive bonus system.' "7 Since then this trend has continued
with the co-ordination of job evaluation and incentive schemes becoming
more frequent/19^  There has also been a trend to incorporate both
types of system into the works council agreements for monthly payment 
(197 )of wages.' Since methods of payment fall under the social co­
determination rights of the works council, these systems require their 
agreement/19°^ This has caused the Chemical Workers1 Union to employ
full-time officers to advise the works councillors and to introduce a
(199)large educational programme.' 7 If the British union officials are 
to cope successfully with these systems, then a similar course of action 
would seem advisable.
Although the role of industrial relations management has increased in 
the chemical industry in recent years, senior line management apparently 
spend more of their time on industrial relations activities than was 
previously the c ase/200 ^ This is possibly a reflection of the greater 
involvement of unions and their offioers in workplace industrial re­
lations.
Plant managers in the British chemical industry must rely upon the labour
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establishments surveyed by the Chemical Workers 1 Union employed some
195* GB 69~71> op .cit., p.342.
196. GB 72-75? op.cit♦, p.392f*
197. For example, cf. Bayer AG (ZB-Personalwesen), Monatslohn 
fur Zeitlohner, Leverkusen, 1975*
1 9 8 . W. B&ubler, op.cit., p.249f*
199* of» GB 69-71? o p .cit., p.344ff anti GB 72-75? o p .cit., p.396ff •
200. At Growmore Ltd.. the Engineering Manager stated, that whereas
his job was once composed 95 Psr cent of engineering and 5 
per cent of industrial relations, it is now split 60 per cent 
engineering to 40 per cent industrial relations. Interview 
MAN 4? June ’79.
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force which works for them since without them the sophisticated tech­
nology employed in the production plants is useless/201) Plant 
managers jobs are not therefore, simply a matter of ’juggling1 the
technical and economic factors, although this remains their primary
(202)concern; they need man-management skills. "
An increased stress on the economio aspects of chemical production has- 
been introduced by company management from the era of productivity 
bargaining onwards. Chemical plants are often treated as isolated 
economic units, buying and selling raw materials, products, etc. from 
other plants on the same site. Individual plant manager’s success, or 
lack of it, is noted by the company and in order to deal with the 
economio administration of the plant they have been forced to plan and 
co-ordinate from within an office rather than be involved in the plant 
itself. Even though managers might be in favour of economising pro­
duction, they regret the loss of contact with the m e n / 203)
The workforce at Chemco's Riverside works realised there were constraints 
on management and categorised them into two groups, "bad bastards’’ or 
"bastards”, where " ’bad bastards’ are managers who behave like bastards 
because they are (sic.) bastards. Common or garden ’bastards’ are men 
who find that, as managers, there are unpleasant things they have to 
do." 2^°4 )
201. Nichols and Beynon, o p  .cit., p.33.
202. Ibid., p.31ff and Interview MAN 2, May '18,
203. Nichols and Beynon, op .cit., p.34ff and Interview MAN 4?
June ’79*
204. Nichols and Beynon, op.cit., p.34.
Whilst there is no exact empirical basis for it, the impression gained 
from the author’s investigations is that the latter group are in the 
majority in the chemioal industries in Britain and in Germany.
In the German ohemical industry the VAA has developed considerable
membership amongst senior staff and managers with academic qualifications.
The concentration of such staff in the industry and the support of the
employers’ association seem to main reasons for this. Although APST
can be considered to have received some senior support within ICI^2°9)
and has gained membership within this company, its success elsewhere
has been limited. On the other hand, whilst Nichols and Beynon could
confidently report at the beginning of the 1 9 7 0 ’s that "joining a
union ... for a manager ... is a contradiction in terms,"^208)this no
longer seems to be the case. Many plant managers and their equivalent
grades have now joined ASTMS, and unionism seems to be "creeping up 
(207 )the tree".' This trend has been reported elsewhere, after con­
sideration of developments in the chemical and other industries, and 
has been explained as follows:
"The increasing concentration of employment, more favourable attitudes 
of employers to white-collar unions, changes in labour law, continuing 
problems with the management of the economy and the effect on pay 
differentials and the development of defensive managerial unions with 
a moderate character are seen as- the main factors explaining the growth 
of managerial unionism." (2 0 8 )
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205. Interview TU 10, May ’7 8 .
206. Nichols and Beynon, op .cit., p*42.
207. Interviews M N  3, M N  4 , June ’79; MAN 6 , July ’79.
208. J. Purcell, "Managers and union membership," R & D Management, 
Vol.6 , No.3, 1976, p.97.
This argument seems generally applicable within chemicals where the
possible liability of managers under the Health and Safety at Work
Act has apparently contributed towards management desires for the
(2 0 9  )security of union membership.' 7 Similar problems have been ex­
perienced amongst supervisory grades where other factors have con­
tributed to the insecurity resulting from recent legislation.
Whereas in Germany the supervisory hierarchy still seems to be firmly 
established, in Britain considerable rationalisation is underway. 
Previous grades such as superintendent , senior foreman, and assistant 
foreman have been erased from the organisational chart in many com­
panies / 210^the term "foreman" being commonly replaced by supervisor.
In general, shift supervisors have been retained, and there might be
(21l)a senior supervisor who vrorks days in addition.' 7
Allied to this rationalisation has been the feeling of lost status
amongst older foremen who remember when to receive a white-coat was to
(212)join the aristocracy of labour.' 7 In addition, the growth of work­
place bargaining has led to the foreman being by-passed on industrial
relations matters, since negotiations take place with more senior, or
( 2 1 3 )industrial relations management.' • 7 This level of management has
then not always been capable of tackling the problem of communicating
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209. Interview MAN 4? June ’79•
210. cf. Nichols and Beynon, op .cit., p.45  ^ anti at chemical 
companies visited by the author.
211. Interviews MAN 2, May ’78; MAN 5? TU 6, June ’79•
212. Nichols and Beynon, op .cit., p.55Tf, Intervievr MAN 3, June *79°
213. Interviews MAN 2, May *78; TU 2, June ’79* Although the super­
visors do retain a position at the base of the grievance pro­
cedure, at Growmore Ltd. for example, 90 Pe** cent of grievances 
are pushed up the line to the senior engineers and 30-40 per 
cent to the Engineering Manager, Interview MAN 4? June ’79*
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with its own supervisors so that they receive information second-hand 
from the shop stewards/214)
These trends have resulted in considerable -unionisation amongst super­
visory grades with most process supervisors joining ASTMS and the 
majority of maintenance supervisors joining the white-collar section 
of their respective oraft union, although there is sometimes intense 
competition between these unions and ASTMS for the members/219)
Process foremen join ASTMS as opposed to the white-collar sections of 
TGWU or GMWU to avoid a conflict of interests should the process workers 
be called out on strike. On the oraft side, however, it generally re­
quires a decision by the national executive to call foremen out on 
strike/21®)
Union organisation amongst supervisory staff should be strong and
effective since it seems common in the British chemical industry for
(217)foremen to be ex-shop stewards. However, unlike in Germany, union
structure prevents the foremen from becoming the representative of 
their own work group. Indeed, local union policy sometimes prevents
/ Q -J O
charge-hands from becoming shop stewards. This is indicative of
the role of both shop stewards and foremen in the British chemical in­
dustry where a duality of function would be bound to result in a con­
flict of interests.
214. Interviews MAN 1, May ’78; TU 11, TU 14, June ’7 8 ,
215* Interviews MAN 2, May *7 8 ; MAN 7? April ’7 8 ; MI 9? Dec. ’77>
TU 2, TU 4 , June ’79; TU 13, Aug. *7 8 .
216. Interviexvs TU 11, June ’78; TU 1 4 , Aug.'78.
217*‘ As at Ghemco, cjf. Nichols and Beynon, op .oit., p. 51 and
Growmore Ltd.
218. Interview TU 2, June *79*
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Supervisory staff are recognised as constituting the bottom of the 
management hierarchy, although it is possible for two separate types 
of foremen to develop, given the changing position of supervisors.
These types have been categorised as "management men" - often young, 
technically skilled, and ideologically committed to the nev manage­
ment attitudes - and "tradition foremen" who regret the changes that
(219)have taken place and feel threatened by them.
The main job for supervisors is to organise work and to check that it
is carried out satisfactorily although trends towards "self-supervision"
(220)have been gaining momentum. They are also responsible for safety
(221)in the plants and this can impose considerable strain upon them.
However, "the role of the foreman in formal industrial relations terms 
is just about nil, although on the informal side the role hasn’t 
changed much, except they’re more mellow; something which is a general 
trend.” 2^22)
Some supervisors in the British chemical industry seem uncertain of
their role. They lack the authority to make the decisions which
shopfloor unionists are demanding of them, and thus lose status. With
increasing technological complexity their independence of action in
(223 )the plant seems increasingly limited' 'so that it seems that a better 
definition of role and training for the job are becoming extremely 
important•
2 1 9 . Nichols and Beynon, op.cit., p*47^ f«
220. Ibid., p.45f and J. Roeber, op.cit., p.28lff.
221. Interviews MAN 2, May ’78; TU 6, June ’79•
222. Interview MAN 3, June ’79*
223. Interviews TU 6, MN 5? June *79? TU 1 4 , June ’7 8 .
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Although British ohemioal management is often at pains to stress the 
importance of supervisory staff, the changes which have taken place 
over the last fifteen years seemed to have undermined their position 
in a way which has not taken place in the German chemical industry.
There the supervisory hierarchy has generally been retained, super­
visors have a high, secure status, and are accredited with authority 
by management to deal with a wide range of technical issues. They 
are not greatly involved with industrial relations matters due to the 
bureaucratic handling of most issues via the works council system. 
Furthermore, training is thorough and generally a requirement for 
promotion to supervisory grades.
In the British ohemioal industry, industrial relations management was 
late to develop but has now become firmly established whilst in Germany 
the works constitution ensures the need for personnel specialists.
The trends in Britain have been influenced by changing bargaining 
patterns within the industry, which themselves were caused by economic- 
pressures, government action and alterations in management attitudes. 
Pressure for increased productivity influenced the jobs of plant managers 
and supervisors, and insecurity amongst these groups has resulted in 
a growth in union membership. In Germany, union membership amongst 
these grades is also high, buit in this case industrial relations 
traditions, employer recognition, legislation and employment concen­
tration were the main factors to cause it.
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Until 1 9 6 5  there were two chemical employers’ organisations in Britain, 
the Association of Chemical and Allied Employers (ACAE) which dealt 
with industrial relations matters and was the British equivalent of 
the Arbeitsring Chemie and the British Association of Chemical Manu­
facturers (ABCM) which was a trade association similar to the Verband
(224)der Chemischen Industrie. 7 However, "following the formation of
the Confederation of British Industry ... bringing together the 
formerly separate confederations dealing with industrial relations and 
commeroial matters, there were parallel mergers of employers’ organ-
( 225 )
isation in a number of individual industries, including chemicals ..." 
According to a recent publication by the Chemical Industries Assoc­
iation (CIA)' as this new employers* association is known, it has the 
following role s
"At one time its work was limited to trade matters and the basics 
of industrial relations. Today, however, its span is muoh wider, 
taking in the social and political context of business; statutory 
and semi-statutory requirements; economic, financial and fiscal 
questions; the impact of lobbies and special interest groups; per­
sonnel matters of interest to all employees; the esteem of opinion 
formers, parliamentarians, the media and a host of other publics; 
and in looking to the future, training, retraining and education in 
the broadest sense." (226)
In order to fulfil this role the CIA engages in a wide range of act­
ivities which will be discussed presently. Although the British
(iv ) Employers' associations in the chemical industry.
226. CIA, Activities Report 1976-77. London, p.l. Nevertheless,
we are concerned here primarily with the industrial relations 
and related roles.
224. Interview MAN 9? Dec .’77 •
225* H.A. Clegg, 1979? op .cit., P.94T*
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chemical employers ’ association covers a wider range of issues than 
its German counterpart, it does not seem to have achieved quite the 
same membership density within the industry. Around 270,000 chemical 
employees work for firms which are members of the C?IA# In 1976 there 
were 2 9 6  such companies, this being a reduction of 4 8  from 1 9 6 9  which 
could reflect continuing trends towards industrial concentration/22^  
Furthermore, there are two categories of full-membership, one of which 
"does not necessarily entail collective obligations in all spheres of
/ o p Q ^
activity",' "specifically as far as the national agreements are con­
cerned. A number of companies have chosen not to conform to national 
agreements in this way including IGH, the chemical industry’s largest 
employer. Despite such flexible membership arrangements the CIA,
which has seventeen affiliated organisations covering various product 
(229 )sectors, "has not managed to achieve a membership density greater
than 9 0  per cent in terms of chemical companies, employing around 6 8
(230)per oent of chemical employees. "
The two categories of membership also appear to have existed in the 
ACAE for ICI was able to rejoin the association in 1949 as a "com­
panionate member" having been outside the employers * organisation for 
(231)thirteen years. It reflects an attempt to regain the membership
227. Interview MAN 9? Dec.’77•
228. Gill et al., up .cit., p.6 #
229* of# Ibid., p.3f. Nevertheless, some sectors such as Soap,
Candle and Edible Fats, as well as Paintmakers have not 
joined the CIA. Ibid., p#4f»
230# The CIA itself claims 90 per cent coverage. 68 per cent was 
calculated from data in Interview MAN 9? Dec.’77 and G. Gill,
R. Norris and J. Eaton, "Employer organisation, in the UK 
chemical industry," Industrial Relations Journal, Vol.9?
No . 1, 1978, p.37ff.
231. P.C. Verma, 1 9 6 6 , on.cit., p.256.
of this important company' 'and has certainly proved a useful tactic 
in countering a loss of membership as a result of the grovrth in work­
place and productivity bargaining/288)
In Germany, the chemical employers’ associations organise a far wider 
range of sectors of the ohemical and allied industries. The principle 
of membership in employers’ associations is also generally accepted, 
reflecting perhaps the importance of the negotiations between the 
Arbeitsring'and the Chemical Workers* Union and of-legal advice to 
the smaller companies, since legislation plays a very important role 
in German industrial relations*
Gill et al. have sought to explain the development of chemical em­
ployers’ associations in Britain, and have rejected as inappropriate 
the more usual explanations of the incentives for membership in employers 
associations/284) The "traditional incentive" for joining employers’ 
organisations to counter the spread of unionism is invalidated by the 
late development of unionism and the overall climate of industrial 
peace within the industry. Similarly, the "peace-keeping or procedural 
incentive", can be discounted because of the peaceful industrial climate 
and since a disputes procedure was not introduced until 1927 2^89)ten
232. And to retain that of A3CM members who were not bound by ACAE 
agreements when the two organisations amalgamated. Ibid.,
p.259-
233. In the early 1960’s some firms were forced to resign from 
employers’ associations because of the introduction of pro­
ductivity agreements, of. A.l* Marsh, 1972, op.cit., p. 84,
234* This analysis was first published in Gill et al.. "Employer 
organisation on.cit. and subsequently in Ibid.,
Industrial relations oo.cit., pp.29~49« Unless otherwise
stated, the analysis presented here is abstracted from these 
two sources.
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(232 )
235• Further discussion of disputes procedures may be found below.
years after the formation of the first employers1 association/288) 
The "economic incentive" for employers* association membership which 
is based upon the elimination of competition in the area of labour 
costs may have had some limited historical validity in the chemical 
industry but its "explanatory value .... is largely undermined .... 
by the device of fnon-conforming membership' extended by the CIA to 
ICI and some fifty member firms in addition. This means that these 
firms are in no way bound by national agreements and retain complete
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(237 )autonomy in industrial relations."'
Gill et al. argue convincingly that the state has been instrumental in
encouraging employers' organisation in the chemical industry/288) The
basis of this argument is that "the origin of the CEF was closely
connected with state intervention in a period when a wartime siege
(239)economy imposed controls over labour supply and labour costs..."' 7 ' 
After the establishment of the JIC's the state imposed pressure on 
employers to join the association by threatening to withhold contracts. 
Although the Drug and Fine Chemical Manufacturers Association soon 
faltered without continued state support this was not the case for 
the CEF because of a desire to maintain the JIC bargaining procedures.
236. In 1918 renamed the Chemical Employers* Federation.
P.C. Verma, 1966, op.cit., p.256.
237* Gill et al., "Employer organisation ...," op.cit., p.43.
238. This argument was first expounded by P. Jackson and
K. Sisson, "Employers' Confederations in Sweden and the 
UK," BJIR, Vol.XIV, Mo.3, 1976, pp.306-323.
239. Gill et al., "Employer Organisation ...," op .cit., p.44*
- 69 -
"As in World War One, state intervention in World War Two has been 
responsible for the second major expansory phase in chemical employer 
organisation. The new legal framework introduced after 1939 •••• 
arrested the decline of the main chemical employers’ organisation 
whose membership had contracted from 110 firms in 1920 to 70 in the 
late 1930’s." (240)
This "new legal framework" included the Order 1305 which established 
compulsory arbitration and obliged employers to observe standard minimum 
conditions in industries where collective bargaining took place and 
thus removed the advantages of non-membership such as undercutting the 
national rate. Furthermore, unless employers were party to industrial 
bargaining they could not be classed as "essential undertakings" under 
the 1941 Essential Work Order/ 241  ^
State involvement in the chemical economy was reasserted during the 
1960 's in an effort to stimulate an industry which exported a high 
percentage of its products and it was natural that the CIA should re­
present employers on the Economic Development Committee for the chemical 
(242)industry. 7 Increased legislation in the industrial relations area 
has brought calls from members on the CIA for specialist expertise, 
management services advice and support in training, etc.
The training programme of the CIA which covers a large range of issues 
such as health and safety, general industrial relations, and the
240. Ibid., p.4 5 .
241* Apparently ICI was large enough to be considered as an 
industry in its own right.
242. For examples of the work of this body in the industrial
relations area of. Chemicals Manpower in Bur one, op .cit., 
and Chemical EDG, Manpower in the Chemical Industry.
A Study of British and American Practices, London, 1967*
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problems of staff unionism, for example. These courses are normally 
open to both shop stewards, managers and supervisors and some are run 
jointly with the unions/243) It was interesting that these training 
initiatives were viewed positively by trade union officers^244Vhilst 
German unionists had generally rejected the employers' courses for 
works councillors. This may be a reflection of the poorer financial 
position of British unions and the subsequent difficulty in running 
education programmes themselves/249)
Another major feature of CIA work in recent years has been the ad­
visory services it has made available to personnel or industrial re­
lations managers. Much of this advice might be based upon internal
ion £
(2 4 7 )
( 2AG )surveys' "or on policy that has been drawn up by the associat such
as on white-collar unionism, or communication and consultation.
In both training and the provision of advisory facilities for its
member companies the CIA has shown its ability to adapt to the changing
role of employers’ associations. This was also evidenced by their
recognition of the importance of productivity bargaining, support for
it in the form of a ’’framework” agreement and the establishment of a
( ? a 8 )Joint Standing Committee to monitor the agreements. "
243. CIA, Activities Report 1976-77* on .cit., p.8ff and Interviews 
MAN 6, July ’79; MAN 9, Bee.*77*
244* Interviews TU 10, May ’78; TU 13, Aug.’78; TU 1 4 , June *7 8 .
245. On union services, for example c_f. GMWU, A Guide to the 
General & Municipal Workers’ Union, Esher, 1976, p.20 and 
TGWU, Report 1976, on .cit., p*278ff.
246. Interviews MAN 3, June ’79; MAN 9, Bee.’77 and. TU 1 5 ,
June ’78.
247. CIA, Activities Report 1976-77. op .cit., p.8ff.
248. Gill et al.. Industrial relations ..., op.cit., p.lOf.
the CIA has been rejected, some managers did claim that the availability
of the Chemical and Allied industries JIC disputes procedure was a
(2 4 9 )major advantage of membership.' 7 "Formal grievance handling in 
chemicals constitutes a process of joint1 regulation"/290^  principle 
which was constantly preferred in the solution of disputes in the 
German chemical industry whether in the joint conciliation procedure 
for disputes between the unions and employers1 association^ 291 o^r in 
the regulation of workplace grievances/292) No explanation of the 
reason for the choice of joint regulation procedures in the British 
chemical industry was given by Gill et al. but similar factors to those 
which lead to a rejection of third party intervention in disputes in 
Germany might be applicable, i.e. a desire to be fully responsible for
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Although the "procedural or peacekeeping initiation" for membership in
any agreement and a feeling that external parties will only gain an
liatii
( 2 5 4 )
incomplete understanding of the problem.^ 53) jjjpioygj concil on
of the type that used to exist in the engineering industries 
probably did not come about due to an absence in the chemical indixstry 
of the circumstances under which this procedure was originally im- 
posed. +55)
249* Interviews MN 3, June ’79 and MN 6, July *79 •
250. Gill et al., Industrial relations . . . , op.cit., p.11.
2 5 1* cf,* Chapter 4> Section (iii)b.
252. cf. Chapter 5? Section (iii)
253. In any case it seems that third party intervention in the early
stages of disputes procedures in Britain is extremely rare,
for no mention of this form of involvement was made in a 
recent summary of the structure of such bodies. H.A. Clegg, 
1979? op.cit., p.229f.
254* cf). R. Hyman, Disputes Procedures in Action, London, 1972.
255- H- Pelling, op .cit., p.l!2f.
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The product market coverage of the chemicals disputes procedure is 
quite comprehensive as far as the chemical and allied industries are 
concerned since it extends to the Heavy Chemicals, Fertilizers and 
Plastics JIC’s' 7 7 as well as the Drug and Fine Chemical Joint Con­
ference/29*7  ^ Although the membership of the CIA has remained re­
latively constant in terms of the number of companies since Marsh and 
McCarthy’s investigations for the Donovan Commission/29°^it is un­
certain whether any non-conforming members of the CIA currently avail
themselves of the national disputes procedure, or what the situation 
(259 )was in i9 6 0 . Gill et al.’s claim that the number of firms with
(260)
access to the disputes procedure cannot, therefore, really be substantiated
The disputes procedure which has endured unmodified in form since 
1927 and which was last amended in 1 9 6 1  has four stages. It is useful 
to quote the text of the agreement, section by section, since this 
aids comment. Clause (a) states.:
2 5 6 . Covering both process and maintenance workers cf. Agreement
for Engineering and Building Trades Craftsmen, op.cit., p.8f; 
Chemical and Allied Industries JIC, Constitution, op .oit., 
p.9f. Gill et al., states that the procedure applies in the 
Glue and Gelatine JIC area since the JIC is now in a state of 
suspension, (industrial relations ..., op.cit., p.12). How­
ever, several sources indicate that the Glue and Gelatine 
JIC is still in operation. B. Robinson, op.cit., p*9?
TGWU, Report 1976, op.cit., p.llOff; USBAW, 31st Annual 
Report 1977 < no place (Manchester), 1978, p.88.
257* Schudule of Wage rates, op .cit., p.13.
2 5 8 . Donovan Research Paper No.2, Part II, Disputes Procedures in 
British Industry, London, 1 9 6 8 , pp.40-46*
2 5 9 * IUI certainly has its own disputes procedure with three stages; 
local, intermediate and headquarters conferences. Arbitration 
is also involved occasionally. This procedure is sometimes 
used to gain indirect pay increases via disputed job assess­
ments. Gill et al., Industrial relations ..., op.cit., 
p.91ff and J. Roeber, op.cit., p.l8f.
2 6 0 . Gill et al., Industrie,! relations ..., op .cit., p.13.
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!,In the event of any dispute arising between an employer and his em­
ployees it shall be dealt with in the first place by the employees 
or the Trade Union shop representative on their behalf and by the 
appropriate representative of management." (26l)
Whilst this might be seen as the standard preamble to a disputes pro-
/ o 62 )cedure' "its importance cannot be overstressed for it is at this
level that the vast majority of grievances are resolved. It is quite
likely that in order to ensure the maximum chance of domestic re-
( ? 6 ?)gulation of disputes' "the company will introduce a number of 
stages info the domestic procedure as was the case at Growmore Ltd.:
"Individual matters will normally be raised by the individual with his 
supervisor in the first instance. If he is dissatisfied with the result 
or with progress he may after informing his supervisor, refer it to his 
local shop steward who may take up the case with the Manager concerned® 
Then if necessary the convenor can refer the matter to the Manager’s 
Head of Bepartment. Matters concerning a particular works or depart­
ment will normally be raised with the Manager hy the local shop steward 
or the Works Manager (2 6 4 ) by the convenor and the shop steward.
Matters concerning all general workers will be raised at the routine 
meeting of the Joint Committee.
If a convenor and a Head of Bepartment or if the Joint Committee are 
unable to reach agreement, then the matter will be referred to the 
General Works Manager. Thereafter, the nationally agreed disputes 
procedure will apply.
It is agreed that pending resolution of matters in formal dispute, 
precipitate action will not be taken and the principle of ’status 
quo* will be observed by all parties." (2 6 5 )
261. Chemical and Allied Industries JIC, Constitution, op.cit., 
p.9* (This also applies for the remaining clauses)/
262. Gill et al., Industrial relations ..., op.cit., p.14*
263. "We don’t like washing our dirty linen in public and this in­
creases the pressure to settle. The convenors don’t like having
the full-time officials involved and I don’t like the CIA on the
site." Interview MM 3, June ’79* Ike similarities between 
these views and those expressed in the German chemical industry 
in respect of works- conciliation committees are most striking.
264. In practice the industrial relations manager would often become 
involved at this stage. Interviews MAN 4? MAN 4 , June ’79*
2 6 5 . Agreement between management and TGWU at Growmore Ltd.
Written disputes procedures are extremely common in Chemical 
establishments with more than 100 employees. of. Gill et al., 
Industrial relations op.cit., p.134*
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The relative success of these formal procedures supplemented by any 
informal methods of grievance solution which might have developed 
locally is illustrated by the infrequency of local conferences at 
Growmore Ltd*' Clause (b) of the disputes procedure regulates
the so-called local conference;
"Failing a settlement within the works, the dispute shall be discussed 
by the Trade Union officer and by the appropriate representative of 
the management who may avail themselves of the services of the Chemical 
Industries Association."
This clause allows management to decide on the degree of external in­
volvement in disputes regulation. Generally, CIA officials are not" 
involved at this stage, something which should foster the establishment
of more intimate relationships between regional''district union officials
/ 0 ^ 7  3
and local management.' 7 The lack of a regional structure within the 
CIA beyond area discussion groups and area productivity committees^ 288) 
"explains why there is no local conference between regional employers 
and union officials parallel to the one which occurs in the ICX 
Procedure,"^ 289)and seems to be equivalent to that of the regional 
conciliation committee under the previous joint conciliation regulation 
in the West German chemioal industry.
266. There are only a handful per year, and had only been one HQ
conference in the last two years. Interview MAN 3, June *79*
2 6 7. Donovan Research Paper No.2, Part II, op.cit., p. 42f.
268. The purpose of which is primarily an exchange of information. 
Interviews MAN 7? Apr.*78 and KAN, Dec. * 7 7 also CIA, 
Activities Report 1976-77? op.oit., p*9« In fact, this absence 
of regional sub-organisations within the CIA contrasts with 
the federalised structure in Germany, the origin of which lies 
with the previous zonal and present state divisions in the 
country. Although this regional structure has an influence
on the structure of collective bargaining in Germany, close 
co-ordination of policy and a high degree of centralisation 
mean that the differences between the employers’ association 
in both countries are not as great as might first appear to 
be the case.
269. Gill et al . 9 Industrial relations . . . . 00.cit., p. 15#
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The third stage in the chemical industry procedure carries the mis­
nomer of HQ conference although it actually takes place at the place 
of the dispute, The name refers to the involvement of officials from 
the central organisations, as indicated by Clause (o) of the procedure:
"In the event of local agreement not being reached, the dispute shall 
be referred for settlement to the appropriate Trade Union headquarters 
and to the Chemical Industries Association."
Gill et al. view this stage as being designed to bring "new minds to
(270)bear" upon the problem and as such it has a very similar function 
to the present type of joint conciliation committee which meets to 
resolve collective disputes in the West German chemical industry.
The final stage of the formal disputes procedure during the; whole of
(271)which no industrial action is supposed to be taken 7is regulated 
in Clause (d);
"In cases where the Trade Union headquarters and the Chemical Industries 
Association fail to arrive at a settlement, the dispute shall be re­
ported forthwith to the Joint Secretaries of the Joint Industrial 
Council. Upon a dispute being reported, the Joint Secretaries shall 
arrange for the dispute to be referred to the Main or Group Joint 
Industrial Council, (2 7 2 ) or to such committee thereof as may have 
power to deal with the same."
The national level of the procedure can take two forms. Generally a Dis­
putes Committee is formed which consists of two members of the Industrial 
Relations Board of the CIA whose company is not involved in the dispute 
and two representatives from JIC signatory unions whose members are 
also not involved. This procedure is felt to be very effective since
270. Ibid.
271. Chemical and Allied Industries JIC, Constitution, 0 0 .cit.,
p. 10.
272- These Group JXC’s (e.g. Fertilisers and Plastics) are now 
defunct.
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who are not directly concerned with the dispute. Disagreement at this
(273)level is extremely rare.
Should there be no Unions neutral to the dispute then it is referred to
a so-called Meeting of Signatory Parties where all organisations are
represented and which decides on the issue. If necessary, the issue
can be decided finally at the Disputes Committee or Meeting of Signa-
(274-)tory Parties by taking a vote.' '
A supplementary disputes procedure to cover productivity bargaining
was introduced in 1 9 6 7  and "with the decline in the regulatory powers
of the subordinate councils, such as the Plasiics, Fertiliser and Glue
and Gelatine JIC’s, ^"the evolution of the Joint Standing Committee
on Productivity Bargaining as a conciliatory panel must be regarded
"(276)as the major formal- innovation of the decade. The frequency
with which this committee has been called upon to resolve disputes 
remains uncertain, however.
In fact, there is very limited statistical data available on the 
operation of the chemical dispute procedure. The following table 
presents the figures that are accessible.
273. Interviews MAN 1, May ’78; MAN 3, June *79; TU 13, Aug. ' 7 8
and TU 14, June *7 8 . Also cf_• Gill et al., Industrial re­
lations ..., op .cit., p.16.
274. Interviews TU 11 and TU 1 4 , June *7 8 .
275* See Note 1 8 5  above.
276. Gill et al., Industrial relations ..., op.cit., p.16.
the Disputes Committee is composed of experienced, knowledgeable persons
Table- 7*6.
References to the chemical industry disputes procedure 1960-78 Z^"7*7 ^
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Year** HQ. Conferences Disputes Committees and
Meetings of Signatory Parties
i9 6 0 1 5 4
1 9 6 1 1 5 3
1 9 6 2 22 5
1 9 6 3 29 3
1 9 6 4 43 3
1 9 6 5 4 6 3
1 9 6 6 36 7
1 9 6 7 33 6
1 9 6 8 29 5
1 9 6 9 23 4
1 9 7 0 22 4
1 9 7 1 36 6
1 9 7 2 40 9
1 9 7 3 40 16
1 9 7 4 4 0 7
1 9 7 5 42 8
1 9 7 6 41 11
1 9 7 7 44 14
1 9 7 8 41 11
The growth of domestic bargaining during the first half of the 1960fs 
probably explains the increase in the number of references to HQ con­
ferences at this time and as has been noted elsewhere, the procedure 
seemed to increase in its effectiveness over this time as there was 
no parallel increase in Disputes Committees/2"70  ^ In the second half 
of the 1960’s the frequency in references decreased once more, perhaps 
as a result of incomes policy restricting the potential for disputes.
Or could the Joint Standing Committee for Productivity Agreements have 
assumed an important conciliatory role during a period whioh represented 
the height of productivity bargaining? The change in industrial re­
lations climate in Britain generally from 1970 onwards seems to have
277* Sources? Ibid,, p.17 and CIA, Activities Reports, 1974/75-1978.
2 7 8 . Donovan Research Paper No. 2, Part II, op .cit., p.4 6 .
been reflected in a rapid rise in disputes references in the chemical 
industry. The level of references has remained remarkably constant 
throughout the decade although the HQ conference stage in the pro­
cedure seems to have lost effectiveness. No satisfactory explanations
(279 )for this has been found.'
Although the time required to achieve settlement seems to be con­
tinually increasing, few respondents considered this to be a problem, 
for as one manager put it:
"It would be rare for both sides to want a particular dispute to pro­
gress swiftly through the procedure. Issues generally reach local 
stages fairly rapidly but there is a gap before national levels are 
reached. This gap may be a couple of months if the issue is not 
serious or maybe a month if it is." (2 8 0 )
One reason for this delay is the shortage of union manpower at national 
level - typically one officer will be responsible for a number of in­
dustries including chemicals, which does not only have the JIC dis­
putes procedure, b;ut the ICI procedure as well. This procedure has 
a similar incidence of references as the JIG procedure, although one 
union national offleers * claim that "hardly a week goes by when I ’m
(2 8 1 ) (2 8 2 )not fixing up a HQ conference at ICI,"' 'is a slight exaggeration.' '
Despite the potential influence of delays in settlement on uncon­
stitutional action, there are no grounds for challenging the conclusion
279. The level of external arbitration within the chemical industry
does not appear to be very high, however. Interview MAN 9?
Dec. ’77 •
280. Interview MAN 1, May ’78.
281. Interview TU 11, June *7 8 .
282. of. Gill et al., Industrial relations ..., op.cit., pp.l8, 92.
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/ p Qo \
arrived at by Gill and bis colleagues' concerning the current 
validity of the statement by Marsh and McCarthy that:
"While stressing again that no procedure can be expected to be uni­
versally acceptable, it cannot be doubted that in general, procedures 
in this- part of' the chemical industry are regarded as satisfactory by 
the signatory parties." (2 8 4 )
This discussion of disputes procedures has been limited to manual workers 
since the CIA is not involved in those procedures which have been agreed 
for white-collar staff• Such procedures normally cover the same unit 
as that for which bargaining takes place, but are often limited to 
a particular company/289)
The disputes procedures in the British and West German chemical industries 
are primarily products of the two national systems of industrial re­
lations. In Germany, the Works Constitution Act provides mechanisms 
for the settlement of most grievances arising from workplace relations, 
and the labour courts can deal with the remainder as a result of legal 
distinctions between industrial relations matters. Furthermore, joint 
conciliation procedures have been developed to provide a means of re­
solving problems arising from the negotiations between the Arbeitsring 
Chemie and the Chemical Workers’ Union. In Britain, the chemical dis­
putes procedure which has been autonomously agreed upon by the parties 
concerned is empowered to regulate individual and collective grievances 
arising from the workplace, national and any other negotiations• Bespite 
these differences, however, the principles behind the actual settlement
283. Ibid., p.18.
2 8 4 . Bonovan Research Paper No.2, Part II, op.cit., p.44*
2 8 5 . cf. Shell UK Ltd., A National Agreement between ASTMS and Shell 
UK Ltd. and Shell Chemicals UK Ltd. for Clerical and Administra­
tive and Technical and Supervisory Staffs in their Manufacturing
Locations, January 1976, p.!7ff'»
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of disputes are common to "both industries. Above all, the parties 
involved in labour relations at whatever level desire to retain full 
autonomy for the resolution of the dispute for as long as possible, 
and the systems developed envisage the joint regulation of grievances* 
This reflects the general tenor of industrial relations in the chemical 
industries of both countries.
One measure of the effectiveness of disputes procedures must lie in 
the incidence of industrial action, particularly from the point of view 
of the employers, and this topic will be discussed in the next section*
The structure of employers * associations in the British and German 
chemical industries diverges considerably and yet their functions in 
the industrial relations field are very similar. They engage in coll­
ective bargaining and disputes settlement with the unions, although 
the bargaining structures do differ somewhat, as do the extent of 
the disputes procedures. Furthermore, the employers* associations 
provide legal, educational and public relations support to their 
member companies.
The similarities in the foie of chemical employers* associations in 
the two countries have, in fact, increased considerably in the last 
two decades. This has been caused by the CIA's adaption to the chang­
ing industrial relations scene in Britain. In Germany, on the other 
hand, the role of the chemical employers' associations is well est­
ablished and has not changed much in recent years.
It is well-known that the chemical industries in Britain and Germany 
are not especially strike-prone. This could be a result ox the effect­
iveness of the disputes procedures, particularly as far as unconstitut­
ional industrial action is concerned. Unfortunately, very little 
direct data is available on the incidence of unconstitutional disputes 
in the chemical industry/288) A survey of 126 chemical establishments
employing around 6 0 , 0 0 0  recently determined that 1 1 2  stoppages had
(287 )taken place over a five year period' 'for which official statistics
(288)
reported only 2 4 0  stoppages in the whole chemical and allied industry. 
Since it would be unlikely that chance had selected the most dispute 
prone establishments in the industry, it must be concluded that in­
dustrial action is more frequent in the chemical industry than official 
figures might lead us to believe. Since it is also probable that 
official industrial action would be included in government statistics, 
the disputes not accounted for are probably unconstitutional.
Other forms of industrial action short of a stoppage of work might also 
take place, particularly in an unconstitutional context. Indeed, such 
forms of action as overtime bans, work-to-rule, etc. can be extremely 
effective in the ohemical industry since they are often sufficient to
/ p Qq \
close down production without costing the workers their full wages.
286. The paucity of statistics on industrial disputes in Germany 
was also commented above.
2 8 7 . Gill et al., Industrial relations ..., op.cit., p.136.
2 8 8 . Ibid., p.19 and British Labour Statistics Handbook, 1976, 
op.cit., p.313, own calculations.
2 8 9 . Interviews MAN 2, May '78; MAN 6 , July *79* MAN 7, Apr.*78;
MAN 10, MAN 11, Jan.’78; TU 2, June *79*
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(v) Industrial action in the chemical industry.
- 82 -
The reason for the effectiveness of overtime bans in particular are 
the low manning levels in production which often require overtime to 
cover for sickness, holidays or absenteeism/290^ This probably ex­
plains the greater incidence of svich action in the chemical industry.
Table 7 *7 *
Industrial action by size of chemical establishment over a period 
of 5 years. (2 9 1)
No of No . of Average No. Average incidence of
Workers Establish­ of -Strikes- other forms of in­
Employed. ments . per Establish­ dustrial action per
ment . Establishment.
1-99 24 0.375 0.25
100-299 42 0.619 1.14'
300-599 28 1 .2 1 4 2.57
600-999 12 1.333 2.08
1000+ 10 1.350 1.95
Totals 126 0.888 1.51
Such results have led to the conclusion that "there is a direct re-
lationship betvreen establishment size and dispute-proneness, with
an initial rise in dispute-proneness with increasing size of est-
(2 9 2 )
ablishment, followed by a slight fall around the 1000 employee mark".
This conclusion receives further discussion presently.
290. Sickness, absenteeism are regarded as indirect measures of un­
organised conflict, cf. R. Hyman, Strikes, Second Edition,
Glasgow, 1977? p*53ff and P.K. Edwards, "Strikes and Unorganised 
conflict - some further considerations," BJIR, Vol.XVII, No.l, 
1979? P*95ff» However, there seem to be positive correlations 
between the low level of strike activity in chemicals (see 
below) and these indicators, <3f. R. Bean, "The Relationship 
between strikes and unorganised conflict in manufacturing in­
dustries," BJIR, Vol.Kill, No.l, 1975? p.98ff.
291* Gill et al., Industrial relations ..., op .cit., p.136.
292. C.G. Gill and M. Warner, "Managerial and Organizational
B'eterminants of Industrial Conflict: the Chemical Industry 
Case," The Journal of Management Studies, Vol.16, No.l,
1979? p.67f.
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No information is available on the level of disputes within the 
sectors of the chemical whioh are covered by the chemical disputes 
procedure. However, the following table does give a limited sectoral 
breakdown of disputes in the ohemical and allied industries.
Table 7*8.
Number of working days lost (lOOO’s) by the chemical industry sectors
1969-1976 (293)
Year Chemicals, Plastics Byestuffs, Ferti­
lisers etc.
Pharmaceutical 
& Toilet 
Preps•
Paints, Soaps 
& other chem# 
inds •
1969 24 20 8
1970 132 34 8
1971 28 8 10
1972 38 2 18
1973 51 2 18
1974 48 30 10
1975 168 20 14
1976 17 3 3
It appears from this table that the sector covered by the Chemical and 
Allied Industries JIC is the most dispute-prone, whilst the Fine 
Chemicals sector with the same and Other Chemioal Industries with 
different disputes procedure have similar levels of disputes. This 
is confirmed when the number of days lost per 1000 employees is con-
(2 9 4 )sidered;' 7 " a result which might lead to the conclusion that the
293* British Labour Statistics Yearbook, 1970-75? anti British Labour 
Statistics Handbook, 1976, op.oit., p.313*
294* The average days lost per 1000 employees for 1974-77 were:
Chemicals, Plastics, Byestuffs, Fertilisers, etc. 521
Pharmaceutical and Toil Preparations 176
Paints, Soaps and Other Chem. Inds. 135
Selected industries (Mining, Manufacturing, 733
Construction and Transport).
From: Bepartment of Employment Gazette, Vol.LXXXVII, No.l. 
1979? p*28ff, own calculations.
Such a conclusion would not seem warranted. Not only are strikes
( 295 )more prevalent in non-federated companies, 7'but other factors such
(296)as the size of establishments' and level of union membership
( ° Q 7  ^
density might contribute towards these differences*
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disputes procedure does not influence the level of dispute-proneness.
Despite the fairly high level of dispute-proneness in the Heavy Chemi­
cals sector, as a whole, the ohemical industry compares very favourably 
with other manufacturing industries. In addition, disputes were dis­
covered to be a very insignificant cause of production delays, accounting 
for only 2.5 per cent of the delays reported in a recent survey/298)
It has been established previously that strike levels in the West
German ohemical industry are very low, there only having been one major
(299)stoppage in the past fifty years.' "  When the relative strike level 
in the British chemical industry was compared with that in Germany, it 
was discovered that the two industries accounted for similar percentages 
of the total days lost as a result of stoppages of work. Between 1966
295* Gill et al., Industrial relations . . . , op .cit., p. 19*
296. The effect of the size of establishment on dispute-proneness 
has been noted above. The size of establishment does vary 
from sector to sector, with the larger production sites being 
concentrated in the General Chemicals and Plastics sectors, 
whilst Agrochemicals, Paints, Toiletries and Pharmaceuticals 
are typified by small sites, cf. Gover Eoonomic Publications, 
UK Chemical Industries Review 1974-75? London, 1974? PP»58?
78, 79, 9 1 ? 102, 116.
297* The JIG areas, and ICI seem to be more highly organised than 
pharmaceuticals, toiletries, and other chemical industries. 
Interviews TU 9? Jan.*78 and TU 1 4 , June ’78.
298. The major causes were technical production problems (73.3
per cent) and labour shortage (13.3 per cent). Gill et al., 
Industrial relations . . . , op .cit., p.6 9.
299* cf. Chapter 4 ? Section (iii)c.
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and 1978 *fcke chemical industry in Britain caused 1.22 per cent of 
days lost whilst the German chemioal industry caused 2.12 per cent 
over the same period/300) It is perhaps surprising that the German 
chemioal industry seems more prone to disruption than its British 
counterpart. However, due to the generally limited nature of in­
dustrial action in Germany even single stoppages can have a great 
influence on the average level of stoppages/301) It would therefore 
he unwise to go beyond the conclusion that industrial action is at a 
comparable level in the German and British chemical industries.
The limitations in the theories used to explain strike-proneness have 
been discussed by Hyman^3°^) Nevertheless, there are some arguments 
which permit a cautious explanation of the reasons for the low level 
of strike action* in the chemical industries of both countries under 
consideration. Due to the restrictions imposed by the research method 
and the dangers arising from generalisations in a highly diverse in­
dustry, the explanations arrived at are no more than tentative in 
nature, and could perhaps be used as the basis for further comparative 
research to provide a more founded explanation.
The incidence of strikes in the British and West German chemioal in­
dustries is apparently- explained by a number of interrelated factors 
common to both industries within the context of each national industrial
300. Statistische Jahrbucher and Department of Employment Gazette, 
various years, own calculations.
301. Furthermore, strike statistics lack great accuracy although 
the statistical definition of a strike is fortunately the same 
in Britain and Germany. Nevertheless, the average number of 
days lost per year x*as 93 400 in Britain and 15 900 in Germany.
302. R. Hyman, 1977? on.oit., Chapter 3.
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relations environment. These common factors may basically be classified 
as the economic state, industrial organisation, and technological chara­
cteristics of the industries together with joint regulatory systems of 
dispute settlement which have developed under these conditions.
The British and German chemical industries have both enjoyed economic 
growth throughout the majority of the post-war period. This has been 
stimulated by the change in the raw material basis of the organic sector 
of the industry from coal to oil and the increasing importance of 
pharmaceuticals as well as new products such as man-made fibres(3°3  ^
and plastics. The economic expansion of the industry has, however, 
been achieved without large increases in the size of the chemical work­
force. This has resulted in greater productivity and capital intensity. 
Also, labour costs now represent a sma^ ler^ r^rejyort:io3+-'rd'fw't01a 1 costs. 
Under such circumstances management can adopt a concessionary approach 
to the unions and works councils in negotiations. The consequence of 
this room for manoeuvre is above average wages and extensive welfare 
and fringe benefits which create good pre-conditions for job satisfaction.
In Britain, however, incomes policy has been responsible for limiting 
the extent to which earnings have been able to increase above the 
average, although it has also provided a stimulus for productivity 
bargaining which has itself had a number of consequences for workplace 
relations, one of which seems to be an increase in foi’malisation/ 304^
303. Although false estimations of the level of investment needed 
in this area have led to excessive over-capacities, and in­
tense competition in this sector in recent years.
304. of. Gill and Warner, op .cit., p.6lff.
Concessionary attitudes on the part of management and employers1 
associations remove the necessity for unions to engage in strike action 
in order to gain satisfactory improvements in wages and conditions*
When such concessions are withheld, despite economic growth, then the 
likelihood of a dispute increases, as in Rheinland-Pfalz in 1977*
The importance of the economic state of the industry to strike levels 
is also illustrated by the minor economic recession in the German 
chemical industry in 1970. The situation gave the employers1 assoc­
iation an opportunity to take on the union with the aim of weakening 
the position of progressive elements within it. This decision was 
unusual for employers in the chemical industry where the levels of 
investment generally make the maintenance of production a very high 
priority for management. This normally increases management’s willing­
ness to find compromise solutions in negotiations rather than risk 
the consequences of industrial action.
Bue to the very wide range of products in the chemical industry, its 
technological characteristics are difficult to summarise. However, 
fairly high levels of automation and continuous production systems are 
common, particularly in the Heavy Chemicals sectors. As a consequence 
most production workers, as well as some craftsmen and staff^work 
shifts, a fact which hinders communication within the workforce as a 
whole. Such communication problems affect the unions more than manage­
ment since supervisors have regular contact with individual operatives 
in order to ensure that the plant is running correctly. Work groups 
are typically small and working places can be dispersed through large
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production complexes. The result of these circumstances is a person­
alisation rather than a collectivisation of relations and they make 
the mobilisation of a workforce for strike action extremely complex.
In the most highly automated sectors of chemical production it is 
feasible for non-union employees to maintain production after the 
majority of workers have withdrawn their labour/309) Such tactics 
have been used in the West German chemical industry with varying de­
grees of success. Union negotiators there have to take this possibility 
into account until they have increased union membership densities, esp­
ecially amongst technical and managerial staff which are the groups most 
likely to be used to run the plants. In Britain, union membership 
amongst white-collar chemical workers is probably high enough amongst 
technical staff to make such tactics unlikely. Since the traditions 
of union solidarity are strong, it is also extremely unlikely that 
staff would be prepared to carry out strikers’ work. In any case, man­
agement in Britain seems more inclined towards closing down production 
in an orderly way when confronted by strike action, rather than attempt­
ing to keep it going despite the strike.
Investigations in the British chemical industry have indicated that the
frequency of disputes generally increases with the size of establishment«
Unfortunately, data doe.s not show whether this trend continues when the
chemioal establishments are extremely large with up to 10 000 employees.
(306)
Although strikes are not unknown on the larger British production sites,
305. of. "Strikes and Automation", New York Times, 12.8.1963, p*20.
306. of. J. Foeber, op .cit., p. 131 and R. Reeves, "Strike may hit
chemioal supplies," Financial Times, 7*9*1978, p.7*
they are extremely rare in Germany where far larger establishments 
exist. Whilst German unionists were generally unanimous in the opinion 
that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to carry out 
a successful strike in a mammoth chemical works, this attitude was not 
shared by their British colleagues/807) The very existence of such 
attitudes amongst German union officials is likely to ensure that it 
does not come to strike action in the chemical industry since the 
structure of collective bargaining is such that a strike of any great 
significance woiild require shutting down production in one of the three 
main chemical works at Leverkusen, Hoechst or Ludwigshafen in order to 
win a strike. The reasons for this are not only their economic im­
portance to the employers’ association but also their symbolic im­
portance to other unionists on strike/808) The failure to carry out 
successful strikes at Bayer and Hoechst in 1971 was one of the major 
causes of the defeat of the chemical workers’ strike. Furthermore, 
the conclusion that a strike at BASF in 1977 would have failed, pre­
vented union officials from calling out their members/809)
Although many of the factors making industrial action in large pro­
duction complexes unlikely to succeed in Germany are inapplicable in 
Britain - the dominance of the local union organisation by works
307• Numerous interviews,
308. Dzielak et al., op.cit., p.382.
309. The difficulties in carrying out successful strike action on 
these sites are manifold. They include a heterogenous work­
force (causing unsolidarity); a lack of trade union traditions 
and low membership density; high levels of material benefits 
and strong company loyalties; a domination of the local trade 
union organisation by works councillors who rarely want a 
dispute to take place; lack of an understanding of the pro­
duction system or how to run down production; an inability
to organise realistic levels of safety cover, etc. For 
some examples of this cf). Ibid.., p.382ff.
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councillors, for example - it would be difficult to organise lightening 
action on large British sites due to the size of the site and scattered 
nature of working places. Even though the technical problems assoc­
iated with industrial action are similar in both countries, British 
unionists were undaunted by them whilst officials of the German 
Chemical Workers1 Union constantly emphasised their importance. This 
may be a reflection of the less acute nature of the communication pro­
blems in Britain, but might also result from the greater strike ex­
perience of the British union officers both within and outside the 
chemical industry. In order to draw firmer conclusions about the 
effect of large production sites and their complex production tech­
nology on the frequency of strike action, further investigations might 
be in order.
Advanced technology appeared to have contradictory effects - decreased 
manual work but increased mental stress, for example - on job content 
and conditions of work in the British and German chemical industries 
so that its relationship with job satisfaction, and hence perhaps 
with a willingness to engage in industrial action could not be as­
certained .
One consequence of advanced technology on strike action in the British 
chemical industry is somewhat paradoxical. Overtime levels appear to 
be quite high to maintain normal production even in automated plants 
with low manning levels since the absence of a single operator - whether 
through sickness, holiday or absenteeism - can be extremely critical,,
This makes an overtime ban as effective as a strike and since it 
costs the union members less is preferred by them. This may be a 
partial explanation of the low strike level in the British chemical 
industry. In Germany overtime is sanctioned by works councillors and 
the legality of a general ban is rather dubious. This tactic is 
therefore extremely rare in the German chemical industry.
Trade union weakness at the workplace is still a feature of industrial 
relations in the West German ohemical industry although British unions 
have recently been able to overcome the difficulties in recruiting 
imposed upon them by technological and organisational problems as well 
as management resistance. In Germany this weakness does not cause 
industrial conflict since the works council system removes the majority 
of workplace issues from the preserve of the unions. Furthermore, 
management policy has been to create loyalty to the company through 
"social paternalistic" benefits thus achieving a stable workforce and 
,a continuity of production and at the same time limiting the influence 
of the unions within the company. This weakness at shopfloor level 
does make it extremely difficult for the unions to call sweeping in­
dustrial action in the context of collective bargaining given its 
present structure in the German chemical industry. Industrial action 
is illegal in Germany unless called by a union after fully exhausting 
the conciliation procedure, which in the chemical industry is a form 
of joint regulation.
The expansion of workplace and especially productivity bargaining with
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the concomitant growth in union membership in the British chemical 
industry has resulted in increasing usage of the disputes procedure. 
Furthermore, the level of strike activity has also increased, for 
whilst the average number of da,ys lost through stoppages of work from 
1 9 6 6  to 1970 was 65400, from 1970 to 1974 it was 8 5 OOO and from 1974 
to 1978 it averaged 14340o/310  ^ This seems to indicate that trade 
union weakness was one of the reasons for the relatively low strike- 
proneness of the chemical industry in Britain.
It would seem, therefore^ that the increase in formalisation of work­
place industrial relations which has taken place in the British chemi­
cal industry is a response to this increase in strike-proneness Z 311'* 
The greater formalisation of workplace relations has generally re­
sulted in an expansion of the joint regulatory grievance procedures 
in workplace industrial relations.
It is contended that the joint regulatory procedures which exist in 
both the British and German chemical industry for the settlement of 
collective and individual grievances at the workplace and disputes 
between the unions and employers* associations have contributed 
greatly towards the low number of strikes in these industries. This 
is indicated primarily by the low frequency of failure of these pro­
cedures despite the occasional outbreak of unconstitutional action, 
especially in Britain.
310. Department of Employment Gazette, various years, own 
calculations.
311. For a similar argument cf. Gill and Warner, op .cit., p.6 8 f.
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Although the institutions which exist to regulate workplace grievances 
in the German chemical industry are the result of legislation, the 
extent to which the institutionalisation of industrial conflict has 
taken place seems to be a particular feature of the chemical industry. 
Besides this example, the remaining procedxires have developed from 
negotiations between unions and employers and illustrate that the 
collective bargaining systems produce effective procedural regulations.
It is not claimed that the strike level in the West German|chemical 
industry has been explained finally and in all its aspects, but what 
does emerge is the fact that similar factors operate in both countries, 
although the details of their operations vary somewhat. Within the 
confines of each national industrial relations environment, the 
economic state, industrial organisation and technological characteristics 
of the chemical industry have resulted in a low level of strike activity.
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Comparison of labour relations in the West German and British ohemical 
industries has revealed that many similarities exist between the situ­
ation in both countries. However, the distinctive national industrial 
relations system in Britain and Germany also have an influence upon 
chemical industrial relations in each country. It is the aim of this 
final chapter to discuss the similarities and dissimilarities and to 
draw conclusions from them.
Before concluding, however, a brief statement of the major findings of 
the study is called for. Labour relations in the chemical industries 
of Britain and West Germany are characterised by effective joint re­
gulatory disputes procedures, and partly as a result of this by a low 
incidence of official and unofficial disputes. Furthermore',, union 
organisation is generally weak, particularly at the workplace, unless 
management policies and state intervention provide stimulus and support 
for the unions. The state has, in fact, played a crucial role in the 
development of ohemical labour relations in the two countries, whilst 
management policies havej.until recently^ shown remarkable similarities.
These statements are based upon wide empirical investigations in Britain 
and Germany, including numerous interviews, as well as a review of many 
primary sources not previously used in academic work and a consideration 
of the relevant secondary sources. This method applied in a comparative 
study of the two countries provides the basis for these conclusions.
Chapter 8 .
Summary and Conclusions.
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The central hypothesis of the study has been that the technical nature, 
the industrial organisation and the economic state of the chemical in­
dustry all have a significant influence on the practice of labour re­
lations in the chemical industry. The importance of these factors has 
been illustrated on numerous occasions during the course of this study. 
However, Part One also indicated that political and legislative develop­
ments as well as behavioural influences also have an effect on chemical 
industrial relations in Germany. The importance of.such factors in 
Britain has been confirmed in the previous chapter, whilst management 
policies were seen to have a considerable influence on labour relations 
in the British chemical industry. As a result, no simple statement can 
be made of the main factors which affect industrial relations in the 
chemical industry although the initial hypothesis has been confirmed.
Management policies amongst large chemical manufacturers in Britain and 
Germany for many years contained social paternalistic measures such as 
extensive welfare services, fringe benefits and company housing schemes 
which were more extensive than was generally the case in manufacturing 
industry.
In Germany this trend began against a background of early state initia­
tives in the social field. Management ideology may also have played a 
certain role but it seems the main motives for these social services in 
both countries were attempts to counter the high turnover amongst chemical 
workers, which resulted primarily from the appalling working conditions; 
the choice of green-field sites which lacked any sort of facilities for 
the employees and efforts to establish a loyal workforce over which the
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unions had little influence. Management was especially successful in 
achieving the last of these aims and only in recent years have British 
trade unions secured a firm organisational base amongst chemical workers. 
The German Chemical Workers* Union has yet to achieve this in the maj­
ority of large chemical companies.
One reflection of the traditional antipathy towards unions in the British 
chemical industry may still be found in IOI’s job evaluation scheme 
which may be seen as a form of "employer conciliation". This form of 
unilateral regulation is, however, unusual in both the British and German 
chemical industries. This contrasts with the situation as it was for 
many years in the British engineering industry and with procedures in 
German industries such as textiles, printing and to a lesser extent
. (I)engineering. 7
In Germany, co-determination has traditions which extend back for sixty 
years, although such provisions are based upon legal statutes - currently 
the Works Constitution Act 1972 - which are common to German industry in 
general. In Britain some voluntary agreements have led to consultative 
procedures being introduced. In fact, some of the most extensive con­
sultative procedures in British industry have developed in chemicals.
The reasons for this seem to be a realisation by management of the 
potential usefulness of such schemes together with union pressure for 
their introduction. Since such consultative procedures have developed 
in many different ways no accurate picture of their effectiveness can
1. H. Kotthoff, op.cit., Graphik Nr.14/5*
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be given but generally both management and unionists seem to prefer 
voluntary procedures to ones imposed through legislation. Consultative 
procedures are also more highly developed in the German chemical in­
dustry than is usually the case since the joint committee systems which 
exist in the chemioal industry are more extensive than in many German 
industries. This situation might be seen as a comprehensive bureau- 
cratisation of industrial conflict at the workplace. The minimal in­
cidence of unconstitutional, indeed illegal, industrial action at the 
workplace in the German chemical industry seems to indicate furthermore 
the efficacy of this system.
Relations between management and the workforce or their representatives’ 
are apparently based upon mutual respect and may generally be classi­
fied as good. Although it would be a mistake to claim that chemical 
technology is the sole cause of this - many jobs remain heavy, dirty, 
dusty and noisy- - it has certainly contributed towards these good 
relations.
Chemical production technology may be characterised as being capital 
intensive and automated, although the extent of automation does vary 
somewhat. This has consequences for the size of work groups, the fixed 
nature of work places, the distribution of a small number of production 
workers over large areas, the extent of shift work and the way in whioh 
supervision is carried out. As a result communication can be difficult 
for union officers, the success of union recruiting drives is often 
limited, and close contacts are established between supervisors and the 
workforce. Woodwardfs findings seem to have certain international
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validity in this context. In summary, chemical production technology 
seems to lead to a personalisation rather than a collectivisation of 
industrial relations.
Despite these difficulties, unions in the British chemical industry have 
succeeded in extending their influence at the workplace. This has led 
to considerable changes in the role and status of the supervisor, and 
often to their subsequent unionisation. In Germany, on the other hand, 
the position of the supervisor is firmly established in tradition and 
no forces have emerged to challenge this. Union membership amongst 
supervisors in the German chemical industry is nevertheless extensive, 
probably through the rigid training qualifications which invariably 
include an apprenticeship of some kind and often further examinations.
In addition^the existence of industrial unionism can sometimes lead to 
the rather paradoxical situation of the supervisor being the union re­
presentative for his work group. It is uncertain whether this situation 
is limited in practice to the chemical industry, or whether it occurs 
generally. However, no evidence for the latter exists.
The unusually large number of managers and senior staff required in 
the chemical industry because of its highly technical nature have pro­
vided the basis for the development of union organisation within these 
groups. The VAA has been extremely successful in recruiting senior1 
staff in Germany whilst white-collar unionisation of managers, such as 
by APST at ICI, is increasing in Britain too. Major factors to in­
fluence this growth have been legislation in both Britain (e.g. Health 
and Safety at Work Act) and Germany (Works Constitution Act 1972).
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In addition the employers have lent support to such organisations in 
both countries, perhaps from a desire to channel increasing collect­
ivisation of senior staff towards professional unions with a less 
militant style. In both countries collectivisation of management to 
the extent that it has occurred in the chemical industry is most un­
common and illustrative of the way in which parallel labour relations' 
developments can occur in the same industry under divergent industrial 
relations environments.
The capital intensive nature of chemical production further affects 
management in a number of ways. High investment levels require a maxi­
mum utilisation of plant, and hence limit management’s room to maneouvre 
with the workforce since strike prevention has a large priority. Further­
more, labour costs are relatively unimportant, so management has a further 
incentive for compromising on demands from the workforce. These factors 
go some of the way towards providing an explanation of the low incidence 
of disputes in the chemical industry. Fuch criteria are not absolute, 
however, for the 1971 German ohemioal industry strike was clearly pro­
voked by the employers in the hope of balancing their immediate losses 
against greater long-term gains as a result of defeating the union.
The timing of this essay against the union was carefully chosen to 
follow soon after the first recession suffered by the chemical economy 
since the Federal Republic came into existence.
The state has played an extremely important role in the development of’ 
employers* associations in the chemical industry. This has been the
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case in ‘both Britain, where this is most unusual, and Germany. Although 
the present structure of employers* associations is very different in 
the two countries due to the rationalisation of British employers* 
organisations during the 1960*s and the federal structure in Germany, 
their actual industrial relations roles are very similar. The employers* 
associations provide legal services, specialist advice and training pro­
grammes on industrial relations issues, although their major role in 
both countries remains collective bargaining with the unions. In fact, 
the Chemical Industries Association was one of the first employers’ 
associations in Britain to pioneer this broad approach to industrial 
relations. The structure of collective bargaining in each of the 
chemical industries under consideration is primarily a reflection of 
the national collective bargaining systems, but is also influenced by 
the structure of the chemical industry. In Britain bargaining occurs 
nationally for a variety of groups of employees reflecting the structure 
of the British trade union movement, as well as on a national (e.g. ICl), 
divisional or local company basis. In Germany, on the other hand, 
regional and national bargaining are prevalent, supplimented by bar­
gaining locally or nationally between works councils and management.
State involvement has also been crucial in the development of bargain­
ing in the British chemical industry by providing the initial impetus 
for national bargaining, then strengthening the system during the Second 
World War and by its periodical support of productivity bargaining 
during the last two decades. Without this support, collective bargaining 
would scarcely have developed or survived in this form, an unusual
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statement to make about an industry in Britain, the birthplace of 
"voluntarism11. In Germany, the collective bargaining system, and hence 
the position of the employers* associations is anchored firmly in 
legislation. Furthermore domestic negotiations generally take place 
according to the provisions of the Works Constitution Act.
The climate of collective bargaining in both the British and German 
chemical industries has been affected positively by their steady economic 
developments with only minor recessions during the post-war period. 
Although this has generally provided management with more scope for 
concessions in negotiations, in Britain consecutive incomes policies 
have removed much of this flexibility, as well as much of the contro­
versy from wage negotiations.
Historically the chemical industry developed later in both Britain and 
Germany than did many of the heavy industries. As a consequence trade 
unionism had scarcely evolved in the chemical industry by the time of 
the First World War which marked the advent of considerable state in­
volvement in industrial relations in both countries. Trade unionism 
in the chemical industry was subsequently influenced greatly by many 
of these developments, for example in Britain through the introduction 
of national collective bargaining and later Joint Industrial Councils, 
and in Germany by the recognition of trade unions and then the passing 
of works council legislation.
Despite the initial similarities in the development of unionism within 
the British and German chemioal industries, political occurrences in
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Germany produced a discontinuity in union development, bringing later 
the opportunity to re-establish the union movement from afresh. This 
resulted finally in a system of industrial unionism whilst in Britain 
the uninterrupted evolution of the union movement has produced general, 
craft and white-collar unions many of which are active within the 
British chemical industry.
Formally the structure of the trade unions in the British chemical 
industry is much more fragmented than in Germany. However, there is 
often much co-operation between the British unions especially on in­
dividual sites, whilst in Germany the Chemical Workers* Union is by 
no means a monolithic organisation. Above all, differences in opinion 
often emerge between works councillors and union lay officers, whilst 
the union officialdom is clearly split into two factions.
Until recently trade unions in Germany and Britain had failed to est­
ablish a firm base amongst chemical employees, especially in the larger 
companies. In the Federal Republic this situation still exists, caused 
primarily by the exclusion of unions from workplace industrial relations 
as a result of the works council system. Further reasons for this 
failure are communication difficulties resulting from the production 
technology, the system of plant representatives in the large companies 
and the almost continuous economic growth of the industry which has 
brought good pay and conditions without the need for intense union 
pressure. These factors have a,lso contributed to the minor role played 
by union lay officers in chemical industrial relations in Germany; a 
circumstance from which it is difficult for the union to strengthen its
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position. In addition, large numbers of white-collar employees work 
in the chemical industry and in Germany they have remained resistant 
to union membership.
In the British chemioal industry the post-war economic development led 
to a strengthening of the position of shop stewards. With the intro­
duction of productivity bargaining by management and supported by 
government incomes policy, a strong, effective shop steward organisation 
became a necessity if a successful agreement was to be achieved and 
subsequently operated. Many productivity agreements also included union 
membership clauses and this helped the unions- to expand their member­
ship in chemicals. Furthermore white-collar unions such as ASTMS have 
been increasingly successful in recruiting members in the ohemical in­
dustry during the last deoade. The reasons for this were the erosion 
of differentials- and staff status by incomes policy and productivity 
bargaining, government encouragement of the extension of bargaining to 
the white-collar sector and the resultant changes in employers1 attitudes 
to white-collar unionisation.
At present there are no signs of any such developments amongst staff in 
the German chemical industry although trade union membership is slowly 
rising. Should there ever be a considerable erosion of differentials, 
however, it is conceivable that the German Salaried Staff Union would 
benefit from increases in membership.
The disputes procedures in the British and German ohemical industries 
are specifically products of each national industrial relations system.
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Despite this there are considerable similarities since joint regulatory 
procedures have been adopted in both countries. In Britain a three 
stage procedure with local, headquarters and disputes committee- con­
ferences supplements the formal and informal means of dispute regulation 
at the workplace. In Germany, collective issues arising from negot­
iations are dealt with by the joint conciliation committees which' are 
seen in a similar way as the British headquarters conferences as 
bringing fresh minds to bear upon the problem, and by works concil­
iation committees in the case of individual issues or those limited in 
scope to the works or company.
In all oases a desire to retain full responsibility for the decision 
for as long as possible at a particular level, and to prevent the in­
volvement of external parties if possible, was prevalent. This could 
well be a reflection of the attitude that outsiders would scarcely be 
able to understand the problem in a technologically oomplioated industry*
It is well-known that German industry is less strike prone than British 
industry. Despite this, however, the relative level of strike proneness 
in the British and German ohemical industries in recent years has been 
very similar. This has been tentatively explained by the effectiveness 
of joint regulatory disputes procedures, the stable economic develop­
ment, the influence of chemical technology and high capital intensity 
and by union weakness at the workplace. The possible importance of 
this last factor is perhaps illustrated by the increasing level of strike 
activity in the British chemical industry from 1966 until 1978, that is 
to say from a time when British unions were first able to establish a
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One consequence of the increased level of strike activity in British 
chemicals seems to be a greater formalisation of industrial relations 
at site and company level, illustrated by the spread of personnel 
specialists and shop stewards committees. Nevertheless, despite the 
similarities in the level of strike proneness, management generally 
reacts in different ways in the two countries when confronted by a 
dispute situation. In Germany, management will often attempt to keep 
production running at all costs whilst in Britain management favours 
an orderly shutting down of prodiiction.
As a result of this study certain tentative conclusions can be drawn 
about labour relations in the modern chemical industry. Relations be­
tween management and employees or their representatives are likely to 
be good due to the steady economic growth enjoyed by the industry and 
as a result of the production technology. Furthermore, joint regulatory 
procedures for the solution of grievances are likely to predominate 
over unilateral procedures, and this also contributes to the peaceful 
tenor of industrial relations. As a consequence of these factors the 
chemical industry is unlikely to be strike prone compared with other 
manufacturing industries.
In addition, workplace union organisation will probably be poorly de­
veloped as a result of technological constraints such as shift work, 
small work groups and scattered work places. This is even more probable
firm base in the chemical industry.
-  1 0 6  -
so long as management policies, for example of a social paternalistic 
nature,,are designed to prevent the growth of union organisation. 
However, where management or the state desire strong, stable work­
place union organisations, then it is possible for the unions to over­
come the organisational difficulties arising from chemical production 
technology.
Labour relations in the ohemical industry are, within the context of 
the respective national industrial relations environment, primarily 
influenced by the technological characteristics, industrial organ­
isation and economio development of the chemical industry.
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PART THREE - RUPPIEMENTARY INFORMATION
Table 1.
Trade union membership in Germany 1978*
Appendix 1 Tables
Union Total Membership 
Men Women Staff
Civil
Servants
Bau, Steine, Erden. 517 842 503 577 14 265 44 801Bergbau und Energie. 362 148 356 053 6 095 43 086 231Chemie, Papier, 
Keramilc. 650 675 531 630 119 045 119 O84
Bruclc und Papier. 145 980 118 433 27 547 18 270Eisenbahner 
Deutschlands• 414 195 395 453 18 742 9 669 196 159
Erziehung und 
Wissenschaft. 158 734 82 337 76 397 30 167 128 567
Gartenbau, Land- und 
Forstwirtschaft• 41 311 38 448 2 863 2 745 2 792
Hande1, Banken und 
Versicherungen• 314 244 149 514 164 730 265 968
Holz und Kunststoff. 145 076 128 441 16 635 9 621Kunst. 42 109 35 152 6 957 42 109Leder. 55 068 31 287 23 781 3 282Metall• 2608 798 2300 974 379 824 394 395N.ahrun g, Genus s, 
Gaststatten. 252 440 180 104 72 336 41 410
6ffentliche Dienste, 
Transport u. Verkehr. 1099 396 826 941 272 455 455 827 95 009
Polizei. 152 486 144 161 8 325 11 818 133 474Deutsche Postgewerks- 
chaft• 428 878 319 042 109 836 30 612 275 856
Texti1-Bekleidung. 290 143 127 627 162 516 26 533
Deutsche Gewerkschaft- 
bund. 7751 523 6269 174 1482 349 1549 397 832 088
Deutsche Angestellten- 
gewerkschaft.
Deutsoher Beamten- 
bund
Christliche Gewerks- 
ohaftsbund.
478 735 
800 671 
249 200
304
610
931
664
173
190
[
c—
0 
0
co 
0
1
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch 1979* op.oit., p.549*
Infobrief, 7/1979? p.4*
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Table 2.
Membership and Union Density in the Industrial Union of Chemical,
Paper and Ceramics Workers 1950-1979•
Year Membership in Employment^ Total Members . . (l)hip'
No. Density No. Density
1950 346 0 72^) 75*2 374 87 8 ) 8 1 .551 431 790 74.2 460 000 79.152 427 336 72.5 461 446 78.353 412 972 64*5 447 463 69.954 412 851 62.3 455 559 6 8 .7
1955 422 053 58.7 459 551 64.056 436 667 59*0 473 249 6 3.957 449 278 57.2 488 440 6 2 .158 469 680 56.7 509 613 6 1 .659 463 486 54.7 510 469 60.3
i960 471 627 53*9 519 461 59.4
61 481 221 52.6 525 649 57+4
62 484 245 5 2 .6 526 957 57.363 479 540 5 2.0 521 062 56.5
64 478 474 5 1 .8 533 699 57.7
1965 485 854 50.7 542 160 5 6 .666 481 712 50.1 537 434 55.967 462 370 52.3 527 834 59.668 469 510 51.9 533 814 59.0
69 489 157 5 1 .6 552 552 58.3
1970 531 269 53.1 598 831 59.971 536 587 52.0 613 057 59.4
72 544 720 5 2 .6 626 771 6O .573 556 092 53.2 645 178 6 1 .774 559 779 54*4 655 703 63.7
1975 537 433 54.0 644 271 64.776 5'32 467 54.2 643 390 6 5 .577 537 051 54.3 651 037 6 5 .878 533 114 54.2 650 6 75 66.179 537 060 53.8 657 920 65.9
1. As at 31.12.
2. As at 31.3
Sources? Dzielak et al., op.cit., p.539? S JB 1 9 7 6, o n . c i t p.533.
§22 1977? op.cit., p.552; Infobrief 7/79? p.4 and 10 Chemie. 
Gesohaftsbericht 1976-79 zum 11. Ordentliohen Gevxerk- 
schaftsta,g in Mannheim vom 7. bis 13. September 1980, Hannover, p.281.
-  1 1 0  -
Table 3.
Union membership density of selected groups within the Industrial
Union of Chemical, Paper and Ceramics Workers 1955-1979.
Year
All
Workers 
Male Female
Salaried 
All Male
Staff
Female All
Total
Male Female
1955 66.2 6 8 .8 5 8.8 . 25.9 29.7 17.7 58.7 62.0 49.8
I960 62.3 6 6 .7 5 0 .1 2 1 .8 2 J-.6 14:.l 53.9 5 8 .8 41.3
1965 6 0 .1 6 5 .1 45.0 2 2 .0 2 6.3 13.1 50.7 56.2 35.666 59*9 64.9 44.3 22.0 2 6 .1 13.2 5 0 .1 55.6 34.667 62.5 6 7.I 47.1 23.8 28.0 14.3 52.2 57.6 36.368 62.4 67.3 4 6 . 1 23.2 2 7 .5 14.2 51-9 57.4 36.6
69 62.0 6 7.I 45.4 23.8 2 7 .9 14.5 5 1 . 6 57.2 35.3
1970 6 4 .4 69.7 46.9 24.7 2 8.6 15.9 53.1 58.9 36.-371 6 4.O 6 9 .4 46.3 2 4.I 2 7 .6 16.3 5 2 .0 57.7 35.672 65.4 71.1 47.4 24.6 27.9 17.5 5 2 .6 58.4 36.273 6 7 .0 72.5 49.2 2 4.8 2 7 .8 18.1 53.2 58.9 ■37.174 68.0 7 2 .8 5 1 . 6 26.4 29.3 20.0 54.4 59.7 39-0
1975 68.3 73.1 5 2 .0 26.7 29.5 20.6 54.0 59.2 38.776 68.9 73.9 5 2 .0 26.8 2 9 .6 20.9 54.2 5 9 .6 3 8.677 6 8 .5 72.2 52.9 27.5 29.9 22.3 54*3 58.8 39.878 6 8 .5 73.3 53.7 27.5 29 .-6 22.9 54.2 58.9 4 0 .279 6 9 .0 73.5 53.6 26.7 28.3 23.1 53.8 58.3 40.4
Sources: Dzielak et al., op.cit., p.540 and GB 76-79, on.cit.,
p.28l, own calculations.
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Table 4 °
Workplace Representatives^^in the Industrial Union of Chemical,
Paper and Ceramics Workers 1953-1979*
Year
Workplace Reps. 
Total
No. of Organised 
Works Councillors
Workplace Reps. Less 
Works Councillors
No. Q ft CD 0^ No. . Change # No. Change #
1953 10 866 - 6 601 - 4 265 -
1956 16 335 +5 0 .6 10 574 +60 .2 5 76 1 +35*3
1959 21 059 +2 8.9 10 -6 5 1 + 0.7 10 408 +8O .7
1962 27 686 +31.5 10 922 + 2.5 16 764 +6 1 . 1
1965 36 373 +31.4 1 1 37 6 + 4*2 24 997 +49*1
1968 35 745 - 1*7 10 246 - 9*9 25 499 + 2 .0
1971 41 072 +14*9 10 246 - 30 826 +20.9
1975 46 366 +12.9 13 799 +34*7 32 567 + 5*6
1979 45 722 - 1.4 14 286 + 3 . 5 ^ 31 436 - 3.5
(1) Including Works Councillors, Lay Officers and Collecting 
Stewards•
(2) Works Council Election 1978*
Source: Dzielak et al., op.cit., p.542.
Der Betriebsrat, Vol.28, No.3? 1979? p*64*
G3 7 6—7 9 y op .cit♦, p»309> own calculations.
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Works Council Elections in the Organisational Area of the Chemical 
Workers* Union.
Table 5 *
Year Turnout Type of 
$ Joint
Election 
% Group
$ Seats 
Workers
to DGB unions 
Staff All
DGB works
councillors
(abs.)
1953 8 9.6 76.5 23.5 9 2 .6 57*6 85.5 6 601
1955 88.6 71.3 28.7 93.0 50.5 84.4 10 574
1957 79.9 6 8 .1 31.9 94.1 5 2 .1 8 5.I 10 562
1959 8 0 .1 64.5 35.5 94.5 51.9 8 5 .7 10 651
1961 75.8 63.4 36 .6 94.6 56.3 86.7 10 922
1963 76.5 62.2 37.8 94.6 55.6 86.1 10 705
1965 73.2 6O .4 39 «6 94.7 6 0 .4 87.2 11 396
1968 75.6 6O .7 39 -3 9 4 .4 62.9 8 7.O 10 246
1972 77*5 60.9 39.1 92.7 6 5.6 84*9 13 219
1975 78.3 63*6 36.4 93.5 72.0 86.8 13 909
1978 78.4 6 4 .2 35.8 92.5 70.8 8 5 .5 14 416
Sources : Dzielak et al., on.cit., p.541.
Der Betriebsrat , Vol.28., No.3, 1979, p . 64 •
Table 6.
The Structure of the Industrial Union of Chemical, Paper and Ceramics 
Workers: Industries, Works and Membership Density 1975*
Industry No of Works 
Abs 1000 +
employees
Total
Employees
Total
Members
Membership
Density
_.. *  .
Chemicals 1497 116 624 411 299 965 48.0
Plastics 378 7 51 396 23 227 45.2
Rubber 171 26 82 742 58 235 70.4
Paper 248 9 70 273 47 295 67.3
Fine Ceramics 195 7 55 974 34 028 60.8
Glass 225 15 71 679 52 761 73.6
Fire proofing 75 3 15 183 10 307 67.9
Abrasives 25 - 5 570 3 185 57-2
Bricks 82 - 2 695 1 678 62.3
Cement 37 - 7 195 5 025 6 9.8
Raw Materials 69 - 3 213 1 651 51.4
Others 58 - 5 682 4 164 73.3
Totals 3060 183 996 013 541 521 54-4
Source: GB 72-75? op .cit., p.267 and p.295f£» (Own calculations).
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Table 7 *
Histogram of District Size in the Chemical Workers 1 Union 1975.
Fo. of 
Dis­
tricts ID 11
0 1 2 3  4 5 6 7 8 9 . 1 0  1 5
SIZE OF DISTRICTS (»000s)
20 30
Source: GB 72-75? op.cit., p.266 and 280®
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Table 8
Regional structure of the Industrial Union of Chemical, Paper and
Ceramics Workers 1968-1975*
Region No.
1968
of Members 
1971 1975
Membership Density 
1968 1971 1975
Niedersachsen 65655 68595 59931 68.3 66.2 6 7 .2
rJordmark-Berlin 35041 38838 39838 5 1 .8 47*0 48.0
Westfalen 40631 46935 47026 6O .4 58.5 6 1 .6
Nordrhein 93940 111026 115987 41*6 45*2 47*2
Hessen 65845 71064 66353 55*3 5 2 .8 49*8
Bayern 73284 82182 79153 57*8 59*6 58.2
Baden—
Wiirtt ember g 42388 52259 54616 4 8 .4 46.1 52.9
Rheinland- 
Pfalz -Saar 52726 65638 74529 4 6 .1 48.8 57*7
Federal
Republic 469510 536537 537433 51*9 5 2 .0 54*0
Sources: GB 72-75? op.cit., p.291°
GB 69-71? 0 0 .cit., p.2 4 6 .
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Table 9 »
Full-time officers and employees of Industrial Union of Chemical, 
Paper and Ceramics Workers 1962-1975•
Position End 1962 End 1965 End 1968 End 1971 End 1975
NEO's 8 8 8 8 8
FTO's in Head Office 42 43 46 48 69
Employees at Head 
Office 54 63 77 86 102
Total Head Office 104 114 131 142 179
Regional Secretaries 9 9 8 8 8
Regional Officers 26 33 34 36 37
Employees at 
Regional Offices 33 37 37 41 42
Total at Regional 
Offices 68 79 79 85 87
District Secretaries 74 73 74 70 67
District Officers 51 64 65 78 85
Employees at 
District Offices 171 176 197 195 218
Total at
District Offices 296 313 336 343 370
Total in 
Organisation 468 506 546 570 636
Sources: GB 63-65? on .cit., p.300.
GB 69-71, op .cit., p.299*
GB 72-75? op .cit., p.343*
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Membership in the Association of Salaried Academic and Senior 
Managerial Staff in the Chemical Industry 1960-1978.
Table 10.
Year Number of Members Index (1960=100)
I960 5430 10 0.0
1961 5905 108.7
1962 6439 1 1 8 .6
1963 7003 12 9 .0
1964 7262 133.7
1965 7775 149*2
1966 8330 153.4
1967(a) 8922 164.3
1968 9357 172.3
1969 10622 195*6
1970 12523 230.6
1971 13906 2 5 6 .1
1972 14359 264.4
1973 15091 2 76 .8
1974 15821 291.4
1975 16294 30 0 .1
1976 16976 3 1 2 .6
1977 17506 322.4
1978 I8000 331.5
Sources: Ii* Ba^ rer, W. Streech, H.E. Treu, 
Dr. Hansel, Director-General VAA
2.2.79*
op.cit., Table VAA 1-1;
, personal communication,
(a) Membership up to 1966 as 
From 1 9 6 7? as on 31.12.
1 on 
of
1 . 4  of each year, 
each year.
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Employers’ Associations in the Chemical Industry - Number of Employees 
covered 1950-1978.
Table 11.
1950 i960 1970 1973 1976 1978
Baden-
Wurttbg 31 258 58 555 83 303 83 984 76 775 77 215
Bayern 30 000 40 600 60 220 60 650 62 727 61 305
Berlin - 13 340 14 067 13 842 14 160 13 585
Bremen 1 359 2 098 1 831 1 498 1 211 1 114
Hamburg 11 607 22 058 24 6'92 22 987 23 498 23 556
Hessen 44 515 72 505 114 636 116 512 113 007 113 461
Nieder­
sachsen 16 876 22 970 34 948 38 371 35 609 37 179
Nordrh-
Westfalen 104 223 174 803 207 642 205 932 190 677 186 445
Rheinland-
Pfalz 38 000 73 300 91 700 94 500 88 100 86 930
Saarland - 2 403 1 599 6 937 6 325 6 694
Schleswig-
Holstein 3 000 6 293 9 698 9 587 9 963 10 417
Westfalen 9 545 30 911 47 519 49 544 49 121 47 529
Total 290 383 519 881 691 855 704 344 671 173 665 430
Source: Zahlen zur Sozialpolitik, 1979? op.cit., p.6.
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Table 12.
Senior Staff in the Chemical Industry 1964 and 1976.
Category 1964Fo
1—1 1976Fo M )7°
1. Total Senior Staff - - 53 713 8.9
2. Senior Managerial 
Staff
- - 24 199 4.0
3 • F on-academi cally 
qualified Senior 
Staff (excluding 
cat.2)
13 743 3.0 (2)22 930v } 3.8
4. Academically qualified:
Staff
Chemists
14 487
6 957
3.1
1° (3)
4 8.O '
23 188 
9 379
3.8 
$ (3)
4 0.5 '"
Engineers 2 620 18.1 4 286 I8 .5
Other Scientists 3 110 21.5 4 529 19.5
Lawyers 318 2.2 493 2.1
Economists and 
Business Studies 1 374 9.5 3 317 14.3
Other disciplines 108 0-7 1 184 5.1
Source: Zahlen zur Sozialpolitik, 1979? op.cit., p.11.
(1) Percentage of all employees.
(2) Includes graduates of Fachhochschulen.
(3) Of total academically qualified.
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Table 13.
Sectoral Development of the West German Chemical Industry.
Sector Percentage of Product Value
1953 1961 1969 1978
Inorganics 1.4 10.9 8.5 7.4
Organics 14*9 14.0 15.1 1 7 .6
Fertilisers 9*3 7.0 4.9 3.5
Plastics 7.1 12.2 13.0 13.2
Fibres 8.3 7.5 9.2 4*4
Paints 5-5 6.1 5.2 4.2
Soaps and 
Detergents 5-7 4 .8 4.7 3.7
Cosmetics 2.4 3.9 4.3 4.7
Pharmaceuticals 9*3 10.1 12.0 15.4
Dyestuffs 2.5 2 .5 3.4 3.2
Others 33.6 21.0 19.7 22.7
Total 100 100 100 100
Sources: W. Munde, op.cit., p*537? own calculations.
VCI, Jahresbericht 1978/79? op.cit., p .16 .
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Prices of Chemical Products compared with Industrial Products in 
general 1969-1978.
Table 14.
Year Industrial
Products
Chemioal Products
All ConsumerProducts
1969 95.3 98.8 97.7 103.3 95.5
1970 100 100 100 100 100
19 7 1 104-3 100.3 102.2 9 6.O 102.7
1972 10 7 .0 100.2 104.1 92.5 1 0 5 .1
1973 114.1 103.3 106.0 102.7 108.3
1974 129.4 12 9 .6 119.5 175.6 116.1
1975 135-5 132.0 137.6 160.1 122.8
1976 140.8 133.5 138.8 159.7 1 2 5 .2
1977 144.5 133.1 142.9 1 5 1 .2 128.3
1978 146.3 131.0 145.7 141.2 130.5
Source: Statistische Jahrbucher, 1979. on .cit., p*473f.
Own calculations. 1978,1974,
1973,
op .cit., 
op .cit •, 
op .cit.,
p.476 
P.439 
p.451
•
•
•
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Dates of Negotiations in the Bargaining Round of 1977 for the 
Chemical Industry.
Table 15*
Baden-VIurtt emberg
1st Negotiation on 23rd May 
2nd Negotiation on 3rd June 
Joint conciliation on 15th June 
3rd Negotiation on 15th June
Bayern
1st Negotiation on 8th June 
Berlin
1st Negotiation on 24th May 
2nd Negotiation on 6th June
Bremen
1st Negotiation on 14th June 
Hamburg
1st Negotiation on 13th May 
2nd Negotiation on 25th May 
Re-opening of Negotiations on 9+h June
Hessen
1st Negotiation on 4th April 
2nd Negotiation on 1 9 th April 
3rd Negotiation on 27th April
Niedersachsen
1st Negotiation on 17th May 
2nd Negotiation on 27th May 
Re-opening of Negotiations on 10th June
Nordrhein
1st Negotiation on 6th April 
2nd Negotiation on 21st April 
Joint conciliation on 10th May 
Continued on 4th June
Adjourned 
Broke down 
Interrupted 
Agreement
Agreement
Adjourned
Agreement
Agreement
Adjourned 
Broke down 
Agreement
Adjourned"
Adjourned
Agreement
Adjourned 
Broke down 
Agreement
Adjourned 
Broke dovm 
Adjourned 
Agreement
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Table 15 Continued 
Rheinland-Pfalz
1st Negotiation on 7th April 
2nd Negotiation on 20th April 
Joint conciliation on 9th May- 
Re-opening of Negotiations on 4th June
Saarland
1st Negotiation on 27th June
Schleswig-Holstein
1st Negotiation on 2 6 th May 
2nd Negotiation on 16th June
Westfalen
1st Negotiation on 10th May 
2nd Negotiation on 16th May 
3rd Negotiation on 26th May 
Re-opening of Negotiations on 7th June
Adjourned 
Broke down 
Broke down 
Agreement
Agreement
Adjourned
Agreement
Adjourned 
Adjourned 
Broke down 
Agreement
Sources: Chemie-Tarifrunde 1977, op .cit«, p.22f.
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Issues which may be decided by a works conciliation committee under 
the compulsory procedure.
Table 16
BetrVG 72 - Section Issue Galled
By
1. Section 37* 6
2. Section 37* 7
3. Section 38. 1
4« Section 39* 1
5* Section 47* 6
6. Section 55* 4 
7* Section 6 5 . 1
8. Section 6 9 .
9* Section 72. 6
10. Section 8 5 . 2
11. Section 8 7 .
12. Section 91*
13* Section 94* 1 & 2
1 4 . Section 95* 1
15. Section 9 8 . 1 & 3 & 6
Attendance of training and M
education courses - works
council
Release of works council M
for education
Release of works council to M
carry out duties
Consultation times of works M/WC
council
Size of Company Council M/WC
Size of Enterprise Council . M/WC
Education for apprentice M
representatives
Consultation time of M/WC
apprentice representative
Magnitude of Company Apprentice M/WC
committee
Settlement of grievances between WC
works council and employers
Codetermination Issues M/WC
Disagreement arising out of M/WC
job changes, working environment
Staff questionnaires, employment M/WC
criteria, personal data - dis­
agreement arising out of these
Guidelines for the selection of M
employees for recruitment, 
transfer, regrading and dis­
missal
Implementation of education tl/WC
sources and selection of 
participants.
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Table 16 Continued
BetrVG 72 - Section Issue Called
By
16. Section 102. 6 Dispute over dismissals if a 
works council agreement 
stipulates consent of works 
council
m/w c
17* Section 109 Information from the economic 
committee
m /w c
18. Section 112. 2 & 3 Reconciliation of interests 
in the case of alterations 
and social compensation plans
m/w c
M = Management
WC = Works Council
After: K. ICoch, Conciliation in West Germany, unpublished paper
presented to Federal Trust for Education and Research Seminar held 
at University of Surrey on 21 April 1978.
Table 17
PROCEDURE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF WORKS CONCILIATION COMMITTEE
Employer or Works Council 
calls for conciliation
Employer/Works Council 
consult over (a) Chairman and 
(b) number of assessors
Agreement non-Agreement
Conciliation 
Committee 
is formed
Positive
result
Voluntary
Agreement
Chairman imposes 
decision
Appeal to Labour Court
Labour Court decides on a) 
competence of conciliation 
committee b) chairman 
c) Number of assessors
Negative Result
Conciliation Committee 
not formed
After: IC. Koch, Conciliation in West Germany, op.cit.
I ro
- 127 -
Appendix 2 Questionnaires.
2.1 Structured Questionnaires (Agrochemie AG)•
.1.1. Industrial Relations Questionnaire.
Guten Tag. Ich heisse David Ebsworth und komme von der 
Universitat Surrey in England. Ich untersuche zur Zeit 
die Arbeitgeber- und Arbeitnehmerverhaltnisse in 
verschiedenen Betrieben der chemischen Industrie. 
Deshalb mochte ich-gem mit Ihnen ein Gesprach fuhren 
und ware Ihnen dankbar, wenn Sie sich zur Mitarbeit 
bereit erklaren. Selbstverst&ndlich wird alles, was 
Sie sagen, vertraulich behandelt. Ihr Name wird nicht 
notiert. Wenn Sie einzelne Fragen aus irgendwelchen 
Grunden nicht beantworten konnen, sagen Sie mir bitte 
Bescheid, auch wenn Sie die Frage aus sprachlichen 
Grunden nicht verstehen. (Hinweis auf englischer 
StaatsangehBrigkeit). In diesem Fall werde ich 
versuchen, die Frage etwas anders zu formulieren.
1. Ich mochte mich zunachst einmal mit Ihnen liber 
Ihre Arbeit unterhalten. Was uben Sie zur Zeit fur 
eine Tatigkeit avis?
Genaue Bezeichnung der Tatigkeit:
2. Mussen Sie bestimmte Vorschriften, Regeln oder 
Richtlinien bei Ihrer Arbeit beachten?
Ja, Unfallverhutung 1
Ja, Betriebsanweisung 2
Ja, Arbeitsordnung 3
Ja, sonstige (welche?)
-----------  4
Nein 5
WN (1) 0
NE X
KA 7
1. WN = Weiss nicht (Don’t know)
LIE = Nicht einzuordnen (Not classifiable) 
KA = Keine Antwort (No answer)
-  1 2 8  -
3. Hat sich die Arbeitsbelastung verandert, seitdem 
Sie an diesem Arbeitsplatz arbeiten?
Ja 1
Nein 2
m  0
NE x
KA y
Wenn ja: wie?
Durch:
Mehr physische Belastung 1
Mehr psychische Belastung 2
Mehr Be lasting wegen Personen 3
Weniger physische Belastung 4
Weniger psychische Belastung 5
Weniger Belastung wegen Personen 6
z.T. mehr, z.T weniger 7
WE x
KA y
4* Werden Sie Ihrer Leitung entsprechend bezahlt?
Ja 1
Nein 2
WN 0
NE x
KA y
5« Was kann Ihre Arbeit hier am meisten erschweren?
Mangelhde Zusammenarbeit mit Mitarbeitem 1
Falsches Vorgesetztenverhalten 2
Fehlende Information der Betriebsfuhrung 3
Arbeitsbedingungen 4
Arbeitssicherheit 5
Arbeitsbelastung 6
Nichts 7
WN 0
NE x
KA y
Was noch? (Ziffer wie oben)
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6. Sind Sie mit Hirer jetzigen Arbeit zufrieden Oder
unzufrieden? 
Sehr zufrieden 1
Eher zufrieden 2
Teils/teils 3
Eher unzufrieden 4
Sehr unzufrieden 5
WN 0
NE X
KA J
Konnen x-rir dieses Urteil ein wenig pr&zisieren. Was 
sind die guten, x*as sind die schlechten Seiten Ihrer 
Arbeit?
Arbeitsinhalt (Qualifiziertbeit, Interessantheit)
Arbeitsbelastxmg
Arbeitssicherheit
Verdienst/Bezahlung
Schichtarbeit
Sonstige arbeits/betriebsunspezifische Grunde 
Pos. - 1, neg. - 2, WF ~ 0, NE - x, EA. - y.
7. Was konnte Ihre Arbeit hier erleiohtern?
Bessere technische Einrichtxmg 1
Bessere technische Ablaufe 2
Bessere Arbeitsorganisation 3
Nichts 4
WN 0
m  x
KA y
8* Arbeiten Sie gern oder ungern Schicht?
Ja 1* * Konnen Sie das etwas
Manchmal 2* naher begrunden?
Fein 3*
Formalschicht 4 
WN 0
FE x
KA y
-  1 3 0  -
9* Man hort immer wieder zwei entgegengesetze Meinungen 
uber die Zukunft der Arbeiter:
1. Die einen sagen: der technische Fortschritt wird 
letztlich zur Folge haben, da.ss es wichtige Unter-
schiede zwischen Arbeitern und Angestellten nicht
mehr gibt•
2. Die anderen sagen: welche VerMnderungen auch 
immer mit dem technischen Fortschritt kommen - die 
Unterschiede zwischen Arbeitern und Angestellten 
bleiben erhalten.
Welcher dieser zwei Meinungen stimmen Sie eher zu? 
Keine mehr 1
Unterschiede bleiben 2 
Keine der Meinungen 3
WN 0
NE x
.KA y
10. Wie geht das uberhaupt vor sich, wenn technische 
Neuerungen hier eingefuhrt werden?
11. Wird der technische Fortschritt Folgen fur Arbeit- 
nehmer haben? Welche?
Arbeitserleichterung 1
Einsparung von Arbeitskrafte 2
Beide 3
Andere------------------------—  4
WN 0
NE x
KA y
12. Gibt es bei Ihnen im Betrieb gewerkschaftliche 
Vertrauensleute?
Ja 1*
Nein, aber BetriebsVL 2*
Nein 3
WN 0
KA y
* TIrfullcn die Vcrtranensleute in Ihrom p-otricb ihre
(2)Auf gabe.
Ja 1
Teils/teils 2**
Hein 3**
vm . 0
KA y
** Was vernaqhlassigen die am ehesten?
13* Uer gibt .Ihrsen Anweisungen?
Vorarbeiter . 1
Ko liege .2
. Ileister . 3
Schiclitmeister 4
Betriebsassi stent 5
Bctriebsleiter 6I
sonstige 
 1; ■ • 8
Hieinand 9 ■
I Hi x
ica y
14. Sollten Hirer Meinung nach die Fordorungen der 
Arbeitnelimer anch heute noch mit Hilfe eines Streaks 
durchgesetst vierden, falls andere Kittel erfolglos 
bleiben?
. Ja * 1*
Teils/teils 2*
Nein 3
WN '• 0
Nr. x
KA y
2® With hindsight an intermediate question was missing 
here. Tt would-have been better to ask first what 
the job of the lay officer was.
-  1 3 2  -
* Sollten Gewerkschaften anch bei politischen Auseinander- 
setzungen ihre Forderungen notfalls mit einem Streik 
durchsetzen?
Ja 1
Teils/teils 2
Nein 3
WN .0
NE / x
KA y
15* Wenn Sie unverschuldet in Not geraten sollten, 
glauben Sie, dass Sie won der Firma Hilfe bek&men?
Ja 1
Vielleicht 2
Nein 3
WN - 0, NE ~ x, KA - y
16. Wer vertritt Ihrer Ansicht nach die Interessen der 
Arbeitnehmer in der Gesellschaft am besten? Sie konnen 
bis zu drei Gruppen herausnehmen (Karten hingeben).
Wenn keine - welche und warum?
Karten s
SPD - 1, CDU/CSU - 2 ,  FDP - 3, NFD - 4, DKP - 5 .
die Unternehmer - 6, der Staat - 7, tiie Gewerkschaften - 8,
lceine dieser Gruppen - 9* WN - 0, KA - y.
17* Wenn wir nun einmal die Gewerkschaften herausgreifen- 
es gibt verschiedene Meinungen fiber ihre Notwendigkeit.
Ich mochte l'hnen gern einige haufig geausserte Meinungen 
nennen und Sie fragen, welcher Sie am ehesten zustimmen.
1. M e  Grundprobleme der Arbeitnehmer sind 
heutzutage vom Staa.t gelost; die Gewerkschaften 
sind deshalb heute nicht mehr notwendig*
3. Nine file index cards each with one of the groups written 
on it were passed to the respondent.
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2. Die Grundprobleme der Arbeitnehmer sind heute 
zwar schon vom Staat gelBst, denno'ch kann as nicht 
schaden, wenn die Arbeitnehmer ihre eigene Vertre- 
tung haben; auch andere Gruppen haben ihre eigene 
Verbande und Organisational
3. Die Gewerkschaften sind noch genauso notwendig 
wie fruher® Wenn die Arbeitnehmer die Gewerk- 
shaften nicht hatten, wfirden die Unternehmer mit 
Ihnen machen, was sie wollen® Es kommt heute vor 
allem darauf an, das Brreichte abzusichem und zu 
schfitzen®
4« Die Gewerkschaften sind heute noch genauso 
notwendig wie frfiher; auch heute ist die wirt- 
schaftliohe und politische Lage der Arbeitnehmer 
unzureichend, nur mit einer starken Gewerkschaft 
kann diese Lage geandert werden®
5° Keine dieser Meinungen
0 WN
y ka
Warum stimmen Sie gerade diese Meinung zu?
18® Man hort auch zwei andere Meinungen fiber die 
Gewerkschaften®
1 © Binige sagen, die Gewerkschaften wissen 
gamicht mehr richtig, worauf es ihren Mitgliedem 
wirklich ankommt; deshalb konnen sie die Inte- 
ressen ihrer Mitglieder nicht mehr richtig vertreten®
2® Andere sagen, die Gewerkschaf'ten wissen sehr 
gut, was die Problem ihrer Mitglieder sind® Sie 
vertreten wirklich die Tnteressen ihrer Mitglieder®
Welcher Meinung neigen Sie am ehesten zu?
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Kennen die Interessen niclit richtig 1*
Vertreten die Interessen 2*
Keine der Meinungen 3*
WN 0
m  . x
KA y
* Konnen Sie mir diese Meinung noch ein wenig erlautem?
19. (a) Worauf kommt es bei einem guten Vorgesetzten 
besonders an?
Gerechtigkeit 1
Fachkonnen 2
Verstandnis, gute Behandlung 3
WN 0
NE x
KA y
(b) Wie sch&tzen Sie Ihren Vorgesetzten ein?
Gut 1
Ether gut 2
Teils/teils 3
Ether sohlecht 4
Schlecht 5
WN 0
NE x
KA y
20. Manche meinen, dass die Gewerkschaften viel mehr fur
die Arbeitnehmer erreichen konnten, wenn sie nur wollten.
Andere sagen: die Gewerkschaften haben ihr Mogliches getan.
Was sie erreichen konnen, haben sie auch erreicht® Welcher 
dieser Meinungen stimmen Sie eher zu?
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Konnten mehr erreichen 1
Teils/teils 2
MBgliches getan 3
Keine dieser Meinungen 4
m  0
NE x
ica y
21. Was sind Ihrer Meinung nach die wichtigsten Aufgaben 
der Gewerkschaften? ICommentars
22* Sollten die Arbeitnehmer ihre Rechte notfalls durch 
Streik verteidigen, wenn ihre Firma dadurch wirtschaftlich 
gesohadet wird?
Ja 1
Manchmal 2
Nein 3
WN 0
NE '' x
KA y
23. Gelegentlich treten einmal Sohwierigkeiten personlicher 
und sachlicher Art auf. An wem wenden Sie sich, wenn 
derartige Probleme vorkommen?
(a) bei personlichen Sohwierigkeiten:
Vorgesetze 1 Vertrauensmann 5
Meister 2 Kollegen 6
Personalabteilung 3 Niemand 7
Betriebsrat 4 x
ICA y
(b) bei sachlichen Schwierigkeiten aus der Arbeit herauss
Vorgesetze 1 Kollegen 5
Meister 2 Niemand 6
Betriebsrat 3 NE x
Vertrauensmann 4 KA y
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24* Auch uber die Stellung und Inter©ssen von Gewerkschafts- 
funlctionaren gibt es mehrere Ansichten: Eine davon ist,
die Funktionare denken heute in erster Linie an ihrer Posten 
und personliche Vorteile und erst in zweiter Linie geht es 
ihnen um die Interessen der Mitglieder.
Eine andere: Man kann gegen die Funktionare sagen, was man
will, in erster Linie geht es ihnen schon darum, die Interessen
der Mitglieder wirkungsvoll zu vertreten.
Welcher Meinung neigen Sie am ehesten zu?
itPersonliche Vorteile • 1
Interessen der Mitglieder 2
Keine der Meinungen 3
WN 0
HE x
KA y
25* Konnen Sie mir aus diesen Kartchen^^die vier Forderungen 
nennen, fur die sich Ihrer Meinung nach die Gewerkschaften 
am stfirksten einsetzen sollen?
Kurzere Arbeitszeit 1
Gerechtere Vermogensbildung 2
Hohere Lohne 3
Ausweitung der Mitbestimmung 4
Sicherung der Demokratie 5
Mehr Urlaub 6
Sicherung der Preisstabilitat 7
Mehr Schutz vor Arbeitslosigkeit 8
Stfirkere Einfluss auf Regierung und Parlament 9 
Mehr Schutz vor betrieblicher Rationalisierung a 
Bessere Altersversorgung b
Bessere Ausbildungsmoglichkeiten c
Herabsetzung des Rentenalters d
WN 0
NE x
ka y
4« 13 Index cards with these categories written on them
were passed to the respondent whilst reading the 
question.
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2 6 . Werden Betriebsvereinbarungen bei Ihnen im Betrieb
ausgehangt?
Ja 1*
Nein 2
WN 0
KA y
* Lesen Sie auch die ausgehangten Vereinbarungen?
Ja, immer 1
Ja, manchmal 2 
Nein 3
WN 0
KA y
27* Wie kommt eine Betriebsvereinbarung zustande? 
Verhandlung zwischen BR und Man. 1
Andere Meinung  —  -----------------------
WN 0
ICA y
2 8 . Wissen Sie welche Aufgaben der Betriebsrat hat?
Gesetze usw. eingehalten (Aufpassen) 1
Massnahmen (Vorteilhaft fur AN) beantragen 2
Vertretung 3
Minderheitenschutz im Betrieb 4
Mitbestimmungsrechte (aligemein) 5
Soziale Mitbestimmung 6
Personelle Mitbestimmung 7
Wirtschaftliche Mitwirkung 8
Betriebsvereinbarungen 9
Arbeitsschutz a
Mitbestimmung bei ICundigung b
Sonstige------------     c
WN 0
m  X
KA y
-  1 3 8  -
29- Haben Sie sich an den Betriebsratswahlen in diesem 
Jahr beteiligt?
Ja 1
Nein* 2
Konnte nicht (Urlaub, krank usw) 3 
M O  KA y
* Warum, nicht?
30® Erfullt der Betriebsrat seine Aufgabe oder vernach- 
lassigt er etwas?
Ja, erfullt Aufgabe 1
Teils/teils 2*
Nein, vemachla’ssigt Aufgabe 3*
WN 0
NE x
KA y
* Welche Aufgabe vernachlassigt er am ehesten?
Warum?
31® Gibt es bei Ihnen im Betrieb Betriebsversammlungen?
Ja 1*
Nein 2
WN 0
KA y
* Wie oft?
Alle o-l Monat 1
Alle 2-3 Monate 2
Alle 4-6 Monate . 3
Alle 7-12 Monate 4
Gelegentlich 5
WN 0
NE x
KA y
* Gehen Sie auoh dahin?
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Ja, immer 1**
Manchmal 2**
Niemals 3**
KA y
** Warum?
32. Gibt es im Betrieb ein oder mehrere Betriebsratsmit- 
glieder, die von ihrer ursprunglichen Tatigkeit wegen ihres 
A'mts freigestellt sind?
Ja 1*
Nein 2
WN 0
KA y
* Meinen Sie dass so etwas gut ist? oder nicht?
Gut 1
Vor- und Nachteile 2'**
Nicht gut 3**
WN 0
KA. y
** Konnen Sie das etwas naher begrunden?
33. Haben Sie den Findruck, dass der Betriebsrat die Interesse 
der Belegschaft gegenuber der Geschaftsleitung hart genug 
vertritt, oder ist das nicht der Fall?
Ja 1
Teils/teils 2
Nein 3
WN 0
NE x
KA y
34° Glauben Sie, dass der Betriebsrat genugend Rechte hat, 
um sich voll fur die Interessen der Belegschaft einzusetzen, 
oder ist das nicht der Fall?
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34* (Contd)
Ja 1 Hat zuviele Rechte 4
Teils/teils 2* Hat genugend Rechte, nutzt
Nein 3* sie aber nicht 5
m  0 ME x, KA y
II* An welche zusatzliche Rechte denken Sie dabei?
35• Mil wievielen Kollegen haben Sie bei der Arbeit am
meisten zn tun?
Keine
Mit einem 2
Mit mehreren 3
Wechselt 4
me x
KA y
36. Gibt es in Ihrem Betrieb bestimmte Binge, die
Geschaftsleitung nicht ohne die Zustimmung des Betriebsrats
durchfuhren darf?
Was?
Sinstellung 1
Versetzung 2
Kundigung 3
soziale Mitbestimmung 4
Ein/Umgruppierung 5
Sonstige ----- — --- —— — ----- 6
WN 0
NE X
KA y
5. The coding system on this question was found to be
relatively ineffective since work groups were rather
larger than expected® A coding system of the type:
0, 1, 2-5? 6-10, 10+
would have been better*
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37* Mann kann den Betrieb, in dem man arbeitet, nach 
verschiedenen Eigenschaften beurteilen. Ich habe hier eine 
Liste von solchen Sigenschaften, die ich gleich vorlesen 
werde. Sagen Sie mir bitte, ob Sie diese Eigenschaften ihres 
Betriebes als sehr positiv, eher positiv, weder pos. noch 
negativ, eher negativ oder sehr negativ beurteilen.
(Liste vorlesen)
Unfallschutz
Sozialleistungen
S'icherheit vor Arbeitslosigkeit
Verhalten der Vorgesetzten
Bezahlung
Auf stiegsmoglichkeiten 
Verhalten der Kollegen
Sehr Pos* Eher Pos. Teils/teils Eher Neg. Sehr Neg.
1 2 3
I<A y.
4 5
WN 0, NE x,
38. Was verstehen Sie unter Mitbestimmung?
Arbeitsplatzbezogen 
Betriebsbezogen 
Unternehmensbezogen 
Gesamtwirtschaftsbezogen
2
3
4 
0
1
WN
NE
KA
Sicherung fur Lebensrisiken 
Gesundheitsfur- und vorsorge 
Bildungshilfen
1
2
3
SlL* Chapter 1 above for the problems which this term 
caused.
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Finanzhilfen 4
Betriebliche Zusatzzahlungen 5
Sonstige  ----------------6
WN 0
NE x
KA y
Keine 7
j 39 • (Contd)
40. Welche F.i gens chaf ten sollte Ihrer Meinung nach eine 
gute Firmenleitung haben?
Wirtschaftliche Leistung 1
Soziale Betriebsfuhrung 2
‘Technische Arbeitsorganisation 3 
Sonstige 4
WN 0
NE x
KA y
41* Was sollten mit den betrieblichen Sozialleistungen 
uberhaupt passieren?
Nichts 1
Ausbauen 2
Umbauen (tariflich absichem) 3 
Abbauen 4
WN 0
NE x
KA y
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fn \
Zum Schluss mochte ich Sie noch um einige startistische 
Angaben bitten. Ihr Name wird grunds&tzlich nicht 
notiert•
1 . Alter?
2*1*2. Statistical Questionnaire '(Personal History)
1 bis 18 Jahre
2 19-20 Jahre
3 21-25 Jahre
4 26-30 Jahre
5 31-35 Jahre
6 36-40 Jahre
7 41-45 Jahre
8 46-50 Jahre
9 51-55 Jahre
10 56—60 Jahre
1 1 61 und alter
2. Familienstand?
1 Ledig
2 Verheiratet
3 Verwitwet
4 Geschieden
J KA
3. Haben Sie Kinder?
1 Kein Kind
2 Ein Kind
3 Zi'Jei Kinder
4 Drei Kinder und mehr 
y KA
7. It was discovered towards the end of the study art Agro­
chemie AG that certain of these questions, particularly 
those on parentage and schooling, had caused a signifi­
cant amount of consternation amongst members cf the 
workforce. The rea„son for this was failure to see the 
relevance of these questions and it led to a couple of 
refusals.
Welchen Beruf ubt oder ubte I hr Vater aus?
1 Facharbeiter, nichtselbstandiger Handwerker
2 Angelernte Arbeiter
3 Hilfsarbeiter
4 Leitende Angestelite
5 Industriemeister
6 Nicht-leitende Angestelite
7 Finfache Beamte
8 Mittlere und gehobene Beamte
9 Hohere Beamte
a Selbstandige im Handel und Gewerbe
b Landwirte
c Freie Berufe
d Berufssoldaten
e Sonstiges
0 WN
J KA
Nelche S'chulbildung haben Sie?
1 Sonderschule
2 Volksschule
3 Mittelschule/Oberschule ohne mittlere Reife
4 Mittlere Reife
5 Oberschule mit mittlere Reife
6 Abitur
y ka
Wie war eigentlich Ihre Berufsausbildung?
1 Abgeschlossene Lehre als
2 Chemiefaoharbeiter
3 Andere Facharbeiterausbildung
4 Lehre abgebrochen
5 Keine Lehre
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7. Nach welcher Lohnform werden Sie bezahlt?
1 Einzelakkord
2 Gruppenakkord
3 Stundenlohn
4 Grundlohn mit Pramie
5 Monatslohn
6 Monatsgehalt
7 Monatsgehalt mit Pramie
8 Andere Entlohnungsformen
y KA
8. Wie hoch 1st Ihr durchschnittlicher monatlicher
Netto-Verdienst?
1 Unter 1000
2 1000-1199
3 1200-1399
4 1400-1599
5 1600-1799
6 1800-1999
7 2000-2199
8 2200-2399
9 uber 2400
y KA
9« Wieviel davon haben Sie ungefahr durch Uberstunden 
verdient? tt1 Keine Uberstunden
2 Lis 55?
3 5 - 1055
4 Mehr als 10$
y ka
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10. Seit wann sind Sie in diesem Vferk beschaftigt?
1 Bis 3 Monate
2 Bis 6 Monate
3 Bis 9 Monate
4 Bis 1 J alar
5 Bis 2 Jahre
6 Bis 5 Jahre
7 Bis 10 Jahre
8 Bis 1 5  Jahre
9 Mehr als 15 Jahre
y KA
11. Arbeiten Sie zur Zeit in Wechselschicht?
1 Ja
2 Nein
3 Nein, 2-Schicht 
y ka
12. Sind Sie gewerkschaftlich organisiert?
1 Ja +
2 Nein* 
y KA
* Waren Sie gewerkschaftlich organisiert?
1 Ja
2 Nein 
y KA
+ 13. Haben Sie ein gewerkschaftliche Funktion inne?
1 Ja*
2 Nein 
y KA
* Welche Funktion?
1 Vertrauensraann
2 Betriebsrat
3 Sonstiges 
y ICA
Ich danke Ihnen selir fur Ihre Mitarbeit
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NUR FUR INTERVIEWER
A. Ort des Interviews
B . Datum
C. Dauer(min)
D. Bei dem Interview war ich mit dem Befragten:
1 Allein
2 Nicht allein, andere xtfaren ansesend
E. Der Befragte folgte dem Interview
1 mit grossen Interesse
2 mit Interesse
3 weder interessiert noch gleichgultig
4 gleichgultig
5 ungeduldig, wollte abbrechen
F. Besondere Schwierigkeiten?
1 Keine
2 Bei:
3 Sprachlich
G. Werk?
-  1 4 8  -
2.2. Guidelines for Informal Focused Interviews (Germany)
2.2.1. Works an^ Officers (Agrochemie AG).
1. Job in works.
2. Main industrial relations problems in chemical industry/works.
3* Influence of technology on industrial relations.
4* Influence of workforce structure and workplace organisation
on industrial relations.
5* Personal history of respondent - background on offices held.
6. Structure of works council.
7. Structure of lay officers’ group#
8. Elections to works council/lay officer posts.
9. Role of various committees, people of importance in organisations.
10. Role of works council.
11. Role of lay officers.
12. Time required for tasks.
13. Facilities available for works councillors/lay officers.
14* Hindrances to fulfilment of tasks.
15* Information available.
16. Influence of grievance handling.
17. Involvement in vrorks council agreement negotiations.
18. Frequency of contact between works councillors and lay officers.
Relationships between these groups.
1 9 . Domestic bargaining.
20. Mechanisms for solution of industrial conflict.
21. Role of conciliation committee.
22. Wage negotiations in the vrorks.
23. Contacts vrith management.
24* Degree of trade union organisation.
2 5 . Influence of workplace organisation on social contact during
working hours and on the fulfilment of various representative 
roles.
26. Passing of information on to the workforce.
27* Willingness to strike - personal and general.
28. Company wage structure.
29* Attendance at education courses.
30. Contacts vrith trade union district and full-time officers in
general.
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31. Power groups within trade union.
32. Works Constitution Act 1972 and its fulfilment.
33. Importance of legislation in industrial relations.
34* Foremen - role, trade union organisation and attitudes.
35* Radical groups and the trade union.
36. Disciplinary procedures.
37- Shift work.
38. Any other points.
(8)39. Statistical questions.
2_.2_.2. Management (Agrochemie AG)
1. Job in works.
2. Main industrial relations problems in chemical industry/works.
3. Influence of technology on industrial relations.
4 . Influence of workforce structure and workplace organisation on 
industrial relations.
5 . Grievance solution and complaints procedure.
6. Education courses (especially industrial relations) attended.
7* Contacts with works councillors and lay officers. Relation­
ships with these groups.
8. Contacts with full-time trade union officers.
9* Role of the personnel department.
10. Disputes and willingness of the workforce to strike.-.
11. Management hierarchy and decision powers•
12. Senior managerial staff - representative councils.
13. VAA.
14. Foremen: role, attitudes and training.
15. Shift work.
16. Contacts with the workforce.
17. Problem solution - personal and work problems.
18. Absenteeism.
1 9 . Safety and Accidents.
20. Co-determination.
21. Works Constitution Act 1972.
8. As in Section 2.1.2.
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22.
23.
24.
25*
2 .2.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9-
10.
11.
12.
13.
14-
15.
16.
17.
18. 
19* 
20.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
Role of legislation in industrial relations.
Co-determination Act 1976.
Appeal to Federal Constitutional Court about Co-determination 
Aot 1976.
(9)Statistical questions.
3. Initial^trade union interviews.
Main problems in chemical industry industrial relations/10)
Influence of technology on industrial relations.
Influence of high percentage white collar staff in the 
chemical industry on industrial relations.
Influence of shift work - particularly on trade union work. 
(Types of shift work).
Chemioal industry strike 1971*
(ll)Collective bargaining round 1977*
Works council elections.
Lay officers elections.
Plant representatives - definition and role.
Co-operation with BAG.
Collective bargaining committees: composition, elections,
types, numbers, size, form of negotiations. (12)
Employers1 associations in the chemical industry.
Internal relations in the union.
Industrial representation within the union.
Collective bargaining at works/company level. J
Relations and contacts with DGB.
Internal union democracy.
Works Constitution Aot 1972.
Co-determination Act 1976.
Changes in the role of supervisory boards.
Ibid.
Unless otherwise specified these questions refer to the chemical 
industry.
Later a specific questionnaire guideline was developed on this 
subject, see Section 2.2.14*
Betailed question guidelines were also developed to deal with 
this subject, see Section 2.2.13*
Betriebsnahe Tarifpolitik, c «f. E. Schmidt, 1972, op .cit ♦, 
p.221ff, ~ ' ' ' "
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21. Influence of the new "labour director".
22. Relations with management.
2.2_.4* Guideline for Members of_Union_Execut i ve Committee.
1. Personal history, background in union,.
2. Main problems of industrial relation in the chemical industry.
3. Influence of technology on industrial relations.
4. Primary trade union tasks at present time.
5* Influence of high percentage of white collar staff on industrial
relations in the chemical industry. (Academic staff).
6. Questions on conciliation and arbitration. (14)
7* Role of the national executive committee.
8. Position of lay officials on the executive committee.
9* Frequency of meetings - committee structure.
10. Lay officers, particularly position in union and rights.
11. Contacts with managers.
12. Strikes and disputes.
13. Appeal to Federal Constitutional Court on Co-determination
Act 1 9 7 6 .
14. Co-determination Act 1976.
15. Internal union democracy.
16. Collective bargaining round 1977*
17* National Conferences.
1 8 . Relations and contacts with DGB.
19* International trade union contacts.
20 o Konzertierte Aktion.
21. Works Constitution Act 1972.
22. Press in industrial relations in general.
2*2^5 . Guideline for Regional Secretaries and Regional Officers.
1. Personal history - background in union.
2. Main problems in chemical industry labour relations.
3. Influence of technology on industrial relations.
4. Main trade union tasks at the present time.
14* As in Sections 2.2.15 and 16 below.
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5• Influence of the high percentage of white-collar staff on
industrial relations. (Academic staff).
6. Position and role of the region within the union organisation. 
Number of full-time officials and other employees. Committee 
structure• (Minority interests).
7. Personal tasks, and breakdown of work load.
8. Collective bargaining committees: numbers, tasks, election,
size.
9. Details of process of negotiation*
10. Employers* associations in chemicals.
11. Relationship with DAG - particularly for bargaining.
12. Disputes.
13* Contacts with management.
14. Contacts and relationships with various groups within union,
e.g. lay officers, etc.
15* Co-operation with other regions within union.
16. Inter-union (DGB) contacts.
17. Regional conferences: frequency, form, decision making power,
delegate system, internal democracy.
18. Works Constitution Act 1972.
1 9 . Co-determination Act 1976 and Appeal to Federal Constitutional 
Court•
20. Changes in the role of the supervisory board.
21. Role of the new "labour director".
22. Influence of legislation in general on industrial relations.
23* Press in industrial relations.
24* Third party intervention - influence of government/state bodies
on industrial relations.
25. Konzertierte Aktion.
2_.2j*6. Guideline for District Secretaries and District Officers.
1. Personal history - background in union.
2. Main labooir relations problems in the chemical industry.
3. Influence of technology on industrial relations.
4 . Influence of workplace organisation on industrial relations.
5 . Main trade union tasks at present time.
6. Influence of high percentage of white-collar staff on industrial 
relations. (Academic staff).
7. District structure and role within union organisation: size,
area, industries covered, number of full-time officers, role 
and fulfilment.
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8. Role of district committee.
9- Influence of major companies on district policy.
10. District conferences and meetings: frequency, attendance,
decision making powers.
11. Education courses run.
12. Dues.
13. Lay officers and their committees: elections.
1 4 . Plant representatives.
15* Influence of size of company on industrial relations.
16. Differences in relations in the largest companies.
17. Degree of organisation.
18. Works councillors: role, election, position in union.
19* Co-operation with other union bodies*
20. Influence of shift work on industrial relations*
21. Works Constitution Act 1972.
22. Co-determination Act 1976 and Appeal to Federal Constitutional 
Court•
23. Changes in the role of the supervisory board.
24* Role of the new "labour director".
2 5 . Role of the press in industrial relations.
2 6 . Public relations work by the union.
27 * IConzertierte Aktion.
28, Influence of legislation in general on industrial relations.
2 9 . Third party intervention - influence of government/state bodies
in industrial relations.
2.2.7* Guideline for Works Councillors (background interviews 
on""workplace industrial relationsj *""" ~
1. Personal history - background in union/office.
2. Main labour relations problems in chemical industry/this works.
3* Influence of technology on industrial relations.
4* Main trade union tasks at present time.
5* Influence of high percentage of white-collar staff on industrial 
relations. (Academic staff).
6. Relationships with management.
7. Most important levels of management for industrial relations, 
especially in domestic negotiations.
8. Management hierarchy - influence of various levels.
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10. Importance of membership in employers’ association to 
company.
11. Conciliation committee - grievance solution.
12. Relationship of works council to uniono
13. Relationships between.works councillors and lay officers/ 
plant representatives.
14* Contacts with the district office and regional office of 
the union.
15. Contacts with other union bodies.
16. Co-operation with works councillors in other companies.
17. Relationships and contacts between full-time works 
councillors and the workforce.
18. Works assemblies: frequency, form, importance.
19. Influence of shift work on industrial relations.
20. Internal union democracy.
21. Works council: structure, size, union membership, relations
between groups, representatives for minority groups.
22. Works council committees: number, structure, function.
23* Economics committee.
2 4 . Main tasks of the works council - time spent on various 
activities.
2 5 . Works council agreements: negotiations, content, importance.
26. Works council agreements on pay - importance.
27• Collective bargaining at company/works level.
28. Works council meetings.
29* Relationship between works council and union collective
bargaining committees.
30. Works Constitution Act 1972.
31. Co-determination Act 1976 - Appeal to Federal Constitutional
Court.
32. Changes in the role of the supervisory board.
33. Role of the new "labour director".
34* Influence of legislation in general on industrial relations.
35. Works council elections: selection of candidates, number of"
lists, type of elections, turnover, turnout.
36. Influence of press in industrial relations.
37. Importance of union public relations work.
38. Third party intervention - influence of government/state 
bodies in industrial relations.
9. Contacts with, representatives of employers’ associations.
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2.2.8. Guideline for interviews with representatives of 
))Sr b e 11 s r in g_Ch e mi e T "
1. Personal history - background in industrial relations work.
2. Main labour relations problems in chemical industry.
3. Influence of technology on industrial relations.
4. Influence of high percentage of white-collar staff on in­
dustrial relations. (Academic staff).
5* Employers1 associations in chemicals: structure, number, 
degree of organisation, function.
6. Function of internal committees: executive, meetings of 
members, co-ordination, etc.
7* Main tasks of employers* associations.
8. Personal tasks of respondent.
9* Influence of central organisation in collective bargaining.
10. Co-ordination of bargaining.
11. Collective bargaining system.
12. Collective bargaining at company/works level.
13. National xmge bargaining.
14. Contacts with the EDA.
15. Relationship between Arbeitsring and member associations.
16. Contacts between Arbeitsring and companies which belong to 
member associations.
17. Companies which are not members of employers* associations.
1 8 . Relations with management and senior managerial staff.
19. Relationship with VAA.
20. Co-operation with VCI.
•t—1C\J Contact with DGB/DAG central organisations.
22. Relationships with Chemical Workers* Union and contact at 
vari ous 1eveIs.
23. Third party intervention - influence of government/state 
bodies on industrial relations..
24. Konzertierte Aktion.
25. Public relations and publicity by chemical employers’ 
associations•
26. Influence of press in industrial relations.
27. Education courses run by employers’ associations.
2 8 . Works Constitution Act 1972.
29. Co-determination Act 1976 and Appeal to Federal Constitutional 
Court•
30. Changes in the role of the supervisory board.
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31. Role of the new "labour director".
32. Influence of legislation in general on industrial relations.
33. Conciliation and Arbitration.
2_.2_.9, Guideline for interview with representatives from
regional employers* associations.
1. Personal history - background in industrial relations.
2. Main labour relations problems in the chemical industry.
3. Influence of technology on industrial relations.
4* Influence of the high percentage of white-collar staff on 
industrial relations. (Academic staff).
5* Employers' associations in chemicals.
6. Regional employers* association: structure, number of 
employees, committees, degree of organisation.
7. Structure and function of Arbeitsring.
8. Meeting of member companies.
9* Standing committee of members.
10. Job of regional employers* association.
11. Personal tasks of respondents.
12. Collective bargaining system: initial discussions, typical 
negotiations, co-ordination.
13. Collective bargaining at company/works level.
1 4 . National wage bargaining.
15. Contacts with BDA and sub-organisation.
16. Contacts with member companies.
17. Contacts with non-member companies.
•
coi-i Relationships and contact with management, especially senior 
managerial staff.
19* VAA.
20. DGB - contacts (direct and sub-organisations).
21. Works Constitution Aot 1972.
22. Co-determination Act 1976 and Appeal to Federal Constitxitional 
Court.
23. Changes in the role of the supervisory board.
24. Role of the new "labour director".
25. Influence of legislation in general on industrial relations.
26, Press in industrial relations and public relations work of 
the employers' associations.
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28. Third party intervention - influence of government state 
bodies on industrial relations.
29• Konzertierte Aktion.
27* Education work of employers’ associations.
2.2.10. Guideline for company management (background interviews 
on_workpIace industrial relations and”case study
1. Personal history - position in company (Company structure too).
2. Production system: overview, processes, general characteristics, 
raw materials, products, workforce structure, shift system, 
maintenance•
3. Case studies.
4* Main labour relations problems in the chemical industry.
5. Influence of technology on industrial relations.
6. Influence of workplace organisation on industrial relations.
7. Influence of high percentage of white-collar staff on industrial
relations. (Academic staff).
8. Personnel department - structure and function.
9* Relations with the works council - joint committees.
10. Resolution of industrial conflict within the company.
11. Conciliation committees.
12. Role of the works council.
13. Domestic bargaining, including wage matters.
14* Payments structure.
15. Elections of representative bodies.
16. Contacts and relations with full-time union officials.
17. Role of lay officers/plant representatives.
18. Management hierarchy.
19. Senior managerial staff, and representative committees.
20. Management training.
21. Foremen and supervisors.
22. VAA.
23. Welfare benefits.
2 4 . Shift work.
25- Disputes.
26. Absentee rates.
27* Safety.
-  158 -
2 8 . Arbeitsring Chemie.
29. Works Constitution Act 1972.
30. Co-determination Act 1976 and appeal to Federal Constitutional 
Court.
31. Changes in the role of the supervisory board.
32. Role of new "labour director".
33. Company public relations work and industrial relations.
34* Training schemes.
2.2.11. Guideline for interview_with DGB officials/19)
1. Personal background.
2. Main union tasks at present time.
3. Influence of technology on industrial relations.
4 . Trade unions in the public image. The role of the press in
industrial relations.
5* Third party intervention - influence of government state 
bodies on industrial relations.
6. Konzertierte Aktion.
7. Research on labour relations at German universities.
8. DAG.
9 . Links between DGB and individual member xinions.
10. Structure of DGB.
11. Finances of the DGB.
12. Minority union confederations (CGB, VAA, etc.)
13. EDI.
14. EDA contacts, relationships.
15. Individual employers’ associations.
16. Co-determination: effect, role, definition and development.
17. Montan co-determination.
18. Problems with Montan, co-determination: lack of competence, 
alienation, payment, selection, duality of role.
1 9 . Works Constitution: developments since World War.
20. Problems with the implementation of the Works Constitution 
Acts: co-operation, peace obligation, career officials, 
alienation, conflict between works councillors and lay 
officials.
1 5 . A number of interviews were held to gain background information 
on general industrial relations matters.
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21. Number of plants without a works council.
22. Co-determination Act 1976 and Appeal to the Federal 
Constitutional Court..
23* Role of trade union members of the supervisory board.
24* Role of the new "labour director" as compared with tha,t in
the Montan industries.
2 5 . Attitudes about co-determination amongst various political 
parties and sections of society.
26. Role of the Hans-Bockler-Stiftung/ 1®)
2 7 . Union publications: public relations work of the unions.
2.2.12. Guideline for interviews with DAG officials.
1. Personal background.
2. Main labour relations problems in the chemical industry.
3. Influence of technology on industrial relations.
4. Influence of the high percentage of white-collar staff on
industrial relations. (Academic staff).
5 . Main trade union tasks at the present time.
6. Relations with BGB.
7. Relations with individual BGB unions, especially Chemical
Workers 1. Union •
8. Relations with VAA.
9. Structure of BAG.
10. Industrial representation within BAG.
11. Lay officials/plant representatives.
12. Membership in the chemical industry.
13. Influence of large companies on industrial relations and 
differences between the companies.
14. BDA and Arbeitsring Chemie: relations, contacts, negotiations
15. Third party intervention - influence of government/state bodie 
on industrial relations.
16. The press and industrial relations.
17• Konzertierte Aktion.
18. Conferences in the DAG.
16. A trade union education foundation formed from the Stiftung 
Mitbestimmung and the Hans-Bockler-Gesellschaft in 1977, 
cf. Stiftung Mitbestimmung,. Jahresbericht 1. Januar bis 31. 
Dezember 1976, Dusseldorf^ p.26 and H.O. Vetter, "Ziele und 
Aufgaben der neuen Hans-Bockler-Stiftung," Mitbestimmungs- 
gesprach, 5/6 1977? P»79ff.
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1 9  • Disputes.
20. Dues and benefits.
21. Works Constitution Act 1972.
22. Co-determination Act 1976 and Appeal to the Federal 
Constitutional Court.
23. DAG supervisory board members.
24. Role of the new "labour director".
2 5 . Influence of legislation in general on industrial relations. 
2_.2.13. Guideline for detailed interviews_on collective bargaining. ^ 11
1. Aims of collective bargaining.
2. Initial contacts: what, when, where, frequency, who, aim.
3. Regulation of formal matters, e.g. time and place of negotiations, 
seating plan, chairmanship.
4 . Influence of these factors.
5- Preparation of collective bargaining committees for negotiations.
6. Decisions on tactical procedures during negotiations.
7* First negotiation - form, etc.
8. How is pressure applied on other side, and by the other side.
9 . Second meeting and further meetings.
10. Climate of negotiations.
11. Relations between actual bargainers and full committees.
12. Method of dealing with points.
13. Concessions - how they are made and achieved.
14* Influence of differences of attitudes within the committee
on the negotiations.
1 5 * A "mock-battle"?
16. Sanctions and their use during negotiations.
17. Influence of external factors (agreements in other industries,
etc.) on negotiations in the chemical industry.
18. Independent regional negotiations?
19. Independent industrial negotiations?
20. Co-ordination of bargaining.
21. Influence of the length of the negotiations.
22. Use of small bargaining committees.
17. Used basically to fill in gaps in knowledge at a later stage, 
(third visit).
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2_.2_.14« Guideline on Collective Bargaining Round 1977?
especially_in_Rheinland-Pfalz.
1. Evaluation with hindsight.
2. Lessons learnt.
3. Willingness to strike and accuracy of strike ballots.
4* Evaluation of employers* offer.
5* Delays in carrying out ballot and calling the members out.
6. Preparations made by employers’ associations and companies 
in case of a strike.
7. Works council rights in a strike.
8. Apprentices’ rights in a strike.
9* Influence of central organisations in regional negotiations.
10. Role of politicians as mediators.
11. Final agreement and satisfaction with it.
12. General attitudes towards strike in Germany.
13. Failure to call out members.
14. Strike in large ohemical works.
15. Support for action in the union in general for actions of 
the Rheinland-Pfalz region.
16. Costs of strike preparations on both sides.
17. Membership loss due to dissatisfaction with results.
2.2.15* Guideline on joint conciliation (Schlichtung).
1. Development of joint conciliation agreements.
2. Reasons for recent revision of agreement.
3. Effects on revisions in agreement.
4 . Sufficiency of joint conciliation agreements.
5 . Creation of informal rules.
6. Need for written guidelines.
7. Possible changes in guidelines.
8. Place the conciliation occurs.
9 . Role of collective bargaining committees in the conciliation 
proceedings.
10. Chairman of meeting.
11. Confidentiality of conciliation proceedings.
12. Information on case received prior to formal proceedings.
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13• Composition of joint conciliation boards.
14. Putting the case to the board.
15. Use of expert "witnesses".
16. Minutes.
17. Climate of proceedings.
18. Informal means of gaining agreement.
1 9 . Role of representatives of parties to the dispute.
20. Spokesmen for various sides.
21. Means of reaching agreement.
22. Publication of the decision.
23. Role of joint conciliation in the collective bargaining system.
24* Importance of joint conciliation.
2 5* Tactical use of oonoiliation in collective bargaining.
26. Conciliation and irresponsibility in bargaining.
27* Influence of external economic factors on the results of 
conciliation•
28. Future importance of joint conciliation.
29* Relations between representatives of the parties to the
dispute and their bargaining committees.
30. Co-ordination of conciliation by national bodies, and between 
regions•
31. Reasons for lack of neutral chairman.
32. Influence of the state on conciliation.
33. "Requirement" for arbitration/conciliation•
34- Cooling-off period.
35. Proposals for an agreement.
36. Voting.
37* Length of conciliation proceedings.
38. Differences in conciliation on national and regional issues.
39* The success of joint conciliation.
40. Role of political mediation.
4 1 . Background of respondent: age, training, sex, position, 
experience as arbitrator/party representative, payment, 
means of appointment.
2.2.16. Guideline on_works conciliation committees (Einigungsstellen) .
1. Frequency of vrorks conciliation committees.
2. The subjects of vrorks conciliation cases.
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3* The presence of trade union/employers’ association at works 
conciliation committees.
4 . Costs.
5 . Change in practise from BetrVG 1952 to BetrVG 1972.
6. Chairmen.
7. Assessors.
8. Witnesses and reports.
9 . Achieving agreement.
10. Challenging decisions.
11. Other methods of industrial conflict resolution.
12. Minutes.
13. Influence of size of works.
14. Informal system of negotiations.
15. Works conciliation committee for electoral reasons.
16. Works council agreements about conciliation committees.
17. Negotiations prior to works conciliation committee*
18. Background of respondent: age, training, position, experience
with conciliation cases®
2.3. Guidelines for Informal Focused Interviews (UK).
2.3.1. Questionnaire on pi ant/manning description/18^
1. Name of plant.
2. Name of process.
3. Annual capacity and level of employment of capacity.
4 . Degree of automation - low/semi/fully.
5 . Type of process, i.e. continuous, batch, etc.
6. How often does the plant require a shut down for maintenance 
or cleaning?
7 . Raw materials -
a. Amount of each.
b. Origins.
c. Method of transportation to works.
d. Method of introduction to plant.
8. Process description, including details of reactions, and 
breakdown of important sub-units of plant.
18. As used in exploration of the possibility of case studies, in 
the form finally developed to send by post to one company who 
wished to clarify matters this way. In substance it is very 
similar to the guideline used for the informal interviews•
-  164 -
9. Use of products - sold/processed further within the company.
10. Total workforce?
lie Number of shifts?
12. What is the shift system?
13. What does one shift consist of? (Process workers, maintenance
workers, management, and others - please specify - and what
are their duties, including part of plant operated.)
14. What are the normal gradings of these workers, with an ex­
planation of the gradings please?
15. How many of the following are employed outside the shift system, 
and what are their jobs?
a. Process workers.
b. Maintenance workers.
c. Supervisors and foremen, 
dq Managers•
e. Others, please specify.
16. How is production control carried out?
17. Is there an external maintenance department available on call?
18. Bo you operate a reserve to replace people absent from shift
work due to holiday, sickness, or absenteeism?
19. How are the employees paid?
a. PBR - no.
b. time work - no.
c. salaried staff - no.
20. What is the average breakdown of wages for a shift process
worker between the following (where applicable)?
ct • National agreed rate %
b. Local agreed rate %
c • Overtime payments (where agreed?) at/“
d • Productivity payments (ditto) %
e. Other payments (Please specify 
together with where agreed) %
2.3.2. Guideline for Lay Trade Union Officers (19)«
1. Function/position in works.
2. Other union offices held.
19 . As used p rim arily  a t Growmore Ltd .
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3. Specific labour relations problems in the chemical industry/ 
this works.
4 . Influence of technology on industrial relations in 
chemical industry/this vrorks.
the
5° Influence of the workforce structure on industrial relations•
6 • Influence of the size of work groups on industrial relations.
7* Time in present office .
8. Previous background.
9- Qualifications necessary for present office.
10. Main features of function.
11. Influence of local factors on industrial relations • (Specify)
12. Contacts with management in representative function.
13. Management - importance in industrial relations policy and 
practice•
14. Relations with management.
15- Foremen.
16. Development of'trade unionism in works.
17- Changes in the role of lay officers.
1 8 . Local union structure•
19- Union density.
20. Full-time union offioers in local industrial relations.
21. Co-operation between unions.
22. Facilities provided by management.
23. Election of officers.
24. Shop stewards: role, fulfilment.
25- Growth of white-collar unionism.
•\oCM Recognition problems.
27. Dues and benefits.
2 8 . Branch meetings - role of the branch.
29. Local negotiations:  frequency, length, form.
30. Disputes procedure.
31. Recent disputes. (Examples).
32. Most effective type of sanction.
33. Influence of chemical process technology on speed 
industrial action.
of
34. Inter-union disputes.
35- Union - management committees.
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36. Custom and practice.
37* Informal relations.
38. Fringe/welfare benefits.
39* Influence of nature of work on industrial relations.
40. Shift work.
41. Safety.
42. Industrial democracy.
43* Union education facilities.
44. ACAS.
2_* 3_* 3 • Guide line for company management /  20)
1. Position.
2. Specific labour relations problems in the chemical industry/ 
this works.
3* Influence of technology on industrial relations in the
chemical industry/this works.
4* Influence of workforce structure on industrial relations.
5* Influence of the size of work groups on industrial relations.
6. Length of time in post.
7* Background prior to appointment.
8. Qualifications required for t'his post.
9. Main features of job.
10. Influence of looal factors on industrial relations. (Specify)
11. Absentee rates.
12. Management hierarchy in own sphere of responsibility. Roles 
of various levels.
13. Overall company management structure.
14* Foremen: role, industrial relations functions, qualifications.
15. Changes in management role.
16. Role of personnel/industrial relation managers.
17. Contacts with employee representatives.
18. Relationships with various unions and representatives.
19. Trade union membership for senior staff.
20. Rapid growth of white-collar unionism.
20. Either specialist (industrial relations/personnel) or line 
managers.
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21. Union-management committees.
22. Informal relations.
23. Custom and practice.
24. Facilities for trade union officers.
25- Local negotiations; form, subject, frequency, length*
26. Disputes procedure.
27. Recent disputes. (Examples).
28. Most effective types of sanction in the chemical industry
29. Influence of chemical process technology on speed of 
industrial action.
30. Inter-union disputes.
31. CIA in local relations*
32. Industrial democracy.
33. Safety.
34* Fringe/welfare benefits.
35* Influence of nature of work on industrial relations.
36. Shift work.
37. ACAS.
2.3 *4. Guideline for interview with representative of CIA.
1. Position in organisation.
2. History of CIA.
3. Structure: levels of organisation, areas of activity, 
committees, bodies, conferences, etc., No of employees.
4 • Role: general and industrial relations. (21)
5* Personal level of activity.
6. Nature of contacts with member companies.
7. Collective bargaining system - CIA involvement.
8. Conciliation and arbitration.
9. Disputes in the chemical industry,
10. Accidents and sickness*
11. Closed shop in chemical industry.
K> • Influence of technology on industrial relations.
13. Shift work.
14. CBI: co-operation and role.
15* International employers1 contacts.
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16. British trade union structure.
17. Third party intervention - influence of government/state 
bodies in industrial relations.
18. Incomes policy/social contract.
19. Influence of changes in industrial relations legislation
•
0CM Industrial Relations Act 1971°
21. Industrial democracy. Bullock Report, works 
other forms.
councils,
22. Public relations activity of CIA.
23. Influence of media on industrial relations.
h i l l • Guideline for interviews with trade union National 
Of fleer s”for~’the chemical~industry or~equivalent.
1 . Personal background.
2. Union structure - industries, groups of workers, regional 
and branch.
3. Number of members in chemical industry/jobs held.
4. Firms organised and not organised.
5. Contacts between full-time and lay union officers.
6. Role of shop steward.
7• Branches •
8. Chemical industry conferences.
9 . Membership agreements•
10. Main labour relations problems in the chemical industry.
11. Influence of technology on industrial relations.
12. Influence of workplace organisation on industrial relations.
13. Inflvience of high percentage of white-collar staff on in­
dustrial relations.
1 4 . Shift work.
1 5 . Custom and practice.
16. Differences between industrial relations in batch/process 
industries•
1 7 . Collective bargaining system - levels.
18. Productivity bargaining.
1 9 . Disputes procedure.
20. Conciliation and arbitration. (ACAS).
21. Disputes (recent examples).
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22* Most effective type of sanctions.
23* Management and shop stewards.
24 . Management - importance for industrial relations policy 
and practice.
2 5 . Role of full-time officials in workplace industrial relations.
26. Contacts between union and CIA.
27 • Foremen •
28. Personnel management•
29. Union recognition in the chemical industry. (Employment 
Protection Act).
30* Consultation and information of the workforce/union.
31. Industrial democracy.
32. Influence of legislation in general on industrial relations.
33. Third party intervention - influence of government/state 
bodies-on industrial relations.
34* Incomes policy.
35* Role of the media in industrial relations.
36. International union contacts.
37* Trades Union and Labour Relations Act.
2_.6. Guideline for interviews with District Officials of 
— trade”unions7 ~ ’* “ ~ **
1. Personal history and background.
2. Time in office.
3. Description of the district - chemical industry traditions 
in area.
4 . Industrial traditions in area - background of labour force.
5* Trade union organisation in companies of interest.
6. Main labour relations problems in chemical industry/area.
7* Influence of technology on industrial relations.
8. Rationalisation.
9 . Influence of high percentage of white-collar staff on 
industrial relations.
10. Shift work.
11. Influence of workplace organisation on industrial relations.
12. Role of district officials in workplace industrial relations.
13. Position of district officials in union.
1 4 . Main features of job - area of responsibility.
15. District structure - meetings and committees.
16. Contacts with head office/regional office.
17- Involvement of district officials in collective bargaining.
1 8 . Shop stewards*
19* Relationships with management.
20. Foremen.
21. Disputes (examples).
22. Custom and practice.
23. Involvement in disputes procedure.
24* Union recognition problems.
2 5. Conciliation and arbitration.
26. Influence of legislation in general on industrial relations.
27* Industrial democracy.
28. Third party intervention - influence of government/state 
bodies in industrial relations.
Results of Agrochemie AG investigations held in October 1978. 
Table 1.
Job breakdown of respondents.
Appendix 3 .
(1 )
n „
Question: Ich mochte mich zunachst 
unterhalten. Was uben Sie zur Zeit
einmal mit Ihnen uber Ihre 
fur eine Tatigkeit aus?
Arbeit
Job AcidF
Plant
$
(2) Works
F
Sample )
* F
Total
4/°
Craftsmen 0 0 11 21.2 11 17.5
Process Workers 9 81.8 13 25.0 22 34.9
Labourers 0 0 5 9.6 5 7.9
Non managerial 
staff 0 0 2 3.8 2 3.2
Supervisors^ 3) 1 9-1 11 21.2 12 19 .0
Middle/Senior
Management 1 9-1 6 11.5 7 11.1
Packing workers 0 0 3 5.8 3 4*8
Apprentices 0 0 1 1.9 1 1.6
Total 11 100 52 100 63 100
Table 2*
Regulations to be obeyed in the course of work.' '
Que s t i on: Muss en 
bei Ihrer Arbeit
Sie bestimmte 
beachten?
Vorschriften, Regeln oder Richtlinien
Type of Acid Plant /,_n Works Sample 
Regulation F # Rel. F # Rel. F
Total
*
Fursten- 
Rel.berg(6)
Safety 9 64*3 81.8 35 52.3 67.3 44 54.3 69-8 13.3
Job - 4instructions 28.6 36.3 19 28.4 36.5 23 28.4 36.5 65.8
Conditions q 
of Service 0 0 8 11.9 1 5 .4  8 9.9 12.7 5.8
Others 1 7.1 9-1 5 7.4 9.6  6 7.4 9-5 1 5 .O
Total 14 100 - 67 100 81 100 - 100
1. Based on the structured questionnaires given in Appendix 2.1.
2. cf_. Research method in Chapter 1. F = Frequency.
3. All three grades cf. Chapter 2, Section (iii)b.
4. N = total sample size =63. This will be given when multi-response 
to questions is possible.
5. Relative percentage F/n where n = sample size. This reflects the 
percentage of respondents who named this type of regulation.
6* F. Furstenberg, op.oit., p.257* Figures are percentages.
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Table 3 »
Change in  work load and d e ta i ls  o f change.
Question: Hat s ich  die Arbeitsbelastung ver&ndert, seitdem Sie’ an
diesem A rbeitsplatz  arbeiten? Wenn ja ,  wie?
Change Acid
F
Plant
$
Works
F
Sample
</° F
Total
$
No 2 1 8 . 2 16 38.1 18 34.0
Yes
(7)Type of change:
9 81.6 2.6 61.9 35 66.0
More physical work 3 27.3 4 12.1 7 15.9
More mental work 1 9 .1 6 7 15.9
More work due to re ­
duction in  manning 2 18.2 15 45-5 17 38.6
Less physical work 0 0 5 1 5 . 2 5 11.6
Less mental work 1 9*1 0 0 l 2 .3
Variable work load 4 36.4 3 9.0 7 15.9
Total 11 100 42 100 53 100
Table 4*
S a t is fa c t io n  with le v e l  of payment ( i ) .
Question: Werden Sie Ih rer Leistung entsprechend bezahlt?
S a t is f ie d AcidF
Plant
$
Works
F
Sample
cd..... t° F
Total
______ $ _______
Yes 8 80.0 31 72.1 39 73.6
No 0 0 10 23.3 10 1 8 . 9
Don Tt  know 2 20.0 1 2.3 3 5.9
D ifferen t answer 0 0 1 2.3 1 1.9
Total 10 100 43 100 53 100
7* I t  was p o ssib le ,  of course, that the work load had changed in 
more than one way. The percentages are calcu lated  using the 
t o t a l  number of changes.
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Table 5•
F a cto rs  which make work d i f f i c u l t .
Question: Was kann Ihre Arbeit h ier  
(Maximum of three responses).
am meisten erschweren?
Factor Acid
F
Plant
<
Works
F
Sample
$  * F
Total
.. %__
Lack of team work 0 0 1 2.6 1 1.8
Working Conditions 13 76*5 19 5 0 .0 32 5 8 .2
Safety 0 0 3 7*9 3 5 .4
Work load 4 23.5 14 36 .9 18 32.8
S h if t  work 0 0 1 2.6 1 1 .8
Total 17 100 38 100 55 100
Table 6*
Job S a t is fa c t io n *
Value Degree of
S a t is fa c t io n
Acid
F
Plant
. _ $  __
Works
F
Sample 
* '  .. F
Total
. . . h ........
1 Very s a t is f ie d 2 18.2 12 26.1 14 24.6
2 S a t is f ie d 8 72.7 31 67*4 39 68.4
3 Neither/nor 1 9 .1 3 6 .5 4 7 .0
4 Unsatisfied 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 Very u n sa tis f ied 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 11 100 46 100 57 100
8. N = 27* Some respondents had d i f f i c u l t y  coping with th is  
question -  they could not separate the various features of 
th e ir  job and saw i t  as a to t a l  e n t i ty .  Some respondents also  
said that nothing made th e ir  work d i f f i c u l t *
( c
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Table 7 »
Components o f job  s a t i s f a c t io n .
Question: Konnen wir dieses U rte i l  ein wenig p ra z is ie re n . Was sind
die guten, was sind die schlechten Seiten  Ih rer  A rbeit?
Component Acid Plant Works Sample Total
F F $ (10) F $ (10)
Good: Job content 1 24 85-7 25 73.5
Work load 2 5 35.7 7 38.9
Safety 0 5 71.4 5 71.4
Payment 1 8 80.0 9 8 1 . 4
S h if t  work 0 2 11.8 2 10.5
Sub-tota l Good 4 44 57-9 48 53.9
Bad: Job content 5 4 14.3 9 26.5
Work load 2 9 64*3 11 6 1 . 1
Safety 0 2 28 .6 2 28.6
Payment 0 2 20.0 2 18.2
S h if t  work 2 15 88.2 17 89.5
Sub-to ta l Bad 9 32 42.1 41 46.2
Total 13 76 100 89 100
Table 8 .
Evaluation of s h i f t  work.
Question: Arbeiten Sie gern oder ungern Schicht? (Konnen Sie das 
etwas naher begrunden?).
Evaluation Acid Plant Works Sample Total w-i-M
_________________________ F , $  F $ R e l .$  F °/o R e l . j
P ositive 4 36.2 8 15.7. " 3 0 .8 12 19.4 3 4 .2
Neither/Nor 2 18.2 13 25.5 5 0 .0 15 24.2 4 2 .9
Negative 3 27.3 5. 9 .8 1 9 . 2 8 12.9 22 .9
Bay Workers 2 18.2 25 49.0 - 27 43.5 —
Total 11 100 51 100 100 62 100 100
9* N -  37• Again a large number of respondents found i t  impossible 
to sub-divide th e ir  jobs in to  various fe a tu re s .
10. Percentage good or bad.
11. Of s h i f t  workers only.
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E ffe c ts  of technological progress on the d ifferen ces between 
b lu e -c o lla r  workers and sa laried  s t a f f .
Table 9 «
Question: Man hort immer wieder zwei entgegengesetzte Meimmgen
uber die Zukunft der Arbeitnehmer•
1 . Die einen sagen: der technische F o r ts c h r i t t  wird l e t z t l i c h  zur 
Folge haben, dass es wichtige Unterschiede zwischen Arbeitern und 
Angestellten n icht raehr g ib t .
2 . Die anderen sagen: welche Veranderungen auch immer mit dem
technischen F o r ts c h r i t t  kommen -  die Unterschiede zwischen Arbeitern 
und A ngestellten bleiben erh a lten .
Welcher d ieser zwei Meinungen stimmen Sie* eher zu?
D ifferences in 
Future
Acid
F
Planti ... WorksF Samplei° F Total_ . i
Nil 1 9*1 7 16.3 8 1 4 . 8
Same as now 6 54.5 29 67-4 35 64*8
Other opinions 3 27.3 6 1 4 . 0 9 16.7
Don’t  know 1 9*1 1 2.3 2 3.7
Total 11 100 43 100 54 100
Table 10.
The e f fe c t s  of technological progress.
Question: Wird der technischer F o r ts c h r i t t  Folgen fiir Arbeitnehmer 
haben? Welche?
E ffe c t Aoid
F
Plant
$  . . .
Works
F
Sample
. % F
Total
. $  .
Work e a s ie r  (a) 3 30.0 5 1 0 . 6 8 14.0
Unemployment (b) 5 5 0 .0 30 63.8 35 61.4
Both (a) and (b) 1 10.0 5 10.6 6 10.5
Other opinions 0 0 5 10.6 5 8 .8
Don’t  know 1 10.0 2 4.3 3 5.3
Total 10 100 47 100 57 100
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Table 1 1 .
Fulfilm en t o f job by la y  o f f i c e r s .
Question: Gibt es bei Ihnen 
leu te?  (12)
E rfu llen  die Vertrauensleute
im Betrieb  gewerkschaftliche Vertrauens- 
in Ihrem Betrieb ihre Aufgabe?
Fulfilm ent Acid
F
Plant
. .
Works
F
Sample
% F
Total
Yes 4 4 4 .4 28 6 2 .2 32 59.3
Partly 3 33.3 14 31.1 17 31.5
No 0 0 3 6.7 3 5 .6
Don’t  know 2 22.2 0 0 2 3.7
Total 9 100 45 100 54 100
Table 12 .
Issuers of in stru ction s
Question: Wer gibt Ilmen Anweisungen?
In stru ctio n
Issuer
Acid
F
Plant
. %
Works
F
Sample
€/o F Total lo
Leading Hand (Lh) 0 0 2 3.9 2 3.2
Supervisor ( s ) 3 27.2 12 23.5 15 24.2
Lh + S 2 1 8 . 2 15 29.4 17 27.4
Plant Manager ('PM) 2 18.2 1 2 ,0 3 4 .8
PM + S 2 18.2 4 7 .8 6 9.7
Others 1 9 .1 14 27.5 15 24°2
S + Others 1 9 .1 1 2.0 2 3.2
Nobody 0 0 2 3.9 2 3 .2
Total 11 100 51 100 62 100
12. A ll respondents rep lied  p o s it iv e ly  to th is  f i r s t  part of the 
question•
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Table 1 3 *
A tt i tu d e s  to  s t r ik e  as a l a s t  r e s o r t .
Question: S o llten  Ih rer Meinung nach die Forderungen der Arbeitnehmer 
auch heute noch mit H ilfe eines S tre ik s  durchgesetzt werden, f a l l s  
andere M itte l e r fo lg lo s  bleiben?
Opinion Acid
F
Plant
d
. . . .  . . 7 9
Works
F
Sample
$ F
Total
$
Yes 4 36.4 20 41.7 24 40.7
Sometimes 1 9-1 9 1 8 . 8 10 1 6 . 9
No 5 45*5 17 35-4 22 37-3
Don 11 know l 9.1 2 4 .2 3 5.1
T o ta l : 1 1 100 48 100 59 100
Table 14* 
Attitudes to p o l i t i c a l  s t r ik e .
Questions S o llten  Gewerkschaften auch bei p o lit isch en  Auseinander-
setzungen ihre Forderungen n o t f a l l s  mit einem S tre ik durchsetzen? ( 1 3 )
Opinion Acid Plant Works Sample Total
F $ F $ F ........ $
Yes 1 14.3 8 2 4 .2 9 2 2 . 5
Sometimes 0 0 5 1 5 . 2 5 12.5
No 6 85.7 19 57.6 25 62.5
Don’t  know 0 0 1 3.0 1 2.5
Total 7 100 33 100 40 100
13* This question was normally only put to those respondents who 
answered ’yes* to the previous one. All; these respondents 
were union members by chance.
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Attitudes to defence of r ig h ts  by s t r ik e  despite economic harm 
to company.
Table 1 5 *
Questions
verteidigen
Sollten  die Arbeitnehmer ihre Reohte n o t f a l l s  durch S tre ik  
, wenn ihre Firma dadurch w irtsch aftlio h  geschadet wird?
Opini on Acid
F
Plant
3  ...
Works
F
Sample
. $  ... F
Total
$
Yes 0 0 4 9 .8 4 8.0
Sometimes 2 22.2 10 24.4 12 2 4 .O
No 6 66.7 26 63.4 32 6 4 .O
Bon ft  know 1 11.1 1 2 .4 2 4 .0
Total 9 100 41 100 50 100
Table 16.
Attitude toi company so c ia l p o licy .
Question: Wenn Sie unverschuldet in Not geraten so llten . 
S ie ,  dass S ie  von der Firma H ilfe bek&men?
, glauben
Company
Support
Acid
F
Plant
_ A  _
Works
F
Sample
i F
Total
......... $
Yes 4 40 • 0 27 6 1 . 4 31 57.4
Perhaps 2 20.0 7 1 5 . 9 9 16.7
No 0 0 4 9 . 1 4 7 .4
Don’t  know 4 40.0 6 1 3 . 6 10 I 8 .5
Total 10 100 44 100 54 100
-  179 -
Table 17 *
A tt itu d e s  on the n e c e s s i t y  o f  trade unions.
Question: Wenn wir nun einmal die Gewerkschaften herausgreifen -  es
gibt verschiedene Meinungen fiber ihre Notwendigkeit• Ich mochte 
Ilmen gern einige haufig geausserte Meinungen nennen und Sie fragen, 
welcher S ie  am ehesten zustimmen.
1 . Die Grundprobleme der Arbeitnehmer sind heutzutage vom Staat 
g e lo s t ;  die Gewerkschaften sind deshalb heute nicht mehr 
notwendig. (unions unnecessary a t t i tu d e ) .
2 . Die Grundprobleme der Arbeitnehmer sind heute zwar schon vom 
Staat g e lo s t ,  dennoch kann es n icht schaden, wenn die Arbeit­
nehmer ihre eigene Vertretung hatren; auch andere Gruppen haben 
ihre eigene Verbande und Organisationen• (P lu r a l is t  a t t i tu d e ) .
3. Die Gewerkschaften sind noch genauso notwendig wir frfiher.
Wenn die Arbeitnehmer die Gewerkschaften nicht hatten , wurden 
die Unternehmer mit Ihnen macKen, was s ie  wollen. Es kommt 
heute vor allem darauf an, das Erre ich te  abzusichern und zu 
schfitzen. (Status quo c la ss  a t t i tu d e ) .
4 .  Die Gewerkschaften sind noch genauso notwendig wie frfiher;
auch heute i s t  die w ir tsch a ft l ich e  und p o lit isc h e  Lage der
Arbeitnehmer unzureichend, nur mit einer starken Gewerkschaft 
kann diese Lage geandert werden. (Radical unionism a t t i tu d e ) .
(Warum stimmen Sie gerade diese Meinungen zu?)
Degree of 
n ecess ity
Acid
F
Plant
_
Works
F
Sample
< F
Total
____  °k
Unions unnecessary 0 0 0 0 0 0
P lu ra l is t  a tt itu d e 4 36.4 5 11.1 9 16.1
Status quo c la ss  
a ttitu d e 4 36.4 2 6 .5 (14) 53.9 30.5 54-5
Radical unionism 
attitu d e 2 1 8 . 2 1 0 .5^14) 23.3 12.5 22.3
Other a tt itu d es 0 0 2 4-4 2 3 .6
Don’t  know 1 9-1 1 2.2 2 3 .6
Total 11 100 45 100 56 100
14- One respondent could not decide between these two p o s s i b i l i t i e s .
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Table 20.
Estim ation of the q u a l i t y  o f  su p e r io rs .
Question: Wie schatzen Sie Ihren Vorgesetzten ein?
Value Acid
F
Plant
1°
Works
F
Sample
.............  $ . F
Total
<
1 Good 10 100 29 65-9 39 7 2 . 2
2 F a ir ly  Good 0 0 9 2 0 .5 9 16.7
3 Okay 0 0 4 9.1 4 7 .4
4 F a ir ly  bad 0 0 2 4 .5 2 3.7
5 Bad 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 10 100 44 100 54 100
Table 21 .
The achievements of trade unions.
Question: Manche meinen, dass die Gewerkschaften v ie l  mehr fur die
Arbeitnehmer erreichen konnten^ wenri Sie nur w ollten. Andere sagen: 
die Gewerkschaften haben ih r  Mogliches getan. Was s ie  erreichen 
konnten, haben s ie  auch e r r e ic h t .
Welcher d ieser Meinungen stimmen Sie eher zu?
Opinion on 
Achievement
Acid
F
Plant
_..........  $ ............
Works
F
Sample
$ F
Total
*
Gould have achieved 1 1 0 . 0 8 1 8 . 6 9 1 7 . 0
more
Average achievement 1 1 0 . 0 6 1 4 . 8 7 13.2
Achieved a l l  they 
could 6 60.0 27 6 2 .8 33 62.3
Neither opinion 2 2 0 .0 1 2.3 3 5*7
Don’t  know 0 0 1 2.3 1 1.9
Total 10 100 43 100 53 100
Table 22. ~ 101 “
Most important tasks fo r  trade unions (Open form at).
Question: Was sind Ih rer  Meinung nach die wichtigsten Aufgaben der
Gewerkschaften?
Task Acid
F
Plant
. . .  *_
Works
F
Sample
i F
Total
. . . .  $  ....
Wages 5 55.6 23 56.1 28 56.0
Holidays 3 33.3 7 17.1 10 20.0
Job protection 2 22.2 6 1 4 . 6 8 16.0
Leisure time 2 22.0 4 9 .8 6 12.0
Health and Safety 0 0 6 1 4 . 6 6 12,0
C o llectiv e  bargaining 1 11.1 3 4.1 4 8 .0
Protect members 0 0 4 5-5 4 8.0
Welfare b en efits 1 11.1 3 4*1 4 8.0
Working conditions 0 0 2 2.7 2 4 .0
Protect economy 1 11.1 1 1.4 2 4*0
Legal protection 0 0 2 2.7 2 4 .0
Others 3 33.3 12 29.3 15 30.0
Total 18 100 73 100 91 100
Table 23.
Person of tru st  for  personal problems •
Question: Gelegentlich tre te n  einmal Schwierigkeiten personlicher und 
sach lich er Art au f. An wem wenden Sie s ich ,  wenn derartige Probleme 
Uorkommen?
(a) bei personlichen Schwierigkeiten?( 10)
Person Acid
F
Plant
i°
Works
F
Sample
. . . .  $ F
Total
0}a
Superior (unspecified) 2 22.2 5 12.2 7 1 4 . 0
Supervisor 2 22.2 8 19.5 10 20.0
Personnel Dept. 1 11.1 1 2 .4 2 4*0
Works council 2 22.2 10 24.4 12 2 4 .0
Work mates 0 0 1 2 .4 2 4 . 0
Works manager 0 0 1 2.4 2 4 . 0
Nobody 2 22.2 15 36.6 17 34.0
Total 9 100 41 100 50 100
15* n (acid plant) = 9 ;  -a (works sample) = 4 1 ;  N = 50; percentages 
are re la t iv e  to sample s iz e ,  which has been reduced by the number 
of respondents unable to answer.
16. Some respondents were re lu ctan t to answer th is  question, others 
did not consider that such problems a ffected  work.
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Table 24-
Person o f t r u s t  fo r  work problems-
Question: following on from Table 23 above 
(b) bei sachlichen Schwierigkeiten aus der
•
Arbeit heraus?
Person Acid Plant Works Sample Total
F . £ ......... F $ F £
Superior (unspecified) 7 63-6 16 34-8 23 40.4
Supervisor 4 36*4 2 1 45-7 25 43-9
Works council 0 0 5 1 0 . 9 5 8 .8
Work mates 0 0 2 4-3 2 3.5
Leading hand 0 0 1 2 . 2 1 1 . 8
Nobody 0 0 1 2 . 2 1 1 .8
Total 11 100 46 100 57 100
Table 25 -
The primary in te r e s t s  of trade union o f f i c i a l s *
Question: Auch uber die S tellung  und Interessen von Gewerkschafts
funktionaren gibt es mehrere Ansichten* Eine davon i s t ,  die 
Funktionare denken heute in e rs te r  Linie an ih rer  Posten und 
personliche V orteile  und e rs t  in zweiter Linie geht es ihnen urn 
die Interessen der M itg lieder.
Eine andere: Man kann gegen die Funktionare sagen, was man w i l l ,
in e rs te r  Linie geht es ihnen schon darum, die In teressen  der 
M itglieder wirkungsvoll zu v er tre te n .
Welcher Meinung neigen Sie am ehesten zu?
Primary in te re s t Acid
F
Plant
*
Works
F
Sample
£__ F
Total
*
Personal in te r e s ts  (P) 2 20.0 10 2 3 . 8 12 23-1
Members in te r e s ts  (M) 5 50 .0 15 35-7 20 38.5
Both P & M 2 20.0 12 28.6 14 26.9
None of these 
opinions
0 0 3 7-1 3 5-8
Don't know 1 10.0 2 4-8 3 5-8
Total 10 100 42 100 52 100
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Table 26.
Reading o f  works co u n cil  agreements.
Question: Lesen Sie auch die ausgeh&ngten Vereinbarungen?
Answer Acid Plant Works Sample Total
F $ F $ F $
Yes 8 72.7 33 70.2 41 70.7
Sometimes 3 27.3 14 29.8 17 29.3
Total 11 100 47 100 58 100
Table 27.
Negotiation process for works council agreements•
Question: Wie kommt eine Betriebsvereinbarunlg zustande?
Answer Acid Plant Works Sample Total
F i F $ ..... F ..... . ...
Works Council + 7 63.6 32 65.3 39 6 5.O
Management 
Union + Man/18) 0 0 2 4.1 2 3.3
Other (incorrect) 2 1 8 .2 7 14.3 9 15 .0
opinions 
Don’t know 2 18.2 8 16.3 10 16 .7
Total 11 100 49 100 60 100
17. All respondents were aware that works council agreements are 
posted on notice boards.
18. This answer reflects the attitude that there is no difference 
between works council and union which is often found amongst 
the worlcf orce •
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Table 28.
Representation o f employees* in t e r e s t s  in  s o c ie t y .
Question: Wer v e r t r i t t  Ih rer  
nehmer in der G esellschaft am 
herausnehmen. ( 1 9 )
Ansicht nach die Interessen der A rbeit-  
besten? Sie konnen b is  zu drei Gruppen
Group
F
Acid Plant 
. . A d i # 20/ F
Works Sample (n-,\
$ Ad.j .$ Rel ' F
Total
df/» Ad j  .$
SPD 5 1 5 . 2 29.4 26 20.2 3 1 . 8 6 0 .5 31 19.1 31.3
CDU/CSU 3 9.1 1 7 . 6 7 5.4 8 .5 16.3 10 6.2 10.1
FDP 1 3.0 5 .9 10 7 .8 12.2 23.2 11 6 .8 11.1
NPD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DKP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Employers 0 0 0 1 0 .8 1.2 2.3 1 0.6 1 .1
State 2 6 .0 11.8 7 5 .4 8 .5 16.3 9 5 .6 9*1
Trade
Unions 6 18.2 35-3 31 24.0 37*8 72.1 37 22.8 37.4
Don *t know 3 9 .1 M 6 4.7 M - 9 5 .6 M
None of 
these 13 39.4 M 41 31.7 M - 54 33.3 M
Total 33 100 100 129 100 100 - 162 100 100
19* A se r ie s  of cards with these groups (see Glossary of abbreviations 
for d e fin it io n s )  was given to the respondents who could s e le c t  
up to 3 of them.
20. Here the categories "Don't know" and "None of these" have been 
taken as missing values.
21. Percentage of sample giving th is  response, n = 43.
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Table 29«
Most important demands/tasks fo r  trade unions (closed  form at).
Question: Konnen Sie mir aus diesen ICartchen die v ier  Forderungen nennen,
fur die sich  Ih rer Meinung nach die Gewerkschaften am s ta r ts te n  einsetzen 
so llen ?
Demand
F
Acid Plant 
Rel.# 
# (n=ll) F
Works Sample
Rel.# Rank 
# (n=4l)Order F
Total
cl (N=52) s # / 22
1 Short working 
time 5 11.4 45.4 8 4-9 19 .5 7 13 6.3 2 5 .O 2
2 Capital
accumulation l 2.3 9 . 1 12 7-3 29.3 5 13 6.3 25-0 41
3 Higher wages 2 4-5 13.2 5 3.0 12.2 12 7 3.4 13-5 29
4 Increase Co­
ordination 0 0 0 9 5-5 22.0 6 9 4-3 17-3 (43)
5 Defend
democracy 4 9.1 36.4 7 4-3 17-1 10 11 5-3 21.2 10
6 More holidays 7 15-9 63.6 14 8-5 34-1 4 21 10.1 40.4 20
7 Protect price 
stability 4 9-1 36.4 17 10.4 41-5 3 21 10.1 40.4 57
8 Job Pro­
tection 6 13-6 54-5 24 14-6 58.5 2 30 14-4 57-7 27
9 Influence
government 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 8
10 Protection 
from rational­
isation
0 0 0 8 4-9 19-5 7 8 3.8 15-4 22
11 Better O.A.P. 3 6.8 27-3 8 4-9 19-5 7 11 5-3 21.2 35
12 Better
training
facilities
0 0 0 6 3-7 14-6 11 6 2-9 11.5 (37)
13 Lowering
retirement
age
7 15-9 63.6 30 18.3 73.2 1 37 1 7 .8 71-2 65
14 None of 
these 5 11.4 - 16 9-8 - - 21 10.1 - -
Total 44 100 - 164 100 - - 208 100 - -
22. Figures ( re la t iv e  percentages) from survey in  Schumann et a l . ,  
op . c i t . ,  p . 2 1 5 f f o r  BASF. Figures in brackets only lim ited 
comparability due to a change in phraseology on the card.
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Knowledge of s p e c if ic  works council ro les (Open form at).
Question: Wissen Sie welche Aufgaben der Betriebrat hat?
Role Acid
F
Plant
.../'•’
Works
F
Sample
$ “ F
Total
$
See law upheld 0 0 10 20.4 10 16.9
Representation 4 36.4 34 64*2 38 59 .4
Protect m inorities 0 0 1 1.9 1 1 .6
Co-det. r ig h ts  (gen.) 1 9.1 4 7 .5 5 7*8
Go-det. r ig h ts  ( s o c ia l ) 0 0 9 17.0 9 14.1
Co-det. r ig h ts  (personnel) 4 36,4 21 39*6 25 39.1
Go-det. r ig h ts  (economic) l 9*1 3 5.7 4 6 .3
Safety 0 0 9 1 7 . 0 9 14.1
Works council agreements 0 0 12 22.6 12 18.8
Go-det. r ig h ts  (dism issal) 0 0 7 13.2 7 10.9
Others 3 2 7 . 3 11 20.8 14 21.9
Averages 1.2 1 0 . 7 5 11 20.8 1 2 . 2 1 9 . 2
Table 31.
Absolute knowledge of works council ro les (number which could be named). ^28 ^
Number Works Sample
F $
0 8 1 5 . 1
1 1 5 28.3 Mean = 2.283
2 12 22.6 Median = 1.792
3 9 1 7 . 0 S2 2.107
4 l 1*9
5 4 7 .5
6 1 1 . 9
7 1 1.9
8 0 0
9 2 3 .8
r ....... . '
Total 53 100
23. Question as above
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Table 32.
Turnout at works co u n cil  e le c t io n s  in  1978*
Que s t i on: Hab en 
beteiligt?
Sie sich an den Betriebsratswahlen in diesem Jahr
Answer Acid
F
Plant
/O
Works Sample 
F $ Rel.$ F
Total
$ Rel .$
Voted 10 90.9 42 91.3 97.7 52 9 1 . 2 96.3
Didn’t vote 
Not allowed
1 9 . 1 1 2 .2  
6 .5
2.3 2 3.5 3*7
to vote ( 2 4 ) 4 4 5*3
Total 11 100 47 100 100 58 100 100
Table 33.
Fulfilment of work council task.
Question: 
er etwas?
Erfullt der Betriebsrat seine Aufgabe oder vernachl&ssigt
Answer Acid
F
Plant
. .  $.......
Works Sample 
F $ F
Total
a/.
Yes 7 77*8 26 66.7 33 68 .8
Partly 2 22.2 5 12.8 7 1 4 . 6
No 0 0 6 1 5 * 8 6 12.5
Don’t know 0 0 2 5*1' 2 4 .2
Total 9 100 39 100 48 100
24* Senior managerial s t a f f  are not allowed to vote in works
council e le c t io n s .  The R e l .$  discounts these respondents.
-  188 -
Table 34.
Frequency o f works assem b lies.
Question: Gibt es bei 
Wenn ja ,  wie o f t?
. Ihnen. im Betrieb  Betriebsversammlungen?
Frequency Acid
F
Plant
( S'
P ......
Works
F
Sample
$ .. F
Total
*
0 - 1  Monthly 0 0 1 2.0 1 1.7
2 - 3  Monthly 4 36.4 36 73.5 40 66 #7
4 - 6  Monthly 6 54.5 2 4 .1 8 13.3
7 - 1 2  Monthly 1 9 .1 6 12.2 7 11.7
Don*t know 0 0 4 8.2 4 6.7
Total 11 100 49 100 60 100
Table 35*
Attendance at works assem blies.
Question: (following 
Gehen Sie auch dahin?
on from previous one).
Attendance Acid
F
Plant
*
Works
F
Sample
i ° F
Total
$
Yes, always 1 9-1 17 34-7 18 30.0
Yes, sometimes 10 90.9 31 63.3 41 68.3
No, never 0 0 1 2.0 1 1.7
Total 11 100 49 100 60 100
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Table 36.
An evalu atio n  o f fu l l - t im e  works c o u n c i l lo r s .
Question: Gibt es bei Ihnen im Betrieb ein oder mehrere Betriebs­
rat smitglieder, die von ihrer ursprunglichen Tatigkeit wegen ihres 
Amts freigestellt sind? Wenn ja: Meinen Sie dass so etwas gut ist, 
oder nicht?
Evaluation Acid Plant 
F i
Works Sample 
F %
Total 
F #
Good 8 88.9 30 85.7 38 86.4
Advantages and 
disadvantages 0 0 3 8.6 3 6.8
Bad 1 11.1 1 2.9 2 4.5
Don 't know 0 0 1 2.9 1 2.3
Total 9 100 35 100 44 100
Table 37.
Representation of the workforce's interests by the works council.
Question: Haben Sie den Eindruck, dass der Betriebsrat die Interessen
der Belegschaft gegenuber der Geschaftsleitung hart genug vertritt, 
oder ist- das nicht der Fall?
Evaluation Acid
F
Plant Works
F
Sample
i  ... F
Total
___ i
Full enough 6 6 0.0 19 46.3 25 49.0
Varies 1 10.0 13 31.7 14 27*5
Not full enough 0 0 4 9.8 4 7.8
Don't know 3 30.0 5 12.2 8 15-7
Total 10 100 41 100 51 100
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Table 38.
S u f f ic ie n c y  o f  works counoil r i g h t s .
Question: Glauben Sie, dass 
urn sich voll ftlr die Interes 
ist das nicht der Fall?
der Betriebsrat genugend Rechte 
sen der Belegschaft einzusetzen,
hat, 
oder
Sufficiency Acid
F
Plant
ni
-.../- .
Works
F
Sample
< Tp
Total
c,'l
Sufficient 8 72.7 35 77.8 43 7 6.8
Partly insufficient 1 9-1 0 0 1 1.8
Insufficient 1 9.1 6 13.3 ni 12.5
More than sufficient 1 9.1 1. 2.2 2 3.6
Sufficient if used 0 0 1 2.2 1 1.8
Don’t know 0 0 2 4.4 2 3.6
Total 11 100 45 100 56 100
Table 39.
Average number of work mates.
Question: Mit wievielen Kollegen haben Sie bei der Arbeit am meisten
zu tun?
None 0 0 8 15.4 8 12.7
One 0 0 11 21.2 11 17.5
Two or more 11 100 32 61.5 43 68.3
Varies 0 0 1 1.9 1 1.6
Total 11 100 52 100 63 100
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Table 40°
Knowledge of s p e c i f i c  co-determ ination r ig h ts  of the works c o u n c il .
Question: Gibt es bei Ihnen im Betrieb bestimmte Massnahmen 
Geschaftsleitung n icht ohne die Zustimmimg des B e tr iebsra ts  
fuhren darf?
., die 
durch-
S p e c if ic  Right Acid
F
Plant
io
Works Sample 
F $ F
Total
p
On employment 2 1 8 . 2 10 23.3 1 2 2 2 . 2
On tra n sfer 2 • 1 8 . 2 6 1 4 . 0 8 1 4 . 8
On dismissal 2 1 8 . 2 16 37.2 18 33.3
S o cia l co­
determination 0 0 3 7°0 3 5°5
On regrading 3 27.3 5 1 1 . 6 8 1 4 . 8
Others 4 3 6 .4 9 20.9 13 24.1
3)on*t know 3 2 7 . 3 11 2 5 .6 14 25.9
Total 11 43 54 _
Table 41.
Absolute knowledge .of co-determination ( 0 5 )rights of the works council.' '
Number known Works Sample
F . $
0 28 5 2 .8
1 13 24.5 Mean = 0-925
2 6 11.3 Median = 0.446
3 2 3 .8 s 2 = 1 . 3 2 8
4 2 3.8
5 2 3 .8
Total 53 100
25« Same question as Table 40, a ltern ate  form of analysis
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Evaluation of the works by con sid eration  of a v a r ie t y  o f c r i t e r i a .
Question? Mann kann den Betrieb, in dem man arbeitet nach verschiedenen 
Eigenschaften beurteilen. Ich habe hier eine Liste von solchen 
Eigenschaften, die ich gleich vorlesen werde. Sagen Sie mir bitte, ob 
Sie diese Eigenschaften Ihres Betriebes als sehr positiv, eher positiv, 
weder pos. noch negativ, eher negativ oder sehr negativ beurteilen. (26)
Table 42.
Accident Prevention.
Rating Acid
F
Plant
__j°
Works
F
Sample
* F
Total
#
1 Very good 0 0 13 31.0 13 25.0
2 Fairly good 9 90.0 21 50.0 30 57.7
3 Okay 1 10.0 8 19.0 9 17.3
4 Fairly bad 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 Very bad 0 0 0 0 0 0
Don't know 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 10 100 42 100 52 100
Works Sample statistics:
mean = 1.881, S2 = 0.705 Lowest 2.5# limit - 3 9^47(2 7 )
26. A list was then read out and the results of this question are 
given in Tables 42 - 4 8.
27* A limit can be calculated for the value below which less than 
2.5# of the workforce would evaluate the works according to 
these criteria. This requires the assumption that a dis­
proportionate stratified random sample may be treated in the 
same way as a simple random sample, and that the data is a 
normal distribution. It requires first calculating the 
interval estimate of the mean (95# confidence) of the popu­
lation (i.e. the workforce) and adding this to I .96 ■-
(standard deviation for the population which must also be 
calculated. N. Lin, on.cit., p.285ff.).
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Welfare b e n e f i ts .
Table 43.
Rating Acid
F
Plant
dp
Works
F
Sample<f F
Total
o'Ld
1 Very good 0 0 7 16.7 7 13.5
2 F a ir ly  good 9 90.0 27 64.2 36 69 .2
3 Okay 1 1 0 . 0 6 14.3 7 13.5
4 F a ir ly  bad 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 Very bad 0 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t  know 0 0 1 2 .4 1 1 . 9
Total 10 100 42 100 52 100
Works Sample 
mean = 1 .927,
s t a t i s t i c s :
s 2 = 0 . 648 , Lowest 2 .5$  lim it  = 3 . 9 1 6
Table 44*
Security  of employment .
Rating Acid
F
Plant
d%
Works
F
Sampled
Total 
F $
1 Very good 0 0 1 2.9 1 2.2
2 F a ir ly  good 2 20.0 13 37.1 15 33.3
3 Okay 5 5 0 .0 9 25.7 14 31.1
4 F a ir ly  bad 1 10.0 4 11.4 5 11.1
5 Very bad 0 0 1 2.9 1 2 .2
Don’t  know 2 20.0 7 20.9 9 20.0
Total 10 100 35 100 45 100
Works Sample s t a t i s t i c s :
mean = 2 .143 , S2 = 1 .353 , Lowest 2 .5$  lim it  = 5*128
Lowest 3 .0$ lim it = 5 * 0
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.Table 45*
The behaviour of s u p e r io rs .
Rating Acid
F
Plant
■ «
Works
F
Sample
d F
Total
i
1 Very good 2 20.0 9 21.4 11 2 1 . 2
2 F a ir ly  good 7 7 0 .0 23 54*8 30 5 7 . 7
3 Okay 1 10.0 8 19*0 9 1 7 . 3
4 F a ir ly  bad 0 0 1 2 .4 1 1 . 9
5 Very bad 0 0 0 0 0 0
Don *t know 0 0 1 2.4 1 1 . 9
Total 10 100 42 100 52 100
Works Sample s t a t i s t i c s ♦
mean = 1 .976 , s 2 = 0.78 , Lowest 2 .5#  lim it ® 4*15
Table 4 6 . 
Payment ( i i )
Rating Acid
F
Plants
*
Works
F
Sample
< F
Total
#
1 Very good 1 10.0 2 4*8 3 5*8
2 F a ir ly  good 6 60 .0 30 71*4 36 69.2
3 Okay 3 30.0 7 16.7 10 19 * 2
4 F a ir ly  bad 0 0 3 7*1 3 5*8
5 Very bad 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 10 100 42 100 52 100
Works Sample s t a t i s t i c s J
mean = 2 .262 , S2 = O.665 , Lowest 2 .5#  lim it  = 4*265
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Table 4 7 »
Chances of promotion
Rating Acid
F
Plant
...... *
Works
F
Sample
.p . ... F
Total
$
1 Very good 0 0 1 2 .6 1 2 .0
2 F a ir ly  good 2 20 .0 1 1 2 8 .2 13 2 6 .5
3 Okay 5 5 0 .0 15 38.2 20 4 0 .8
4 F a ir ly  bad 2 2 0 .0 1 1 2 8 .2 13 2 6 .5
5 Very bad 1 1 0 . 0 0 0 1 2 .0
Don’t  know 0 0 1 2 .6 1 - 2 . 0
Total 10 100 39 100 49 100
Works Sample s t a t i s t i c s •
mean = 2 *8 7 2 , S2 = 0.951? Lowest 2 .5$  lim it  = 5.33 
Lowest 4*5$ lim it  « 5*0
Table 48.
Workmates
Rating Acid
F
Plant
%
Works
F
Sample
$ F
Total
. . $
1 Very good 2 20 .0 7 17.5 9 1 8 . 0
2 F a ir ly  good 7 7 0 .0 29 72.5 36 7 2 . 0
3 Okay 1 1 0 . 0 4 1 0 . 0 5 1 0 . 0
4 F a ir ly  bad 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 Very bad 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 10 100 40 100 50 100
Works Sample s t a t i s t i c s :
mean = 1*925? S2 = 0 . 5 2 6 , Lowest 2*5$ lim it = 3*75
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Table 49°
Conception of co-determ ination.
Question: Was verstehen S i e vinter Mitbestimmung?
Conception Acid Plant Works Sample Total
F <...... j.°. . F °/o F <
Workplace 2 2 0 .0 8 1 8 . 6 10 18.9
Works lev el 5 5 0 .0 13 3 0 .2 18 34.0
Company lev el l 1 0 . 0 1 2 27 *9 13 24-5
Economy lev el 0 0 1 2.3 1 1.9
Union 0 0 1 2.3 1 1-9
Don’t  know 2 20 .0 8 1 8 . 6 10 1 8 . 9
Total 10 100 43 100 53 100
Table 50»
Important welfare b en efits  provided by company.
Question: Welche b e tr ie b lic h e  Sozialleistungen halten Sie ffir
wichtig?
Type of Benefit Acid
F
Plant
$
Works
F
Sample
. $ ______
Total 
F %
Pension 6 54.5 23 57*5 29 56.9
Medical care 5 45*3 13 32.5 18 35 *2
Training 1 9.1 0 0 1 2 .0
Financial help 4 36.4 2 5 .0 6 1 1 . 8
Works bonuses 0 0 6 1 5 . 0 6 1 1 . 8
Others: canteen, e t c . 4 36.4 7 42.5 2 1 4 1 . 2
Don't know 0 0 3 7 .5 3 5*9
Sample s iz e 11 40 51
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Table 5 1 *
Desired changes in  company b e n e f i t s .
Question: Vlas so llte n  
uberhaupt passieren?
mit den b etr ieb lichen Sozialleistungen
Desired changes Acid
F
Plant
/O
Works
F
Sample
£ F
Tot a l
$
Increase 4 36.4 17' 47*2 21 44*7
Convert to c o l le c t iv e  
agreements 0 0 2 5 .6 2 4*3
None 3 27*3 11 3 0 .6 14 29*3
Don’t  know 4 36.4 6 1 6 . 7 10 21.3
Total 11 100 36 100 47 100
Table 52.
The q u a li t ie s  of good company management.
Question: Welche Eigenschaften s o l l t e  
Firmenleitung haben?
Ihrer Keinung nach eine gute
Quality
11 
,H 
, 
o 
ft 
<
Plant
*
Works
F
Sample
q1% F
Total
. %
Business s k i l l  ( b ) 1 9*1 9 22.0 10 19 *2
S o cia l management 
sty le  (s) 2 1 8 . 2 16 39*0 13 34*6
Technical s k i l l  (t ) 1 9.1 0 0 1 1.9
B + S 2 1 8 . 2 3 7*3 5 9*6
B + T 0 0 1 2 .4 1 1*9
S + Others 0 0 1 2 .4 1 1-9
Others 0 0 1 2 .4 1 1*9
Don ft  know 5 45*5 10 24*4 15 2 8 .8
Total 11 100 4 1  100 52 100
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Table 53.
Age (Question: A lte r ? )
Age Acid
F
Plant
$
Works
F
Sample
<__,/°............. F
Total
d]?.
-18 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 - 2 0 0 0 1 2.0 1 1.6
21-25 0 0 0 0 0 0
26-30 0 0 1 2.0 1 1.6
31-35 1 9 . 1 5 9 .8 6 9*7
36-40 1 9 . 1 9 1 7 . 6 10 1 6 . 1
41-45 2 1 8 . 2 8 15*7 10 16.1
46-50 5 4 5 . 5 9 1 7 . 6 14 22.6
51-55 1 9*1 7 13.6 8 12.9
56-60 1 9*1 8 15*7 9 14*5
6 1 + 0 0 3 5*9 3 4*8
Total 1 1 100 51 100 62 100
Works Sample s t a t i s t i c s :
mean '= 4 6 . 2 , median = 4 6 . 8
Table 54'*
M arital Status (Question: Familienstand?)
M arital status Acid
F
Plant 
* ......
Works
F
Sample
..... 35 .......... F
Total
........ g .....
Single 1 9 . 1 3 5.9 4 6 .5
Married 9 81.8 46 9 0 .2 55 88.7
Widowed 0 0 1 2 .0 1 1 .6
Divorced 1 9.1 1 2 .0 2 3.2
T otal 11 100 51 100 62 100
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Table 55*
Number of children (Question: Haben Sie Kinder?)
Number Acid
F
Plant
</0
Works
F
Sample
o f......../°.......-..... F
Total
$
0 1 9.1 8 15*7 9 14-5
1 2 18.2 11 21.6 13 21.0
2 3 27.3 16 31.4 19 30.6
3 or more 5 45-5 16 31.4 21 33.9
Total 11 100 51 100 62 100
Table 56.
Schooling and q u a lif ic a t io n s ' ft
School/
Q u alifications
Acid
F
Plant
$
Works
F
Sample
. $  _ F
Total
$
Volkschule (28) 10 90.0 41 8O.4 51 82.3
M ittelschule ( 29 ) 0 0 3 5*9 3 4*8
M ittlere  Reife (30) 0 0 3 5 .9 3 4 .8
Obersohule (MR) ( 3 l ) 1 9 . 1 1 2.0 2 3.2
Oberschule 
(Abitur) (32) 0 0 3 5.9 3 4 .8
Total 11 100 51 100 62 100
28. School providing primary and secondary eduation generally to 
the age of 1 4  or 1 5 *
29* Middle school ( e .g .  tech n ica l co lleg e) to the age of about 16«
30. Exam approximately equivalent to ’0 f le v e ls .
31. High school of Grammar School type -  ’O' le v e ls .
32. High school hut ’A* lev e l equivalent q u a lif ic a t io n  obtained.
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Table 5 7 »
P rofession  of father#
Question: Welchen Beruf ubt oder fibte Ihr Vater aus?
Profession Acid
F
Plant
$
Works
F
Sample
p F
Total
of
p
Skilled worker 2 18.2 10 20.4 12 20.0
Unskilled worker 3 27.3 7 14.2 10 16.7
Labourer 0 0 1 2.0 1 1.7
Senior managerial 
staff 0 0 1 2.0 1 1.7
Salaried staff 1 9.1 1 2.0 2 3.3
Civil servant 0 0 2 4.1 2 3.3
Senior civil servant 0 0 1 2.0 1 1.7
Self employed 0 0 2 4.1 2 3.3
Agriculture 5 45*5 18 36.7 23 38.3
Professional soldier 0 0 2 4.1 2 3.3
Don't know 0 0 4 8.2 4 6.6
No answer 0 0 2 M 2 M
Total 11 100 51 100 62 100
Table 58. 
Training.
Question: Wie war eigentlich Ihre Berufsausbildung?
Level of Acid Plant Works Sample Total
Training F $ F $ F dp
No skill 5 45-5 14 27-5 19 30.6
Incomplete
apprenticeship 1 9-1 3 5.9 4 6.5
Skilled chemical 
worker 0 0 6 11.8 6 9.7
Other skilled worker 0 0 3 5.9 3 4.8
Apprenticeship
completed 4 36.4 23 45.1 27 43.8
Engineering college 1 9*1 1 2.0 2 3.2
University 0 0 3 5.9 3 4.8
Total 11 100 51 100 62 100
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Table 59*
Form of payment•
Question: Nach welcher Lohnform werden Sie bezahlt?
Form of Payment Acid
F
Plant Works
F
Sample
_ i ............ F
Total
*
Wage 9 8 1 . 8 35 67*3 44 69.8
Salary 2 18.2 16 30.7 18 28.6
Other forms 0 0 1 1-9 1 1.6
Total 11 100 52 100 63 100
Table 60. 
Average net monthly income•
Question: Wie hoch 
Verdienst?
i s t  Ihr durchschnittlicher monatlicher Netto—
Average Acid Plant Works Sample Total
income (DM) \ 3 3 / F F <A F #  .
Under 1000 0 0 2 3 .8 2 3 .2
1000-1199 0 0 0 0 0 0
1200-1399 1 9 . 1 6 11.5 7 11.3
1400-1599 0 0 3 5 . 8 3 4 .8
1600-1799 2 1 8 . 2 12 23.1 14 22.6
1800-1999 5 4 5 . 2 13 2 5 .O 18 2 9 .0
2000-2199 2 18.2 3 5 .8 5 8.1
2200-2399 0 0 2 3 .8 2 3.2
2400+ 1 9.1 10 1 9 . 2 11 17.7
No answer 0 0 1 M 1 M
Total 11 100 52 100 63 100
Median Income 
33. To convert to
of Works 
s te r l in g
Sample 
, at the
1838  DM net per month, 
time of the study £L = ,3.75 dm.
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Table 6 1 .
Time o f employment in works•
Question! S e it  wann sind Sie in diesem Werk besch aftig t 7
Time Acid
F
Plant
$
Works
F
Sample
<... p  .... . ..... ..
Total 
F $
1-2 years 0 0 2 3.8 2 3 .2
3-5 years 1 9 .1 3 5-8 4 6.3
6-10 years 0 0 9 17*3 9 14.3
1 1 - 1 5  years 4 36.4 16 30.8 20 31.7
16+ years 6 54-5 22 42.3 28 44.4
Total 11 100 52 100 63 100
Median time of employment for works sample = 14 *7 5 years •
Table 62.
Types of s h i f t  work.
Question: Arbeiten Sie zur Zeit in . Wechselschicht?
Type Acid
F
Plant
$
Works
F
Sample
< F
Total
<p
Continuous 
(3 on, 1 o f f ) 9 81.8 24 46.2 33 52.4
2 s h i f t  
(ea r ly , la te ) 0 0 2 3 .8 2 3.2
Day s h if t 2 18.2 26 49*1 28 44 *4
Total 11 100 52 100 63 100
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Table 63*
Trade union membership.
Question: Sind Sie gewerkschaftlich organisiert?
Trade Union Acid
F
Plant
... $. . . .
Works
F
Sample
_ $ ................
Total 
F $
Chemical Workers’ 
Union 10 90.9 47 90.4 57 90.5
VAA 0 0 3 5*8 3 4 .8
DAG 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nil 1 9.1 2 3.8 3 4 .8
Total 11 100 52 100 63 100
Table 64.
Trade union officers.
Office Acid Plant Works ‘ Sample Total
F $ F $ F $
Lay Officer 2 18.2 9 17.6 11 17.7
Works councillor 0 0 5 9.8 5 8.1
Youth representative 0 0 1 2.0 1 1.6
VAA representative 0 0 1 2,0 1 1.6
No office 9 81.8 35 68.6 44 7 1 . 0
Total 11 100 5 1  100 62 100
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In te re s t  displayed in interview .
Table 65#
Degree of 
In te re s t
Acid
F
Plant
*
W orks 
F
Sample
. i
Total 
F $
1 Very in terested 0 0 7 13.4 7 11.1
2 In terested 7 63.6 24 46.1 31 49.2
3 Neither/nor 2 18.2 17 32.7 19 30.1
4 D isin terested 1 9.1 4 7 .8 5 7 .9
5 Very d is in terested 1 9 .1 0 0 1 1.7 ,
Total 11 100 52 100 63 100
-  205 “
Bibliography
(i) Sources and works
H. Adam
A.M. Anderson
Arbeitgeberverband 
Chemie Baden-Wurttem- 
berg
Arbeitgeberverband 
Chemische Industrie 
Niedersachsen
Arbeitsring der 
Arbeitgeberverbande 
der Deutschen 
Chemischen Industrie
cited.
Brauchen wir eine neue Wirtschaftspolitik?, 
Koln, 1977-
"Regulations of Occupations in Factories ....  
in European Countries, "in Sir Thomas Oliver 
(ed.), Dangerous Trades, 1902.
Satzung, Mitgliedschaften, Organisation, 
Aufgaben, Verbandsstrtiktur, Mitglieder 
und Organe, Baden-Baden, 1.1.1975*
Lohntarifvertrag, Gehaltstarifvertrag und 
Abkommen uber die Ausbildungsvergfitungen 
fur die chemische und kunststoffverarbeitende 
Industrie des Landes Niedersachsen,
Hannover, 15.6.1977.
Das Bildungswerk der Chemischen Industrie, 
Wiesbaden, 1977*
"Wahl der Aufsichtsratsmitglieder der Arbeit­
nehmer - Die Vorschriften der Wahlordnungen 
zum Mitbestimmungsgesetz," Blatter fur 
Vorgesetzte, 8/77? PP* 6-8.
Paten zur Sozialpolitik, Wiesbaden,
Folge 30, Marz 1978 
Folge 33, Mfirz 1979 
Folge 34? Sept. 1979*
Dokumentation uber die Tarifrunde 1971 der 
chemischen Industrie, no place (Wiesbaden), 
no date (l97l)*
Dokumentation uber die Tarifrunde 1977 der 
chemischen Industrie, no place (Wiesbaden), 
no date (1 9 7 7)* *
Grunds&tze fur die tarifpolitisohe Ko- 
ordinierung, no l^ace (Wiesbaden), in der 
Fassung vom 23* Juli 1976.
Hinweise ffir den Arbeitskampf, Heidelberg,
1977 *
"100 Jahre VCI," Infobrief, 10/77? pp.3-4.
"Entgelttarifvertrfigei Ansatze auf Bundes- 
ebene," Infobrief, ll/77? pp*4-5*
"Information und. Mitwirkung - Ergebnisse 
einer Umfrage bei Chemiebesch&ftigten," 
Infobrief, ll/77? P * 6 #
"Wirtschaftsinstitute: Gedampfte Aussichten," 
Infobrief, ll/77? pp.6-8.
"Sachverstandigengutachten: Lohnpolitik im 
Mit+elpunkt," Infobrief, 12/77? P«4«
"Ungewohnliche Bitte an die IG Chemie: 
Rucknahme der ManteItarifkfindigung," 
Infobrief, 12/77? P*7*
"werde ich mich bemuhen, den Dialog mit den 
Gewerkschaften in Gang zu bringen," Infobrief 
Interview mit BDA - President Otto Esser, 
Infobrief, 4/78? p*3ff*
"Zentrale Tarifgesprache," Infobrief, 4/78? 
pp.6-7•
"Sachlichkeit in den Auseinandersetzungen," 
Interview mit Erhard Bouillon, Infobrief, 
6/78, p.4ff.
"Leitende Angestellte: Abgrenzungs-Prozesse," 
Infobrief, 7/78, p.6ff.
"Bilanz der Auf sichtsratswahiben," Infobrief, 
8/78, pp.5-6.
"Auf Erdol angewiesen- Handel im Energie- 
verbrauch," Infobrief, 2/79? pp.2-3.
’•TiVi +  c joT n o i rin-n cr owov=m  M i +  b e S t i m n T U n g S g e S e t  Z ,  "
"Das Bildungswerk des Arbeitsrings-Service 
fur Fuhrungskrafte," Infobrief, 4/79? P*5*
"Jugendliche ohne Hauptsohulabschlnss - 
Tarifvertrag novelliert," Infobrief, 5/79?
p .6 •
IT n"Acht Thesen zur Rolle der Fuhrungskrafte 
in der Industriegesellschaft," (Mitglieder- 
versammlung Arbeitsring), Infobrief, 6/79? 
p.5ff.
"Deutsche Gewerkschaften 1978: Mehr Mit- 
glieder," Infobrief, 7/79? pp.3-4*
-  207 -
Association of British 
Chemical Manufacturers
ASTMS
G.S. Bain
G.S. Bain and
F. Elsheikh
G.S. Bain and
G.B. Woolven
BASF AG
Bayer AG
H. Bayer, W. Streech 
and H *E. Treu
"Wie sicher ist der Chemiebeschaftigte?"
In f o b r ie f , 7/79? PP*5~7*
"Mehr a ls  2500 Chemie-Arbeitsplatze s e i t  
Monaten nicht zu 'besetzen ," In fo b r ie f ,
8/79? pp.6 -7 .
"Organisation der deutschen Wirtschaft: 
der Arbeitsring Chemie," Infobrief, 10/79?
p . 8 .
Satzung, no place (Wiesbaden), 1976.
Schliohtungsvereinbarung fur die chemische 
In d u str ie , no place (Wiesbaden), 13 .1 .1971 .
Schlichtungsregelung fur die chemische 
In d u str ie , Mainz, 29.1*1976.
Zahlen zur S o z ia lp o lit ik  in der chemischen 
In d u str ie , 10th Revised Edition , Wiesbaden,
1979*
Report on the ohemioal industry, London,
1949.
Annual Report to Tenth Annual Conference 
Brighton, 1978, London, 1978.
The Growth of White-Collar Unionism, Oxford, 
1970.
"An In ter-Ind ustry  Analysis of Unionisation," 
BJIR , Vol.XVII, No.2, 1979? pp.137-157*
A Bibliography of British Industrial Relations, 
Cambridge, 197 9 •
Geschaftsbericht 1976, Ludwigshafen, 1977*
Arbeitsordnung, Leverkusen, 1 .1 .1 9 7 0 .
Monatslohn fur Zeitlohner, Leverkusen, 1975°
R iohtbeisp iele  fur A n g este llten ta tig k e ite n , 
no place (Leverkusen), no date.
S ie  westdeutsohe Gewerkschaftbewegung im 
Spiegel der Zahlen. Ein Handbuoh zur 
organisationsstrukturellen  Entwicklung von 
In d u str ie -  und Berufsverbanden, Frankfurt,
1980.
_ 208 _
R. Bean
H. Bechtel 
J.J. Beer
G. Beier
D.W.F. Bendix
J. Bergmann in 
SSRC
J.Bergmann, 0.18.0 0131, 
W. Muller-Jentsch
BG Chemie
K. von Beyme
H. Beynon
H.J. Bischoff
J.A. Black and
D.J. Champion
R. Blauner
F. Bleistein
"The relationship between strikes and 
'unorganised * conflict in manufacturing 
industries," BJIR, Vol.XIII, No.l, 1975,
pp.98-101•
Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte Peutschlands, 
Munchen, 1 9 6 7• '
The Emergence of the German Dye Industry,
Urbana, 1957•
Pas Lehrstuck vom 1. & 2. Mai 1933. Frankfurt,
1975.
Limits to Codetermination? Industrial Democracy 
in the Federal Republic of Germany 1945-77. 
Institute of Industrial Relations, University 
of South Africa, Pretoria, 1978*
Industrial Democracy: international views,
Papers given at SSRC Internation Conference 
on Industrial Democracy, held at Churchill 
College, 4-8 July 1977, Coventry, 1978.
Gewerkschaften in der BRD, Vol.l, 
Gewerkschaftliche Lohnpolitik- zwischen 
Mitgliederinteressen und okonomisohen 
Systemzwangen, Frankf urt/Koln, 197 5 *
Jahresberioht 1973. no place (Heidelberg), 
no date (19 7 4)•
Jahresberioht 1977* no place (Heidelberg), 
no date (1978).
Gewerkschaften und Arbeitsbeziehungen in 
kapitalitischen Landern, Munchen, 1977*
Working for Ford, Harmondsworth, 1973.
Die Einigungsstelle im Betriebsverfassungsrecht,
1975.
Methods and Issues in Social Research,
New York, 1976.
Alienation and Freedom, the Factor?/' Worker and 
his industry, Chicago and London, 1964.
Betriebsverfassung in der Praxis, (Praxis- 
naher Leitfaden und Kommentar zum BetrVG
1972), Bonn, 1974.
-  209 -
0. Blume
G.B.J. Bomers and 
R.G. Peterson
I. Boraston, 
H.A. Clegg and 
M. Rimmer
H. Borsdorf, 
H.O* Hemmer and 
M. Martiny
E. Bouillon
V .A. Broadhurst
D. Burtenshaw
S. Gameron
S. Castles and
G. Kosack
R. Charles
Chemical Age
Chemical and Allied 
Industries, Engineering 
and Building Trades 
Craftsmen
Chemical and Allied 
Industries JIC
Chemical Data 
Services
Normen und Wirklichkeit einer Betriebs- 
verfassung, Tubingen, 1964*
"Multinational Corporations and Industrial 
Relations: The Case of West Germany and 
the Netherlands," BJIR, Vol.XV, No.l, 1977? 
p.45ff.
Workplace and Union: a Study of Local 
Relationships in Fourteen Unions, London*
1975*
Grundlagen der Einheitsgevjerksohaft, 
Historische Dokumente und Materialien, 
Frankfurt/K0In, 1977•
Betriebliche Sozialpolitik in unserer Zeit, 
Grundsatzliches zur Sozialpolitik bei Hoechst, 
no place (Frankfurt), no date (1978).
"What the manager needs to know about safety 
reps," Works Management, Aug. 1978, pp.30-34*
Economic Geography of West Germany, London 
and Basingstoke, 1974*
"Naphtha rises start new ICI price round," 
Financial Times, 23-5*79? P * 1 0 .
"Immigrant Workers and Trade Unions in the 
German Federal Republic," Radical America,
Vol.8, No.6, 1974, PP*55-77*
The Development of Industrial Relations in 
Britain 1911-39? London, 1973*
"Chemical Age Survey - West Germany," 25*5*68.
"German employers say claims excessive,"
15*4*77? P*l.
"CA 200: A Chemical Age Survey," 20.7*79*
Wages and Conditions, no place, Sept .77 •
Constitution and Schedule of wages and con­
ditions , no place, Dec.1976*
Chemfacts: Federal Republic of Germany, 
London, 1976.
-  210 -
Chemicals EDC
Chemical Industries 
Association
Chemistry and 
Industry
J. Child
J. Clark
H.A. Clegg
G. Cole and 
R. Stuart-Kotze
CIR Study No.3
Committee of Inquiry 
on Industrial Re­
lations (Chairman 
Lord Bullock)
Chemical Plant Data Book, London, under 
constant revision.
Chemicals Manpower in Europe, London, 1 9 7 3 *
Manpower in the Chemioal Industry: A Study of 
British and American Practices, London, 1967*
UK Chemicals 1975-1985, London, 1976.
Activities Report, London, 1974/5? 1975/6,
1977, 1978.
making success happen, Enterprise and change 
in British Chemicals, London, no date (1977?)•
Submission to the Committee of Inquiry on 
Industrial Democracy, London, 25.3.1976.
UK Chemical Industry Statistics, 8th Edition, 
London, 1976.
"Bulloolc sparks ohemical reaction," 5*2.77?
p .88.
"Europe's troubled fibre industry - a home 
for masochists," 5*2.77? P«95«
The Industrial Supervisor, The University of 
Aston Management Centre, Working Paper Series
No.33, 1975.
"Concerted Action in the Federal Republic of 
Germany," BJIR, Vol.XVII, No.2 ,  1 9 7 9 ?  p p . 2 4 2 -  
258.
The Changing System of Industrial Relations 
in Great Britain, Oxford, 1979•
The System of Industrial Relations in Great 
Britain, 3rd Edition, Oxford, 1976.
"Employee Attitude Surveys - a neglected 
technique," Optimum, Vo1.10, No.l, 1979? 
pp.22-29 *
Recognition of White-Collar Unions in Engineer­
ing and Chemicals, London, 1973*
Report, Cmnd. 6706, London, 1977*
-  2.11. -
S. Cotgrove,
J. Dunham and 
C. Vamplew
S.F. Cotgrove and 
C• Vamplew
C. Crouoh
c s o
E.C.M. Cullingford 
DAG
R. Dahrendorf
W. D&ubler
F.Deppe, J.V.Freyberg, 
C.Kievenheim, R.Meyer 
and F.Werkmeister
F.Deppe,
K.Fulberth and 
H.-J. Harrer (eds.)
DGB
DGB - Abteilung 
Gesellschaftspolitik
Deutsches Institut 
fxir Wirtschafts- 
forschung
K. Done
W. Dreibus, G. Rose,
A. Weisner,
J .  Walter
The Nylon Spinners, London, 1971*
"Technology, c la ss  and p o l i t i c s , "  Sociology, 
V o l.6 , May 1972, pp.169 - 1 8 5 . —  —
The P o l i t i c s  of In d u str ia l R e la tio n s , London, 
1979.
Monthly Digest of S t a t i s t i c s ,  No.402, June
1 9 7 9 ? p.118.
Standard In d u str ia l  C la s s i f ic a t io n s , 3rd 
Ed ition , London, 1968.
Trade Unions in West Germany, London, 1976.
Programm der DAG zur G e se l ls c h a fts p o li t ik , 
Hamburg, 1976.
G esellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland, 
Munchen, 1965•
Das A rb e itsre ch t, Reinbelc bei Hamburg, 1976. 
K r it ik  der Mitbestimmung, Frankfurt, 1973*
Die Geschichte der deutschen Gewerkschafts- 
bewegung, Koln, 1977*
Mitbestimmung .jetzt -  und keine halben Sachen, 
Referentenmaterial zur Mitbestimmung,
Dusseldorf, 8/ 7 4 .
Gewerkschaften und Mitbestimmung, 
Sch riften reih e  der Bundeszentrale fur 
p o lit isch e  Bildung, Band 128, Bonn, 1978.
Die Deutsche Industrie im Kriege 1939-1945? 
no p lace , 1 9 5 4 *
"German Chemicals, Giant at bay," Financial 
Times, 6 . 6 . 7 8 .
"B e isp ie l eines Arbeitsprogramms fur Betriebs 
r a t e , "  Der B e tr ie b sra t , V o l.27, No.3/ 4 , 1978, 
p . l 7 3 f f .
-  212 -
Drug and Fine 
Chemical Joint 
Conference
C. Duisberg
W. Dzielak, W.Hindrichs,
H. Martens,
V. Stanislawski and 
W. Wassermann
D.R. Ebsworth
B. Edwards
P *K • Edwards
Mr. Egerton
R.C. Estall and 
R.0. Buchanan
European Industrial 
Relations Review
F. Fitting,
F. Auffarth,
H. Kaiser
Schedule of Wage Rates and Working Conditions, 
no place, Jan.76.
Die A,rbeiterschaft der chemischen Gross- 
industrie, Berlin, 1921.
Belegschaften und Gewerkschaften im Streik, 
Frankfurt, 1978*
"Arbitration in West Germany as illustrated by 
the chemical industry* Is this a continuation 
of bargaining?", unpublished paper presented to 
the Federal Trust for Education and Research 
Seminar on "Conciliation and Arbitration in 
Britain and West Germany," held at University 
of Surrey, Guildford, on 21.4*1978.
Die deutsche chemische Industrie, unpublished
B.Sc. dissertation, University of Surrey, 
Guildford, 1976*
"Lay Officers in the German Chemical Workers 1 
Union: a Case Study,mIndustrial Relations 
Journal, forthcoming, 1980*
Chemicals: servant or master? Life or Death?, 
London, 1945*
"Strikes and Unorganised conflict: some further 
considerations," BJIR, Vol.XVII, No.l, 1979? 
pp.95-98.
Personal Communication, Annual Census of 
Production, Newport, 7*9*1979*
Industrial Activity and Economic Geography, 
Revised Edition, London, 1966.
"West Germany: The Importance of Arbitration," 
No.55, August 1978, pp.21-22.
"West Germany: Compiling a social balance 
sheet," No.66, July 1979? pp*78.
"West German unions and employers bury their 
differences," No*68, Sept. 1979? P * 2 *
Betri ebsverfassungsgesetz, Handkommentar,
10th Edition, Munchen, 1972*
-  213 -
A. Flanders
M. Fores,
P. Lawerence and 
A. Sorge
R. Fricke
F. Furstenberg 
J . Galtung 
R. Geipel 
GMWU
The Fawley Productivity Agreements: A case 
study of management and c o l le c t iv e  bargain­
in g , London, 1 9 6 4 .
In d u str ia l  R e la tion s : What i s  wrong with the 
system? An Essay on i t s  Theory and Future, 
London, 1 9 6 5 *
"Germany’ s F ron t-lin e  F o rce ,"  Management 
Today, March 1978, pp.87- 8 9 , 1 5 8 .
IJber das Wesen der Chemie. und ihre Bedeutung 
fur Volk and V olksw irtschaft, S tu ttg a r t ,
1936.
Die Soziallage der Chemiearbeiter, Neuwied 
and B e r lin ,  1969*
Theory and Methods of Socia l  Research, London, 
1967.
Industriegeographie a ls  Einfuhrung in der 
A rbeitsw elt, Braunschweig, 1 9 6 9 .
Chemical Industries Review, Esher, 1978.
A Guide to the General Municipal Workers1 
Union, Esher, 1976.
The GMWU, the Bullock Report and In d u str ia l 
Democracy, document fo r  discussion, August,
1977 •
UK Chemicals: The Way Forward, Esher, no date
( 1 9 7 7 ? ) .
Gesetz uber B e tr ie b sa r tz e , Siohertheitsingenieure und andere Fachkrafte 
fur A rb e its s ic h e rh e it , Bgb.I, 1 8 8 5 , 12.12.1973*
C.G. G ill  and 
M. Warner
C. G i l l ,  R. Norris 
(Morris, misprint 
in o r ig in a l)  and 
J .  Eaton
"Managerial and Organisational Determinants 
of In d u str ia l  C o n f l ic t : the ohemioal industry 
c a s e ,"  Journal of Management Stud ies, V ol.16, 
N o.l, 1979, pp.56-69.
"Employer Organisation in the UK Chemical 
Industry ," In d u stria l Relations Journal,
V o l.9 , N o.l, 1978, pp.37-47.
C. G i l l ,  J .  Eaton, 
R. Morris
In d u str ia l  Relations in the Chemical Industry, 
Farnborough, 197 8•
-  214 -
S. Gipperich et al. 
J.F.B. Goodman
A.W. Gottschalk and 
Mee
Gower Economic 
Publications
H. Grebing
W. Greiling
H. Grunewald
E. Grutzner
L .F . Haber
K. Hansen
Dr. Hansel
H. Hartmann
"Managerial Control and Collective Bargaining: 
some 'political1 aspects of job evaluation in 
a multi-site enterprise," Personnel Review,
Vol.6, No.4, Autumn 1977? pp.51-57*
Gewerkschafter ffir einen besseren BetriebsratI 
handbill, Leverkusen, 1978*
"Government Agencies and Productivity Bargain­
ing, in B.Towers, T.G.Wittingham and A.W. 
Gottschalk (eds.), Bargaining for Change, 
London, 1972.
"Productivity bargaining, the Management 
Function and the Behavioural Science," in 
Ibid.
UK Chemical Industries Review 1974-75* London, 
1974*
The history of the German labour movement, 
London, 1969*
75 Jahre Chemieverband, Frankfurt, 1952.
"Bayer's formula for product innovation," 
International Management, Feb.1978, pp.18-21•
"Ne\ie Schwerpunkte der Tarifpolitik," Gp,
5/7 9 , p.4.
The Chemical Industry during the Nineteenth 
Century, Oxford, 1958*
The Chemical Industry 1900-1930, Oxford, 1971*
"Report on the company's activities," Bayer- 
Berichte, English Edition, 3l/l973, pp.1-9.
"Die Auswirkungen der Regierungsbeschlusse in 
der Praxis eines Unternehmens," transcript 
of paper presented to EDA, Koln, 26.3*74*
Personal Communication, VAA, Koln, 2.2.1979*
Authority and Organisation in German Manage­
ment , 2nd Edition, Westport, Connecticut,
1970.
"Works Councils and the Iron Lav; of Oligarchy," 
BJIR, Vol.XVII, No.l, 1979? pp.70-82.
K, Hauenschild "Luckenhaft und ungereimt," Wirtschaftswoche, 
No.3, 13*1*78, p.23*
-  215 -
W.O. Henderman
K. Hernekamp 
G• Himmelmann
K. Hirche
H. Hochgreve
Hoechst AG
K. Hofer 
W.G. Hoffmann
K.O. Hondrich
A. Horne
J. Huffschmid 
H. Schui (eds.
R. Hyman
"West Germany" in G. Levinson (ed.) Industry*s 
Democratic Revolution, London, 1972.
The Rise of German Industrial Power 1834-1914? 
London, 1975*
Arheitskampf, Aktuelle Dokumente, Berlin, 1974*
Lohnbildung durch Kollektiwerhandlungen,
Berlin, 1971.
Die Finanzen der Gewerkschaften, Dusseldorf 
and Wien, 1972.
"Moglichkeiten und Grenzen gesamtwirtschaftlicher 
Mitbestimmung," Pie Neue Gesellsohaft, Vol.23* 
No.6, 1976, pp.492-4*
Bericht aus dem Personal- und Sozial'bereich 
Hoechst Konzem 1976, no place (Frankfurt), 
no date (1 9 7 7) •
Beriofat aus dem Personal- und Sozial'bereich 
Hoechst Konzern 1977? no place (Frankfurt),
. no date (1978)•
Betriebsvereinbarung uber betriebliche 
Vertrauensmanner, Frankfurt(Mj- Hochst,
13.3.1967*
Gesch^ ftsbericht 1977. Frankfurt, 1978.
"Buros-Bildschirme-Belastungen," Gewerkschaft- 
liohe Umsohau, 5/19 79> pp.2-4*
"The Take-Off in Germany," in W.W.Rostow (ed.), 
The Economic Take-Off and Sustained Growth,
New York and London, 1963•
"Mitbestimmung und Funktionsfahigkeit von 
Unternehmen," Pas Mitbestimmungsgespr&ch,
No.9/10, 1975, pp.157-162.
Per beklagte Sieg, Gesprach uber die Mit­
bestimmung, 2nd Edition, Villingen, 1964.
and Gesellschaft im Konkurs? Handbuch zur
) Wirtsohaftskrise 1973-76 in der BRP, Koln,
1976.
Disputes Procedure in Action: A Study of the
    - -—n i -   - r r   t  t tii   fr- Trim i 1 — m t  i
Engineering Disputes Procedure in Coventry, 
London, 1972.
-  216 -
IDS Brief 
F. Ische
IG Chemie 
Keramik
Strikes, 2nd Edition, Glasgow, 1977*
"Bullock* Examination Continued," No.103,
Feb. 1977? pp.3-4*
"Wir sind nicht eine Gewerkschaft im Sinne 
einer ICampforganisation gegen den Kapitalismus," 
Infobrief, 9/77) pp.6-8.
"Der DGB sollte seine diskriminierden Angriffe 
gegen die ULA einstellen," Infobrief, 5/79?
7-8.
•Papier- "Sozialplan," Der Betriebsrat, Vol.26, No.4)
1977-
"BR-Wahl 1978 - SchneHubersicht," . Der 
Betriebsrat, Vol.28, No.3, 1919, p.64.
Gesohaftsbericht 1963-1965 (zum 7* ordentlichen 
Gewerkschaftstag in Dortmund vom 4 . his 10.9.66) 
Hannover, no date (1966)
Gesohaftsbericht 1966-1968 (zum 8. ordentlichen 
Gewerkschaftstag in Wiesbaden vom 31.8. bis
6.9.1969), Hannover, no date (I969)
Gesohaftsbericht 1969-1971 (zum 9> ordentlichen 
Gewerkschaftstag in Dortmund vom 17.9. his 
23.9.1972), Hannover, no date (1972)
GeschgLftsbericht 1972-1975 (zum 10."ordentlichen 
Gewerkschaftstag in Hamburg vom 19. bis 
25*9."1976}) Ilannover, no date (197 6)
Gesohaftsbericht 1976-1979 (zum 11. ordentlichen 
Gewerkschaftstag in Mannheim vom 7. bis. 
13.9.1980), Hannover, no date (1980).
"Die Srgebnisse der 2. Bundesarbeitstagung der 
IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik in Munchen," 
Gewerkschaftliche Umschau, 6/7 8, Dokumentation.
"Wir fordern," Gp. 4/77? p.3.
"Chemier.unde zugespizt," Gp. 5/77? p.3«
"Chemie-Runde lrf 8 :  Spitzengesprache ,"
Gp. 4/78, p.2.
"Mehr Urlaub - Mehr Geld - Chemie Tarifrunde
7 8 , Gjd. 5/7 8 , p.3.
"Jeder Vierte geht auf Schioht, (Die Probleme 
der Rchichtarbeiter and was fur sie getan 
werden)," Gp. 2/7 9 ? pp.10-11.
-  217 -
"Berufung b le ib t  Ausnahme," Gp_*3/79? p*2.
"Xlares J a ,  kein Aber (Mitbestimmungsurteil), "
5 £ .  3/79? p .4 .
"Geschafft I Sechs Wochen Urlaub, " G£.4/79,
pp.1 - 2 .
"Anderung der Satzung," Gp_. 4/79? p .2.
"Pro jekt S ch io h ta rb e it : Erste  Runde g e s c h a f f t ,"  
Qfi. 9 /79 , P - 8 .
"Sechs Prozent mehr bei M ineralo l,"  Gp_.ll/79?
p . 8 .
M anteltarifvertrag  fur gewerbliche Arbeit­
nehmer und A ngestellte  dbr chemischen 
Industrie vom 22. Februar 1973 in der Fassung 
vom 1. Mai 1978? Hannover, 1978.
"Tarifrunde Chemie 1977• E rs te r  Abschluss in 
Hessen, 7# mehr Lohn und G ehalt," Pressed ien st, 
X I I l /2 1 ,  2 8 .4 .7 7 .  — — ■
"Hauptvorstand e r t e i l t  Streikgenehmigung," 
P ressed ien st, VTII (X I I I? ) /2 3 ,  27*5.1977.
"Tarifrunde Chemie 1977 erfo lg re ich  beendet," 
P ressed ien st, VIII (X III? )/2 5 ?  2 8 . 6 . 1 9 7 7 .
"IG Chemie Hauptvorstand warat Arbeitgeber 
der chemischen In d u str ie ,"  Pressed ien st,
X I I l / 2 8 , 13 .7 .1977 .
"IG Chemie- Hauptvorstand zur Entlastung des 
Arbeitsmarktes fur weitere A rb e its z e it -  
verkurzung -  Aufforderung an Tarifkommissionen," 
P ressed ien st, X I I l / 2 9 ? 13*7*1977*
"Chemische Industrie -  IG Chemie Mantel- 
tarifkommission b er ie t  Forderungen,"
P ressed ien st, X IIl/31?  21.7*77*
"Chemische In d u str ie :  A rbeitsplatze sichern 
und sch a ffen ,"  P ressed ienst, X IIl/3 7 ?  3 0 .8 .77*
"Chemische In d u str ie :  Erstmals T arifv ertrag  
gegen Ju g en d arb eitslosig k eit , "  P ressed ienst, 
X I I l /4 1 ,  13*9*77*
"Jahresubersicht 1977s 13* Jahrgang," 
P ressed ien st, X IIl/51?  29*12.77*
-  218 -
"Chemische In d u str ie :  IG Chemie -  Hauptvor­
stand gibt Empfehlungen fur die Tarifrunde 
1978," Pressed ien st, X IV /l, 1 6 .1 .7 8 .
"IG Chemie-Hauptvorstand und Beirat zum 
Arbeitskampf in der Druck- und M etall- 
in d u s tr ie ,"  P ressedienst, XIV/5 , 1 5 . 3 . 7 8 .
"Erste Lohn- und Gehaltsforderungen -  
Spitzengesprach in  Aachen," Pressed ien st,
x iv /8 ,  2 9 . 3 , 7 8 .
"Ergebnisse der Spitzengesprache in Munchen," 
P ressed ien st, X IV /l2 , 13 .4*78 .
"Tarifkommissionen stimmen Ergebnis zu -  IG 
Chemie Hauptvorstand nimmt Tarifvereinbarungen 
an ,"  Pressed ien st, XIV/l3, 17*4*78.
"Aufsichtsratswahlen -  fiberzeugender E rfo lg  
der IG Chemie," Pressed ien st, XIV/20, 2 6 . 6 . 7 8 .
" In t  em at i  onal e Mineral 0 lge s e l l s  chaf t  en- 
Tarifrunde erfo lg re ich  abgeschlossen," 
P ressed ien st, XIV/4 2 , 4 .1 2 .7 8 .
"Tarifgesprach uber M anteltarif  und Lohn -  
und Gehaltsrunde," P ressed ien st, XV/12, 
26 .2 .79*
"4*3 Prozent mehr Lohn und Gehalt-Sechs 
Wochen Urlaub fur a l le  ab 1984  -  Mehr 
zusatzliches Urlaubsgeld," Pressed ien st,
XV/20, 2 6 .3 .7 9 .  ^  •
"Tarifrunde Chemische In d u str ie :  Tarifrunde 
abgeschlossen: Alle Tarifkommissionen 
stimmten zu," Pressed ienst, XV/22, 2 .4 *7 9 .
tt
"IG Chemie Beirat tag t in Essen: Anderung 
der Satzung besohlossen, "  P ressed ienst,
XV/2 4 , 5 -4 .7 9 .
"Vertrauenserklarung fur ICarl Hauenschild, 
Verurteilung tendenzioser Berichterstattu ng 
der ’Frankfurter Rundschau*," Pressed ienst,
XV/2 5 , 5 -4 .7 9 -
"IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik s c h l ie s s t  
Vertrauensleutewahlen erfo lg re ich  ab ,"  
P ressed ien st, XV/7 0 , 6 .12 .79*
-  219 -
Protokoll des 8. Ordentlichen Gewerkshaftstages 
in Wiesbaden vom 31.8. bis 6.9.69, Hannover^  
no date (1970?).
Protokoll des 9* Ordentlichen Gewerkshaftstages 
in Dortmund vom 17. bis 22.9.1972, Hannover, 
no date (197 37).
Protokoll des 10. Ordentlichen Gewerkshaftstages 
in Hamburg vom 19. his 25.9.76, Hannover, 
no date (1977?).
Richtlinien fur Betriebsratewahlen, no place 
(Hannover), 15*7.77*
Richtlinien fUr Gewerlcschaftliche Vertrauens­
leute der IG Chemie, no place (Hannover), 
1 4 .1 2 .7 6 .
Richtlinien fair die Tarifarbeifr, no place 
(Hannover), 1.1.73.
Satzung 77, no place (Hannover), 1.1.77*
Wahlkurier der BGB-Gewerksohaften IG Chemie- 
Papier-Keramik - IG Metall - IG Druok und 
Papier zur Aufsichtsratswahl bei Gunter Wagner 
Pelikan in Hannover am 31. Januar und 1.
Februar 1978? Hannover, no date (1977).
IG Chemie-Papier- BiIdungsprogramm, Winterhalbjahr 1978/79*
Keramik, Verwaltungs- 
stelle Leverkusen
IG Metall Gesohaftsbericht 1974-76, Frankfurt, 1977*
Interim Report on Standing Joint Industrial Councils, Cmnd. 8608, 
London, 1917*
P. Jackson and 
K. Sisson
0. Jacobi
0. Jacobi, W. Muller- 
Jentsch,
E. Sohmidt (ed s .)
"Employers * Confederations in Sweden and the 
UK," BJIR, Vol.XIV, No.3, 1976, pp.306-323.
"Die innerverbandliche SteHung der Vertrauens­
leute in der IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik," in 
0. Jacobi, W. Muller-Jentsch, E. Schmidt (edso)} 
Gewerkshaften und Klassenkampf, Kritisch.es 
Jahrbuch 1973, Frankfurt, p.83ff.
"Betriebsratswahlen 1972" in Ibid., p.57ff*
Gewerkshaftspolitik in der Krise, Kritisches 
Gewerkschaftsjahrbuch 1977/78, Berlin, 1978.
-  220 -
R. Juhe 
U. Kadnitzke 
H. Kaelbe
0. Kahn-Freund
II. Kern and 
M. Schumann
T. Kirkwood and 
H. Mewes
M. Kittner 
E. Koch
E.R. Koch and
F. Vahrenholt
K. Koch
Gewerkschaftspresse, Beitrage zur Gesellschafts- 
und Bildungspolitik, Institut der deutschen 
Wirtschaft, No.22, Koln, 1977*
Angestellten - die geduldigen Arbeiter.
Zur Soziologie und sozialen Bewegung der 
Angestellte, Frankfurt and Koln, 1975*
Industrielle Interessenpolitik in der 
Wilhelminischen Gesellschaft: Centralverband 
Deutsoher Industrieller 1895-1914, Berlin,
1967*
Labour and the Law, 2nd Edition, London, 1977*
Industriearbeit und Arbeiterbewusstsein,
2 volumes, 3rd Edition, Frankfurt and Koln,
1974.
"The limits of Trade Union Power in the 
Capitalist Order: The Case of West German
Labour's Quest for Codetermination," BJIR,
Vol.XIV, No.3, 1976, pp.295-305. ......
The Role of Trade Unions in the German 
Federal Republic: Formula for successful 
Labour Politics in the Welfare State, 
unpublished manuscript (1976?).
Arbeits- und Sozialordnung, 3rd Edition,
Koln, 1978.
"Chemie kann die Kohle besser nutzen,"
Die Welt, 4*1*74*
"Chemie - Das unheimliche Risiko,"
Part 1, Stern, 7*9*78, pp.66-77*
Part 2, Stern, 14*9*78, pp.66-7 6 .
Part 3, Stern, 21.9*78, pp. 120-8,.
S'eveso ist uberall - Die tBdlicheiRisiken der 
Chemie, Koln, 1978.
"Conciliation in West Germany", unpublished 
paper presented to the Federal Trust for 
Education and Research Seminar held at 
University of Surrey, Guildford on 21.4*78.
Trade Union Workshop Representatives (Gewerk- 
schaftliche Vertrauensleute) in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, mimeographed report for 
the Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of 
Industrial Society, no place (London), 1978.
H. Kotthoff
H. Kramer
Kronos Titan GmbH 
M. Kruk
M• Kruper
J. Kurucz (e'd.)
O.Graf Lambsdorff
F. Landwehrmann 
and R, Albring
H • G • Lang
A. Leisewitz
S.W. Lerner
-  221 -
Soziale Wirksamkeit des Betriebsverfassungs-- 
gesetzes, Teil A: Ergebnisse der Betriebs­
rat e be fragung, mimeographed report, University 
of Freiburg, Institute of Industrial Sociology*
1976.
"Was bei der Wahl der Vertrauensleute zu 
beachten ist," Gewerkschaftliche Umsohau,
4/79, PP-5-7-
Arbeitsordnung, Leverkusen, 8.10.75*
"Me hundert gross ten Unt ernehmen,"
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Nr.197?
4 .9 .7 6 , p.15*
"Kraftiges Lohnplus notwendig und moglich," 
Gewerkschaftliche Umschau, 2/77? p.2ff.
"Veba Konzern jetzt massgeschneidert?," 
Gewerkschaftliche Umschau, 4/?8, pp.14-17*
?i
Das Selbstverstandnis von Nat urwis sens chaf t- 
lem in der Industrie, Ergebnisse einer 
Betragung promovierter Industriechemiker, 
Weinheim/Bergstr •, 1972. * j
I
"Wir setzen auf die gesamtwirtschaftliche 
Einsicht der selbstst&ndig entscheidenen 
Tarifparteien," Infobrief, 12/77? p.2f.
Information und Mitwirkung, Mittel betrieblicher 
Fuhrung, Heidelberg, no date (1977?).
"Gewerkschaftsausschlusse in Hoechst - die 
IG Chemie statuiert ein Exempel," in 0.Jacobi 
et al. (eds.), 1978, op.oit.
"Innergewerkschaftliche Auseinandersetzung bei 
Bayer, Hoeohst and BASF," in 0, Jacobi,
W. Muller-Jentsch, E. Schmidt (eds.) Arbeiter- 
interessen gegen Sozialpartnerschaft, Kritisch.es 
Gewerkschaftsjahrbuch 1978/79< Berlin, 1979«
|
"Me Auswirkungen der Verwissenschaftlichung 
der Produktion auf $ie Monopolbildung und auf 
das Verhaltnis von Okonomie und Politik, 
dargestellt am Beispiel der chemischen In­
dustrie," Teil 1, Das Argument, Vol.14? No.
5/ 6 , 1 9 7 2 .
j
Breakaway Unions and the Small Trade Union,
London, I 96I 0
-  222 -
G. Levinson
H. Limmer 
N. Lin
S.M. L ip set, M.Trow 
and J .  Coleman
L. Losacker 
R .B . McKersie
J • McMullen
H. Maasen
A.I. Marsh
P. Mathias and 
M.M. Postan (eds.)
?. ter Meer
Inflation, das weltweite Phanomen, Hamburg,
1972.
Die deutsche Gewerkschaftsbewegung, Munchen,
1973.
Foundations of Social Research, New York,
1976.
Union Democrac?;-, Glencoe, 111., 1956*
"Portrait eines Verbandes" in Arbeitsring 
Chemie, 25 Jahre Arbeitsring Chemie,
Wiesbaden, 1974*
"The Significance of Productivity Bargaining 
in Grea-t Britain," in B.C. Roberts (ed.), 
Industrial Relations; Contemporary Issues, 
London, 1968, p.220f.
Rights at Work, London, 1978.
Verfassnngsbeschwerde der ... Arbeitgeber- 
vereinigungen ... gegen ... Vorschriften 
des MitbestG vom 4*5*1976, Bonn-Bad Godesberg, 
26.6.1977*
Verfassungsbewerde gegen ... Vorschriften des 
MitbestG vom 4*5*1976. Besohwerdefuhrer 
sind ... Alctiengesellschaften ... Gesell— 
schaften mit beschrankter Haftung ••«, Bonn- 
Bad Godesberg, 26.6.1977*
"The Contribution of Employers' Associations," 
in B. Towers, T.G. Whittingham and A.W, 
Gottschalk, Bargaining for Change, London, 
1972. ‘  ^ ~  ~
Industrial Relations in Engineering, Oxford 
and London, 1965*
"The Staffing of Industrial Relations Manage­
ment in Engineering," Industrial Relations 
Journal, Vol.2, No.2, 1971) pp.14-23.
The Cambridge Economic History of Europe,
V ol.V II, The In d u stria l Economies? C ap ita l ; 
Labour and En terp rise , Part 1, B r i ta in ,
France, Germany and Scandinavia, Cambridge, 
1978.
Die IG Farbenindustrie AG, Busseldorf, 1953.
-  223 -
W. Mehte and 
M. Reimann
W. Meissner and 
L. Unterseher (ed s .)
0 . Mickler,
E. D it t r ic h  and 
U. Neumann
D. M iller
C. Milton
Mitbestimmungsgesetz
4 .5 .1 9 7 6 .
MonopoIkommissi on
C.A. Moser and
G. Kalton
P.E . Mott, P.C.Mann, 
0 .  McLoughlin and
D.P. Warwick
W. Munde
B. Muszynski
P. Naphtali
A.P. Napp-Zinn
BASF A ktiengesellschaft -  Sozialbilanz -  
Analyse -  K r i t ik , IG Chemie, Verxwaltungsstelle 
Ludxwigshafen, no date (1977?)*
Verteilungskampf und S t a b i l i t a t s p o l i t i k , 
S tu ttg a r t ,  1972.
Technik, Arbeitsorganisation und A rbeit, Eine 
empirische Untersuchung der automatisierten 
Produktion, Frankfurt, 1976.
"Trade Union Workplace Representatives in the 
Federal Republic of Germany: An analysis of
the Postwar Vertrauenslevxte policy  of the 
German Metalworkers1 Union t5 2 - t77?" BJIR,
Vol.XVI, No.3, 1978, pp.335-355.
Das w ir tsch a ft l ich e  Wachstum der Bundes- 
republik Deutschland se i t  der Wahrungsreform 
1948, unpublished B .Sc . d is se r ta t io n ,
University of Surrey, Guildford, 1975*
E rste  Wahlordnung, Bgb. 1977* IS 8 6 l ,  Zweite 
Wahlordnung, Bgb. 1977 IS .  893, D ritte  Wahlord­
nung, Bgb. 1977 I S . 934*
Hauptgutachten 1973/75* Mehr Weltbexwerb i s t  
moglich, Baden-Baden, 1976*
Survey Methods in S o cia l In v estig a tio n s ,
2nd E d ition , London, 1971*
S h if t  work: the s o c ia l ,  psychological and 
physical consequences, University of Michigan 
Press, 1 9 6 5 *
"Die Chemische Industrie der BRD?" Ind.Chem. 
B elg . , V o l.38, No.5, 1973, p .5 3 5 ff*
W irtschaftliche Mitbestimmung zwisohen K o n flik t-  
und Harmoniekonzeptionen, Meisenheim am Gian,
1975*
Wirtschaftsdemokratie, Ihr Wesen, Weg, Z ie l , 
reprinted , Frankfurt, 1966.
"W irtschaftsrate  und uber b e tr ie b lic h e  Mit­
bestimmung in Deutschland, in W. Weddigen (e d .) ,  
Zur Theorie und Praxis der Mitbestimmung,
B e r l i n ,  19 6 4 ? p p .6 1 -1 5 4 *
-  2 2 4  -
N ationalrat der 
Nationalen Front 
des demokratischen 
Beutschlan&s (eds. )
0 .  Neuloh
New York Times
T. Nichols and 
P. Armstrong
T. Nichols and
H. Beynon
N.H.Nie, C.A.Hull, 
J .G .  Jenkins,
K. Steinbrexmer and
D.H. Bent
H.-U. Niedenhoff
C. Noe
H.R* Northrup and 
R .L . Warton
NPBI
OECD
P .v . Oertzen
B. Otto
M. Panic (ed .)
B. Partridge
M. P eltzer
Weissbuch uber die amerikanisch-englische 
In terv en tio n sp o lit ik  und. das Wiedererstehen 
des deutschen Imperialismus, B erlin , 1951°
"S o z ia l isa t io n  xind S c h ic h ta rb e it , 11 Soziale 
Welt, V o l.5, 1964, pp.350-369.
"S tr ik e s  and Automation," 12 .8 .1963 , p .20.
Workers Divided: A Study in Shopfloor P o l i t i c s ,  
London, 197 6•
Living with Capitalism: Class re la t io n s  in  the 
modern fa c to ry , London, 1977*
SPSS, S t a t i s t i c a l  Package fo r  the Socia l 
Sc ien ces , 2nd Edition , New York, 1975*
Die unbekannte Macht, Koln, 1975•
Gebandigter Klassenkampf: Tarifautonomie in 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, B e r lin ,  1970.
"M ultinational union a c t i v i t i e s  and plant 
c lo s in g s :  the case of AICZO," In d u str ia l 
Relations Journal, V o l.9? N o.l, 1978? 
pp.27-36.
Fay of General Workers and Craftsmen in ICI 
Ltd. , Report No.105, Cmnd. 3941? London, 1969-
The Chemical Industry 1976, no p lace , 1978.
Die Probleme der w irtsch aftlichen  Neuordnung 
und der Mitbestimmung in der Revolution von 
1918, unter besonderer Beriicksichtigung der 
M eta llind u str ie , Frankfurt, no d a te (1 9 6 2 ?7 *
Gewerkschaftsbewegung in Deutschland, Koln,
1975* ~
The UK and West German Manufacturing Industry 
1954-72, NEDO Monograph 5? London, 1976.
"The A c t iv it ie s  of Shop Stewards," In d u str ia l  
Relations Journal, V o l.8 , No.3, 1977? 
pp.28-43.
The German Labour-Management Relations A ct,
London, 1 9 7 2 .
-  225  -
R . Pennock
Personnel Management
E.H. Phelps-Brown
E. Piehl
K# Pohl and
F. Werther
P. Price and
G.S. Bain
Pro j  ektgruppe 
Gewerks chaft s f  ors chung
J .  Prott
J .  Purcell
I • Raehlmann
R a tio n a lisa tio n s-  
kuratorium der 
W irtschaft
H. R aupach
" IG I ’ s t o t a l  approach," In d u str ia l  S o c ie ty ,
Feb. 1978, pp.14-15.
"S tr ik e s  -  a break-even a n a ly s is ,"  V ol.9?
No.2, 1977? p .2 2 f f .
"Wage d r i f t , "  Economioa, Vol.XXIX, 1 9 6 2 , 
pp.339-356.
M ultinationale Konzerne raid in ternationale  
Gewerksohaftsbewegung, Nordlingen, 1975?
0 .1973 .
"M e fre ie n  Gewerkschaften im ersten W eltkrieg ," 
in  F . Deppe et a l . 1977? o p .c i t . pp.94- 1 4 5 .
"Union Growth R ev isited : 1948-1974 in per­
sp e c t iv e ,"  BJIR, Vol.XIV, No.3, 1976, p .339ff«
Rahmenbedingungen der T a r i fp o l i t ik ,  Band I , 
Gesamtwirtschaftliche Entwicklung und 
Organisation der T arifp arte ien  and Band 2 , 
Strulcturdaten der M etallverarbeitenden, der 
chemischen und der Druckindustrie, Forschungs- 
berichte des In s t i tu ts  fur Sozialforschung, 
Frankfurt am Main, Frankfurt/New York, 1979-
Tarifbewegung 77* Darstellung und Analyse 
der Tarifbewegung in der M etallverarbeitenden, 
dere.Chemischen und der Druckindustri e ,  sowie 
im O ffentlichen D ien st, Frankfurt/New York,
1978.
T a r i fp o l i t ik  unter Krisenbedingurigen. Dar­
s te llu n g  und Analyse der Tarifbewegung 1975 
und 1976 in  der Chemischen Industrie und in 
der Druckindustrie, Frankfurt/New York, 1977*
In d u str iearb e it  bei betr ieb lich en  Umstrukturier- 
ungen, Koln, 1975*
"Managers and union membership," R & D Manage­
ment , V o l.6, No.3, 1976, pp.97-103.
Der In te re ss e n s tre i t  zwischen DGB und BDA um 
die Ausweitung der q u a li f iz ie r te n  Mit— 
bestimmung -  Eine id eo lo g iek istr isch e  
Untersuohung, Koln, 1975*
Sieben B e rich te , Frankfurt, 1970.
Die Schlichtung von kollektiven  A rbeits-  
s t r e i t ig k e i te n  und ihre Probleme unter 
besonderer Beruoksichtigung der deutschen
E n tw ic k lu n g , B e r l i n ,  1 9 6 4 *
-  226 -
J .  Rauschel
W .J. Reader 
W. B . Reddaway
R. Reeves 
H. Reichel
A. Reichl
B.G. Reuben and 
M.L. B u rsta ll
Rheinisch-W estfalisches 
In s t i t u t  fair W irt- 
schaftsforschung,
Essen
H.D. Riesche
G.A. R i t te r
B. Robak
B. Robinson
J .  Roeber
F . J .  Roethlisberger
G. Rose
Die BASF: Zur Anatomie eines multinationalen 
Konzerns, K6ln, 1975.
IC I: A History, V o l . I I ,  Oxford, 1971.
"The Chemical Industry" in  D. Burns (ed *),
The Structure of B r i t is h  Industry, NIESR 
symposium, London, 1958*
"S tr ik e  may h it  chemical su p p lies ,"  F inancial 
Times, 7*9*78, p .7*
"Recent Trends in C ollective  Bargaining in 
the Federal 'Republic of Germany," In tern atio n al 
Labour Review, Dec.1971? pp.469-487*
Chemische Industrie und Aussenhandel, un­
published Doctoral Thesis, Ludwigshafen am 
Rhein, 1957*
The Chemical Economy, A guide to the tech­
nology and economics of the chemical industry, 
London, 1973, reprinted 1978.
"Tarifkalender 1975?” Kon.junkturberichte,
V o l.27, N o.l,  pp.22-23*
Zur Struktur und Funktion innergewerksohaft- 
l ic h e r  Willensbildung auf Gewerkschaftstagen 
der IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik 1948-66, un­
published Diplomarbeit, Frankfurt, 1968.
Arbeiterbevregung, Parteien und Farlament- 
arismus, Gottingen, 1976.
Indus triezx^eigstruktur und u b e r ta r if l ic h e  
Entlohnung, B e r lin , 1978.
The Nature and Extent of EmployersT Organi­
sa t io n : The B r i t is h  Chemical Industry and 
i t s  M ultinationals, unpublished M.A* d is se r ta ­
t io n ,  University of Warwick, 1976.
S o cia l Change at Work: The ICI Weekly S t a f f  
Agreement, London, 1975*
Management and Morale, Cambridge, Mass, 1943®
"Die Hauptaufgaben der B e tr ie b sra tea rb e it  
1978-1981," Per B e tr ie b s r a t , V o l.27? No.3/ 4 ? 
1978, p . l 6 9 f f .
-  227  -
W.W* Rostow
Royal Commission on 
Trade Unions and 
Employers 1 Associations 
(Chairman Lord Donovan)
R. Sasuly 
E.K. Scheuch
D. Schewe,
K. Nordkorn,
K. Schenke and 
K.-W. Hermsen
E. Schmidt
R. Schmiede
H. Schneider and
D .J .  Kingsman
H. Schulte
H.G. Schumann
M. Schumann,
P. Gerlach,
A. Geschossl. and 
P. M ilhoffer
VI.A. S c o tt ,  E. Mumford,
I .C .  McGivering and 
J.M • Kirby
The World Economy, History and Prospect,
London and Basingstoke, 1978.
Disputes Procedures in B r i ta in , Research Paper 
No.2 ,  Part I I ,  London, 19 6 8 .
Productivity Bargaining, Research Paper No#4? 
Part I ,  London, 1 9 6 7 *
IG Farben, B e r lin ,  1952.
"Das Interview in der Sozialforschung," in 
R. Konig (e d .) ,  Handbuch der empirischen 
Sozialforschung, Band 2, Grundlegende Methoden 
und Techniken der empirischen Sozialforschung, 
E rs te r  T e i l ,  S tu ttg a r t ,  1973*
t !
Ubersicht uber die Soziale  Sicherung, 9th 
E d ition , Bonn, 1975*
Die verhinderte Neuordnung 1945-1952,
Frankfurt and Koln, 1970*
"Betriebsnahe T a r i fp o l i t ik  und Mitbestimmung 
durch Arbeitsgruppen," in H. Huss and E. 
Schmidt (ed s .)  Kooperation und Mitbestimmung, 
Frankfurt, 1972, pp.209-225*
"Technical change and in d u str ia l  democracy," 
in  SSRC, In d u str ia l Democracy: In tern atio n al 
views, paper given at SSRC In tern ation al 
Conference on In d u str ia l  Democracy, held at 
Churchill College, 4-8  July  1977? Coventry,
1 9 7 8 ,  p p . 6 1 - 1 0 8 .
The German Co-determination Act 1976, German 
te x t  with synoptic English t r a n s la t io n , 
Frankfurt, 197 6•
Die Entwicklung der chemischen Industrie 
Deutschlands, 19 0 8 .
Nationalsozialismus und Gewerksohaftsbewegung, 
Hannover and Frankfurt, 1958*
Am B e isp ie l der Septemberstreiks -  Anfang der 
Rekonstruktionsphase der A rb eiterk lasse ,
Koln, 1971.
Coal and C o n f l ic t : a Study of In d u str ia l  
Relations at C o l le r ie s , Liverpool, 1963*
-  228 -
H. S e id e l ,  E. K assler , 
and W• Schotenrohr
C. S e i fe r t
J . B .  Seymour 
Sh ell UK Ltd.
W. Simon 
H. Skrzypczak
M.F. Somerton
A. Sollner
G. Sprang©r
S ta t is t is c h e s
Bundesamt
L. S te ttn e r
J .  S tieh er  (ed .)
G. S to lp er , K. Hauser, 
and K. Borchardt
E .  T e s c h e r
"Mitbestimmungs- und gew erkschaftspolitische 
Schwerpunkte des Mitbestimmungsgesetzes 1976," 
Das Mitbestimmungsgespraoh, No.5 /6 , 1977? 
pp.88-93•
"Die deutsche GeWerkschaftsbewegung in der 
Weimarer Republic," in  F . Deppe et a l . ,  1977, 
o p . c i t . ,  pp.146-210.
The Whitley Councils, London, 1932.
A National Agreement between ASTMS and S h ell 
UK Ltd. and Shell Chemicals UK Ltd. for 
C le r ic a l  and Administrative and Technical 
and Supervisory S ta f fs  at th e ir  Manufacturing 
Looations, January 1976.
Union membership agreement, 1 .6 .7 7 *
Macht und Herrschaft der Unternehmerverbande 
EDI, BDA und DIHT, Koln, 1976.
"Fuhruugsprobleme der so z ia l is t is c h e n  A rb eiter-  
bewegung in der Endphase der Weimarer Republic ,"  
in Herkunft und Mandat, Frankfurt and Koln,
1976, pp.128-147.
"Productivity Bargaining and the Trade Unions," 
in B. Towers, T.G. Whittingham and A.W. 
Gottschalk. ( eds. ) . Bargaining for Change,
London, 1972.
A rb e itsre ch t, 5^L Ed ition , S tu ttg a r t ,  1976.
"Wer d ik t ie r t ? " ,  T r ier isch er  Volksfreund,
21.5*1977* “
S ta t is t i s c h e s  Jahrbuoh der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, S tu ttg art  and Mainz, various years .
"The Impact of Advanced Technology on In d u str ia l  
R elations" in B. B a rre tt ,  E . Rhodes and J .  
B?ejshon (e d s .) ,  In d u str ia l Relations and the 
Wider S o c ie ty , London, 1975? pp.163-170.
Employment Problems of Automation and Advanced 
Technology, An in tern ation al persp ective,
London, 19 6 6 .
Deutsche Wirtschaft s e i t  I 87O, Tfibingen, 1 9 6 4 *
Lohnpolitik im B etr ieb , Eine empirische 
Untersuchung in der M eta ll- ,  Chemie-, T e x t i l - , 
und Tabakindustrie, Frankfurt/New York, 1977*
-  22 9  -
A.W•J . Thomson and 
V .? .  Murray
K.E. Thurley and
A.C. Hamblin
B. Towers
Trade and Industry 
TGWU
H.E. Treu
H.A. Turner, G. Clack, 
and G. Roberts
H.-P. Ullmann
R• Undy
USDAW
H. Unterhinninghofen
C. Vamplew
Veba AG
H .J .  T e u te b e rg Geschichte der in d u str ie llen  Mitbestimmung 
in Deutschland, Tubingen, 1961.
Grievance Procedures, Farnborough, 1976.
The Supervisor and h is Jo b , London, 1963.
"The Nature and Development of Productivity 
Bargaining" in B. Towers, T.G. Whittingham 
and A.W. Gottschalk (e d s .) ,  Bargaining for  
Change, London, 1972.
"Chemicals: disruptions in f i r s t  quarter 
depress output," V o l.36, No.3, 2 0 . 7 . 19 7 9 , 
pp.148-50•
Report and Balance Sheet 1976, London, no 
d a t e ( 19 7 7 ? ) .
Gewerkschaft und B e tr ie b , mimeographed rep ort, 
University of Mfinster, In s t i tu te  of Economic 
and S o cia l Sciences, 1978*
Labour Relations in the Motor Industry: a 
Study of In d u stria l Unrest and an In tern ation al 
Comparison, London, 1967*
Per Bund der In d u str ie llen  1895-1914,
Go t  t  in  gen, 1976.
"The e le c to r a l  Influence of the Opposition 
party in the AI3EW Engineering Section I 96O- 
75?” BJIR , Vol.XVU, No.1 ,  1979, p . l 9 f f .
"Pay in Pharmaceuticals, from an IDS Study, 
March 1976.
31st Annual Report 1977 (to 32nd Annual 
Delegate Conference at Blackpool, 3 0 .4 .  -  
2 .5 .7 8 , no place (Manchester), 1978*
"Wahlen nach dem M itb estim m u n g sg esetzDas 
Mitbestimmungsgesprach, No.5/ 6 , 1977? pp.93-96.
"Automated process operators: work, a ttitu d es  
and behaviour," BJIR , V ol.XI, No.3, 1973, 
pp.415-430.
Gesohaftsbericht 1977»
-  230 -
Veba Chemie AG 
VAA
VCI
Verband der Fabrik- 
a rb e ite r  Deutsch- 
lands
P.C. Verma
E.G. Vetter
H.O. Vetter
S. V iesel
Wahlordnung fur die Wahl der Arbeitnehmer- 
v e r tr e te r  in den Aufsiohtsrat der Veba Chemie 
AG, no place ( GelsenkirchenV, 1977.
G eh altstarifv ertrag  uber die Mindest .jahres- 
bezuge fur akademisoh gebildete A ngestellte  
der chemischen Industrie in den ersten 
Berufs.jahren, no place (Koln), 1 6 .5 .78 .
M anteltarifvertrag  fur akademische gebildete 
A ngestellte  in der chemischen In d u str ie , 
Wiesbaden, 5*3*76, revised 1 6 .5 . 7 8 .
Mitbestimmung, In form ation sb latt , Koln, 1974*
Chemiewirtschaft in Zahlen, 18th Edition ,...    »i y y   ■■■ ■ * . mi   *
Dusseldorf and Koln, 1976.
Jahresbericht 1975/76, Frankfurt, 1976. -
Jahresbericht 1978/79, Frankfurt, 1979*
Seveso i s t  n icht u berall -  Chemische Industrie 
zum Buch "Seveso i s t  u b e r a l l , "  Frankfurt, 1978o
F e s ts c h r i f t  zur Erinnerung an die Grundung 
und der 40 Jahriger Kampf, no place (Kannover) ,
no date ( 1 9 3 0 ) . -------
Labour Relations and in d u str ia l  organisation 
in the B rit ish  chemical industry, unpublished 
Ph.D Thesis, University of Manchester, 19 6 6 .
"Multiple Unionism: A study of Trade Unions 
in the B r i t is h  chemical Industry ," Indian 
In d u str ia l  Relations Jou rn al, April 1972,
P P  *549-68.
"The Chemical Industry" in S.W. Lem er, J.R® 
Cable and S . Gupta (e d s .) ,  Workshop Wage 
Determination ,  Oxford, 19 6 9 ? P P *95-157*
Pokerspiel um den Lohn -  Tarifautonomie, wie 
lange noch? , S tu ttg a r t ,  1974*
"Z iele  und Aufgaben der neuen Hans-Bockler- 
S t i f tu n g ," Das Mitbestimmungsgesprach, No.
5/ 6 , 1977, p .7 9 f f .
Der A rbeitsd irektor, Aufgaben und P flio h te n , 
Koln, 1 9 7 3 .
-  231 -
W. V itt
F. Vogl
J .  Walter
R .S .  Walton and 
R .B . McKersie
M. Weaver
E. Weber and 
W. B itzer
D. Wedderburn and 
R. Crompton
M. Weiss
H. Weitbrecht 
H. Weisner
T . I .  Williams 
Winnaker/Biener 
Wirt schaft swoche
W irtschaft und 
S t a t i s t i k
G.W. Witt
"Betriebsratsw ahl 1978 tro tz  grosserer 
Schwierigkeiten ein E rfo lg  fur die IG 
Chemie-Papier-Keramik," Der B e tr ie b s r a t ,
V o l.28, No.3, 1979? p .5 5 f f .
German Business a f te r  the Economic M iracle, 
London, 1973*
"Neuer T arifvertrag  se tz t  ein Zeichen," 
Gewerkschaftliohe Umschau, 5/77? p .2 .
A Behavioural Theory of Labor N egotiations, 
New York, 1965*
"Union's 'Would you s t r ik e ? '  survey among 
managers," Daily Telegraph, 12 .12 .1978, p .6 .
A rb eitsrech ts-  und S o z ia l f ib e l , 14th Revised 
E d ition , Koln, 1977*
Workers' Attitudes and Technology -  a case 
study, Cambridge, 1972.
Gewerkschaftliohe Vertrauensleute, t a r i f -  
vertragliohe Verbesserung ih re r  Arbeit im 
B e tr ie b , Koln, 1978.
E ffek tiv it& t und Legitimit&t der T a r if -  
autonomie, B e r lin , 1969*
"Das Problem unserer Zeit -  Rationalisierung 
und Automatisierung," Gewerlcsohaftliohe 
Umschau, 3/78, pp.5“7 •
The Chemioal Industry, Wakefield, c .1953 , 
Reprinted 1972.
Grundzuge der chemischen Technik, Munchen 
and Wien, 1974*
"Auf b r e i te r  Basis gut verdient-Degussa,"
No.14? 25.3 .77? P«54*
"Der Aufstieg der BASF," No.23, 27«5*77? 
pp.38 -42 .
"Fast ein Lotteriespiel-Konjunkturprognosen," 
No.5, 1 .2 .7 8 ,  p . l 6 f f .
No.8, 1979? p .526*.
Leitende A ngestellte  und Einheitsgew erkschaft, 
Frankfurt and Koln, 1975*
-  232 -
J .  Woodward (ed .)  
J .  Woodward
WSI-Mi t1 e ilungen
In d u str ia l  Organisation; Behaviour and 
Control, Oxford, 1970.
In d u str ia l  Organisation: Theory and P r a c t ic e , 
Oxford, 1965*
Management and Technology, London, 1958.
"Branchenanalyse -  Chemische In d u str ie ,"
V ol.26, No.6, 1973, pp.209-237.
-  2 3 3  -
( i i )  G en eral B ib l io g r a p h y .
B. Aaron and 
K.W. Wedderburn
ABCC/CBI
R . J .  Adams
J .  Alberts and 
M• Traut
E. A le ff  (ed .)
G.C. Allen
G. Apel
A rbeitsring
Chemie
IC.J. Armstrong, 
B. Bowers and 
B. Burkitt
J • Backmann
A. Banks,
P.R. Bradbury and 
C.W. Suckling
C. Balfour
B. B a rre tt ,
E . Rhodes and 
J .  Bershon (ed s .)
In d u str ia l  c o n f l ic t  -  a comparative lega l 
survey, London, 1972.
Report of the Commission of Inquiry on 
In d u str ia l  and Commercial Representation, 
(Chairman Lord D evlin), London, 1972.
"The Recognition of White-Collar Unions,"
BJIR. V o l .X III ,  N o.l, 1975? p . l 0 2 f f .
"B a in ’s Theory of White-Collar Union Growth -  
A conceptual c r i t iq u e " ,  BJIR , Vol.XV, No.3, 
1977? p .3 1 7 f f .
Der Boss in Sp ieg el, Koln and Frankfurt, 1977°
Das B r i t t e  Reioh, Hannover, 1970.
B r i t i s h  Industries and th e ir  organisation ,
5th Ed ition , London, 1970.
The structure of industry in  B r i ta in , 3rd 
Ed ition , London, 1970.
Mitbestimmung, Munchen, 1969°
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz 72 , Wiesbaden, 1972.
Informat ions b r ie f  ffir Puhrungslcr&fte.
"The Measurement of Trade Union Bargaining 
Power," BJIR , Vol.XV, N o.l, 1977? p °9 1 ff .
Competition in the Chemical Industry, 
Washington D.C.^ 19 6 4 .
Research in  the Chemical Industry, Amsterdam- 
New York-London, 19 6 9 .
In d u str ia l  Relations in the Common Market, 
London, 1972.
In d u str ia l  Relations and the Wider S o c ie ty , 
London, 1975*
J .W • B a r r e t t "Change in the Chemical Industry in the 
1 9 7 0 's , "  Nature, No.234? 1971? p *5 1 5 ff .
E. Baumler 
BDA
H, Bednareck,
A• Behren&t and
D. Lange (eds*)
C. Berenson (ed*) 
J .  Bergmann (ed .)
J .  Bergmann and 
W. M uller-Jentsch
BG Chemie
K.II. Biedenhopf 
and M. Miegel
R.M. Blackburn and 
K. Pran&y
H.M. Blalock
Bonner Berichte aus 
M it te l -  und Ost- 
deustchland
A.M. Bowry
F.R . Bradbury and
B.G. Dutton
H. Brandt
B r i t is h  Productivity 
Council
Ein Jahrhundert Ghemie, Dusseldorf, 1963*
Stellungnahme des A rbeitskre ises Mitbestimmung 
gum Mitbestimmungsgesetz. Koln, 1976.
Gewerkschaftlicher Neubeginn, Dokumente 1945/46, 
no p lace , 1 9 7 5 *
-  2 3 4  -
Administration of the Chemioal E n terp rise ,
New York, 1963*
Beitrage zur Soziologie der Gewerkschaften, 
Frankfurt, 1979*
Gewerkschaften in der BRD, V ol.2, Gewerksohaft- 
l ich e  Lohnpolitik im Bewusstsein der Funktionare, 
Frankfurt, 1977•
Ja h resb erich te , 1974? 1975? 1976, no place 
(H eidelberg)•
Merkblatt uber die g e se tz lich e Unfal lversicherung, 
Bonn, 1977*
Wege aus der A rb e its lo s ig k e it , S tu ttg a r t ,  1978*
"White-Collar Unionization: a conceptual 
framework, "  B r i t is h  Journal of Sociology,
Vol.XVI, No.6, 1965, pp.111-122.
An Introduction to Socia l Research, New York, 
1970*
Die chemische Industrie in  der sow.jetisohen 
Besatzungszone, Bonn, 1952.
"The changing status of the supervisor,"
BJIR , V o l.11, No.3, 1973, pp.393-414*
Chemical Industry; Socia l and Economic Aspects, 
London, 1972.
"F o r ts c h r i t t  fur die Angestellten durch eigene 
K r a f t , "  paper to 11th DAG Bundeskongress,
14 .10 .1975 .
Report: The Chemioal Industry in Western 
Germany, London, 1963*
-  235  -
A. Brock, W. Hindrichs, 
R. Hoffmann, W. Pohler 
and 0 • Stmd •
R.K. Brown
W. Brown, R. Ebsworth 
and M. Terry
N .IC • Buxt on and 
I ) . I .  MacKay
G.A. Campbell and 
R• Brora
Chemical Age
Chemical Industry 
Handbook
Chemicals EDC
Chemische Industrie
Chemistry and 
Industry
Der Konflikt urn Leistung und Lohn, Revised 
Edition , no p lace , 1975*
"From Donovan to where? In terp reta tion s of 
in d u str ia l  re la t io n s  in B r ita in  since 1968," 
B r i t i s h  Journal of Sociology, V ol.29, No.4>
1978, pp.439-461.
"Factors shaping shop-steward organisation in 
B r i t a in , "  BJIR, Vol.XVI, No.2, 1978, pp.139-174*
B r i t is h  Employment S t a t i s t i c s :  a guide to 
sources and methods, Oxford, 1977*
How to  find out about the chemical industry, 
Oxford, 19 6 9 .
"Chemical Age Survey 68 -  Labour Relations in 
the W. German Chemical Industry ," May 25, 1968.
London, 1975*
Economic Assessment to 1972, London, 1970*
F inancia l Results of UK Chemical Companies 
1971/2 -  1974/5. London, 1976.
Focus on Pharmaceuticals, London, 1972•
Imports of Chemicals, London, 1966.
In d u str ia l  Review to  1977. London, 1973*
Innovative a c t iv i t y  in  the pharmaceutical 
industry, London, 1973*
The p la s t ic s  indus t r y and i t s  prospects, 
London, 1972.
"Welche Faktoren beeinflussen die Zukunft der 
Chemie," Vol.XXVIII, 1976, p .6 2 7 f f .
Chemical Industries 
Association
Lost Time and Accident S t a t i s t i c s  1976, 
(Chemical Industry Safety  and Health Council), 
London, 1977*
-  236 -
T. Clarke and 
L. Clements (ed s .)
C.W.Clegg, N.Nicholson,
G. U rse ll ,  P.R.Blyton 
and T.D. Wall
H.A. Clegg
A.W.J. Craig
BAG
R. Dahrendorf
Daily Tele,graph 
IC. Dammann
W. Daubler
G. Degen
Chemicals' 77, A d irectory  of chemicals on 
the UK market, London, no date.
Trade Unions under Capitalism , Glasgow, 1977 *
"Managers1 a tt itu d es towards in d u str ia l  
democracy," In d u stria l Relations Journal,
V o l.9, Mo.3, 1978, pp.4-17*
"Pluralism in In d u str ia l  R e la t io n s ,"  BJIR ,
V o l .X I I I ,  No.3, 1975? p .3 0 9 f f .
"Employers1 A ssociations: Should they be 
ab o lish ed ?,"  Federation News, February 19 6 4 ? 
pp.N14-Nl8.
Trade Unionism trnder C o llectiv e  Bargaining, 
Oxford, 1976.
"A Framework for the analysis of In d u str ia l  
Relations Systems." Paper to In tern ation al 
In d u str ia l  Relations Association Third World 
Congress, London, 1973*
Satzung, beschlossen 11. Bundeskongress, 1975*
"Thesen zur p o lit isch en  Bildung," 
S c h r if te n re ih e , 9/73 , Hamburg.
"W irtsch aftsp o lit ik  ohne'Dogma,"
S ch r if te n re ih e , 15/76, Hamburg.
S t r e i k f i b e l , Hamburg, 1974/75*
Wir uber uns, Hamburg, 1975*
Das Mitbestimmungsproblem in der deutschen 
Sozialforschung, 2nd Edition , Munchen, 1 9 6 5 ®
"Chemical workers demand no lim it  to pro­
d u ctiv ity  pay," 31 .1 .78*
T arifv ertrag  und Arbeitskampf, Rechtliche 
Rahmenbedingungen aktiver Lohnpolitik, Koln, 
1977*
Das Grundrecht auf Mitbestimmung, Frankfurt,
1975*
Shop Stewards: Ihre zentrale Bedeutung fur 
die Gewerkschaftsbewegung in Grossbritannien, 
Frankfurt and Koln, 1976.
-  237 -
F .  Deppe
DGB
D ep artm en t o f  Employment
R . Done
E .G .  D r e t t a k i s
J . T .  Dunlop 
Econom ist
C. Edwards
European Chem ical News.
European I n d u s t r i a l  
R e l a t i o n s  Review
E n g in e e r in g  E m p lo y e rs • 
F e d e r a t io n
E rd o lch em ie  AG
A. F i s c h e r
M.P. F o g a r ty
A. Fox
J  • Gennard and 
A • Lasko
J . Gennard and 
M.D. S t e u e r
G ew erkschaft  V i c t o r  
Chemie
G a z e t te
Das B e w u s s ts e in  d er  A r b e i t e r , K o ln ,  1 9 7 1 .  
G e w e r k s c h a f t l ic h e  M on atsh e 'fte . 
M itbestim m ungsgespr& oh.
V o rsc h la g e  des DGB zur W ie d e r h e r s te l lu n g  d er  
V o l lb e s c h a f t s g u n g , D u s s e ld o r f ,  1977*
B r i t i s h  F a c t o r y / J a p a n e s e  F a c t o r y , London, 1 973*
"The employment o f  m igran t w orkers  i n  W. Germany 
1 9 6 1 - 7 2 , "  A p p lied  E co n o m ics , V o l . 8 ,  N o . l ,  1 9 7 6 .
I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s  S y s te m s , New Y ork , 1 9 5 8 .
"M easu rin g  Union Pow er: A com parison o f  two 
methods a p p l ie d  t o  th e  s tu d y  o f  l o c a l  union 
power in  th e  c o a l  i n d u s t r y , "  B J I R , V o l .X V I ,  
N o . l ,  1 9 7 8 ,  p . I f f .
EEF N a t io n a l  Study C o n feren ce  (Chairman S i r  
G e o ff r e y  Hawkins) ,  v e rb a t im  r e p o r t ,  2 7 . 2 . 1 9 7 9 .
A us- und w e i t e r b i ld u n g , K o ln ,  no d a t e .
"S p re c h e ra u s s c h f is s e  in  d er  chem ischen I n d u s t r i e , "  
Der B e t r i e b , N o.4 3 ,  1973? p . 2 1 4 1 f f .
"The P la c e  o f  Managers in  I n d u s t r i a l  D em ocracy*" 
B J I R , V o l .X IV ,  N o .2 ,  1 9 7 6 ,  p . H 2 f f .
" C o l l e c t i v e  B a r g a in in g ,  F la n d e r s  and th e  
W ebb s,"  B J I R , V o l . X I I I ,  N o .2 ,  1975? p . l 5 1 f f .
"The I n d iv id u a l  and th e  s t r i k e , "  B J I R , V o l .
X I I I ,  N o .3 ,  1975? p . 3 4 6 f f .
"The I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s  o f  f o r e i g n  owned 
S u b s id u a r ie s  in  th e  U n ited  K in g d o n ,"  B J I R ,
V o l . I X ,  N o . l ,  1971? p p .1 4 3 - 1 5 9 .
" 5 0  J a h r e  G ew erkschaft V i c t o r  Chemie Werk 
C a s t r o p - R a u z e l , "  P r e s s e k o n f e r e n z , 9 * 3 * 7 7  •
J . F . B .  Goodman and 
J .  K r i s l o v
D. Grawes ( e d . )
D .W .F . H ardie and 
J .  D avidson P r a t t
H. Hartmann
P .  Hartmann
R •I . Hawke sw orth 
S • Hays
F .A ,  H en gle in  
S .  H ergt
S .  H i l l
H oechst AG 
V. Hopp
J  • Hughes and
H. P o l l i n s
L .C .  Hunter
L .C .  H u nter ,
G .L . R e id  and
D. Boddy
" C o n c i l i a t i o n  i n  I n d u s t r i a l  D is p u te s  in  G reat 
B r i t a i n :  A su rv ey  o f  a t t i t u d e s  o f  th e  p a r t i e s ,  
B J I R ,  V o l . X I I ,  N o .3 ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p . 3 2 7 f f .
Management R e s e a r c h :  A c r o s s  c u l t u r a l  p e r ­
s p e c t i v e  , Amsterdam, 1973*
A H is t o r y  o f  th e  Modern B r i t i s h  Chem ical 
I n d u s t r y , O xford , 1 9 6 6 .
"M a n a g e r ia l  Employees -  new p a r t i c i p a n t s  in  
i n d u s t r i a l  r e l a t i o n s , "  B J I R , V o l . X I I ,  1 9 7 4 ,  
p . 2 6 8 f f .
" C o - d e te r m in a t io n :  Today and Tomorrow,"
B J I R , V o l . X I I I ,  N o . l ,  1975, p .5 4 f f .
" I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s  in  t h e  News M e d ia ,"  
I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s  J o u r n a l , V o l . 6 ,  N o.4 , 
1 9 7 5 ,  p p .4 - 1 8 .
" F r in g e  b e n e f i t s  in  B r i t i s h  i n d u s t r y ,  B J I R , 
V o l.X V , N o .3 ,  1 9 7 7 ,  p . l 3 9 6 f f .  ~
The C hem ical and A l l i e d  I n d u s t r i e s , London, 
1 9 7 3 .
C hem ical T ech n o lo g y , O xford , 1 9 6 9 .
M itbestim m ung, 35 M odelle  und Meinungen zu 
einem g e s e l l s c h a f t s p o l i t i s c h e n  P rob lem ,
Opladen, 1974*
"Norms, groups and pow er: th e  s o c io lo g y  o f  
w orkplace  i n d u s t r i a l  r e l a t i o n s , "  B J I R ,
V o l . X I I ,  N o .2 ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p . 2 1 3 f f .
M onatslohn Werk H o e c h s t ,  B e t r i e b s v e r e in b a r u n g , 
F r a n k f u r t ,  15 . 3 . 7  4 ‘*
" B e t r i e b l i c h e  W e ite rb i ld u n g  -  E in e  D i e n s t -  
l e i s t u n g  f u r  d ie  G e m e in s c h a ft , "  mimeographed 
r e p o r t  f o r  H oechst AG.
Trade Unions in  G reat B r i t a i n , Newton A b b o t,  
1 9 7 3 .
"Economic I s s u e s  in  C o n c i l i a t i o n  and A r b i ­
t r a t i o n , "  B J I R , V o l.X V , N o .2 ,  1 9 7 7 ,  p . 2 2 6 f f .
Labour Problem s o f  T e c h n o lo g ic a l  Change, 
London, 1970*
-  239 -
R . Hyman
IDS R e p o r t . 
IG Chemie
IG M e t a l l
I n d u s t r i a l  and 
Commercial T r a in in g
I n s t i t u t  f u r  M a rx is t  
i s c h e  S tu d ie n  und 
Forsch u n g en  ( e d s . )
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Labour 
Review
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
P u b l i c a t i o n  S e r v i c e s
F .  J a c o b i  ( e d . )
0 .  J a c o b i ,
W. M u l l e r - J e n t s c h  
and E .  Sohmidt ( e d s . )
E .  J a c o b s
Jap an  Ammonium 
S u lp h a te  In d u s t r y  
A s s o c i a t i o n
" P l u r a l i s m ,  P r o c e d u r a l  con cen su s  and 
c o l l e c t i v e  b a r g a i n i n g , "  B J I R , V o l .X V I ,
No. 1 ,  1 9 7 8 ,  p . l 6 f f .
I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s :  a M a rx is t  I n t r o d u c t i o n , 
London, 1975*
Der B e t r i e b s r a t .
D ie  E i n s t e l l u n g  d er  A rb e itn eh m er zur M it­
bestimmung i n  G r o s s b e t r ie b e n  des o r g a n i s a t i o n s -  
b e r e i c h s  d e r  IG C h e m ie -P a p ie r -K e ra m ik , P a r t  I I ,  
T a b l e s ,  Hannover, 19 6 6 ,
G e w e rk s c h a f t l io h e  Umschau.
G e w e r k s c h a f ts p o s t♦
P r e s s e d i e n s t .
"Textsammlung zur M itbestim m ung," '
S c h r i f t e n r e i h e , N o .6 1 ,  2nd E d i t i o n ,  1975*
"w orker  p a r t i c i p a t i o n :  a  p r o g r e s s  r e p o r t ;  th e  
l a t e s t  p o s i t i o n  in  West Germany," November 
1 9 7 6 ,  p p .4 4 2 - 4 4 9 *
I n f o r m a t i o n s b e r i c h t  N r .7  u b e r  d ie  S t r e i k s  in  
d e r  chem ischen I n d u s t r i e  im J u n i / J u l i  1971 
i n  e in i g e n  Z en tren  d e r  T arifb ew eg u n g  in  Hessen 
und R h e in la n d , F r a n k f u r t , no d a t e •
Mitbestimmung;" a l s  K am pfaufgabe, K o ln ,  1 9 7 2 .
" C o l l e c t i v e  Agreements i n  th e  Chemioal I n d u s t r y , "  
1 4 . 4 . 1 9 5 6 ,  p p .3 7 7 - 4 0 2 .
C hem ical In d u s t r y  D i r e c t o r y  and Who’ s Who 1 9 7 5 , 
London, 1975*
B e i t r a g e  zur hundert . ja h r ig en  F ir m e n g e s c h ic h te  
d e r  B ayer  AG, L ev erk u sen , 1 9 6 4 *
G ew erkschaften  und K la sse n k a m p f, K r i t i s c h e s  
Ja h r b u c h , 1 9 7 2 ,  1974? 1975? F r a n k f u r t ,  v a r io u s  
y e a r s •
European Trade U nionism , London, 1 9 7 3 .
Im pact o f  T e c h n o lo g ic a l  Change on Labor in  
Chem ical I n d u s t r y , T o k io ,  1 9 6 6 .
-  24 0  -
G. J e n k in s  and 
J . R .  M ortim er
W. K e n d a ll
C. K e rr  and
A . S i e g e l
W. K is t a u
H. K lu th  
K . Koch
E .  Kogon 
R . K on ig  ( e d . )
K o ln e r  Z e i t s c h r i f t  
f u r  S o z i o l o g i e  und 
S o z ia l p s y c h o lo g ie
P .  Krug
W. L e ch e r  and 
U .S ie l in g -W e n d e l in g
R . Lewi s
R .B .  M cKersie and 
L .C .  Hunter
The k in d  o f  laws th e  u n ion s  ought t o  w ant, 
O xfo rd , 1 9 6 8 .
The Labour Movement in  E u ro p e , London, 1975*
"The I n t e r - I n d u s t r y  P r o p e n s i t y  t o  S t r i k e , "  
in  A. ICornhauser, R .  Duben and A.M. Ross 
( e d s . )  I n d u s t r i a l  C o n f l i c t , New Y o rk , 1 9 5 4 ,  
p . l 8 9 f f .
B e t r i e b s r a t s w a h l e n ,  H inw eisen und E r l& u te ru n g  
BetrVG 7 2 , DAG, Hamburg, no d a te *
S o z i o l o g i e  d er  G r o s s b e t r i e b e , 3rd R ev ise d  
E d i t i o n ,  S t u t t g a r t ,  1975*
An e m p i r i c a l  s tu d y o f  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een 
w orker r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  t r a d e  union r e p r e s e n t a ­
t i v e s  and t h e i r  c o n s t i t u e n t s  w ith in  th e  fram e­
work o f  th e  works c o u n c i l  in  West Germany, 
u n p u b lish e d  M-VA• d i s s e r t a t i o n ,  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  
Warwick, 1974*
D ie Stun.de d er  I n g e n ie u r e .  T e ch n o lo g iso h e  
I n t e l l i g e n z  und P o l i t i k , D u s s e ld o r f ,  1 9 7 6 .
Beobachtu ng raid Exp erim ent in  d er  S o z i a l -  
fo r s c h u n g , K o ln ,  c . 1 9 5 6 , 1975*
Das I n t e r v i e w :  Formen, T e c h n ik ,  A usw ertung,
1 0 th  E d i t i o n ,  K o ln ,  1 9 7 6 .
" I d e o l o g i s c h e  Fu n k tion en  dem oslcopischer 
E rh ebu ngen : K r i t i s c h e  Bewerkungen zur Umfrage 
d e r  E M N I D -I n s t i t u te , "  V o l . 2 0 ,  March 1 9 6 8 ,  
p p .5 2 -77•
" G e w e r k s o h a f t s s ta a t  oder U n te rn e h m e rs ta a t , "
D ie  Neue G e s e l l s c h a f t , H / 7 6 , p p .9 2 1 - 5 *
"New Developm ents in  th e  d i s c u s s io n  o f  Co­
d e te r m in a t io n  in  E u r o p e ,"  Labour and S o c i e t y , 
V o l . 4? N o . l ,  1979? p p .8 0 - 9 9 .
"The l e g a l  e n f o r c e a b i l i t y  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  
a g r e e m e n ts , "  B J I R , V o l . V I I I ,  N o .3 ,  1970? 
p p .3 1 3 - 3 3 3 .
P ay , p r o d u c t i v i t y  and c o l l e c t i v e  b a r g a i n i n g , 
London, 1973*
The L ab o r R e la t io n s  in  th e  i n t e g r a t e d  c h e m ic a l
in d u s t r y  o f  J a p a n , no p l a c e ,  1 9 6 1 .
-  2 4 1  -
Management Today
R . Marsh and 
M. P e d le r
M. M aurice
M. M aurice  and
F .  S e l l i e r
Je a n  M i l l e r  
John  M i l l e r
S .  M i l l i g a n
J . E .  M ortim er 
(Chairm an)
T . N ic h o ls  and 
P .  A rm strong
W .A .T. N ic h o ls  and
D .H. Beynon
M. N ic h o ls o n  
N .C . N ipperdey
H .R . N orthrup and 
R . L .  Rowan
S . M a lle t "A m erik an isch e  A r b e i t e r  in  d e r  G iron d e: M e
’ C a l t e x 1 R a - f f in e r ie  i n  Ambes," i n  F .  F u r s te n ­
b e r g  ( e d . ) ,  I n d u s t r i e s o z i o l o g i e _I I I , I n d u s t r i e  
und G e s e l l s c h a f t , Neuwied and B e r l i n ,  1975? 
p p .4 9 - 7 0 .
" U n io n is in g  W h i te -C o l la r  w o r k e r s , "  Employee 
R e l a t i o n s , V o l . l ,  N o .2 ,  1979? p . 2 f f .
S h i f t  work -  Economic a d v an tag es  and s o c i a l  
c o s t s , Geneva, 1975*
" S o c i e t a l  A n a ly s is  o f  I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s :
A com parison "between F ra n ce  and West Germany," 
B J I R , V o l .X V I I ,  N o .3 ,  1979? p . 3 3 2 f f .
B r i t i s h  management v e rs u s  German management:
A com parison o f  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  
in  West German and UK F a c t o r i e s , Farn boro u gh ,
1979*
"A p o s i t i v e  employment programme f o r  I C I , "
TGWU, London, 1 9 7 1 .
"R e ce n t  Trade Union D ev e lo p m en ts ,"  European 
Chem ical News.
The New B a r o n s , London, 1 9 7 6 .
ACAS Annual R ep ort 1 9 7 7 * London, 1978*
S a f e t y  or P r o f i t ?  , I n d u s t r i a l  A c c id e n ts  and 
th e  C o n v e n tio n a l  Wisdom, B r i s t o l ,  1 9 7 3 .
B eh av io u r  and A t t i t u d e s  o f  Workers and Managers 
in  a P r o c e s s  P l a n t , SSRC, HR 1295*
"The R o le  o f  Shop S te w a rd s :  An e m p ir i c a l  c a s e  
s t u d y , "  I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s  J o u r n a l , V o l . 7 ,  
1 9 7 6 ,  p p .1 5 - 2 6 .
"The developm ent o f  la b o u r  law in  th e  F e d e r a l  
R e p u b l ic  o f  Germany," I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Labour 
R ev iew , V ol.LX X , N o . l ,  1954? P P * 2 6 -4 3  and 
N o .2 ,  1 9 5 4 ,  p p .1 4 8 - 1 6 7 .
"The IGF -  IFPCW D i s p u t e , "  Columbia J o u r n a l  
o f  World B u s i n e s s , V o l . I X ,  W in ter  1974? 
p p .109-119•
-  242  -
G. Palm er
A , 0 • Papandreaiu 
N .F .  P a t t e r s o n
M. P e d le r
P e r s o n n e l  Management
R .B .  P e te r s o n  and 
L .N. T ra cy
H® P o p i t z ,  H. B a h rd t ,
E .  J u r e s  and H .K e s t in g
E * P o t t h o f f ,  0 . Blume, 
and H, D u v e rn e l l
F . L .  P ry o r
H, Ramsey 
A .K . R ic e
A. R ic h  
K. R ie k e r
B .C .  R o b e r ts
" M u l t i n a t i o n a l  C o l l e c t i v e  B a r g a in in g  A c t i v i t y :  
The F a c t u a l  R ecord  in  C h e m ic a ls ,  G lass  and 
Rubber T i r e s , "  P a r t  I ,  Columbia J o u r n a l  o f  
World B u s i n e s s , V o l . I X ,  S p r in g  1974? p p . 1 1 2 - 2 4  
and P a r t  I I ,  I b i d . , Summer 1974? PP * 4 9 - 6 3 .
" I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s  in  th e  N ew s," B J I R ,
V o l .X V I ,  No. 1 ,  1 9 7 8 ,  p . l l 9 f f *
P a t e r n a l i s t i c  C a p i t a l i s m , M in n e a p o l is ,  1 972*
" S a f e t y  i n  c h e m i c a l s :  The work o f  th e  B r i t i s h  
C hem ical In d u s t r y  S a f e t y  C o u n c i l , "  B r i t i s h  
J o u r n a l  o f  I n d u s t r i a l  S a f e t y , V o l . 6 ,  N o .6 8 ,  
1 9 6 4 ,  p p .1 7 7 -1 8 4 *
"Shop s tew ard s  as  l e a d e r s , "  I n d u s t r i a l  Re­
l a t i o n s  J o u r n a l , V o l . 4 ? 1 9 7 3 ,  p p .4 3 - 6 0 .
"A B e h a v io u r a l  model o f  problem  s o l v i n g  in  
la b o u r  n e g o t i a t i o n s , "  B J I R , V o l .X IV ,  N o .2 ,  
1 9 7 6 ,  p p . l 5 9 f f .
Das G e s e l l s c h a f t s b i l d  des A r b e i t e r s .  T u b in g en , 
1961.
Z w isch e n b ila n z  d er  M itbestim m ung, T u b in g en , 
7L962 .
"An i n t e r n a t i o n a l  com parison o f  c o n c e n t r a t io n  
r a t i o s , "  Review o f  Econom ics and S t a t i s t i c s , 
May 1 9 7 2 ,  pp. 1 3 0 - 1 4 0 .
"The s i z e  o f  p ro d u c t io n  e s t a b l i s h m e n t s  in  
m a n u fa c tu r in g ,"  Economic J o u r n a l , June 1 9 7 2 ,  
p p .5 4 7 - 5 6 6 .
" P a r t i c i p a t i o n  -  th e  s h o p f lo o r  v iew , B J I R ,
V o l .X IV ,  N o .2 ,  1 9 7 6 ,  p . l 2 8 f f .
The E n t e r p r i s e  and th e  E n v iro n m e n t, London, 
1 9 6 3 .
M itbestimmung i n  d er  I n d u s t r i e , Z i ir ic h ,  1 9 73*  
I n d u s t r i e l a n d  B u n d e s r e o u b l ik , K o ln ,  1 9 7 2 .
" M u l t i n a t i o n a l  C o l l e c t i v e  B a r g a in in g :  A 
European P r o s p e c t ? , "  B J I R , V o l .X I ,  N o . l ,  
1 9 7 3 ,  pp.
-  243  -
I . C .  R o b e r ts
L. R o sen b erg
R oy al Commission on 
Trade Unions and 
E m p lo y e rs '  A s s o c i a t i o n s
1 9 6 5 - 6 ; (Chairman 
Lord Donovan)
P .  S a d le r
G. Schaub
E .  Schmidt
W.H. S c o t t ,
J . A • B an k s ,
A.H. H alsey  and
C. Lupton
H. S e i d e l
A . Sen
J .  Sho rey
J .  S i I v e y
"The Works C o n s t i t u t i o n  A c ts  and I n d u s t r i a l  
R e l a t i o n s  in  West Germany: i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  
th e  U n ited  Kingdom ," B J I R , V o l .X I ,  N o .3 ,
1 9 7 3 ,  p p .3 3 8 - 3 6 7 .
The C o -d e te rm in a t io n  R ig h t s  o f  Workers in  
Germany, 2nd E d i t i o n ,  K o ln ,  1 9 6 2 .
R e p o r t , Cmnd. 3623? London, 1 9 6 8 .
R e s e a r c h  P ap er 1 , "The R o le  o f  Shop Stew ards 
i n  B r i t i s h  I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s , "  London,
1967.
R e s e a r c h  P ap er 2 ( P a r t  l ) , "D is p u te s  P r o -  . 
c e d u re s  in  B r i t i s h  I n d u s t r y , "  London, 1 9 6 6 .
R e s e a r c h  P aper 3 . " I n d u s t r i a l  S o c io lo g y  and 
I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s , "  London, 1 9 6 6 .
R e s e a r c h  P ap er 7 ? "E m p lo y e rs '  A s s o c i a t i o n s , "  
London, 1 9 6 7 •
S o c i a l  R e s e a rc h  on A u to m ation , London, 1 9 6 8 . 
A r b e i t s r e c h ts h a n d b u c h , 2nd E d i t i o n ,  Munchen,
1 9 7 5 .
O rdnungsfalctor oder Gegenmacht -  d ie  p o l i t i s c h e  
R o l l e  d er  G ew e rk sc h a fte n , F r a n k f u r t ,  1 9 71*
T e c h n ic a l  change and I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s ,  
L iv e r p o o l  U n i v e r s i t y ,  1 9 5 6 .
Mitbestim mung i n  d er  S i c h t  d e r  G ew erkschaften  
und A rb e itn e h m e r , Hannover, 1 9 7 0 .
Das V e r h a l t n i s  der A n g e s t e l l t e n  zur M it— 
bestim m ung, F r a n k f u r t ,  1 9 7 2 .
D ie  W il le n s b i ld u n g  d e r  m itb estim m ten  Montan- 
Unternehmen, K o ln ,  1963*
Employment, Technology and D evelopm ent,O x f o r d ,
1 9 7 5 .
"Time S e r i e s  A n a ly s is  o f  S t r i k e  F r e q u e n c y ,"  
B J I R , V o l.X V , N o . l ,  1977? p . 6 3 f f -
D e c ip h e r in g  D a ta , London, 1 9 7 5 *
-  2 4 4  -
R . S k ib a  and 
H. Adam
R . Sonnemann
A. Sorge
0 .  S t e i n e r t  and 
W. R o g g e rs d o r f
W, S t r e e c h ,
E .  Treu  
and H• B ayer
Das West D eutsche Lohnniveau zw ischen den 
b e id e n  W e ltk r ie g e n  und nach  d er  W hhrungsreform . 
K oln ,'  1 9 7 4 .
"D er ’V e re in  zur Wahrung d e r  I n t e r e s s e n  d e r  
chem isch en I n d u s t r i e  D e u tsc h la n d s  ’ -  Grund- 
u n g su rsa c h e n , Z i e l e  und Kampfmethode, "  
W is s e n s c h a f t l io h e  Z e i t s c h r i f t  d er  F r i e d r i c h -  
S c h i l l e r - U n i v e r s i t a t  J e n a ,  G e s e l l s c h a f t s -  
und S p r a o h w is s e n s c h a f t l i c h e  R e i h e , V o l .4 ,
1 9 6 5 ,  p p .2 7 5 - 2 7 7 .
"The E v o lu t io n  o f  I n d u s t r i a l  Democracy in  th e  
C o u n tr ie s  o f  th e  European Community," B J I R ,  
V o l .X IV ,  N o .3 ,  1 9 7 6 ,  p p .2 7 4 - 2 9 4 .
Im R e ic h e  d e r  Chemie -  100 J a h r e  BASF, 
D u s s e ld o r f ,  1 9 6 5 .
O r g a n i s a t i o n s s t r u k t u r e l l e  W andlungsprozesse 
im Westd-eutsohen G ew erkschaften  1 9 6 0 - 1 9 7 5 ? 
mimeographed r e p o r t ,  B e r l i n  and M u nster ,
1 9 7 8 .
S tu d ie s  in  P e t r o c h e m i c a l s , P r e s e n te d  a t  th e  U n ited  N a tio n s  I n t e r ­
r e g i o n a l  C o n feren ce  on th e  Development o f  th e  P e tr o c h e m ic a l  I n d u s t r i e s  
in  D e v e lo p in g  c o u n t r i e s ,  T eh ran , I r a n ,  1 6 -3 0  Nov. 1 9 6 4 ? 2 volum es,
New Y o rk , 19 6 6 .
A. S tu rm th a l  ( e d . )
T .  S u l l i v a n
A. S z a k a ts
J .  T e i r e  and 
D. Varney
K .G . Tempel 
M• T e rry
W h i t e - C o l l a r  Trade U n io n s , U rbana, I l l i n o i s ,  
1968.
I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s  in  West Germany, O c c a s io n a l  
P aper N o .2 ,  I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s  U n i t ,  Uni­
v e r s i t y  o f  Nottingham  A dult E d u c a t io n  D e p a r t­
m ent, N ottingham , 1 9 7 6 .
"W o rk er ’ s P a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  M anagement,"
J o u r n a l  o f  I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s , V o l .X V I ,
M arch, 1974? p p .2 9 - 4 4 *
" S o c i a l  Value and T e c h n o lo g ic a l  c h a n g e ,"  
Management D e c i s i o n , Summer 1971? p p .1 7 9 - 1 8 8 .
t t
P a r t e i e n  und Verbande in  d e r  p l u r a l i s t i s c h e n  
G e s e l l s c h a f t  d er  B u n d e s re p u b lik , B e r l i n ,  1979*
"The I n e v i t a b l e  Growth o f  I n f o r m a l i t y , "  B J I R , 
V o l.X V , No. 1 ,  1 9 7 7 ,  p . 7 6 f f .
TGWU The S t o r y  o f  th e  TGWU (Amalgamated) ,  R e v ise d  
E d i t i o n ,  London, 1977*
Trade and I n d u s t r y .
UN Economic Commission 
f o r  Europe
USDAW •
VAA
R . Thompson ( e d . )
P .O . Verma
F .  V ilm ar ( e d . )
H . J .  V o llm er
-  245  “
The modern I n o r g a n ic  C h em icals  I n d u s t r y ,
London, 1 9 7 7 *
C hem ical I n d u s t r y , 2 volumes-, New Y ork , 1973*
C hem ical In d u s t r y  R ep ort ( t o  2 6 th  USDAW 
N a t io n a l  Trade C o n feren ce  f o r  th e  C hem ical 
I n d u s t r i e s ) ,  Y ork , 1 8 . 9 . 7 7 *
2 9 th  Annual R ep ort  1975 ( t o  3 0 th  Annual 
D e le g a te  C o n fe r e n c e ) ,  B la c k p o o l  1 9 7 6 .
3 0 th  Annual R ep ort 1976 ( t o  3 1 s t  Annual 
D e le g a te  C o n feren ce  Scarb o rou g h  1 9 7 7 .
Aufgaben und Z i e l e , K o ln ,  1975*
C hem ieberu fe -  e in e  V orausschau  zum S t e l l e n -  
markt 1 9 7 7 - 1 9 8 5 ," K o ln ,  1 9 7 7 .
L e i t f a d e n  f u r  den A bsoh lu ss  von D i e n s t -  
v e r t r a g e n  f u r  F u h ru n g s k ra f te  in  d er  chem ischen 
I n d u s t r i e , K o ln ,  1 9 7 § .
S a tz u n g e n , K o ln ,  1 9 7 2 .
" T e c h n o l o g ic a l  Change in  B r i t i s h  Chem ical 
I n d u s t r y , "  Chem ical Age o f  I n d i a , S e p t .  1 9 7 1 ,
p p .6 1 7 - 6 2 1 .
" I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s  in  B r i t i s h  C hem ical 
I n d u s t r y :  A c a s e  s t u d y , "  In d ia n  I n d u s t r i a l  
R e l a t i o n s  J o u r n a l , V o l . 8 ,  N o . l ,  1 9 7 2 ,
67-81.
" C o l l e c t i v e  B a r g a in in g  in  th e  B r i t i s h  Chem ical 
I n d u s t r y :  A c a s e  s t u d y , "  In d ia n  I n d u s t r i a l  
R e l a t i o n s  J o u r n a l , V o l . 8 ,  N o .3 ,  1 9 7 3 ,  
p p .5 1 3 - 5 2 6 .
" T r a i n i n g ,  Redundancy and P r o d u c t i v i t y :  a  c a s e  
s tu d y  o f  th e  Chem ical In d u s t r y  i n  B r i t a i n , "  
Manpower J o u r n a l , Ja n .-M a r c h  1 9 7 2 ,  p p .2 3 - 4 2 .
I n d u s t r i e l l e  D em okratie  in  W esteu ro o a , Hamburg,
1975*
" I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s  in  West Germany," Works 
Management, A p r i l  1 9 7 3 ,  p p .9 - 1 4 *
-  246  -
P . Warr 
A. Warren
A .R . Weber
M. Weber
J .  Wei,
T .W .F . R u s s e l  and 
M.W. Schw artz la n d e r
M.G. W i ld e s ' and 
S . R .  P a rk e r
R ♦J .  W il le y
H.A. W inkler ( e d . )
W ir t s c h a f t  und S t a t i s t i k .
W ir ts o h a f t s w o c h e .
Wood, Wagner,
A rm strong 
Goodman and 
D avis
"The c h a l le n g e  from b elow : An a n a l y s i s  o f  
the  R o le  o f  th e  Shop S t  exward in  I n d u s t r i a l  
R e l a t i o n s , "  I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s  J o u r n a l , 
V o l . l ,  1 9 7 1 ,  p p .5 2 - 6 0 ,
" 'C o m p e t i t iv e '  Unionism in  th e  Chem ical 
I n d u s t r y , "  I n d u s t r i a l  and Labor R e l a t i o n s  
R ev iew , Vo 1 . X I I I ,  1959? p p .1 6 - 3 5 .
"Union -  Management Power R e l a t i o n s  in  th e  
C hem ical In d u s t r y :  The Economic S e t t i n g , "  
Labor Law J o u r n a l , V o l . I X ,  Septem ber 19 5 8 ,
p p . 664- 8 .
The P r o t e s t a n t  F t h i c  and th e  S p i r i t  o f  
C a p i t a l i s m ,  t r a n s l a t e r  by T . P a r s o n s ,
1 2 th  Im p re s s io n , London, 1974*
The S t r u c t u r e  o f  th e  C hem ical P r o c e s s in g  
I n d u s t r i e s :  F u n c t io n  and E co n o m ics ,
New Y ork , 1979*
"Changes in  Workplace I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s
1 9 6 6 - 7 2 , "  B J I R , V o l . X I I I ,  N o . l ,  1975? 
p . l 4 f f .
"Trade Unions and P o l i t i c a l  P a r t i e s  i n  th e  
F e d e r a l  R e p u b lic  o f  Germ any," I n d u s t r i a l  
and Labour R e l a t i o n s  R ev iew , O c to b e r  1975? 
p p .3 8 - 5 9 .
O r g a n i s i e r t e r  K a p i t a l i s m u s , V o rau ssetzu n gen  
und Anf ffnge , G fit t in g e n ,'  1974*
P sy ch o lo g y  and C o l l e c t i v e  B a r g a in in g , London.
"The ' I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s  S y s te m ' co n ce p t  
as a b a s i s  f o r  th e  th e o r y  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  
r e l a t i o n s , "  B J I R , V o l . X I I I ,  N o .3 ,  1975? 
p , 2 9 1 f f »
t) , E . Wray "M arg in a l Men o f  I n d u s t r y :  th e  F o rem an ,"  
American J o u r n a l  o f  S o c i o l o g y , V o l .L I V .  
1949? p p .2 9 8 - 3 0 1 .
